Kinderbuch incoming in 3, 2, 1, .…

20. März 2026

Bildschirmfoto 2026 03 20 um 14 06 10
src: click

In other news, mos­ques. Also hard to get out of.

Australia’s PM cal­led a ‘putrid dog’ and cha­sed out of mosque

Morning of pray­er turns into high-speed exit for Antho­ny Alba­ne­se as his attempt to gar­ner the ‘mul­ti­cul­tu­ral vote’ was met with boos

src: click (The Telegraph)

Also ich hab gelacht, …

Was war passiert?

He wants to come here after shaking hands with the Pre­si­dent of Isra­el, who’s got blood on his hands,” said Sek­laoui, 29, who con­fron­ted the prime minister.

He said: “To come here and act like not­hing has hap­pen­ed is a disgrace.”

Dazu die deut­sche Vor­sit­zen­de der Lin­ken bei Lanz: “Wir wol­len einen gerech­ten Frie­den für, …” Ja scheis­se, jetzt hab ich das Land ver­ges­sen, für das wir einen gerech­ten Frie­den wol­len… Aber noch­mal schau ich mir das auch nicht an, …

Moment, einen Hab ich noch.

Im Kin­der­buch vor­kom­men soll­te auch er, als gerech­ter König und Vati der ver­lieb­ten Prin­zes­sin Kal­las nämlich:

Bildschirmfoto 2026 03 20 um 14 13 20
src: click

Da ist sie ja wie­der, das zar­te Pflänz­chen, das wir so lan­ge ver­mißt haben! Die Geheim­di­plo­ma­tie der Euro­päi­schen Außenpolitik.

Schi­nas argued that Tur­key – a NATO mem­ber – “owes” Euro­pe a clear ans­wer on whe­ther it stands with “Hamas or us.”

They need to be able to tell us whe­re they stand. If they stand with us, that’s a clea­rer path. If they stand with them, I’m not sure they want to be with them,” he said.

The for­mer EU offi­cial sug­gested Anka­ra seeks to posi­ti­on its­elf as a key play­er bet­ween the Isla­mic world and the West – but war­ned that such a role may not be sus­tainab­le given cur­rent regio­nal dynamics.

Wer­te­wes­ten!

Nein, die kann logisch folgern?

20. März 2026

Bildschirmfoto 2026 03 20 um 13 44 37
src: click

Als Frau?

Ja darf die das?!

Sehen sie - im deutsch­spra­chi­gen Qua­li­täts­jour­na­lis­mus darf man das nicht - da darf man die­se Mel­dung gleich gar­nicht brin­gen, aber anstatt­des­sen bes­ser sol­che schöööööön nost­al­gi­schen Geschich­ten schieben.

Nicht dass die Pro­pa­gan­da in der Bevöl­ke­rung zu wir­ken auf­hört. Gott behüte!

Peter Bogner, legst du noch kurz ein Scheit beim Feu­er nach?

Dan­ke, Peter…

Bildschirmfoto 2026 03 20 um 13 47 51
src: click

Ich mein das wär ja wirk­lich schlimm, wenn die jetzt - so kurz bevor der Orban weg ist selbst zu den­ken begin­nen wür­de was da… Ha, na aber nicht mit uns.

Ich mein wo gäbs den sowas, heu­te die Posi­ti­on einer ita­lie­ni­schen Frau bei uns in den deutsch­spra­chi­gen Qua­li­täts­me­di­en veröffentlichen?

Ha. Soweit kommts noch. Da könnt ja jeder kommen..

Staats­chef my ass.

Also die schreib ma tot.

Hm.…

20. März 2026

NZZ im Krisen-PR Modus?

Den Beweis dafür lie­fert Kent in sei­nem Rück­tritts­schrei­ben gleich sel­ber. Der ver­meint­li­che sicher­heits­po­li­ti­sche Exper­te behaup­tet allen Erns­tes, dass bereits bei der Ent­schei­dung zur Irak-Invasion von 2003 die Israe­li die Fäden gezo­gen hät­ten. Es ist eine bös­ar­ti­ge Ver­dre­hung der Tat­sa­chen, da Isra­el damals in Wirk­lich­keit kei­nes­wegs begeis­tert über den von der Regie­rung Bush beschlos­se­nen Krieg gewe­sen war.

Kent geht noch wei­ter und beklagt, dass sei­ne Ehe­frau Shan­non in einem «von Isra­el fabri­zier­ten Krieg» umge­kom­men sei. Er bezieht sich auf einen töd­li­chen Anschlag in Nord­sy­ri­en im Jahr 2019, dem die jun­ge Unter­of­fi­zie­rin zum Opfer fiel. Doch jener Kriegs­ein­satz war mit­nich­ten ein fins­te­res israe­li­sches Mach­werk. Die Schuld tru­gen nicht die Juden, son­dern die Ter­ro­ris­ten des IS, die mit ihrer Schre­ckens­herr­schaft eine aus­län­di­sche Inter­ven­ti­on not­wen­dig gemacht hat­ten. Dass Kent sogar den Tod sei­ner Frau für abstru­se Theo­rien instru­men­ta­li­siert, wirkt infam.

Die Demo­kra­ten wuss­ten es frü­her besser
Kent ist offen­sicht­lich ein Extre­mist, der über­all die bösen Israe­li am Werk sieht.

src: click (NZZ)

Wasn hier los?

