Wichser, Schweine, Arschlöcher, Lügner, Dreck, Säue.

13. August 2024

Selen­skyj: Ope­ra­ti­on bei Kursk Sicherheitsmaßnahme
Der ukrai­ni­sche Prä­si­dent Wolo­dym­yr Selen­skyj hat die Offen­si­ve sei­ner Trup­pen über die Gren­zen hin­weg in die west­rus­si­sche Regi­on Kursk als Sicher­heits­maß­nah­me bezeich­net. Die bis­her erober­ten Gebie­te dort sei­en Regio­nen, aus denen Russ­lands Streit­kräf­te die ost­ukrai­ni­sche Regi­on Sumy wie­der­holt ange­grif­fen hät­ten. Allein seit Anfang Juni sei­en dort rund 2.100 Angrif­fe regis­triert worden.

Des­halb sind unse­re Ope­ra­tio­nen eine rei­ne Sicher­heits­fra­ge für die Ukrai­ne, um die Gren­ze vom rus­si­schen Mili­tär zu befrei­en”, sag­te Selen­skyj in sei­ner all­abend­li­chen Video­an­spra­che. Kursk wer­de zum Sym­bol vom Anfang und Ende des rus­si­schen Prä­si­den­ten Wla­di­mir Putin, sag­te Selen­skyj mit Blick auf die Kata­stro­phe beim Unter­gang des moderns­ten rus­si­schen Atom-U-Boots “Kursk”, das im August 2000 mit 118 Besat­zungs­mit­glie­dern an Bord gesun­ken war. “Vor 24 Jah­ren gab es die Kursk-Katastrophe, die den sym­bo­li­schen Beginn sei­ner Herr­schaft dar­stell­te; jetzt sehen wir das Ende davon - und es ist wie­der Kursk.”

Selen­skyj unter­strich ein­mal mehr, wie wich­tig die von ihm erhoff­te Erlaub­nis zum Ein­satz der vom Wes­ten gelie­fer­ten Lang­stre­cken­waf­fen gegen Zie­le in Russ­land sei. „Wir brau­chen ent­spre­chen­de Geneh­mi­gun­gen unse­rer Part­ner für den Ein­satz von Lang­stre­cken­waf­fen“, beton­te Selenskyj.

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Also die ver­lot­ter­ten ver­wichs­ten Drecks­schwei­ne beim Stan­dard die das lie­ber nicht prüfen.

Es ist nur fair, die rus­si­schen Ter­ro­ris­ten dort zu ver­nich­ten, wo sie sind, wo sie ihre Angrif­fe star­ten - rus­si­sche Mili­tär­flug­plät­ze, rus­si­sche Logis­tik.“ Russ­land müs­se gezwun­gen wer­den, Frie­den zu schlie­ßen, wenn Kreml­chef Putin so erpicht dar­auf sei, weiterzukämpfen. 

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Sie haben noch kei­nen Logis­tik­kno­ten erreicht.
Und der Flug­ha­fen war nen Oblast wei­ter. Und sie hat­ten die means, und die Reich­wei­te den aus der Ukrai­ne anzugreifen.

Selbst die UN will den Völ­ker­rechts­bruch verschweigen.

Anna Sawer­thal vor einer Minute
Uno besorgt über Zivi­lis­ten nach Ukraine-Offensive in Russland

Das UN-Menschenrechtsbüro ist besorgt über die mög­li­chen Aus­wir­kun­gen der jüngs­ten mili­tä­ri­schen Ent­wick­lun­gen im Krieg zwi­schen Russ­land und der Ukrai­ne. So beant­wor­te­te ein Spre­cher des Büros eine Fra­ge zum Angriff der Ukrai­ne auf die Regi­on Kursk. “Wo immer eine Sei­te mili­tä­ri­sche Ope­ra­tio­nen durch­führt, muss der Schutz von Zivi­lis­ten und zivi­len Objek­ten in Über­ein­stim­mung mit dem huma­ni­tä­ren Völ­ker­recht obers­te Prio­ri­tät haben”, sag­te der Spre­cher bei einem Brie­fing am Dienstag.

Der Uno lie­gen unbe­stä­tig­te Berich­te über vier getö­te­te Zivi­lis­ten sowie einen ver­letz­ten Kriegs­be­richt­erstat­ter und eine ver­letz­te Sani­tä­te­rin vor. Es konn­te nicht fest­ge­stellt wer­den, unter wel­chen Umstän­den die Per­so­nen getö­tet wurden.

