Keep your journalists dumb

10. August 2022

So they still act like they cant wrap their heads around what hap­pen­ed here.

Die­se Gesell­schaft ist das Allerletzte.

Money­quo­te:

What is abso­lute­ly remar­kab­le is, that at the end of march, nego­tia­ti­ons were advan­cing, for a neu­tral Ukrai­ne, and for an end of the war. And then Ukrai­ne wal­ked away from the nego­tia­ting table, at the end of march, and the rea­son is, that the UK and the US pres­sed them. “You can win on the battle­field. You dont have to nego­tia­te non-enlargement of NATO.” This was a big mista­ke. My point is sim­ply, that we need this war to end, with rus­sia lea­ving Ukrai­ne and NATO say­ing, we are not going to fill in the void, Ukrai­ne is going to be neu­tral. And this is how we could also save the world eco­no­my, as well as saving Ukrai­ne, its very strai­ght for­ward. Rus­sia needs to lea­ve. But the United Sta­tes doesnt need to fill in after­wards. Thats the basic point. We need a buffer.

Hin­ter­grund ist fol­gen­der. Stand 02.02.2022

Russia’s most recent demands-to exclu­de the pos­si­bi­li­ty of Ukrai­ne beco­m­ing a mem­ber of NATO -met with a firm refu­sal by NATO and its mem­bers, many of them also EU Mem­ber Sta­tes, as the deman­ds under­mi­ne nati­ons’ rights to self-determination and free choice of alli­an­ces, both for NATO coun­tries and aspi­ring sta­tes. Howe­ver, while NATO’s 2008 Bucha­rest sum­mit decla­ra­ti­on sta­ted that both Ukrai­ne and Geor­gia will beco­me NATO mem­bers, their NATO mem­bers­hip has not mate­ria­li­sed, as NATO was reluc­tant to trig­ger fur­ther Rus­si­an aggres­si­on and has not gran­ted them the Mem­bers­hip Action Plan, the next step on the mem­bers­hip path for the two countries.

The Coun­cil of the Euro­pean Uni­on dis­cus­sed the Euro­pean secu­ri­ty situa­ti­on on 24 Janu­a­ry 2022 and appro­ved con­clu­si­ons which empha­sis­ed the indi­vi­si­bi­li­ty of Euro­pean secu­ri­ty: ‘Any chal­len­ge to the Euro­pean secu­ri­ty order affects the secu­ri­ty of the EU and its Mem­ber Sta­tes’. The Coun­cil rejec­ted noti­ons of ’sphe­res of influ­ence’, con­dem­ned Russia’s con­ti­nued aggres­si­ve actions and thre­ats against Ukrai­ne and cal­led on Rus­sia to de-escalate, abi­de by inter­na­tio­nal law and enga­ge con­struc­tively in dialogue.The Coun­cil rei­tera­ted the Euro­pean Coun­cil con­clu­si­ons of 16 Decem­ber 2021, sta­ting ‘that any fur­ther mili­ta­ry aggres­si­on by Rus­sia against Ukrai­ne will have mas­si­ve con­se­quen­ces and seve­re costs’.

[…]

Diplo­ma­tie actions

The above-mentioned actions were fol­lo­wed by a seri­es of diplo­ma­tic exch­an­ges around New Year.

On 17 Decem­ber 2021, Rus­sia deman­ded bin­ding gua­ran­tees that Ukrai­ne and Geor­gia will not beco­me NATO mem­bers, as well as limi­ta­ti­ons on NATO’s mili­ta­ry pre­sence in eas­tern and cen­tral Euro­pean coun­tries which alrea­dy belong to the Alli­an­ce. The Rus­si­an and Ame­ri­can pre­si­dents tal­ked by pho­ne on 30 Decem­ber 2021, and agreed on a set of mee­tings which took place during the second week of 2022. The­se inclu­ded: the US-Russia Stra­te­gic Sta­bi­li­ty Dia­lo­gue (SSD) in Gene­va on 10 Janu­a­ry 2022, a con­ti­nua­tion of a secu­ri­ty dia­lo­gue crea­ted in June 2021 to address arms-control and risk-reduction mea­su­res; the NATO-Russia Coun­cil in Brussels on 12 Janu­a­ry and the OSCE’s Per­ma­nent Coun­cil mee­ting in Vien­na on 13 Janu­a­ry. During the­se mee­tings, Russia’s initi­al requests, equa­ting to Putin’s red lines, were rejec­ted by the Wes­tern coun­tries. The NATO allies pro­po­sed a dia­lo­gue on arms con­trol, mili­ta­ry trans­pa­ren­cy, and pre­ven­ting mili­ta­ry inci­dents; this was asses­sed by Rus­sia as not suf­fi­ci­ent, addres­sing only topics of secon­da­ry inte­rest to the country.

During bila­te­ral talks with Rus­sia, the United Sta­tes coor­di­na­ted its posi­ti­on with Ukrai­ne and Euro­pean allies and exclu­ded dis­cus­sing Euro­pean secu­ri­ty without Euro­pean allies and part­ners, as sta­ted by the US Depu­ty Secreta­ry of Sta­te, Wen­dy Sher­man. This was pre­ce­ded by EU High Repre­sen­ta­ti­ve Josep Borrell’s state­ment, which under­li­ned the need to invol­ve the EU in the talks-an aim in clear con­trast to Vla­di­mir Putin’s wil­ling­ness to return to Cold War bi-polar logic, in which only Rus­sia and the US would be gran­ted a place in nego­tia­ti­ons. HR/VP Bor­rell visi­ted Ukrai­ne from 4 to 6 Janu­a­ry. In eas­tern Ukrai­ne, he reaf­fir­med the EU’s ‘full sup­port to Ukraine’s inde­pen­dence, sov­er­eig­n­ty and ter­ri­to­ri­al inte­gri­ty’, adding that the main pur­po­se is to de-escalate through both nego­tia­ti­ons and ’strong stands and firm posi­tons on sup­por­ting Ukrai­ne’. He also decla­red that ‘the­re is no secu­ri­ty in Euro­pe without the secu­ri­ty of Ukrai­ne’. The ‘Gym­nich’ for­mat, infor­mal mee­tings of EU for­eign minis­ters, took place on 13and 14 Janu­a­ry 2022, and recon­fir­med this poli­cy based on two cour­ses of action: a strong deter­mi­na­ti­on to intro­du­ce ‘large-scale sanc­tions in the event of any vio­la­ti­on of Ukraine’s ter­ri­to­ri­al inte­gri­ty’; and con­ti­nua­tion of diplo­ma­tic talks with Rus­sia, inclu­ding in the ‘Nor­man­dy format’.