AMY GOODMAN: Today, an exclu­si­ve hour with Gene­ral Wes­ley Clark, the reti­red four-star gene­ral. He was Supre­me Allied Com­man­der of NATO during the Koso­vo War. He has been awar­ded the Pre­si­den­ti­al Medal of Free­dom. In 2004, he unsuc­cess­ful­ly ran for the Demo­cra­tic pre­si­den­ti­al nomi­na­ti­on. He recent­ly edi­ted a seri­es of books about famous U.S. gene­rals, inclu­ding Dwight Eisen­ho­wer and Ulys­ses Grant, both of whom beca­me pre­si­dent after their mili­ta­ry care­ers ended.

On Tues­day, I inter­view­ed Wes­ley Clark at the 92nd Street Y Cul­tu­ral Cen­ter here in New York City befo­re a live audi­ence and asked him about his pre­si­den­ti­al ambitions.

AMY GOODMAN: What do you think of the­se gene­rals who run for president?

GEN. WESLEY CLARK: I like them. It’s hap­pen­ed before.

AMY GOODMAN: Will it hap­pen again?

GEN. WESLEY CLARK: It might.

AMY GOODMAN: Later in the inter­view, I fol­lo­wed up on that question.

AMY GOODMAN: Will you announ­ce for president?

GEN. WESLEY CLARK: Well, I haven’t said I won’t.

AMY GOODMAN: What are you wai­t­ing for?

GEN. WESLEY CLARK: I’m wai­t­ing for several dif­fe­rent pre­con­di­ti­ons, which I’m not at liber­ty to dis­cuss. But I will tell you this: I think about it every sin­gle day.

AMY GOODMAN: Well, for the rest of the hour, we’ll hear Gene­ral Wes­ley Clark in his own words on the pos­si­bi­li­ty of a U.S. attack on Iran; the impeach­ment of Pre­si­dent Bush; the use of clus­ter bombs; the bom­bing of Radio Tele­vi­si­on Ser­bia during the Koso­vo War under his com­mand; and much more. I inter­view­ed Gene­ral Clark on Tues­day at the 92nd Street Y in New York.

AMY GOODMAN: Now, let’s talk about Iran. You have a who­le web­site devo­ted to stop­ping war.

GEN. WESLEY CLARK: Www.stopiranwar.com.

AMY GOODMAN: Do you see a replay in what hap­pen­ed in the lead-up to the war with Iraq — the alle­ga­ti­ons of the wea­pons of mass dest­ruc­tion, the media lea­ping onto the bandwagon?

GEN. WESLEY CLARK: Well, in a way. But, you know, histo­ry doesn’t repeat its­elf exact­ly twice. What I did warn about when I testi­fied in front of Con­gress in 2002, I said if you want to worry about a sta­te, it shouldn’t be Iraq, it should be Iran. But this government, our admi­nis­tra­ti­on, wan­ted to worry about Iraq, not Iran.

I knew why, becau­se I had been through the Pen­ta­gon right after 9/11. About 10 days after 9/11, I went through the Pen­ta­gon, and I saw Secreta­ry Rums­feld and Depu­ty Secreta­ry Wol­fo­witz. I went down­s­tairs just to say hel­lo to some of the peop­le on the Joint Staff who used to work for me, and one of the gene­rals cal­led me in. He said, “Sir, you’ve got to come in and talk to me a second.” I said, “Well, you’re too busy.” He said, “No, no.” He says, “We’ve made the decisi­on we’re going to war with Iraq.” This was on or about the 20th of Sep­tem­ber. I said, “We’re going to war with Iraq? Why?” He said, “I don’t know.” He said, “I guess they don’t know what else to do.” So I said, “Well, did they find some infor­ma­ti­on con­nec­ting Sad­dam to al-Qaeda?” He said, “No, no.” He says, “There’s not­hing new that way. They just made the decisi­on to go to war with Iraq.” He said, “I guess it’s like we don’t know what to do about ter­ro­rists, but we’ve got a good mili­ta­ry, and we can take down governments.” And he said, “I guess if the only tool you have is a ham­mer, every pro­blem has to look like a nail.”

So I came back to see him a few weeks later, and by that time we were bom­bing in Afgha­ni­stan. I said, “Are we still going to war with Iraq?” And he said, “Oh, it’s worse than that.” He reached over on his desk. He picked up a pie­ce of paper. And he said, “I just got this down from ups­tairs” — mea­ning the secreta­ry of defense’s office — “today.” And he said, “This is a memo that descri­bes how we’re going to take out seven coun­tries in five years, star­ting with Iraq, and then Syria, Leba­non, Libya, Soma­lia, Sudan and, finis­hing off, Iran.” I said, “Is it clas­si­fied?” He said, “Yes, sir.” I said, “Well, don’t show it to me.” And I saw him a year or so ago, and I said, “You remem­ber that?” He said, “Sir, I didn’t show you that memo! I didn’t show it to you!”

AMY GOODMAN: I’m sor­ry. What did you say his name was?

GEN. WESLEY CLARK: I’m not going to give you his name.

[…]

src: click (Demo­cra­cy Now)

Money Quo­te: Amy: “[…] This is com­ing as the Bush admi­nis­tra­ti­on and Sau­di Ara­bia are pum­ping money for covert ope­ra­ti­ons into many are­as of the midd­le east, inclu­ding Liba­non, Syria and Iran, in an effort to streng­t­hen Sau­di sup­por­ted Sun­ni Islam groups, and wea­ken Ira­ni­an backed Shi­as, some of the covert money has been given to Jiha­dist groups in Leba­non, with ties to al Qai­da. Figh­t­ing the Shi­as, by fun­ding with prince Bandar and then with US money not appre­ved by con­gress, fun­ding the Sun­nis con­nec­ted to al Qaida.”

