Heilige Maria Mutter Gottes

12. Juli 2025

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Jetzt und in der Stun­de unseres,

*prust*

Ach­so, ja ehm. Wie­der­auf­bau­kon­fe­renz. Ohne Blackrock.

The crafted to time Trump administration lie about russia using chemical weapons made John Mearsheimer laugh

11. Juli 2025

Ah, hap­py 12 seconds.

Wait was this a Trump admi­nis­tra­ti­on lie? Bet­ter not rese­arch that too closely…

One of the quintessential dark HK commedies

11. Juli 2025

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About HK filmma­king in the 90s.

edit: Es gibt aber natür­lich auch wie­der gute Nachrichten:

What the fuck?!

Wenn man sich die Kom­men­ta­re durch­liest, kom­men die Likes von per­sön­li­chen Freun­den, die dazu auf­ge­for­dert wur­den. So funk­tio­niert in Öster­reich auch Poli­tik, und ja - genau, sie habens geahnt, geför­der­ter Journalismus.

Ich glaub es braucht wie­der mehr Qua­li­täts­jour­na­lis­ten För­de­rung. Für die letzt­klas­si­ge Musik­un­ter­ma­lung zum Bei­spiel. Oder für die ein Halb­satz Schnit­te. Oder für das Mel­ken eines Name­drop­pings in ner Fra­ge­stel­lung. Oder für die unpro­vo­zier­te Wort­wi­der­ho­lung. Fal­sche gram­ma­ti­ka­li­sche Phra­sie­run­gen. Oder das Ver­wech­seln von Kriegs­füh­rung mit hybri­der Kriegs­füh­rung (hybri­de Kriegs­füh­rung sind nicht Droh­nen­an­grif­fe, auch wenn sies im Bei­trag so zei­gen). Vol­le Ver­tei­di­gungs­fä­hig­keit unter der Tripwire-Doktrin? Anti-Nato Hal­tung in Öster­reich auf­bau­en? Fra­gen sie doch mal den Reis­ner, bezüg­lich des US Plans wie im Fal­le eines rus­si­schen Angriffs tat­säch­lich eine Ver­zö­ge­rungs­wir­kung her­ge­stellt wer­den soll­te. *hust*

Gut dass ichs nicht offen aus­spre­che, oder wie?

Is schon art­sy, wenn man sich in nen Pan­zer setzt oder? Mach ma das gleich in 5 ver­schie­de­nen shots…

AI Gebrab­bel:

Ope­ra­ti­on Dropshot (1949):

As men­tio­ned pre­vious­ly, Ope­ra­ti­on Dropshot was a U.S. con­tin­gen­cy plan for a poten­ti­al war with the Soviet Uni­on in the 1950s. While its pri­ma­ry focus was stra­te­gic nuclear strikes on Soviet ter­ri­to­ry, it also con­si­de­red tac­ti­cal mea­su­res in Wes­tern Euro­pe. This inclu­ded the poten­ti­al use of nuclear or con­ven­tio­nal demo­li­ti­ons to des­troy key infra­st­ruc­tu­re (e.g., brid­ges, rail lines, and ports) in NATO-controlled are­as, par­ti­cu­lar­ly in West Ger­ma­ny, to slow Soviet advan­ces. The­se actions were inten­ded to crea­te bot­t­len­ecks or delay Soviet logistics, even if it meant sacri­fi­cing Wes­tern assets.

