Wait what?!

24. September 2024

18.10 Uhr: Pis­to­ri­us - Bun­des­wehr schnellst­mög­lich kriegs­tüch­tig machen

Ver­tei­di­gungs­mi­nis­ter Boris Pis­to­ri­us (SPD) hat die Not­wen­dig­keit der schnellst­mög­li­chen Aus­stat­tung der Bun­des­wehr bekräf­tigt. Bis 2029 müs­se man damit rech­nen, dass Russ­land sei­ne mili­tä­ri­sche Rekon­sti­tu­ti­on abge­schlos­sen haben wer­de und in der Lage sein könn­te, einen mili­tä­ri­schen Schlag gegen Nato-Gebiet zu füh­ren, sag­te Pis­to­ri­us ange­sichts des rus­si­schen Angriffs­kriegs gegen die Ukraine. 

src: click

Kann man das bit­te mal genau­er begrün­den, oder ist schon Vorwahlkampfphase?

Hin­ter­grund: Weder Chat­ham House, noch Kof­man, noch CSIS, noch Gres­sel, noch… Also nie­mand hat das bis­her auch nur angedeutet.

Selen­skyj behaup­tet Sieg Ende 2025 - gut, hörn wir nicht drauf, der Rest mehr so 3-10 Jah­re war of attri­ti­on, aber der SPD Kanz­ler­kan­di­dat in spe…

edit: Ah, schau an - der Pis­to­ri­us liest Atlan­tic Coun­cil Copy, und BR24 weist das als Eigent­leis­tung aus…

[edit: Kor­rek­tur, er liest doch nicht Atlan­tic Coun­cil, der sagt das schon län­ger (seit Juni)…]

NATO-Russia dyna­mics: Pro­spects for recon­sti­tu­ti­on of Rus­si­an mili­ta­ry power

Exe­cu­ti­ve summary

The Rus­si­an Federation’s full-scale inva­si­on of Ukrai­ne on Febru­a­ry 24, 2022, brought war to the North Atlan­tic Alliance’s doorstep—altering the political-military dyna­mics bet­ween NATO and its neigh­bor to the east. Sin­ce the Rus­si­an inva­si­on, NATO has been under­go­ing a dra­ma­tic chan­ge that has impac­ted its plans, com­mand struc­tu­re, for­ce model, and capa­bi­li­ties requi­re­ments. The effec­ti­ve­ness of this chan­ge must be gau­ged against the adversary’s abi­li­ty to field its for­ces and resour­ce them in a way that nega­tively impacts the Supre­me Allied Com­man­der Europe’s abi­li­ty to exe­cu­te the new regio­nal plans. The del­ta bet­ween how quick­ly Rus­sia can rebuild its mili­ta­ry and how quick­ly NATO can rearm, espe­cial­ly the Euro­pean allies, will defi­ne the risk level for the Alli­an­ce should deter­rence fail. A credi­ble assess­ment of the speed with which Rus­sia can recon­sti­tu­te and expand its military—especially its land for­ces com­po­nent, which has been signi­fi­cant­ly attrit­ted during the cur­rent cam­pai­gn in Ukraine—is cru­cial to accu­rate­ly asses­sing NATO’s over­all for­ce pos­tu­re and abi­li­ty to respond should Rus­sia choo­se to attack a mem­ber of the Alli­an­ce. Here, the exper­ti­se and assess­ments of the United Sta­tes’ allies most expo­sed to the Rus­si­an thre­at along the eas­tern flank offer valu­able insights from the front­li­ne, aug­men­ted by their regio­nal exper­ti­se and under­stan­ding of Rus­si­an cul­tu­re, poli­tics, and mili­ta­ry infu­sed with cen­tu­ries of expe­ri­ence of living next door to Russia. 

In sup­port of United Sta­tes Euro­pean Command’s Rus­sia Stra­te­gic Initia­ti­ve, the Atlan­tic Coun­cil orga­ni­zed two workshops—in War­saw, Poland, and in Hel­sin­ki, Finland—to gain a bet­ter under­stan­ding of alter­na­ti­ve futures for Rus­si­an mili­ta­ry recon­sti­tu­ti­on and its impli­ca­ti­ons for secu­ri­ty on the Euro­pean con­ti­nent. The work­shops were desi­gned to assess (1) how Rus­sia will recon­sti­tu­te its land for­ces in respon­se to ongo­ing deve­lo­p­ments in Ukrai­ne and NATO for­ce adap­t­ati­on, (2) the vul­nera­bi­li­ties hin­de­ring Russia’s visi­on for the recon­sti­tu­ti­on of its mili­ta­ry, and (3) the thre­at of future Rus­si­an capa­bi­li­ties to the trans­at­lan­tic secu­ri­ty architecture.