Gut, wer kann schon in eine AI “list me 20 Sau­di sup­por­ted Sun­ni Islam groups in a table” ein­ge­ben, ich meine…

Und wie die Goog­le Gemi­ni AI erst hal­lu­zi­niert, wenn du sie nach Key Attri­bu­ti­on fin­dings fragst!

Bildschirmfoto 2026 03 20 um 08 45 47

Gut, Isra­el war ja auch kaum involviert, …

Isra­el pro­vi­ded sup­port to Syri­an rebels, many of them extre­mist Isla­mists, when they were figh­t­ing for­mer Tehran-friendly Pre­si­dent Bas­har Al Assad and has also said it would like to divi­de the coun­try along eth­nic lines.

In Leba­non Ira­ni­an pro­xy Hez­bol­lah has been neu­te­red mili­ta­ri­ly by the Isra­el Defence For­ces and side­li­ned poli­ti­cal­ly as the US pushes for the organisation’s disarmament.

Howe­ver, Netanyahu’s ulti­ma­te goal is regime chan­ge in Iran. He first war­ned in 1992, when he was a par­lia­men­ta­ry mem­ber, that Iran was three to five years away from a nuclear bomb. Then in his 1995 book, Figh­t­ing Ter­ro­rism, Net­an­ya­hu war­ned that Iran was “five to seven years at most” from assemb­ling a nuclear weapon.

In 2006, US Gene­ral Wes­ley Clar­ke recei­ved a clas­si­fied memo out­lining a new mili­ta­ry stra­te­gy of topp­ling seven coun­tries over five years. Iraq, Syria, Leba­non, Libya, Soma­lia, Sudan and Iran were again per­cei­ved as being hos­ti­le to Isra­el and the US

src: click

Dabei weiss doch jeder, dass Isra­el ganz klar gegen den Irak Krieg war! Der die USA in der Regi­on gebun­den hat.

Ver­damm­te hal­lu­zi­nie­ren­de goog­le Gemi­ni AI schon wieder, …

Goog­le Gemi­ni weiter:

Die Ver­bin­dung zu Isra­el ist der zen­tra­le Punkt, an dem Kri­ti­ker und inves­ti­ga­ti­ve Jour­na­lis­ten anset­zen, um den Ursprung des von Wes­ley Clark beschrie­be­nen Plans zu erklä­ren. Die Ver­bin­dung läuft über das Doku­ment „A Clean Break: A New Stra­te­gy for Secu­ring the Realm“ (1996).

1. Die Autoren und die Adressaten

Das „Clean Break“-Memo wur­de nicht für die US-Regierung geschrie­ben, son­dern für den israe­li­schen Pre­mier­mi­nis­ter Ben­ja­min Netan­ja­hu.

  • Die Autoren: Eine Arbeits­grup­pe unter der Lei­tung von Richard Per­le (spä­ter Defen­se Poli­cy Board). Mit dabei waren Dou­glas Feith (spä­ter Pen­ta­gon) und David Wurm­ser (spä­ter Bera­ter von Dick Cheney).
  • Der Zweck: Den Frie­dens­pro­zess von Oslo zu been­den und statt­des­sen eine Poli­tik der „Stär­ke“ und des Regime­wech­sels einzuleiten.

2. Strategische Deckungsgleichheit

Die im Memo von 1996 vor­ge­schla­ge­nen Zie­le spie­geln fast exakt die Län­der wider, die Wes­ley Clark 2001 auf der Pentagon-Liste sah:

  • Irak: Abset­zung von Sad­dam Hus­sein als wich­tigs­tes stra­te­gi­sches Ziel.
  • Syri­en: Iso­la­ti­on durch den Sturz Hus­seins und Druck über den Libanon.
  • Liba­non: Schwä­chung der His­bol­lah durch Angrif­fe auf syri­sche Interessen.
  • Iran: Lang­fris­ti­ge Bedro­hung, die nach dem Fall des Iraks ange­gan­gen wer­den müsse.

3. Die „Brücke“ ins Pentagon (2001–2003)

Der jour­na­lis­ti­sche Vor­wurf (u.a. von Sey­mour Hersh und Jason Vest) lau­tet: Die Neo­kon­ser­va­ti­ven brach­ten eine Stra­te­gie, die ursprüng­lich zur Siche­rung Isra­els gedacht war, nach 9/11 als offi­zi­el­le US-Militärdoktrin ein.

Vergleichstabelle

Aspekt „Clean Break“ (1996) Wes­ley Clarks Lis­te (2001/2003)
Haupt­ziel Siche­rung Isra­els durch Regimewechsel US-Vorherrschaft im Nahen Osten
Schlüs­sel­fi­gu­ren Per­le, Feith, Wurmser Per­le, Feith, Wol­fo­witz, Rumsfeld
Ers­ter Schritt Sturz Sad­dam Husseins Inva­si­on des Irak
Fol­ge­zie­le Syri­en, Liba­non, Iran Syri­en, Liba­non, Liby­en, Soma­lia, Sudan, Iran

SCHLIMM DIESE HALLUZINIERENDEN GOOGLE AIS!