The diplo­ma­tic pro­cess con­ti­nued with Ger­man For­eign Minis­ter Anna­le­na Baerbock’s visit to Moscow on 18 Janu­a­ry and the mee­ting bet­ween US Secreta­ry of Sta­te Ant­o­ny Blin­ken and Rus­si­an For­eign Minis­ter Ser­gey Lav­rov in Gene­va on 21 Janu­a­ry 2022. Fur­ther diplo­ma­tic exch­an­ges are expec­ted, and the OSCE’s Polish pre­si­den­cy is plan­ning to visit Washing­ton, Kiev and Moscow to con­ti­nue talks during Febru­a­ry, an initia­ti­ve wel­co­med by Russia.

NATO reac­tion

Fol­lowing the NATO-Russia Coun­cil on 12 Janu­a­ry 2022, NATO’s Secretary-General reaf­fir­med NATO’s open door poli­cy, as each nati­on has the right to choo­se its secu­ri­ty arran­ge­ments. NATO cal­led on Rus­sia to de-escalate immedia­te­ly and to refrain from aggres­si­ve and malign beha­viour. On 30 Novem­ber 2021, NATO’s Secretary-General and for­eign minis­ters rei­tera­ted NATO’s sup­port for Ukraine’s path towards mem­bers­hip and fur­ther Euro-Atlantic inte­gra­ti­on. On top of the prac­ti­cal sup­port Ukrai­ne has recei­ved, inclu­ding trust funds, equip­ment and trai­ning, the Secretary-General sta­ted that ‘any future Rus­si­an aggres­si­on against Ukrai­ne would come at a high pri­ce’. In a sub­se­quent mee­ting of NATO’s for­eign minis­ters with the repre­sen­ta­ti­ves of Ukrai­ne and Geor­gia on 1 Decem­ber, the minis­ters dis­mis­sed the con­cept of Russia’s sphe­re of influ­ence over inde­pen­dent sov­er­eign sta­tes, such as Ukrai­ne, which they deemed to be unacceptable.

[…]

US reac­tions

During a pho­ne con­ver­sa­ti­on on 2 Janu­a­ry 2022 bet­ween the US and Ukrai­ni­an pre­si­dents, Pre­si­dent Biden decla­red that the US and its allies ‘will respond decisi­ve­ly if Rus­sia fur­ther inva­des Ukrai­ne’. Alrea­dy during his can­di­da­cy, Joe Biden was outs­po­ken about Ukraine’s role in US for­eign poli­cy and ack­now­led­ged the pos­si­bi­li­ty of pro­vi­ding secu­ri­ty assi­s­tance and wea­pons. Pre­si­dent Zelen­skyy visi­ted Washing­ton in Sep­tem­ber 2021 and met Pre­si­dent Biden. The Joint State­ment on the US-Ukraine Stra­te­gic Part­ners­hip reaf­fir­med US sup­port for ‘Ukraine’s right to deci­de its own future for­eign poli­cy cour­se free from out­side inter­fe­rence, inclu­ding with respect to Ukraine’s aspi­ra­ti­ons to join NATO’. Moreo­ver, Pre­si­dent Biden announ­ced a US$60 mil­li­on secu­ri­ty assi­s­tance packa­ge, inclu­ding addi­tio­nal Jave­lin anti-armour sys­tems and forth­co­m­ing joint hard­ware pro­duc­tion through Ukro­boron­prom. Washing­ton reco­gni­s­es Ukrai­ne as ‘cen­tral to the glo­bal strugg­le bet­ween demo­cra­cy and auto­cra­cy’. In late Decem­ber 2021, defen­si­ve mili­ta­ry aid worth US$200 mil­li­on was appro­ved, with deli­ve­ries alrea­dy arri­ving. In Janu­a­ry 2022, the US appro­ved the sen­ding of American-made anti-tank and anti-aircraft mis­si­les to Ukrai­ne by the Bal­tic States.

src: EU Par­lia­ment Brie­fing “EU-Ukraine rela­ti­ons and the security
situa­ti­on in the coun­try” 02.02.2022

Fuck­ing Schwei­ne, Arsch­lö­cher, Lüg­ner, Säue, Wich­ser, Arsch­lö­cher, Wich­ser, Wich­ser, Wichser.

Aber dank der Inter­ven­ti­on der Hoo­ver insti­tu­ti­on, die acht Tage nach Kriegs­be­ginn das Epis­tem gezim­mert hat, das DAS garan­tiert nicht der Grund für ein Ein­marsch Russ­lands war - oder die fuck­ing Stin­ger und Jave­lins die seit Okto­ber im Don­bas im Ein­satz waren, wis­sen wir dass der Papst nur ein ver­rück­ter Spin­ner ist, wenn er davon spricht, dass ihn Staats­ober­häup­ter vor­ge­warnt hät­ten, dass Russ­land pro­vo­ziert wer­den sollte.

Fuck­ing scheiß Gesellschaft.

Was für ein ver­damm­tes dis­trac­tion play. “Wir las­sen den Ein­fluss in unse­rer geo­po­li­ti­schen Sphä­re nicht zu.” Seit den FUCKING Neun­zi­gern - das sel­be Argu­ment. Der sel­be Selen­skyj der sich mal für mal zurück­neh­men muss­te, da der nächs­te Schritt im Nato Auf­nah­me­ver­fah­ren EXPLIZIT “um kei­nen Kon­flikt zu pro­vo­zie­ren” nicht ange­bo­ten wur­de. Dann Regie­rungs­wech­sel in den USA - UND PLÖTZLICH - “we reject the noti­on, that Rus­sia has any right to a geo­po­li­ti­cal sphe­re of influ­ence”. Weil freie Demo­kra­tien frei ent­schei­den kön­nen, müs­sen, sol­len, dür­fen. Wegen Wer­ten. Nie­mals in der ver­fick­ten Geschich­te von Geo­stra­te­gie hat irgend­et­was auch nur ähn­li­ches, auch nur annä­hernd eine Rol­le gespielt. Aber nein, ganz klar, das ist jetzt das domi­nan­te Nar­ra­tiv, dar­an muss man schon glauben.

Ich bin in einer Welt auf­ge­wacht, in der mit Soap Logik Tages­po­li­tik gemacht wird. Weil sichs die Hoo­ver Insti­tu­ti­on und das Atlan­tic Coun­cil für die Medi­en aus­ge­dacht haben, und die das seit dem ver­brei­ten wie eine Eins.

Die­se Gesell­schaft ist das Allerletzte.