Nuclear Demo­li­ti­ons: In extre­me sce­n­a­ri­os, Dropshot con­si­de­red the use of low-yield ato­mic bombs or nuclear mines (e.g., Ato­mic Demo­li­ti­on Muni­ti­ons, or ADMs, though the­se were not ful­ly deve­lo­ped until the 1950s) to des­troy infra­st­ruc­tu­re or crea­te impas­sa­ble bar­ri­ers. For instance, nuclear explo­si­ons could ren­der key trans­por­ta­ti­on hubs radio­ac­ti­ve or phy­si­cal­ly impas­sa­ble, deny­ing their use to Soviet forces.
Examp­les: Spe­ci­fic tar­gets inclu­ded the rail net­work in West Ger­ma­ny, which was vital for moving tro­ops and sup­plies, and ports like Ham­burg or Bre­mer­ha­ven, which could be used by the Soviets if cap­tu­red. The plan prio­ri­ti­zed assets that, if left inta­ct, would enab­le rapid Soviet advances.
Retar­da­ti­on Operations:
Dropshot empha­si­zed “retar­da­ti­on” or “delay­ing” ope­ra­ti­ons, which aimed to dis­rupt Soviet logistics and com­mand struc­tures in Wes­tern Euro­pe. The­se ope­ra­ti­ons involved:
Air Strikes: U.S. and allied air for­ces, inclu­ding nuclear-capable bom­bers like the B-29 and later B-36, would tar­get Soviet troop con­cen­tra­ti­ons, sup­ply depots, and for­ward com­mand posts in NATO ter­ri­to­ry. The­se strikes could invol­ve con­ven­tio­nal bombs or, in extre­me cases, tac­ti­cal nuclear weapons.
Ground Ope­ra­ti­ons: NATO ground for­ces, inclu­ding U.S. and West Ger­man units, would con­duct defen­si­ve ope­ra­ti­ons to hold key ter­rain while pre­pa­ring to des­troy infra­st­ruc­tu­re as they retrea­ted. This was part of a broa­der “defen­se in depth” stra­te­gy to slow Soviet momentum.
The goal was to crea­te cho­ke points and delay Soviet for­ces long enough for NATO to mobi­li­ze rein­for­ce­ments, par­ti­cu­lar­ly from the U.S. via air and sea (a pre­cur­sor to later REFORGER concepts).
Tac­ti­cal Nuclear Weapons:
Alt­hough tac­ti­cal nuclear wea­pons were not wide­ly avail­ab­le in 1949, Dropshot anti­ci­pa­ted their deve­lo­p­ment and deploy­ment by the mid-1950s. The plan envi­sio­ned using low-yield ato­mic bombs (1–20 kilo­tons) to tar­get Soviet for­ces advan­cing through Wes­tern Euro­pe. The­se strikes could occur in West Ger­ma­ny or other NATO coun­tries if Soviet for­ces cros­sed the border.
Spe­ci­fic tar­gets inclu­ded Soviet armo­red divi­si­ons, sup­ply con­voys, and air­fiel­ds cap­tu­red by the Soviets in Wes­tern zones. For examp­le, a nuclear strike on a Soviet tank column in the Ful­da Gap could dis­rupt an ent­i­re offen­si­ve, though it would also devas­ta­te the sur­roun­ding area.
Dropshot’s plan­ners reco­gni­zed that nuclear strikes in Wes­tern zones would cau­se signi­fi­cant col­la­te­ral dama­ge, inclu­ding civi­li­an casu­al­ties and dest­ruc­tion of allied infra­st­ruc­tu­re, but deemed this accep­ta­ble in the face of a Soviet occupation.

Ich glaub ich tret heut noch dem öster­rei­chi­schen Mili­tär bei, damit es sich in die­ser Form bes­ser ver­tei­di­gen kann, und nie­mand gegen die Nato Stim­mung macht.

Scheiss auf die Öster­rei­chi­sche Ver­fas­sung, nicht?

MC 48 and “New Look” Poli­cy (1954):
Over­view: The NATO stra­te­gy docu­ment MC 48, adop­ted in 1954, for­ma­li­zed the use of tac­ti­cal nuclear wea­pons to stop a Soviet inva­si­on in Wes­tern Euro­pe. This ali­gned with the U.S.’s “New Look” poli­cy under Pre­si­dent Eisen­ho­wer, which empha­si­zed nuclear wea­pons to off­set con­ven­tio­nal weaknesses.
Imple­men­ta­ti­on: NATO deploy­ed nuclear-capable sys­tems like the MGR-1 Honest John rocket, M29 Davy Cro­ckett recoil­less rif­le, and MGM-5 Cor­po­ral mis­si­le to West Ger­ma­ny. The­se wea­pons, with yiel­ds from 0.01 to 20 kilo­tons, were inten­ded for battle­field use against Soviet troop con­cen­tra­ti­ons, sup­ply lines, or infra­st­ruc­tu­re in NATO ter­ri­to­ry if overrun.
Wes­tern Zones: Plans inclu­ded nuclear strikes on advan­cing Soviet for­ces in West Ger­ma­ny, par­ti­cu­lar­ly in choke­points like the Ful­da Gap or North Ger­man Plain. For examp­le, NATO’s “Car­te Blan­che” exer­cise (1955) simu­la­ted 268 nuclear strikes, many in West Ger­ma­ny, to halt a Soviet offen­si­ve, assuming signi­fi­cant dest­ruc­tion of allied infra­st­ruc­tu­re and civi­li­an areas.
Ratio­na­le Con­ti­nui­ty: Like Dropshot, the­se plans aimed to dis­rupt Soviet logistics and mobi­li­ty, even at the cost of Wes­tern assets. Howe­ver, the focus shifted from pre­emp­ti­ve demo­li­ti­ons to battle­field nuclear strikes tar­ge­ting enemy for­ces directly.

3. Fle­xi­ble Respon­se Doc­tri­ne (1967–1980s)
By the mid-1960s, NATO adop­ted the “fle­xi­ble respon­se” doc­tri­ne (MC 14/3, 1967), which shifted away from reli­an­ce on mas­si­ve nuclear reta­lia­ti­on to a gra­dua­ted approach, balan­cing con­ven­tio­nal and nuclear options.