Quel­le / Autor Titel / Medium Kern­aus­sa­ge zur Israel-Verbindung
Richard Per­le et al. (1996) A Clean Break: A New Stra­te­gy for Secu­ring the Realm (IASPS) Das Ori­gi­nal­do­ku­ment: Ent­wi­ckelt für Ben­ja­min Netan­ja­hu; for­dert den Sturz Sad­dam Hus­seins als Prio­ri­tät für Isra­els Sicherheit.
Bri­an Whita­ker (2002) “Play­ing Skitt­les with Mon­archs” (The Guar­di­an) Ana­ly­siert, wie die Autoren des israe­li­schen Stra­te­gie­pa­piers (Per­le, Feith) die­se Zie­le in die Bush-Regierung einbrachten.
Jason Vest (2002) “The Men From JINSA and CSP” (The Nati­on) Doku­men­tiert die engen Ver­bin­dun­gen zwi­schen pro-israelischen Denk­fa­bri­ken und den Archi­tek­ten des Irak­kriegs im Pentagon.
Patrick J. Buchanan (2003) “Who­se War?” (The Ame­ri­can Con­ser­va­ti­ve) Kri­ti­siert offen, dass die Neo­kon­ser­va­ti­ven den US-Apparat für eine Agen­da nut­zen, die pri­mär Isra­els regio­na­len Inter­es­sen dient.
Aki­va Eldar (2002) “Perle’s Clean Break” (Haa­retz) Eine israe­li­sche Per­spek­ti­ve dar­auf, wie das 1996er-Papier zur Blau­pau­se für die US-Außenpolitik unter Geor­ge W. Bush wurde.
Sey­mour Hersh (2007) “The Redi­rec­tion” (The New Yor­ker) Unter­sucht die stra­te­gi­sche Koope­ra­ti­on zwi­schen USA und Isra­el bei der Desta­bi­li­sie­rung von Syri­en und Iran.
Ste­phen Walt & John Mear­s­hei­mer (2006) “The Isra­el Lob­by and U.S. For­eign Poli­cy” (Lon­don Review of Books) Wis­sen­schaft­li­che Ana­ly­se des Ein­flus­ses pro-israelischer Akteu­re auf die Ent­schei­dung zur Inva­si­on des Irak und wei­te­rer Länder.
Ian Buru­ma (2003) “How to belie­ve in War” (The New York Times) Beschreibt die ideo­lo­gi­sche Brü­cke zwi­schen israe­li­schen Sicher­heits­in­ter­es­sen und der neo­kon­ser­va­ti­ven “Demo­kra­ti­sie­rung” des Nahen Ostens.
Jim Lobe (2003) “The Glo­ba­lists vs. The Natio­na­lists” (Asia Times) Detail­liert die Rol­le von David Wurm­ser und Dou­glas Feith bei der Ver­knüp­fung israe­li­scher und ame­ri­ka­ni­scher Militärziele.
Demo­cra­cy Now! (2007) “Gen. Wes­ley Clark Weighs Pre­si­den­ti­al Bid” Das Clark-Interview, das die Lis­te der sie­ben Län­der (Irak, Syri­en, Liba­non etc.) mit der Agen­da des Ver­tei­di­gungs­mi­nis­te­ri­ums verknüpfte.

Dann die NZZ weiter:

>Er bezieht sich auf einen töd­li­chen Anschlag in Nord­sy­ri­en im Jahr 2019, dem die jun­ge Unter­of­fi­zie­rin zum Opfer fiel. Doch jener Kriegs­ein­satz war mit­nich­ten ein fins­te­res israe­li­sches Mach­werk. Die Schuld tru­gen nicht die Juden, son­dern die Ter­ro­ris­ten des IS, die mit ihrer Schre­ckens­herr­schaft eine aus­län­di­sche Inter­ven­ti­on not­wen­dig gemacht hatten.

IN SYRIEN?!

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c2ldj04p0q2o

Hay­’at Tah­r­ir al-Sham (HTS) (Orga­niz­a­ti­on for the Libe­ra­ti­on of the Levant) and Hur­ras al-Din (Guar­di­ans of Reli­gi­on) are two effec­ti­ve orga­niz­a­ti­ons in Idlib that are important not only with respect to the Syri­an cri­sis, but also in terms of the regio­nal and inter­na­tio­nal secu­ri­ty. The main rea­son for this is that both orga­niz­a­ti­ons are effec­ti­ve in the pro­vin­ce of Idlib. One of the most cri­ti­cal issu­es to resol­ve the Syri­an cri­sis is the Idlib ques­ti­on. The other point that makes the two orga­niz­a­ti­ons important is the fact that one car­ri­ed the flag of al-Qaeda in the past, while the other is still car­ry­ing that flag in Syria. The­se orga­niz­a­ti­ons, which were ideo­lo­gi­cal part­ners befo­re and were figh­t­ing under the same roof, have ent­e­red an esca­la­ting rival­ry and a hot con­flict pro­cess in 2020.

The core al-Qaeda ele­ments of HTS bro­ke up with HTS by arguing that HTS had moved away from the al-Qaeda ideo­lo­gy and had taken prag­ma­tic steps in line with the agree­ments signed wit­hin the frame­work of the Asta­na pro­cess, and estab­lis­hed Hur­ras al-Din on 27th Febru­a­ry 2018. HTS has regar­ded Hur­ras al-Din as a thre­at sin­ce its incep­ti­on and has tried to dis­sol­ve this orga­niz­a­ti­on becau­se Hur­ras al-Din has the power to pick mili­tants from HTS. The­re were many armed clas­hes bet­ween the par­ties, which even­tual­ly ended in a cease­fire. Until the last and major con­flict on 3rd June 2020, the­re had been a ten­se rela­ti­ons­hip bet­ween the two sides on account of small clas­hes and mutu­al arrests.