Atlan­tic Coun­cil - 2006:

The Inter­agen­cy System:

Domestic reforms are of key impor­t­ance to the EU-Ukraine and NATO-Ukraine action plans. Suc­cess­ful poli­cy­ma­king requi­res inte­gra­ti­on of for­eign and domestic poli­cy, as well as eco­no­mic and social poli­cy with secu­ri­ty and defen­se issu­es. Imple­men­ting the EU-Ukraine and NATO-Ukraine plans, and poten­ti­al­ly NATO mem­ber agree­ments and/or the EU acquis com­mu­ni­taire in the future, will be a com­plex pro­cess. It will requi­re con­sen­sus bet­ween the pre­si­dent and prime minis­ter, as well as sup­port from a working majo­ri­ty in the Rada. Moreo­ver, the­re must be skil­led coor­di­na­ti­on across the Ukrai­ni­an government. This requi­res a strong, accep­ted, and empowe­red inter­agen­cy coor­di­na­ting mechanism.

Goals of an Inter­agen­cy System

A suc­cess­ful inter­agen­cy pro­cess - be it in Ukrai­ne, the United Sta­tes, or a Wes­tern Euro­pean coun­try - needs to accom­plish several tasks. In par­ti­cu­lar, it should:

• Deli­ne­a­te clear lines of respon­si­bi­li­ty. Minis­tries and agen­ci­es should have an unam­bi­guous idea as to which part of the inter­agen­cy sys­tem is the venue for addres­sing a par­ti­cu­lar issue.

• Give each minis­try and agen­cy that has an equi­ty in a par­ti­cu­lar ques­ti­on an oppor­tu­ni­ty to pre­sent its poli­cy view. Invol­ving bureau­cra­tic play­ers in an inclu­si­ve pro­cess incre­a­ses the pro­spects of secu­ring bureau­cra­tic “buy-in” to poli­cy decisi­ons, even if a minis­try or agency’s desi­red opti­on ulti­mate­ly is not chosen.

• Pre­sent poli­cy­ma­kers with the ran­ge of via­ble poli­cy opti­ons in an even and balan­ced man­ner, without undu­ly skewing the field in favor of one recom­men­da­ti­on or ano­t­her. This hel­ps to ensu­re that poli­cy­ma­kers are able to make ful­ly infor­med decisions.

• Be capa­ble of moni­to­ring imple­men­ta­ti­on of poli­cy decisi­ons once taken. This pro­vi­des for necessa­ry follow-up and, if imple­men­ta­ti­on lags, ensu­res that the seni­or lea­ders­hip is made aware.

• Encou­ra­ge reso­lu­ti­on of inter­agen­cy poli­cy dis­pu­tes at lower levels, pre­ser­ving the time of seni­or lea­ders for resol­ving tho­se issu­es that defy reso­lu­ti­on. This also allows time for seni­or lea­ders to review major poli­cy decisi­ons that are agreed at lower levels but, becau­se of their impor­t­ance, requi­re senior-level validation.

In the United Sta­tes, inter­agen­cy coor­di­na­ti­on is mana­ged by the Natio­nal Secu­ri­ty Coun­cil staff. The NSC staff is hea­ded by the natio­nal secu­ri­ty advi­sor and is a part of the Exe­cu­ti­ve Office of the Pre­si­dent. (The struc­tu­re of the U.S. inter­agen­cy coor­di­na­ting sys­tem is descri­bed below in Chart #1.) When the U.S. inter­agen­cy sys­tem works pro­per­ly, it accom­plis­hes the five tasks descri­bed above.

• The struc­tu­re, inclu­ding regio­nal and func­tio­n­al inter­agen­cy groups, or poli­cy coor­di­na­ting com­mit­tees (PCCs), is estab­lis­hed and well known; when an issue ari­ses, it is almost always clear at the out­set which PCC has responsibility.

• The mem­bers­hip of most inter­agen­cy groups is inclu­si­ve, so that all depart­ments or agen­ci­es with an inte­rest in a par­ti­cu­lar natio­nal secu­ri­ty issue gene­ral­ly par­ti­ci­pa­te in the rele­vant PCC. They thus have an oppor­tu­ni­ty to weigh in with their view.

• When agen­ci­es dif­fer, a ran­ge of opti­ons is for­war­ded to poli­cy­ma­kers at the next hig­her level with a descrip­ti­on of the pros and cons of each.

• Inter­agen­cy groups, usual­ly at the PCC level, are used to moni­tor imple­men­ta­ti­on of pre­si­den­ti­al policy.

• The sys­tem tends to work issu­es first at lower levels, eit­her in a PCC or sub-PCC. If agree­ment can­not be reached the­re, the issue is moved up the chain to the Depu­ties Com­mit­tee and, if necessa­ry, the Princi­pals Com­mit­tee. Sub-PCCs and PCCs often can reach inter­agen­cy agree­ment, which pre­ser­ves the time of more seni­or offi­cials for tougher issues.

Ukraine’s Inter­agen­cy Sys­tem for Euro-Atlantic Issues

The exe­cu­ti­ve branch mecha­nisms in Ukrai­ne respon­si­ble for coor­di­na­ting Euro-Atlantic inte­gra­ti­on have evol­ved sin­ce Yush­chen­ko beca­me pre­si­dent. Howe­ver, they will have to evol­ve fur­ther to accom­mo­da­te the con­sti­tu­tio­nal chan­ges appro­ved in Decem­ber 2004, which are being imple­men­ted in the first part of 2006. Tho­se chan­ges - descri­bed in grea­ter detail on page 10 of this paper - will give the prime minis­ter grea­ter inde­pen­dence from the pre­si­dent and sub­stan­ti­al­ly expan­ded aut­ho­ri­ty. Euro-Atlantic inte­gra­ti­on, to be pur­sued effec­tively, will then requi­re a con­sen­sus bet­ween the pre­si­dent and prime minister.

The Natio­nal Secu­ri­ty and Defen­se Coun­cil (NSDC) is, accord­ing to the Ukrai­ni­an con­sti­tu­ti­on, the pre­mier coor­di­na­ting body for Ukrai­ni­an natio­nal secu­ri­ty and defen­se issu­es. Arti­cle 107 of the con­sti­tu­ti­on pro­vi­des that the NSDC, under the chair­manship of the pre­si­dent, “coor­di­na­tes and con­trols [moni­tors]” exe­cu­ti­ve branch agen­ci­es in the area of natio­nal secu­ri­ty and defen­se. Arti­cle 107 does not char­ge the NSDC with pri­ma­ry respon­si­bi­li­ty for coor­di­na­ting for­eign poli­cy; the For­eign Minis­try has that respon­si­bi­li­ty. The NSDC inclu­des the prime minis­ter; the minis­ters of defen­se, inter­nal affairs, and for­eign affairs; the head of the Secu­ri­ty Ser­vice of Ukrai­ne; and addi­tio­nal mem­bers appoin­ted by the pre­si­dent. In Decem­ber 2005, Yush­chen­ko appoin­ted Pro­se­cu­tor Gene­ral Olek­san­der Med­ve­d­ko, Pre­si­den­ti­al Secre­ta­ri­at head Oleg Ryba­chuk, and Health Minis­ter Yuriy Polyachen­ko to the NSDC.