Key takea­ways from this line of effort include:

Rus­sia has demons­tra­ted that it can fight and mobi­li­ze at the same time.
The pace of Rus­si­an mili­ta­ry recon­sti­tu­ti­on has been fas­ter than Wes­tern ana­lysts expec­ted, inclu­ding both refur­bis­hed and new equip­ment and man­power mobi­liz­a­ti­on. Still, the rea­di­ness of the Rus­si­an armed for­ces is not likely to be the princi­pal dri­ver of decision-making in Moscow; rather, any decisi­on to attack a NATO mem­ber will fac­tor in the “cor­re­la­ti­on of for­ces,” with the goal of explo­i­t­ing the Alli­an­ce in a moment of weakness.
Based on pro­duc­tion data, the big­gest risk of Rus­sia attacking a NATO mem­ber will be in 2025–26 when peak pro­duc­tion, refur­bish­ment, and training/readiness lines inter­sect. One ana­lyst pro­jec­ted Rus­sia will pro­du­ce well over one thousand tanks annu­al­ly by then.
Moscow will not, howe­ver, make decisi­ons based on objec­ti­ve indi­ces of rea­di­ness alo­ne. It will deci­de to move against a NATO sta­te when it deems that the win­dow of oppor­tu­ni­ty has opened—hence, under­stan­ding the poli­ti­cal cul­tu­re that under­girds Russia’s decision-making is as important as having an accu­ra­te assess­ment of its mili­ta­ry capabilities.
The West is in a race against time, with the del­ta bet­ween Rus­si­an for­ce recon­sti­tu­ti­on and NATO’s invest­ment in real, exer­cis­ed mili­ta­ry capa­bi­li­ties con­sti­tu­ting the level of risk in the Euro­pean thea­ter in the event of a full-scale war. Clo­sing the gap will requi­re NATO to prio­ri­ti­ze rear­ma­ment across the board, inclu­ding its defen­se indus­tri­al base in Euro­pe and the United States.

src: click (Atlan­tic Council)

edit: Oh Wun­der, oh Wun­der, Chat­ham­house sah das noch im Juli ganz anders… Pick your favou­rite Anlaysts! I KNOW, I KNOW, I’M BORIS PISTORIUS, I’M PICKING ANALYSTS FROM War­saw, Poland, and Hel­sin­ki, Fin­land, THOSE WILL TELL ME THE UNFILTERED AND BALANCED TRUTH! (Well in EU terms, you got to lis­ten to the most frea­ked out mem­bers, I guess…)

08 Conclusion
Mathieu Boulègue
Con­sul­ting Fel­low, Rus­sia and Eura­sia Programme

Just as the war in Ukrai­ne has high­ligh­ted both weak­nes­ses and resi­li­en­ce in the Rus­si­an mili­ta­ry, the les­sons for the West are equal­ly mixed. Signs of Rus­si­an vul­nera­bi­li­ty offer no grounds for Wes­tern com­pla­cen­cy – but point to the impor­t­ance of redu­cing Russia’s war-making capa­ci­ty by attri­ti­on. Abo­ve all, con­ti­nued Wes­tern sup­port for Ukrai­ne will remain crucial.

More than two years into the full-scale inva­si­on of Ukrai­ne, Rus­sia remains able simul­ta­ne­ous­ly to con­ti­nue to pro­se­cu­te the war and to effect war­ti­me adap­t­ati­ons to its com­mand struc­tu­re. With vary­ing degrees of suc­cess, the Krem­lin has been able to rapidly mobi­li­ze reser­vists, employ pri­va­te mili­ta­ry com­pa­nies, sus­tain military-industrial pro­duc­tion for basic sys­tems, and hea­vi­ly mili­ta­ri­ze the public infor­ma­ti­on space in sup­port of the war.

In terms of com­mand struc­tu­re, the sepa­ra­ti­on of the Wes­tern Mili­ta­ry District into Moscow and Lenin­grad districts in March 2024 is also telling.163 Moscow is now rever­ting to its ‘com­fort zone’, name­ly Soviet-era com­mand struc­tures in the Euro­pean theat­re. The new Moscow Mili­ta­ry District will con­cern its­elf exclu­si­ve­ly with Ukrai­ne, Bela­rus and Kali­nin­grad, which will ine­vi­ta­b­ly be of direct con­cern to the US and NATO in the Bal­tic theat­re as well as on the eas­tern flank of the Alliance.

The pace of imple­men­ta­ti­on and the effi­ci­en­cy of con­ti­nued reforms in the com­mand struc­tu­re, howe­ver, remain to be seen. They will part­ly depend on the effec­ti­ve­ness or other­wi­se of the new minis­ter of defence, And­rei Belou­sov, appoin­ted in May 2024. Simi­lar­ly, it is unknown if the Rus­si­an Armed For­ces can be a ‘lear­ning orga­niz­a­ti­on’ able to imple­ment genui­ne chan­ges, whe­ther struc­tu­ral or cultural.164

On top of war­ti­me adap­t­ati­ons in the com­mand struc­tu­re, the mili­ta­ry indus­try has dis­play­ed resi­li­en­ce in its abi­li­ty to deli­ver mili­ta­ry equip­ment and hard­ware in the war against Ukrai­ne. The ongo­ing recon­sti­tu­ti­on of mili­ta­ry equip­ment and hard­ware will ine­vi­ta­b­ly inform the next cycle of the Sta­te Arma­ment Pro­gram­me (GPV) after 2027, as well as future plans regar­ding modern mili­ta­ry tech­no­lo­gy and mili­ta­ry innovation.