Cri­ti­cism by Hur­ras al-Din of HTS can be gathe­red under the fol­lowing topics:
1. HTS accepts and imple­ments the Sochi Agree­ment and pre­vents the oppo­si­ti­on from star­ting a war against the regime.
2. HTS does not attack Rus­si­an patrols but ensu­res the secu­ri­ty of the patrol mission.
3. Some ISIS mili­tants have been han­ded over to the Inter­na­tio­nal Coalition.
4. HTS is part of inter­na­tio­nal efforts aimed at eli­mi­na­ting Hur­ras al-Din.

Accu­sa­ti­ons by HTS against Hur­ras al-Din are as follows:
1. HTS decla­res Hur­ras al-Din to be a “non-believer” organization.
2. Hur­ras al-Din cau­ses divi­si­on wit­hin HTS and encou­ra­ges HTS mem­bers to join Hur­ras al-Din.
3. Hur­ras al-Din hosts all radi­cal mili­tants and gives room for them.
4. Hur­ras al-Din pro­vi­des move­ment area for the ISIS cells in Idlib and faci­li­ta­tes their actions.

Rela­ti­ons bet­ween the par­ties have beco­me more ten­se with each pas­sing day becau­se of the state­ments by the lea­ding per­so­na­li­ties of the two orga­niz­a­ti­ons and the mutu­al accu­sa­ti­ons through the media, and even­tual­ly, the first major con­flict emer­ged in June 2020.

Cau­ses of Con­flict and Con­flict Process
The Ansar al-Tawhid group announ­ced its estab­lish­ment on 3rd May 2020. Short­ly the­re­af­ter, on 23rd June 2020, Hur­ras al-Din announ­ced the crea­ti­on of a new ope­ra­ti­on room cal­led “Fes­bu­tu” con­sis­ting of Ansar al-Din Front, Ansar al-Islam, al-Jihad Coor­di­na­ti­on (mili­tants that sece­ded from HTS under the lea­ders­hip of Abu al-Abd Ashi­daa), al-Muqatileen al-Ansar Bri­ga­de (mili­tants that sece­ded from HTS under the lea­ders­hip of Jamal Zay­neye, nick­na­med as Abu Malik al-Talli) and Hur­ras al-Din.

The­re were some pro­blems going back a long way bet­ween HTS’s lea­der, al-Jolani, and Abu Malik al-Talli. Abu Malik al-Talli recei­ved USD 8 mil­li­on in exchan­ge for releasing the cap­ti­ve sol­di­ers of the Leba­ne­se army while he was the com­man­der of the al-Nusra Front (for­mer name of HTS) in Qal­a­moun, but the money was not deli­ve­r­ed to the lea­ders­hip of the al-Nusra Front. Moreo­ver, Al-Talli con­ti­nued figh­t­ing with the regime for­ces at a time when he was requi­red to stop figh­t­ing in accordance with a decisi­on taken in respect the­re­of. Howe­ver, an agree­ment was reached later bet­ween HTS’s lea­der, al-Jolani, and Abu Malik al-Talli. This agree­ment requi­red that al-Talli would not join Hur­ras al-Din or form a new orga­niz­a­ti­on. Hence, HTS arres­ted al-Talli as soon as he decla­red that he had joi­ned the ope­ra­ti­on room “Fes­bu­tu”. Two days befo­re this, HTS had also arres­ted Abu Salah al-Uzbeki, one of the com­man­ders of the Fes­bu­tu Ope­ra­ti­on Room who was wan­ted by Inter­pol for being respon­si­ble for the bom­bing in Russia.

Hur­ras al-Din made a state­ment on behalf of the Fes­bu­tu Ope­ra­ti­on Room and gave an ulti­ma­tum to HTS to release al-Uzbeki and al-Talli. Two days after HTS fai­led to respond to the warning, the Fes­bu­tu Ope­ra­ti­on Room began to set up a bar­ri­ca­de near Arab Sae­ed, a small vil­la­ge west of Idlib. In the mean­ti­me, Hur­ras al-Din arres­ted dozens of HTS mem­bers. HTS reci­pro­ca­ted by blo­cking the roads to the vil­la­ge of Arab Sae­ed with barricades.

HTS tried to give the fol­lowing mes­sa­ge to Tur­key and the inter­na­tio­nal com­mu­ni­ty as an exit stra­te­gy in the face of Turkey’s pres­su­re on it to abi­de by agree­ments: “HTS is the only for­ce that can pro­vi­de the secu­ri­ty of the Turkish-Russian joint patrol, dis­band extre­mist groups and pre­vent their pro­vo­ca­ti­ve actions against the regime”. HTS rai­ded in this regard the head­quar­ters of Hur­ras al-Din on 24th June 2020 and arres­ted dozens of their mem­bers. Hur­ras al-Din reached the Cen­tral Pri­son west of Idlib and mana­ged to con­trol the al-Kunsura plant, al-A’laf check­point and the ent­i­re vil­la­ge of Arab Sae­ed in reta­lia­ti­on for this action. HTS nee­ded a few days to reco­ver from this shock. The next day, HTS deploy­ed its for­ces and stro­ve to reta­ke the check­points, and besie­ged the vil­la­ge of Arab Sae­ed and atta­cked the­re with mor­tar shells and tanks. Con­se­quent­ly, one of the com­man­ders of Hur­ras al-Din, Abu Zaid Al-Urduni, was kil­led while HTS lost three mili­tants. Clas­hes inten­si­fied fur­ther with the resis­tance of Hur­ras al-Din. The rival­ry pro­cee­ded to a new pha­se with the expan­si­on of clas­hes to the are­as whe­re mem­bers of the Fes­bu­tu Ope­ra­ti­on Room were loca­ted and due to the fight over the al-Yaqubiyya checkpoint.