The NSDC reports to the pre­si­dent but is sepa­ra­te from the pre­si­den­ti­al secre­ta­ri­at. The secre­ta­ri­at inclu­des advi­sors to the pre­si­dent on both for­eign poli­cy and defen­se issu­es; they ser­ve as the president’s per­so­nal staff on the­se issu­es, per­forming ana­ly­ti­cal work, making poli­cy pro­po­sals, and assis­ting with coor­di­na­ti­on on for­eign affairs, defen­se, and natio­nal secu­ri­ty issu­es. For com­pa­ri­son, the pri­ma­ry func­tions of the U.S. NSC staff - coor­di­na­ting inter­agen­cy poli­cy, ensu­ring imple­men­ta­ti­on of pre­si­den­ti­al poli­cy, and staf­fing the pre­si­dent - are per­for­med in Ukrai­ne by both the NSDC and the pre­si­den­ti­al secretariat.

The NSDC’s port­fo­lio in rea­li­ty extends well bey­ond tra­di­tio­nal natio­nal secu­ri­ty and defen­se issu­es. In April 2005, a seni­or NSDC offi­cial esti­ma­ted that the Council’s staff spent about 50 per­cent of its time on natio­nal secu­ri­ty, defen­se, and for­eign poli­cy issu­es, and 50 per­cent on domestic issu­es. The lat­ter inclu­ded admi­nis­tra­ti­ve reform, the sta­te bud­get, and reform of the ener­gy sec­tor. While this may have reflec­ted in part the pre­fe­ren­ces of Petro Poro­s­hen­ko, who was NSDC secreta­ry from February-September 2005, the NSDC has in the past regu­lar­ly invol­ved its­elf on domestic mat­ters, and will likely con­ti­nue to do so under Ana­to­liy Kin­akh, its cur­rent secreta­ry and a for­mer prime minister.

Bey­ond the NSDC, the Government Com­mit­tee on Euro­pean and Euro-Atlantic Inte­gra­ti­on is spe­ci­fi­cal­ly tas­ked with coor­di­na­ting Euro-Atlantic inte­gra­ti­on poli­cy. This body was crea­ted to ensu­re that all parts of the exe­cu­ti­ve branch were enga­ged on Euro-Atlantic inte­gra­ti­on, for examp­le, by making sure that each minis­try and agency’s bud­get request reflec­ted Euro-Atlantic issu­es. The Government Com­mit­tee comes under the Cabi­net of Minis­ters and is char­ged with defi­ning and imple­men­ting poli­ci­es accord­ing to the stra­te­gy deli­ne­a­ted by the Cabi­net. The for­eign minis­ter chairs this com­mit­tee, which also inclu­des the minis­ters of defen­se, eco­no­my, inter­nal affairs, finan­ce, and jus­ti­ce plus the head of the Sta­te Cus­toms Service.

As of Janu­a­ry 2006, the Cabi­net of Minis­ters was con­si­de­ring pro­po­sing to the pre­si­dent the estab­lish­ment of an Inter­agen­cy Com­mis­si­on of Natio­nal Coor­di­na­tors for Euro-Atlantic Inte­gra­ti­on. This would be chai­red by a depu­ty for­eign minis­ter, which would mean it would rank lower in the bureau­cra­tic hier­ar­chy than the Government Com­mit­tee on Euro­pean and Euro-Atlantic Inte­gra­ti­on. This body would focus on NATO-Ukraine issu­es; a seri­es of inter­agen­cy working groups, orga­ni­zed around key NATO ques­ti­ons and chai­red by depu­ty minis­ters, would be sub­or­di­na­te to the Com­mis­si­on. Howe­ver, it is not clear that the Inter­agen­cy Com­mis­si­on would be direct­ly sub­or­di­na­te to the Government Com­mit­tee. In a Novem­ber 2005 dis­cus­sion, a seni­or Minis­try of Defen­se offi­cial sug­gested that, while the Government Com­mit­tee reports to the Cabi­net of Minis­ters, the Inter­agen­cy Com­mis­si­on might report to the pre­si­dent (pres­um­a­b­ly through the NSDC). Other Ukrai­ni­an offi­cials have sug­gested the Com­mis­si­on would report direct­ly to the Cabi­net of Minis­ters, but not necessa­ri­ly through the Government Committee.

The struc­tu­re for coor­di­na­ting Euro-Atlantic inte­gra­ti­on poli­cy thus is not clear at this time. Adding to the mix, Yush­chen­ko has signed decrees assigning the For­eign Minis­try prime respon­si­bi­li­ties for coor­di­na­ting (as well as imple­men­ting) for­eign poli­cy. For examp­le, a Novem­ber 2005 decree gave the For­eign Minis­try respon­si­bi­li­ty for coor­di­na­ting mea­su­res taken by exe­cu­ti­ve branch organs rela­ted to Euro-Atlantic inte­gra­ti­on. In addi­ti­on, the legal basis for for­eign policy-making is dated, as the under­ly­ing law is a 1993 Rada reso­lu­ti­on “On the Basic Direc­tions of Ukrai­ni­an For­eign Policy.”

The­re has been some con­so­li­da­ti­on in the exe­cu­ti­ve branch struc­tu­re. Yush­chen­ko eli­mi­na­ted the posi­ti­on of depu­ty prime minis­ter for Euro­pean inte­gra­ti­on that he had crea­ted in Febru­a­ry 2005. Ori­gi­nal­ly held by Ryba­chuk (cur­r­ent­ly the head of the pre­si­den­ti­al secre­ta­ri­at), the depu­ty prime minis­ter posi­ti­on had respon­si­bi­li­ty for over­see­ing government-wide efforts to draw clo­ser to the Euro­pean Uni­on, while the For­eign Minis­try under For­eign Minis­ter Borys Tara­syuk had the lead on issu­es rela­ted to NATO. The divi­si­on was not clear-cut; the For­eign Minis­try main­tai­ned important respon­si­bi­li­ties for coor­di­na­ting ques­ti­ons regar­ding the Euro­pean Union.

The secre­ta­ri­at of the Cabi­net of Minis­ters’ Depart­ment for Euro­pean Inte­gra­ti­on repor­ted to then-Deputy Prime Minis­ter Ryba­chuk in February-September 2005. With the aboli­ti­on of the depu­ty prime minister’s posi­ti­on, the secre­ta­ri­at now comes under the Cabi­net of Minis­ters, though its long-term sta­tus is unclear. In ano­t­her con­so­li­da­ting move, Yush­chen­ko in Novem­ber 2005 issued a decree aboli­shing the Sta­te Coun­cil on Euro­pean and Euro-Atlantic Inte­gra­ti­on of Ukrai­ne. The coun­cil had repor­ted direct­ly to the pre­si­dent, in par­al­lel to rather than through the NSDC.