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Man könn­te ja im Völ­ker­recht nachschlagen…

An attack against an area or loca­li­ty without it being mili­ta­ri­ly necessa­ry to do so would con­sti­tu­te a vio­la­ti­on of the pro­hi­bi­ti­on on des­troy­ing the pro­per­ty of an advers­a­ry, unless requi­red by impe­ra­ti­ve mili­ta­ry neces­si­ty (see Rule 50).
A loca­li­ty loses its pro­tec­tion from attack when it cea­ses to ful­fil the requi­red con­di­ti­ons. Accord­ing to Arti­cle 59(3) of Addi­tio­nal Pro­to­col I, the pre­sence of per­sons affor­ded spe­cial pro­tec­tion and of poli­ce for­ces retai­ned for the sole pur­po­se of main­tai­ning law and order is not con­tra­ry to the­se conditions.[24]

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Basis for the war cri­mes lis­ted above

The­se vio­la­ti­ons of cus­to­ma­ry inter­na­tio­nal law are lis­ted as gra­ve breaches in Addi­tio­nal Pro­to­col I and as war cri­mes in the Sta­tu­te of the Inter­na­tio­nal Cri­mi­nal Court.[41] The wor­d­ing varies slight­ly bet­ween the­se two instru­ments, but in essence they are the same vio­la­ti­ons as indi­ca­ted in the Ele­ments of Cri­mes for the Inter­na­tio­nal Cri­mi­nal Court.

(i) Making the civi­li­an popu­la­ti­on or indi­vi­du­al civi­li­ans, not taking a direct part in hos­ti­li­ties, the object of attack. In addi­ti­on to the prac­ti­ce men­tio­ned abo­ve, the­re are nume­rous examp­les of natio­nal legis­la­ti­on which make it a cri­mi­nal offence to direct attacks against civi­li­ans, inclu­ding the legis­la­ti­on of Sta­tes not, or not at the time, par­ty to Addi­tio­nal Pro­to­col I.[42] Refe­ren­ces to more prac­ti­ce can be found in the com­men­ta­ry to Rule 1.
(ii) Laun­ching an attack in the know­ledge that such attack will cau­se inci­den­tal loss of civi­li­an life, inju­ry to civi­li­ans or dama­ge to civi­li­an objects which would be clear­ly exces­si­ve in rela­ti­on to the con­cre­te and direct mili­ta­ry advan­ta­ge anti­ci­pa­ted. In addi­ti­on to the prac­ti­ce men­tio­ned abo­ve, nume­rous Sta­tes have adop­ted legis­la­ti­on making it an offence to car­ry out an attack which vio­la­tes the princip­le of proportionality.[43] Refe­ren­ces to more prac­ti­ce can be found in the com­men­ta­ry to Rule 14.
The defi­ni­ti­on of the war crime “laun­ching an attack in the know­ledge that such attack will cau­se inci­den­tal loss of civi­li­an life, inju­ry to civi­li­ans or dama­ge to civi­li­an objects which would be clear­ly exces­si­ve in rela­ti­on to the con­cre­te and direct mili­ta­ry advan­ta­ge anti­ci­pa­ted” fol­lows more clo­se­ly the wor­d­ing found in the Sta­tu­te of the Inter­na­tio­nal Cri­mi­nal Court.[44] The word “over­all” is not con­tai­ned in Arti­cles 51 and 85 of Addi­tio­nal Pro­to­col I, nor in the sub­stan­ti­ve rule of cus­to­ma­ry inter­na­tio­nal law (see Rule 14). The pur­po­se of this addi­ti­on in the Sta­tu­te of the Inter­na­tio­nal Cri­mi­nal Court appears to be to indi­ca­te that a par­ti­cu­lar tar­get can have an important mili­ta­ry advan­ta­ge that can be felt over a leng­thy peri­od of time and affect mili­ta­ry action in are­as other than the vicini­ty of the tar­get its­elf. As this mea­ning is inclu­ded in the exis­ting wor­d­ing of Addi­tio­nal Pro­to­col I and the sub­stan­ti­ve rule of cus­to­ma­ry inter­na­tio­nal law, the inclu­si­on of the word “over­all” does not add an extra element.[45]
(iii) making non-defended loca­li­ties and demi­li­ta­ri­zed zones the object of attack. In addi­ti­on to the prac­ti­ce refer­red to abo­ve, it is an offence to attack non-defended loca­li­ties under the legis­la­ti­on of nume­rous States.[46] Refe­ren­ces to more prac­ti­ce can be found in the com­men­ta­ry to Rule 37.
While “making demi­li­ta­ri­zed zones the object of attack” is a gra­ve bre­ach of Addi­tio­nal Pro­to­col I, it is not men­tio­ned as such in the Sta­tu­te of the Inter­na­tio­nal Cri­mi­nal Court. Nevertheless, attacks against demi­li­ta­ri­zed zones are an offence under the legis­la­ti­on of nume­rous States.[47] In addi­ti­on, such attacks would argu­ab­ly con­sti­tu­te the war crime of “making civi­li­an objects, that is, objects that are not mili­ta­ry objec­ti­ves, the object of attack” or “making the civi­li­an popu­la­ti­on or indi­vi­du­al civi­li­ans, not taking a direct part in hos­ti­li­ties, the object of attack” con­tai­ned in the Statute.[48]