Madra­sah stu­dents and some oppo­si­ti­on groups star­ted to take steps towards peace as the clas­hes were con­ti­nuing, and owing to the­se initia­ti­ves, the Fes­bu­tu Ope­ra­ti­on Room decla­red that the clas­hes had stop­ped. The state­ment by the “Damas­cus Sol­di­ers” led by Mus­lim al-Shishani and the “Cau­ca­si­an Sol­di­ers” led by Abdul Malik al-Shishani sta­ted that “they were rea­dy to end the con­flict bet­ween the two sides and pre­vent the shed­ding of Mus­lim blood”. A 24-hour cease­fire was decla­red fol­lowing the­se attempts and then an agree­ment was made.

The par­ties agreed on the con­di­ti­on that the Fes­bu­tu Ope­ra­ti­on Room would evacua­te the mili­ta­ry and secu­ri­ty check­points and with­draw its for­ces. The Fes­bu­tu Ope­ra­ti­on Room also agreed to draw back its all mili­tants from the vil­la­ge of Arab Sae­ed under the assuran­ce of the “Damas­cus sol­di­ers” and the “Cau­ca­si­an sol­di­ers”. Accord­ing to the Agree­ment made, all fif­ty Hur­ras al-Din mili­tants left the vil­la­ge of Arab Sae­ed, except tho­se from the vil­la­ge. Hur­ras al-Din cen­tres in Arab Sae­ed were also han­ded over to HTS.

Soon after signing the agree­ment, HTS rai­ded several cen­tres of Ansar al-Din and the sett­le­ments north of Jisr al-Shughur, such as al-Janudiyya, al-Yaqubiyya and Arma­naz, tar­ge­ting Hur­ras al-Din and Ansar al-Islam. HTS legi­ti­mi­zed the­se ope­ra­ti­ons by arguing that “the agree­ment signed was only com­pri­sing the vil­la­ge of Arab Sae­ed, not other regi­ons”. HTS arres­ted the mili­tants of the Fes­bu­tu Ope­ra­ti­on Room as part of the ope­ra­ti­ons, and thus vio­la­ted, in essence, the agree­ment. HTS also rai­ded the al-Jihad Coor­di­na­ti­on Cent­re led by Abu al-Abd, and arres­ted the mili­tants in the Cent­re, sei­zed all ammu­ni­ti­on, besie­ged the check­points of the Coor­di­na­ti­on, and had them evacua­ted. Moreo­ver, HTS besie­ged the house whe­re Abu al-Abd was stay­ing and wan­ted him to sur­ren­der, but he mana­ged to escape.

The fol­lowing stand out when we reci­pro­cal­ly look at the strengths and weak­nes­ses of the two organizations:

Strengths of HTS
1. HTS has hea­vy wea­pons, armou­red vehi­cles, tanks, and armou­red per­son­nel carriers.
2. It pos­ses­ses eco­no­mic oppor­tu­nities that enab­le it to con­ti­nue a con­flict for a long time.
3. It has field con­trol and is wide­ly spread over the geo­gra­phi­cal area.
4. It has a strong lea­der / lea­ders­hip and the mili­tants dis­play high loyal­ty to the leader.
5. It has media power and thus was able to mis­lead the Idlib public opi­ni­on that Hur­ras al-Din was vio­la­ting the agree­ments and cor­rup­t­ing in the are­as liberated.

Weak­nes­ses of HTS
1. At least half of HTS mili­tants have refu­sed to fight against Hur­ras al-Din.
2. HTS is per­cei­ved as an orga­niz­a­ti­on that fol­lows the inst­ruc­tions of the inter­na­tio­nal com­mu­ni­ty and Turkey.
3. The con­flict bet­ween HTS and Hur­ras al-Din coin­ci­ded with the assas­si­na­ti­on of the Hur­ras al-Din lea­ders by the US.
4. HTS bro­ke the truce after the Fes­bu­tu Ope­ra­ti­on Room had accep­ted the attempts to reach a com­pro­mi­se. This was inde­ed one of the key rea­sons why a con­si­derable part of HTS mili­tants refrai­ned from con­flic­ting with Hur­ras al-Din.

Strengths of Hur­ras al-Din
1. Hur­ras al-Din does not disown its arres­ted mili­tants and intra-organizational soli­da­ri­ty is strong.
2. Mili­tants of Hur­ras al-Din have got the moti­va­ti­on to fight to their last breath with a strong belief in martyrdom.
3. It has mili­ta­ry expe­ri­ence and is capa­ble of showing fle­xi­bi­li­ty in mano­eu­vres and to with­draw when necessary.
4. It has influ­ence over extre­mist mili­tants in HTS and is able to con­vin­ce them not to join batt­le. As an examp­le, we can cite the refu­sal by Abdul Rah­man bin Awf, a mili­tant frac­tion affi­lia­ted to HTS, to par­ti­ci­pa­te in conflicts.