Alt­hough it goes bey­ond the scope of this paper, which focu­ses on exe­cu­ti­ve branch mecha­nisms, the Rada, in par­ti­cu­lar its For­eign Affairs and Euro­pean Inte­gra­ti­on Com­mit­tees, also plays an important role on Euro-Atlantic inte­gra­ti­on poli­cy. The exe­cu­ti­ve branch will have to ensu­re good links to the Rada to faci­li­ta­te Rada sup­port and pas­sa­ge of legis­la­ti­on to advan­ce Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic course.

Weak­nes­ses of the Cur­rent System

A com­pa­ri­son to the five tasks iden­ti­fied as necessa­ry for an effec­ti­ve inter­agen­cy coor­di­na­ting sys­tem reve­als a num­ber of weak­nes­ses in the Ukrai­ni­an system.

First, the Ukrai­ni­an struc­tu­re does not clear­ly deli­ne­a­te lines of respon­si­bi­li­ty, crea­ting con­fu­si­on about which body is the appro­pria­te venue for hand­ling a par­ti­cu­lar pro­blem. It appears that the­re will be a choice, at least bet­ween the Government Com­mit­tee on Euro­pean and Euro-Atlantic Inte­gra­ti­on and the Inter­agen­cy Com­mis­si­on of Natio­nal Coor­di­na­tors for Euro-Atlantic Inte­gra­ti­on. And while the lat­ter body, hea­ded by a depu­ty for­eign minis­ter, appears to be juni­or to the for­mer, hea­ded by the for­eign minis­ter, it is not clear that the Com­mis­si­on would in fact be direct­ly sub­or­di­na­te to the Com­mit­tee. This rai­ses the pos­si­bi­li­ty of par­al­lel, com­pe­ting struc­tures. Fur­ther­mo­re, it is not obvious how the work of the­se inter­agen­cy bodies will rela­te to the For­eign Ministry’s assi­gned coor­di­na­ti­on efforts. Unclear divi­si­on of and/or over­lap­ping respon­si­bi­li­ties crea­te pos­si­bi­li­ties for was­ted time, poli­cy dis­con­nects, and even con­tra­dic­to­ry decisions.

Second, the cur­rent struc­tu­re may also give the For­eign Minis­try too much respon­si­bi­li­ty for inter­agen­cy coor­di­na­ti­on. The­re is no ques­ti­on that the For­eign Minis­try should lead on mana­ging the imple­men­ta­ti­on of for­eign poli­cy. Moreo­ver, the appa­rent shift in rela­ti­ve weight for deve­lo­ping for­eign poli­cy from the pre­si­den­ti­al secre­ta­ri­at to the For­eign Minis­try that took place during Yushchenko’s first mon­ths in office is a pru­dent move for sen­si­ble poli­cy­ma­king. But it may be wiser for an over­ar­ching body such as the NSDC - rather than the For­eign Minis­try, which is also an imple­men­ting agen­cy - to have the broa­der respon­si­bi­li­ty for coor­di­na­ti­on among all minis­tries and agen­ci­es. It can be more dif­fi­cult for a minis­try, which is advo­ca­ting its own pre­fer­red poli­cy view, to ensu­re that all opti­ons are con­vey­ed to seni­or lea­ders in a fair and balan­ced way.

Third, it is not clear whe­ther the cur­rent struc­tu­re pro­vi­des all minis­tries and agen­ci­es that have an equi­ty in a par­ti­cu­lar ques­ti­on the oppor­tu­ni­ty to pre­sent their views on that ques­ti­on. The Government Com­mit­tee cer­tain­ly inclu­des key minis­try and agen­cy heads: the minis­ters of defen­se, eco­no­my, inter­nal affairs, finan­ce, and jus­ti­ce; the head of the cus­toms agen­cy; and the for­eign minis­ter. But will the Com­mit­tee coor­di­na­te the Euro-Atlantic inte­gra­ti­on efforts of other minis­tries as well? The­se inclu­de such minis­tries as Agrari­an Poli­cy (a major issue for EU-Ukraine rela­ti­ons will be how Ukraine’s agri­cul­tu­ral sec­tor rela­tes to the Euro­pean Uni­on and its Com­mon Agri­cul­tu­ral Poli­cy); Fuel and Ener­gy (ano­t­her major sub­ject, high­ligh­ted by the recent Ukrainian-Russian gas dis­pu­te and its poten­ti­al impact on gas flows to Wes­tern Euro­pe); and Labor and Social Poli­cy (given the gro­wing har­mo­niz­a­ti­on of EU labor and social prac­ti­ces). The­se and other minis­tries need to be enga­ged as a nor­mal part of the inter­agen­cy coor­di­na­ti­on pro­cess, lest the­re be cri­ti­cal gaps in Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic inte­gra­ti­on effort.

Fourth, the­re are ques­ti­ons as to whe­ther the cur­rent Ukrai­ni­an struc­tu­re is able to ensu­re that, when the­re is an inter­agen­cy dis­pu­te, seni­or poli­cy­ma­kers recei­ve the full ran­ge of via­ble poli­cy opti­ons pre­sen­ted in a balan­ced man­ner. The pre­si­dent will be the ulti­ma­te judge of the opti­ons that he recei­ves and whe­ther he is well-served. Much will depend on the NSDC secreta­ry and his approach: will he tre­at all opti­ons even­ly, or will his pre­sen­ta­ti­ons pre­ju­di­ce the choice in favor of his own pre­fe­rence? During Poroshenko’s ten­u­re as NSDC secreta­ry, the NSDC and Cabi­net appeared to regard one ano­t­her as com­pe­ti­tors rather than col­la­bo­ra­tors in shaping government poli­cy, reflec­ting the in-fighting bet­ween Poro­s­hen­ko and Tymos­hen­ko. The NSDC laun­ched some initia­ti­ves with litt­le coor­di­na­ti­on. For examp­le, during spring 2005, the NSDC con­cei­ved and laun­ched a new initia­ti­ve to address the long-simmering Trans­nis­tria dis­pu­te in neigh­bo­ring Mol­d­o­va with litt­le appa­rent input from the For­eign Ministry.

Final­ly, the Ukrai­ni­an sys­tem does not encou­ra­ge the reso­lu­ti­on of inter­agen­cy poli­cy dis­pu­tes at lower levels of the bureau­cra­cy, as the lowest-ranking mecha­nism ope­ra­tes at the depu­ty minis­ter level. Seni­or For­eign Minis­try offi­cials have tried to devol­ve aut­ho­ri­ty down to the level of depart­ment heads, but other minis­tries insis­ted that coor­di­na­ti­on take place at the level of depu­ty minis­ters. As a result, the Ukrai­ni­an sys­tem appears to have no equi­va­lent to the PCC and sub-PCC struc­tu­re in the U.S. model that would allow dis­cus­sion of issu­es and pre­pa­ra­ti­on of poli­cy opti­ons at levels below that of depu­ty minis­ter and minis­ter. This crea­tes a situa­ti­on in which depu­ty minis­ters (and their bos­ses) end up doing coor­di­na­ti­on work that could be accom­plis­hed at lower levels, pre­ser­ving their time for other issues.