[…]

Serious natu­re of the violation
A deduc­ti­ve ana­ly­sis of the actu­al list of war cri­mes found in various trea­ties and other inter­na­tio­nal instru­ments, as well as in natio­nal legis­la­ti­on and case-law, shows that vio­la­ti­ons are in prac­ti­ce trea­ted as serious, and the­re­fo­re as war cri­mes, if they end­an­ger pro­tec­ted per­sons or objects or if they bre­ach important values.
(i) The con­duct end­an­gers pro­tec­ted per­sons or objects. The majo­ri­ty of war cri­mes invol­ve death, inju­ry, dest­ruc­tion or unlaw­ful taking of pro­per­ty. Howe­ver, not all acts necessa­ri­ly have to result in actu­al dama­ge to per­sons or objects in order to amount to war cri­mes. This beca­me evi­dent when the Ele­ments of Cri­mes for the Inter­na­tio­nal Cri­mi­nal Court were being draf­ted. It was deci­ded, for examp­le, that it was enough to launch an attack on civi­li­ans or civi­li­an objects, even if some­thing unex­pec­ted­ly pre­ven­ted the attack from causing death or serious inju­ry. This could be the case of an attack laun­ched against the civi­li­an popu­la­ti­on or indi­vi­du­al civi­li­ans, even though, owing to the fail­u­re of the wea­pon sys­tem, the inten­ded tar­get was not hit. The same is the case for sub­jec­ting a pro­tec­ted per­son to medi­cal expe­ri­ments – actu­al inju­ry is not requi­red for the act to amount to a war crime; it is enough to end­an­ger the life or health of the per­son through such an act.[7]

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Does IHL pro­tect civi­li­ans lea­ving, or being evacua­ted from, a besie­ged area?

In all cir­cum­s­tan­ces, IHL pro­vi­des strong pro­tec­tions to civi­li­ans lea­ving, or being evacua­ted from, a besie­ged area.

From a prac­ti­cal per­spec­ti­ve, safe evacua­tions are best orga­ni­zed when the par­ties to the con­flict agree on the necessa­ry pro­ce­du­res. In the absence of such an agree­ment, both par­ties remain obli­ged to take all fea­si­ble pre­cau­ti­ons to avoid causing inci­den­tal harm to civi­li­ans fle­eing during hostilities.

In case of dis­pla­ce­ment, regard­less of whe­ther civi­li­ans flee or are evacua­ted from a besie­ged area, all pos­si­ble mea­su­res must be taken to ensu­re that the civi­li­ans in ques­ti­on are recei­ved under satis­fac­to­ry con­di­ti­ons of shel­ter, hygie­ne, health, safe­ty (inclu­ding from sexu­al and gen­der based vio­lence) and nut­ri­ti­on and that mem­bers of the same fami­ly are not separated.

The besie­ging par­ty may deci­de to screen dis­pla­ced per­sons for secu­ri­ty rea­sons, such as fin­ding out whe­ther mem­bers of the besie­ged for­ces inter­min­gled with the civi­li­ans lea­ving the besie­ged area. Scree­ning and other secu­ri­ty mea­su­res under­ta­ken by the besie­ging par­ty must be con­duc­ted with full respect for IHL and inter­na­tio­nal human rights law, par­ti­cu­lar­ly regar­ding huma­ne tre­at­ment, living con­di­ti­ons and rele­vant pro­ce­du­ral safe­guards in cases of detenti­on, and the pro­hi­bi­ti­on against collec­ti­ve punishment.

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Die sol­len wahr­schein­lich alle zum Atom­kraft­werk Kursk, oder?

Und falls hier noch ein Wich­ser auf die Idee kommt, der ukrai­ni­sche Angriff sei nicht völ­ker­rechts­wid­rig gewesen:

Is the besie­ging par­ty requi­red to allow civi­li­ans to lea­ve a besie­ged area?

Yes. Civi­li­ans must not be trap­ped in sie­ges, and both par­ties must allow civi­li­ans to lea­ve the besie­ged area.

The Gene­va Con­ven­ti­ons con­tain essen­ti­al, but limi­ted, pro­vi­si­ons on the evacua­ti­on (inclu­ding by sea) of spe­ci­fic cate­go­ries per­sons at spe­ci­fic risk, inclu­ding woun­ded and sick, as well as cer­tain civi­li­ans like per­sons with disa­bi­li­ties, older per­sons, child­ren or pregnant women.

More broad­ly, today a besie­ging par­ty may not for­ce civi­li­ans to remain against their will in the besie­ged area.