Weak­nes­ses of Hur­ras al-Din
1. It has neit­her hea­vy wea­pons nor eco­no­mic oppor­tu­nities enab­ling it to con­ti­nue the war.
2. Local com­man­ders in the sett­le­ments con­trol­led by Hur­ras al-Din did not want war in their own regi­ons; hence they opted for signing agree­ments with HTS. The trans­fer of the sett­le­ments near the Tur­kish bor­der, i.e. Haram, Koko and Arma­naz, to HTS through agree­ments can be cited as an examp­le in this regard.
3. It fol­lows a jiha­dist ideo­lo­gy, its objec­ti­ves con­tra­dict the inte­rests of the Syri­an revo­lu­ti­on, and it con­si­ders its­elf an inter­na­tio­nal organization.

Cost of the Conflicts
The clas­hes ended at least in the vil­la­ge of Arab Sae­ed after an agree­ment was inked bet­ween the par­ties. The par­ties agreed that the Arab Sae­ed peop­le would stay at their homes and the Hur­ras al-Din’s quar­ters in the vil­la­ge would be closed.

The big­gest loss of Hur­ras al-Din was inde­ed the clo­sure or dama­ge of its quar­ters in Haram, Arab Sae­ed, Al-Yaqubiyya, Arma­naz and Koko. Moreo­ver, Hur­ras al-Din had to return the hea­vy wea­pons it had sei­zed from HTS. It also fai­led to res­cue Abu Malik al-Talli and Abu Salah al-Uzbeki, who were the rea­son for star­ting the war, from the hands of HTS. Last­ly, men­ti­on should be made that Hur­ras al-Din remai­ned limi­ted to a nar­row geo­gra­phi­cal area.

Loo­king at the out­co­me of the HTS-Hurras al-Din con­flict, we can make an assess­ment that HTS has the edge over Hur­ras al-Din in terms of mili­ta­ry strength. Nevertheless, it seems that HTS has fai­led to achie­ve its goals when loo­king at the essence of the mat­ter. Becau­se arres­ting all the lea­ding staff of Hur­ras al-Din and get­ting the cen­tres and mili­ta­ry points of Hur­ras al-Din in some cri­ti­cal loca­ti­ons under con­trol were HTS’s pri­ma­ry objec­ti­ves. The Hur­ras al-Din lea­ders of note con­ti­nue their acti­vi­ties and the orga­niz­a­ti­on main­tains its important centres.

Sce­n­a­ri­os for the Future of Rival­ry bet­ween HTS and Hur­ras al-Din
The rela­ti­ons­hip bet­ween HTS and Hur­ras al-Din based on mutu­al thre­at per­cep­ti­on will con­ti­nue alt­hough con­flicts bet­ween them have been hal­ted for now. The balan­ce of power is in favour of HTS in the fight bet­ween the par­ties. HTS will con­ti­nue its fight against Hur­ras al-Din becau­se this orga­niz­a­ti­on poses a thre­at to HTS and to deli­ver a mas­sa­ge to the inter­na­tio­nal com­mu­ni­ty that “it can be a tool in figh­t­ing the radi­cals”. Three dif­fe­rent methods can be fol­lo­wed in the fight of HTS against Hur­ras al-Din.

The first opti­on is that HTS dis­sol­ves Hur­ras al-Din and pur­ges its lea­ding staff of by infil­tra­ting the regi­ons of that orga­niz­a­ti­on. The mate­ria­liz­a­ti­on rate of this sce­n­a­rio is low becau­se mili­tants of Hur­ras al-Din are extre­me­ly devout and moti­va­ted, and the lea­ders­hip of the orga­niz­a­ti­on atta­ches par­ti­cu­lar impor­t­ance to pri­va­cy and takes high secu­ri­ty measures.

The second sce­n­a­rio is that HTS unleas­hes a wide-scale mili­ta­ry ope­ra­ti­on aimed at eli­mi­na­ting Hur­ras al-Din after pul­ling it into are­as with no civi­li­an sett­le­ment. This sce­n­a­rio has a hig­her pro­ba­bi­li­ty rate com­pa­red to the first one. Howe­ver, its pro­ba­bi­li­ty is still not suf­fi­ci­ent­ly high due to the fact that HTS is seen as “the poli­ce of the inter­na­tio­nal com­mu­ni­ty and Tur­key,” it is dif­fi­cult to limit Hur­ras al-Din to a geo­gra­phi­cal regi­on, and Hur­ras al-Din can signi­fi­cant­ly harm HTS even though not able to defeat HTS, as it is strong in terms of combativeness.

The final sce­n­a­rio is that HTS con­ti­nues to raid the regi­ons of Hur­ras al-Din and fol­lows a stra­te­gy that aims at wea­ke­n­ing / eli­mi­na­ting Hur­ras al-Din over time. In this con­text, HTS can restrict Hur­ras al-Din over time by small-scale con­flicts, arres­ting the second- and third-degree mili­tants of Hur­ras al-Din and put­ting eco­no­mic pres­su­re on it. Con­si­de­ring the cour­se of rival­ry bet­ween HTS and Hur­ras al-Din, we can say that this sce­n­a­rio is most likely to be rea­li­zed. Rea­sons for this are as follows:

1. It is the sce­n­a­rio in which the risk of con­flict and the loss of mili­tants is mini­mal. HTS will pre­fer this scenario.
2. HTS will be able to avoid media­ti­on attempts of media­tors, sheikhs, and dis­si­dents to halt clashes.