The Forth­co­m­ing Con­sti­tu­tio­nal Changes

The Ukrai­ni­an inter­agen­cy coor­di­na­ting sys­tem will be fur­ther chal­len­ged by the con­sti­tu­tio­nal chan­ges that began to come into effect on Janu­a­ry 1, 2006. The­se will signi­fi­cant­ly alter the balan­ce of power bet­ween the pre­si­dent and the Rada, and the balan­ce of exe­cu­ti­ve power bet­ween the pre­si­dent and the prime minis­ter. In both cases, the president’s aut­ho­ri­ty will be diminished.

This move away from the kind of super-presidency model that deve­lo­ped during the Kuch­ma years will intro­du­ce grea­ter checks and balan­ces into the Ukrai­ni­an government and poli­ti­cal sys­tem. This could very well be a posi­ti­ve deve­lo­p­ment for Euro-Atlantic inte­gra­ti­on, as evi­den­ced by the expe­ri­ence of the coun­tries of Cen­tral and Eas­tern Euro­pe that have recent­ly joi­ned NATO and the Euro­pean Uni­on after imple­men­ting major demo­cra­tic and eco­no­mic reforms. In most cases, par­lia­ment was the pri­ma­ry branch of government, as oppo­sed to the super-presidency model more com­mon in the for­mer Soviet space.

Pri­or to the 2006 con­sti­tu­tio­nal reforms, the Ukrai­ni­an pre­si­dent nomi­na­ted the prime minis­ter, who then had to be appro­ved by the Rada, and the pre­si­dent appoin­ted all minis­ters. When the con­sti­tu­tio­nal chan­ges take full effect with the March Rada elec­tions, the Rada will choo­se the prime minis­ter. In addi­ti­on to acqui­ring inde­pen­dence from the pre­si­dent, the prime minis­ter will have grea­ter aut­ho­ri­ty; he or she will appoint all minis­ters and seni­or agen­cy heads except for the for­eign and defen­se minis­ters, heads of the secu­ri­ty ser­vice and Natio­nal Bank of Ukrai­ne, pro­se­cu­tor gene­ral, and NSDC secreta­ry. Thus, most minis­ters will be named by, and pres­um­a­b­ly be more behol­den to, the prime minister.

This form of co-habitation bet­ween the pre­si­dent and prime minis­ter will add a new lay­er of com­ple­xi­ty to inter­agen­cy coor­di­na­ti­on in Ukrai­ne. For examp­le, the con­sti­tu­ti­on requi­res that many pre­si­den­ti­al decrees be coun­ter­si­gned by the prime minis­ter and rele­vant minis­ter. This pre­sen­ted litt­le pro­blem when the prime minis­ter and minis­ters ser­ved at the plea­su­re of the pre­si­dent. And it pres­um­a­b­ly will pre­sent litt­le pro­blem if the new prime minis­ter comes from Yushchenko’s poli­ti­cal par­ty, Our Ukrai­ne. That by no means is a given. Once the chan­ges are in place, and if the Rada choo­ses someo­ne other than a mem­ber of Our Ukrai­ne to be prime minis­ter, Yush­chen­ko will need to find ways to secu­re the prime minister’s sup­port for his poli­cy cour­se and con­sent to pre­si­den­ti­al decrees. Absent a mee­ting of the minds on a Euro-Atlantic inte­gra­ti­on cour­se bet­ween Yush­chen­ko and the prime minis­ter, this new power arran­ge­ment could pro­ve a for­mu­la for stale­ma­te that no coor­di­na­ti­on mecha­nism could overcome.

Thus, a clear under­stan­ding on Euro-Atlantic inte­gra­ti­on issu­es bet­ween the pre­si­dent and prime minis­ter will be even more important for a cohe­rent poli­cy cour­se toward the Euro­pean Uni­on and NATO. One key ele­ment to imple­men­ting such an under­stan­ding is to have an effec­ti­ve struc­tu­re in place for coor­di­na­ti­on bet­ween the pre­si­dent and prime minis­ter, as well as among all the various minis­tries and agencies.

Recom­men­da­ti­ons

The weak­nes­ses of the Ukrai­ni­an poli­cy coor­di­na­ti­on sys­tem could well com­pli­ca­te Ukraine’s abi­li­ty to deve­lop and imple­ment a cohe­rent approach to Euro-Atlantic insti­tu­ti­ons. The Ukrai­ni­an sys­tem will be fur­ther chal­len­ged once the prime minis­ter gains grea­ter inde­pen­dence and aut­ho­ri­ty. Ukrai­ni­an offi­cials should begin to con­si­der now, even befo­re the con­sti­tu­tio­nal reforms are ful­ly imple­men­ted and the Rada elec­tions take place, how to recon­fi­gu­re their struc­tu­re to faci­li­ta­te effec­ti­ve poli­cy coor­di­na­ti­on on Euro-Atlantic issu­es. In par­ti­cu­lar, they should con­si­der the fol­lowing chan­ges to the cur­rent poli­cy coor­di­na­ti­on structure:

• The Natio­nal Secu­ri­ty and Defen­se Coun­cil should be the seni­or policy-coordinating body for Euro-Atlantic ques­ti­ons. It pro­vi­des the logi­cal mecha­nism for coor­di­na­ti­on bet­ween the pre­si­dent and the prime minis­ter, as the NSDC is chai­red by the pre­si­dent with the prime minis­ter as a key mem­ber. When the NSDC con­si­ders Euro-Atlantic issu­es, mem­bers­hip on the body should be expan­ded to inclu­de all minis­ters who are invol­ved in or affec­ted by poli­ci­es desi­gned to draw Ukrai­ne clo­ser to the Euro­pean Uni­on and NATO. In terms fami­li­ar to Ame­ri­cans, an NSDC ses­si­on would be the equi­va­lent of a full Natio­nal Secu­ri­ty Coun­cil mee­ting chai­red by the president.