Over­view: Fle­xi­ble respon­se aimed to deter Soviet aggres­si­on with con­ven­tio­nal for­ces first, esca­la­ting to tac­ti­cal nuclear wea­pons only if necessa­ry. This doc­tri­ne still inclu­ded plans to tar­get Wes­tern zones to dis­rupt Soviet advan­ces, but with grea­ter empha­sis on pre­cisi­on and mini­mi­zing allied losses.
Implementation:
Con­ven­tio­nal Delay­ing Actions: NATO’s for­ward defen­se stra­te­gy invol­ved hol­ding key ter­rain in West Ger­ma­ny with mecha­ni­zed units (e.g., U.S. VII Corps, Ger­man I Corps). If for­ced to retre­at, units would des­troy infra­st­ruc­tu­re to slow Soviet pur­su­it, simi­lar to Dropshot’s retar­da­ti­on operations.
Tac­ti­cal Nuclear Opti­ons: NATO main­tai­ned plans to use nuclear artil­le­ry (e.g., M109 howitzers with W48 nuclear shells) or air-delivered bombs (e.g., B61 bombs) against Soviet for­ces in Wes­tern zones. Exer­ci­ses like “Able Archer” (1983) simu­la­ted such sce­n­a­ri­os, with nuclear strikes in West Ger­ma­ny to halt a Soviet breakthrough.

Fuck me - wenn wir erst die gan­zen Anti-Informations Kriegs­füh­rungs Kämp­fer beim öster­rei­chi­schen Bun­des­heer anstel­len, die das unter den Tep­pich kehren, …

Ich mein, jo scheis­se - wie schaut denn das aus?

Key Dif­fe­ren­ces from Dropshot
While the­se newer plans car­ri­ed for­ward Dropshot’s ratio­na­le, they dif­fe­red in several ways:

Redu­ced Nuclear Empha­sis: As NATO’s con­ven­tio­nal for­ces impro­ved (e.g., M1 Abrams tanks, F-15 figh­ters), reli­an­ce on nuclear demo­li­ti­ons decre­a­sed. Fle­xi­ble respon­se and Air­Land Batt­le prio­ri­ti­zed con­ven­tio­nal delay­ing tactics.
Pre­cisi­on and Tech­no­lo­gy: Advan­ces in precision-guided muni­ti­ons and intel­li­gence (e.g., satel­li­te recon­nais­sance) allo­wed more tar­ge­ted deni­al ope­ra­ti­ons, redu­cing the need for widespread dest­ruc­tion of Wes­tern zones.
Poli­ti­cal Sen­si­ti­vi­ty: West Germany’s inte­gra­ti­on into NATO and its eco­no­mic impor­t­ance led to grea­ter cau­ti­on about plans that would devas­ta­te allied ter­ri­to­ry. Public and poli­ti­cal oppo­si­ti­on to nuclear use grew, espe­cial­ly in the 1970s–1980s.

DANKE AI, für dei­ne Offenheit…

Chal­len­ges and Controversies

Col­la­te­ral Dama­ge: Plans to des­troy infra­st­ruc­tu­re or use nuclear wea­pons in West Ger­ma­ny remai­ned con­tro­ver­si­al, as they would devas­ta­te civi­li­an are­as and eco­no­mies. For examp­le, NATO’s 1970s war games esti­ma­ted mil­li­ons of civi­li­an casu­al­ties from tac­ti­cal nuclear use

Aber zumin­dest nicht rus­sisch, sag ich mir immer.

Btw. kein Exper­te, ich hab nur Reis­ner dar­über reden gehört, und dann ne AI bean­sprucht. Aber ja, so sah die “Ver­tei­di­gungs­fä­hig­keit Öster­reichs” unter Trip­wire mal aus.

Unse­ren Alp­bach Exper­ten kanns gar­nicht schnell genug gehen, dahin wie­der zurück zu wollen.

Russland kämpft in einem existentiellen Krieg gegen die Nato

11. Juli 2025

Was, das ist tiefs­te rus­si­sche Propaganda?

Ja, aber nur bis Trump sei­nen Anna­le­na Moment hat­te, und exakt das vor der Pres­se verlautbart.

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Die­ser ver­damm­te lügen­de Rus­se schon wieder.

Die Pres­se ver­suchts heut auch im Ticker zu ver­ste­cken (dann ist die Mel­dung spä­ter schwer im Archiv auffindbar):

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Die Papst PR hat heute herausgefunden, dass es a bisserl transparent war, dass sie am Begräbnistag des Alten, den Trump zu mehr Waffen für die Ukraine überreden wollte

10. Juli 2025

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… da haben sie in der Kri­sen PR Abtei­lung angerufen:

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Jede Chan­ce, wirk­lich, jede Chan­ce hat die NEUE wer­te­west­li­che, hei­li­ge, römisch-katholische Kir­che für das Enab­ling von mehr Waf­fen­lie­fe­run­gen genutzt.

Gut, wenns für nen län­ge­ren Krieg hilft…

God I wish them the Strei­sand Effect.

edit:

Da haben sie doch, was sie wollten:

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Akti­ve Mit­hil­fe, das gesam­te Ver­mäch­nis des alten Papsts noch am Tag sei­ner Beer­di­gung rui­niert, danach aber wie­der heu­cheln, was will man mehr?

Viel­leicht noch ein klei­ner 50%iger Zoll auf Waren aus Bra­si­li­en? Ganz im Sin­ne der US ame­ri­ka­ni­schen Kurie…

edit: Dass mir aber kei­ner vor­wirft ich miss­re­prä­sen­tier was…

Ihr glaubt doch nicht, ich bin so ein ver­fick­ter Idi­ot wie mei­ne Leser…

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