If we look from the view­point of Hur­ras al-Din, the­re seems to be only one via­ble stra­te­gy. Hur­ras al-Din will build a for­ti­fi­ca­ti­on in a geo­gra­phi­cal­ly rug­ged ter­rain and con­duct assas­si­na­ti­ons against the HTS lea­ders. Al-Jolani will be the pri­ma­ry tar­get of Hur­ras al-Din becau­se eli­mi­na­ting al-Jolani may bring about the dis­so­lu­ti­on of HTS.

When we obser­ve the rela­ti­ons­hip among them­sel­ves, we see that orga­niz­a­ti­ons with “Sala­fi jiha­dist” ideo­lo­gies often com­pe­te and fight against each other. Con­flicts among Sala­fi jiha­dist groups in Afgha­ni­stan, Paki­stan, Soma­lia, Yemen, and Syria are clear examp­les of this rea­li­ty. Des­pi­te some chan­ges made by HTS in its own orga­niz­a­ti­on and its ideo­lo­gi­cal trans­for­ma­ti­on, some of its mili­tants are still extre­mist, a situa­ti­on which would trig­ger more clas­hes with other dis­si­dent Syri­an groups in the Idlib region.

src: click (The Cen­ter for Midd­le Eas­tern Stu­dies (ORSAM))

edit: Wait, Piers Mor­gan to the rescue???!??!

Ich hab grad geprüft ob ich mich eh nicht im Jahrzehnt geirrt habe

19. März 2026

aber nein - stellt sich her­aus, die UvdL fin­det - GENIALE ZEIT um ein Unter­neh­men zu gründen.

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src: click

Die UvdL du, … Immer am Puls der Zeit, …

Jetzt neu, mit noch weni­ger Abgaben.

Das muss die­ses anti­zy­kli­sche Dings sein, von dem immer alle sprechen.

edit: Es gibt aber natür­lich auch wie­der gute Nachrichten, …

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src: click

Das war die Check­list beim Designwettbewerb:

- BBW
- zwei­ge­schlecht­lich (min­des­tens)
DTF
- Furry
- Tou­ris­mus Aus­tria Fannybag
- Beats headphones
- Stei­fer Lüssel

Aber

- Iro­ke­se und natürlich
- Vier Finger

Ob da nicht viel­leicht doch Chat-GPT aus­ge­hol­fen hat…

Der Spie­gel sag­te: „Wien is vurn“
Wenn’s der ned waß, wer daun?
Wann da Mr. Smith a Glotzn hot
Ver­kauf ma eahm an Kamm

[…]

edit:

Ah, ja…

Oardefault

Images

Thumb 21859966 segments list

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Mega.

Falls sie sich gefragt haben soll­ten, der Lüs­sel ist steif und soft. Die Kopf­hö­rer spark­ly durch­sich­tig und auch mit Tou­ris­mus Aus­tria Emblem, und ja - der lebt auch noch.

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src: click

Sehr geil auch, leadersnet.at schützt die Event-Bilder mit java­script over­lays. Irrrrsin­nig schwer die run­ter­zu­la­den. Ein click auf “Unter­su­chen” und oh, da isses ja mit Direktlink.

edit: Video beim ORF: click

By the Power of Geriatrie!

19. März 2026

Ich brech weg…

Bww­waaaaah­ha­ha­ha!

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src: click

Da wird die US aber jetzt schaun, wie sie zurecht kommt!

This pact would map shared cri­ti­cal depen­den­ci­es, such as semi­con­duc­tors and rare earth ele­ments, and pro­po­se mutu­al respon­se clau­ses in tra­de agree­ments to deter coer­ci­on from the US or Chi­na. If one coun­try is tar­ge­ted with aggres­si­ve tariffs, all coun­tries should respond.”

Jaja, die sel­te­nen Erden Japans…

*prust*

Ich mei­ne, jaja, die sel­te­nen Erden Con­nec­tions Japans, …

The pro­po­sal reflects the group’s respon­se to remarks by Cana­di­an Prime Minis­ter Mark Car­ney at the World Eco­no­mic Forum in Davos, whe­re he cal­led on so-called “midd­le powers” to unite and “build some­thing big­ger, bet­ter, stron­ger and fairer.”

This is the task of midd­le powers, the coun­tries that stand to lose the most in a world of fortres­ses and gain the most from genui­ne coope­ra­ti­on,” Car­ney said.

Jaja, die fai­ren Japa­ner, die sind ja in ganz Asi­en für ihre fai­re Außen­po­li­tik berühmt!

*prust*

Eben auch Wer­te­west­ler ganz wie wir.

edit: Es gibt aber natür­lich auch wie­der gute Nachrichten.

Ich seh grad, Zypern muss nicht in die Nato, auch wenn es die­ses Monat ange­grif­fen wur­de, das wird jetzt ein­fach von Isra­el beschützt.

Dan­ke Isra­el. Dan­ke Bibi. Fürs über­fäl­li­ge Ersatznarrativ.

Moment, bedeu­tet das, dass israe­li­sche Rak­ten Europa, …

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src: click

Mean­while in Haifa, …