• The Government Com­mit­tee on Euro­pean and Euro-Atlantic Inte­gra­ti­on should be retai­ned, but the Ukrai­ni­ans should con­si­der two princi­pal chan­ges. First, the Com­mit­tee should be made sub­or­di­na­te to the NSDC rather than the Cabi­net of Minis­ters, as the Com­mit­tee will have to pre­pa­re poli­cy opti­ons and recom­men­da­ti­ons not just for the prime minis­ter, but for the pre­si­dent as well (sin­ce he will still retain lead respon­si­bi­li­ties in the for­eign and secu­ri­ty poli­cy are­as). Second, the Com­mit­tee should be chai­red by the NSDC secreta­ry. Par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on by minis­tries should be at the minis­te­ri­al level. In U.S. terms, the Com­mit­tee would then beco­me the equi­va­lent of the Princi­pals Committee.

• The Inter­agen­cy Com­mis­si­on of Natio­nal Coor­di­na­tors for Euro-Atlantic Inte­gra­ti­on should be made direct­ly sub­or­di­na­te to the Government Com­mit­tee on Euro­pean and Euro-Atlantic Inte­gra­ti­on. It should be chai­red by the seni­or depu­ty secreta­ry of the NSDC. Minis­tries should par­ti­ci­pa­te at the depu­ty minis­ter level. In U.S. terms, this would be the coun­ter­part to the Depu­ties Committee.

• To work issu­es at lower levels of the bureau­cra­cy, the Ukrai­ni­ans should regu­la­ri­ze a set of inter­agen­cy working groups sub­or­di­na­te to the Inter­agen­cy Com­mis­si­on. The­se should inclu­de groups addres­sing for­eign poli­cy issu­es; defen­se and secu­ri­ty issu­es; eco­no­mic, finan­cial, and tra­de issu­es; jus­ti­ce, rule of law, and law enfor­ce­ment issu­es; and health and social issu­es. Each group would be chai­red by an NSDC offi­cial, with appro­pria­te minis­tries repre­sen­ted by depart­ment heads or depu­ty heads (not all minis­tries would need to par­ti­ci­pa­te in all working groups; par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on would be deter­mi­ned by sub­ject mat­ter). Most inter­agen­cy coor­di­na­ti­on issu­es rela­ted to Euro-Atlantic inte­gra­ti­on should first be enga­ged at this level. The­se working groups could do preli­mi­na­ry coor­di­na­ti­on and pre­pa­ra­ti­on of poli­cy opti­ons and ther­eby take some of the bur­den off of busy minis­ters and depu­ty minis­ters; in some cases, the working groups might resol­ve dis­pu­tes and pro­du­ce con­sen­sus. The­se would be the equi­va­lent of the U.S. Poli­cy Coor­di­na­ting Committees.

With this struc­tu­re, the advi­sors in the pre­si­den­ti­al secre­ta­ri­at for for­eign poli­cy and defen­se issu­es would con­ti­nue to sup­port the pre­si­dent on Euro-Atlantic inte­gra­ti­on poli­cy, but they would shed respon­si­bi­li­ties for coor­di­na­ting inter­agen­cy poli­cy. They would stay in clo­se con­ta­ct with the NSDC secre­ta­ri­at as poli­cy ques­ti­ons were deve­lo­ped, so that they could keep the pre­si­dent infor­med on major issu­es and ensu­re that pre­si­den­ti­al views were fed into the process.

Like­wi­se, the Cabi­net of Minis­ters’ Depart­ment for Euro­pean Inte­gra­ti­on would be a par­al­lel group sup­por­ting the prime minis­ter on for­eign poli­cy and defen­se issu­es. It would have no respon­si­bi­li­ties for coor­di­na­ting inter­agen­cy poli­cy, but would main­tain clo­se con­ta­ct with the NSDC secre­ta­ri­at, kee­ping the prime minis­ter infor­med and making sure that his or her views were fed into the poli­cy process.

The struc­tu­re out­lined abo­ve for coor­di­na­ting Euro-Atlantic inte­gra­ti­on (see Chart #2 on page 15) offers several advantages:

• It would eli­mi­na­te the ambi­gui­ty and pos­si­ble over­laps in the cur­rent Ukrai­ni­an sys­tem. Ins­tead, it offers a clear hier­ar­chy, in which poli­cy issu­es move through a sin­gle, well-defined chan­nel from one level to the next.

• By regu­la­ri­zing a seri­es of working groups, this struc­tu­re would allow issu­es to be worked at levels below minis­ters and depu­ty minis­ters. Inde­ed, this is whe­re most inter­agen­cy coor­di­na­ti­on should take place, reser­ving the time of depu­ty minis­ters and minis­ters for major poli­cy issu­es or tho­se issu­es on which con­sen­sus can­not be achie­ved at the working level.

• This struc­tu­re would pro­vi­de a clear mecha­nism for coor­di­na­ting poli­cy bet­ween the pre­si­dent and the prime minis­ter. Each would have his or her advi­sors to moni­tor the deve­lo­p­ment of poli­cy as it moved up from the working group level toward the NSDC. All rele­vant minis­tries would be invol­ved at each level of the struc­tu­re. And, for tho­se issu­es that go all the way to a full NSDC mee­ting, both the pre­si­dent and prime minis­ter would be taking part.

Some may see this struc­tu­re as a dimi­nu­ti­on of the power of the Cabi­net of Minis­ters, as the NSDC - view­ed as “the president’s body” - would be the pri­ma­ry coor­di­na­ting enti­ty. Use of the NSDC makes sen­se, howe­ver, as the NSDC invol­ves both the pre­si­dent and the prime minis­ter, while the Cabi­net will be respon­si­ble to the prime minis­ter. All minis­tries, moreo­ver, would be invol­ved at all levels of the pro­po­sed coor­di­na­ti­on struc­tu­re. The pre­si­dent as chair of the NSDC might appe­ar to have a stron­ger posi­ti­on than the prime minis­ter, who is only a mem­ber of the NSDC. Howe­ver, the con­sti­tu­tio­nal requi­re­ment that the prime minis­ter and rele­vant minis­ter coun­ter­sign pre­si­den­ti­al decrees and the prime minister’s aut­ho­ri­ty over most minis­ters pro­vi­de a de fac­to check on pre­si­den­ti­al power.

For this struc­tu­re to work, it will be important that the NSDC secreta­ry be com­mit­ted to pre­sen­ting poli­cy opti­ons in a fair and balan­ced way. He or she must be, and must be seen to be, play­ing the role of “honest bro­ker.” It will also be important to ensu­re that the NSDC’s secre­ta­ri­at, as well as the Euro-Atlantic offices of the various minis­tries, are staf­fed with peop­le who under­stand what a Euro-Atlantic cour­se requi­res of Ukrai­ne. It is not enough to aspi­re to be “Euro­pean.” One must grasp the princi­ples, values, and pro­ces­ses that that ent­ails. The­re is a small but gro­wing cad­re of such experts in Ukrai­ne; they need to be empowered.