IHL rules app­ly to the con­duct of hos­ti­li­ties during sie­ges, in par­ti­cu­lar the princi­ples and rules of dis­tinc­tion, pro­por­tio­na­li­ty and pre­cau­ti­ons. The imple­men­ta­ti­on of several rules stem­ming from the princip­le of pre­cau­ti­ons requi­res both par­ties to allow civi­li­ans to lea­ve the besie­ged area to escape hos­ti­li­ties whenever fea­si­ble. In par­ti­cu­lar, con­stant care must be taken to spa­re the civi­li­an popu­la­ti­on in all mili­ta­ry ope­ra­ti­ons, and all fea­si­ble pre­cau­ti­ons must be taken, nota­b­ly in the choice of means and methods of war­fa­re, to avoid or mini­mi­ze inci­den­tal loss of civi­li­an life, inju­ry to civi­li­ans and dama­ge to civi­li­an objects. In a besie­ged area whe­re hos­ti­li­ties are taking place, and in view of the risk that this poses to them, one obvious pre­cau­tio­na­ry mea­su­re is to evacua­te civi­li­ans, or at least allow them to lea­ve. Par­ties must also give effec­ti­ve advan­ce warnings of attacks that may affect the civi­li­an popu­la­ti­on, the pur­po­se of which is pre­cise­ly to enab­le civi­li­ans to take mea­su­res to pro­tect themselves.

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Boah wie GERN haben unse­re HURENMEDIEN Auf­ma­cher der Bren­nen­den Dör­fer gezeigt! IMAX Grö­ße, hin­ter der Moderatorin.

Oder falls irgend ein ver­fick­tes GROTESKES ARSCHLOCH auf die Idee kommt, die könn­ten ja in die Ukrai­ne fliehen:

(iv) Other serious vio­la­ti­ons of inter­na­tio­nal huma­ni­ta­ri­an law com­mit­ted during a non-international armed con­flict (con­ti­nued):
• orde­ring the dis­pla­ce­ment of the civi­li­an popu­la­ti­on for rea­sons rela­ted to the con­flict and not requi­red for the secu­ri­ty of the civi­li­ans invol­ved or impe­ra­ti­ve mili­ta­ry necessity; 

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Ich wünsch den 1000 Arsch­lö­chern ja noch viel Spass in den zwei Beset­zen Dör­fern und der einen beset­zen Klein­stadt, nach­dem die Rus­sen die Eva­ku­ie­rung orga­ni­sie­ren durften…

Wich­ser.

Und wie­viel Sicher­heit das dem ver­wichs­ten Drecks­se­len­skyj nicht doch gebracht hat!

Das Dorf das bis­her noch nicht eva­ku­iert wur­de, lag 5km von Russ­land ent­fernt, oder wie Selen­sky vor­ges­tern ankün­di­gen wür­de 2100 Droh­nen Artil­le­rie und Mör­ser­an­grif­fe auf Sumy, auch wenn Mör­ser nur eine Reich­wei­te von 3 Kilo­me­tern haben…

Ich hät­te ja ger­ne dass er das vorm inter­na­tio­na­len Straf­ge­richts­hof noch­mal wiederhohlt.

Sie wis­sen schon, 17 Tote in Sumi im Jah­res­schnitt durch rus­si­sche Angrif­fe. 32 Ver­kehrs­to­te. Sta­tis­tisch ein Droh­nen­to­ter durch Droh­nen aus Kursk. Und dann erst die Men­schen die aus der Ent­fer­nung auf Mör­ser­feu­er starren.

Letz­ter Satz der Kor­re­spon­den­tin: “Sumy regi­on has been shel­led hund­reds of times this mon­th only by rus­si­an forces”.

Geil! 2100 Atta­cken laut Selen­skyj in 66 Tagen. Mör­ser­reich­wei­te zu kurz. Nur knapp 134 Atta­cken auf https://liveuamap.com/ ver­zeich­net. Kein Droh­nen Toter in den letz­ten drei Mona­ten in Sumy.

Aber allei­ne im Letz­ten Mona­te HUNDERTE ATTACKEN auf Sumy Region.

Da bricht schon fast die Mathe­ma­tik. Ein Monat hat sta­tis­tisch sagen wir 30 Tage. (2100/66)*30 = 955!

Hun­der­te allei­ne letz­tes Monat! Wo https://liveuamap.com doch in drei Mona­ten nur 134 Atta­cken ver­zeich­net hat! Und da sind die Dop­pel­mel­dun­gen noch nicht rausgeerechnet.

Zum Glück hat sich Selen­skyj ja zur Eva­ku­ie­rung entschieden.

Jetzt, wo er die Bil­der braucht! Damits nicht völ­ker­rechts­wid­rig war.









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