Moreo­ver, making the working groups effec­ti­ve will requi­re a sub­stan­ti­al chan­ge in Ukrai­ni­an government cul­tu­re, which cur­r­ent­ly is run “top down.” The­re will need to be a con­scious effort to encou­ra­ge initia­ti­ve, inno­va­ti­on, and decision-making at lower levels. Some seni­or offi­cials will likely resist this, fea­ring loss of their own aut­ho­ri­ty, but it is essen­ti­al if Ukrai­ne wis­hes to have a more effi­ci­ent and effec­ti­ve process.

Con­clu­si­on

Joi­ning Euro­pe” will requi­re that the pre­si­dent and prime minis­ter have a com­mon visi­on on Euro-Atlantic inte­gra­ti­on issu­es. It also will requi­re that the­re be in the new Rada a sup­por­ti­ve coali­ti­on that shares this visi­on and can com­mand a regu­lar majo­ri­ty to appro­ve necessa­ry legis­la­ti­on. And “joi­ning Euro­pe” will requi­re sup­port from a gro­wing seg­ment of the Ukrai­ni­an public; neit­her the Euro­pean Uni­on nor NATO will con­si­der ulti­mate­ly taking Ukrai­ne in without evi­dence that mem­bers­hip has the sup­port of a size­ab­le seg­ment of the Ukrai­ni­an peop­le. The expe­ri­ence of the Cen­tral and Eas­tern Euro­pean sta­tes ser­ves as an important remin­der in this regard. All of them enjoy­ed a par­lia­men­ta­ry and natio­nal con­sen­sus on the stra­te­gic objec­ti­ves of joi­ning NATO and the Euro­pean Uni­on, a con­sen­sus that has yet to coale­sce in Ukrai­ne. [Aber gut dass da schon wer dran denkt. Danach kann man immer noch demo­kra­ti­sche Mehr­hei­ten finden.]

For­ging a com­mon visi­on on Euro-Atlantic inte­gra­ti­on, ensu­ring that that visi­on is trans­la­ted into the myri­ad poli­cy decisi­ons that must be taken, and then fol­lowing up on the imple­men­ta­ti­on of tho­se decisi­ons requi­res a defi­ned, robust, and empowe­red inter­agen­cy coor­di­na­ting struc­tu­re. The struc­tu­re sug­gested in this paper would help to imple­ment a via­ble inter­agen­cy coor­di­na­ti­on pro­cess in Ukrai­ne on Euro-Atlantic issu­es. The Ukrai­ni­an government should con­si­der the­se recom­men­da­ti­ons, ide­al­ly befo­re the Rada elec­tions, as the coun­try after the bal­lot will be (right­ly) focu­sed on government for­ma­ti­on. Without such a struc­tu­re, even if the pre­si­dent and prime minis­ter see eye-to-eye on Euro-Atlantic inte­gra­ti­on fol­lowing the March elec­tions, “joi­ning Euro­pe” will pro­ve for Ukrai­ne a slower, more cum­ber­so­me and pain­ful pro­cess than should be the case.

src: The Atlan­tic Coun­cil Bul­le­tin Febru­ar 2006, via ETH Zürich

Ist erstaun­lich wie sehr sich die Gesell­schaf­ten dafür selbst ent­schei­den, nicht?

Nein, also und war­um Putin nur mit den US ver­han­deln möch­te, kann ich ja über­haupt nicht verstehen.

edit: Bist du gscheid, must du als Jour­na­list heu­te ver­blö­det sein.

Es geht um den glo­ba­len Kul­tur­kampf gegen Schwu­len­has­ser! Wel­che Ver­bin­dun­gen gibt es in welt­wei­ten Netz­wer­ken? Auch zu evan­ge­li­ka­len ultra­re­li­giö­sen Chris­ten, und wel­che Rol­le spie­len Rechts­ex­tre­mis­ten in die­sen Netzwerken?

Ich darf zusam­men­fas­sen, jeder der nicht das Kulturkampf-Narrativ frisst, ist Hitler.

Die letzten drei Monate

09. August 2022

lie­fen uner­war­tet sehr super für die Ukrai­ne, auch dank der neu­en schwe­ren west­li­chen Waffen.

Die BBC hat das mal ver­an­schau­licht und die Gesamt­kar­te gleich mal an fünf­ter Stel­le im Arti­kel ver­steckt. Frü­her konn­te man die ja noch an ers­ter Stel­le bringen…

Interesting

05. August 2022

Hellfire missiles on drones incoming!

05. August 2022

(The­re are repor­ted plans to sell them to Ukraine)

(Second part of the video.)

Initi­al source is Reu­ters: click about a mon­th ago. (“Could still be blo­cked by Con­gress the source said.”)

Die­se Gesell­schaft ist das Letzte.

Der Standard hat diesmal keine Propaganda gefunden.

04. August 2022

Eigent­lich komisch.

Amnes­ty kri­ti­siert ukrai­ni­sche Kriegsführung
Die Men­schen­rechts­or­ga­ni­sa­ti­on Amnes­ty Inter­na­tio­nal wirft der ukrai­ni­schen Armee vor, mit ihrer Kriegs­füh­rung teils Zivi­lis­ten in Gefahr zu brin­gen. Bei der Abwehr der bereits seit mehr als fünf Mona­ten andau­ern­den rus­si­schen Inva­si­on errich­te­ten die Ukrai­ner Mili­tär­ba­sen etwa in besie­del­ten Wohn­ge­bie­ten - dar­un­ter auch in Schu­len und Kran­ken­häu­sern - oder bedien­ten dort Waf­fen­sys­te­me, heißt es in einem am Don­ners­tag erschie­ne­nen Amnesty-Bericht.

Das Kriegs­recht aber ver­lan­ge von Kon­flikt­par­tei­en, mili­tä­ri­sche Objek­te so weit wie mög­lich ent­fernt von zivi­len Ein­rich­tun­gen zu plat­zie­ren, mahn­te die Orga­ni­sa­ti­on. Amnes­ty beton­te aber auch: “Gleich­zei­tig recht­fer­ti­gen die ukrai­ni­schen Ver­stö­ße in kei­ner Wei­se die vie­len wahl­lo­sen Schlä­ge des rus­si­schen Mili­tärs mit zivi­len Opfern, die wir in den ver­gan­ge­nen Mona­ten doku­men­tiert haben.”

Wäh­rend der Bericht von kremltreu­en rus­si­schen Medi­en aus­führ­lich the­ma­ti­siert wur­de, zeig­te sich Kiew empört. Der ukrai­ni­sche Prä­si­den­ten­be­ra­ter Mycha­j­lo Podol­jak warf Amnes­ty eine Betei­li­gung an einer rus­si­schen Propaganda-Kampagne vor, mit wel­cher die west­li­chen Waf­fen­lie­fe­run­gen gestoppt wer­den sollen.

src: click

Ich würd sagen ein­fach mehr schwe­re Waf­fen lie­fern, oder?