The Rus­si­an Armed For­ces remain a credi­ble thre­at to NATO and its allies. In Ukrai­ne, the Rus­si­an mili­ta­ry has shown it can absorb los­ses and main­tain tactical-operational credi­bi­li­ty des­pi­te stra­te­gic fail­u­res. Rus­si­an for­ces can count on impro­ved recon­nais­sance fire and strike com­ple­xes equip­ped with a vast arse­nal of long-range pre­cisi­on muni­ti­ons, as well as lar­ger quan­ti­ties of impro­ved uncrewed aeri­al vehi­cles (UAVs). Rus­si­an long-range strike and stand-off muni­ti­ons, cou­pled with multi-layered air defence sys­tems, repre­sent the big­gest con­ven­tio­nal thre­at to NATO.

The Aero­space For­ces (VKS) and the Rus­si­an Fede­ra­ti­on Navy (RFN) remain cri­ti­cal parts of the nuclear and con­ven­tio­nal stra­te­gic deter­rence for­ce, poten­ti­al­ly hol­ding NATO assets at risk of dest­ruc­tion. Final­ly, asym­metric capa­bi­li­ties – espe­cial­ly the use of cyber and infor­ma­ti­on war­fa­re; elec­tro­nic war­fa­re for counter-UAV and counter-precision-guided-munitions ope­ra­ti­ons; and space-based assets – are still able to off­set NATO and US con­ven­tio­nal superiority.

Russia’s pro­spects for rege­ne­ra­ting its mili­ta­ry machi­ne remain mixed, both in terms of speed and effec­ti­ve­ness. Yet as the war against Ukrai­ne con­ti­nues, and regard­less of the depth of the recon­sti­tu­ti­on of Russia’s mili­ta­ry power, the cur­rent Krem­lin lea­ders­hip will remain a thre­at to Euro­pean and trans­at­lan­tic secu­ri­ty as well as a stra­te­gic com­pe­ti­tor to NATO and its allies.

Ana­ly­sis of Moscow’s nuclear decla­ra­to­ry poli­cy sug­gests that if Rus­sia were to suf­fer suf­fi­ci­ent­ly seve­re degra­dati­on of its con­ven­tio­nal mili­ta­ry power, such that the lea­ders­hip deemed the exis­tence of the Rus­si­an sta­te to be under thre­at, this would crea­te con­di­ti­ons under which Rus­sia might con­si­der the use of nuclear weapons.165 Howe­ver, this pos­si­bi­li­ty remains remo­te, espe­cial­ly while Russia’s air arms, and its naval for­ces bey­ond the Black Sea, remain rela­tively intact.

Fur­ther­mo­re, Rus­sia will con­ti­nue to explo­it its tool­kit of asym­metric capa­bi­li­ties and ambi­guous sub-threshold tac­tics. The­se tools must no lon­ger be ana­ly­sed as part of a ‘grey zone’ or ‘hybrid’ ran­ge of mea­su­res aimed at blur­ring the line bet­ween war and peace. They are fun­da­ment­al­ly part of Russia’s con­ti­nued low-intensity war­fa­re against Wes­tern interests.

Con­ti­nued assess­ments of Russia’s mili­ta­ry reform and of its ongo­ing recon­sti­tu­ti­on of equip­ment are vital to under­stan­ding in which sec­tors Moscow still repres­ents a thre­at to Wes­tern inte­rests. Such assess­ments will be essen­ti­al for the US and NATO in terms of retai­ning both a tech­no­lo­gi­cal and over­all deter­rence advan­ta­ge against the Kremlin.

The sin­gle most signi­fi­cant fac­tor that can impair Russia’s abi­li­ty to recon­sti­tu­te its over­all mili­ta­ry power and leverage asym­metric capa­bi­li­ties in com­ing years will be ongo­ing Wes­tern sup­port for Ukraine.

Final­ly, the sin­gle most signi­fi­cant fac­tor that can impair Russia’s abi­li­ty to recon­sti­tu­te its over­all mili­ta­ry power and leverage asym­metric capa­bi­li­ties in com­ing years will be ongo­ing Wes­tern sup­port for Ukrai­ne. Wes­tern coun­tries must con­ti­nue to work tog­e­ther to pro­vi­de Ukrai­ne with arms, ammu­ni­ti­on, finan­cial sup­port and refu­gee assi­s­tance, and to show moral soli­da­ri­ty with the Ukrai­ni­an war effort.

Deny­ing Rus­sia vic­to­ry and for­cing it to con­ti­nue in a long attri­tio­nal strugg­le will fur­ther degra­de all ele­ments of its war-making capa­ci­ty, inclu­ding its abi­li­ty to invest in and pro­du­ce cutting-edge tech­no­lo­gi­cal enab­lers. Cri­ti­cal­ly, the­se efforts will also fur­ther under­mi­ne the Kremlin’s infor­ma­tio­nal stra­te­gy both at home and abroad, dimi­nis­hing its abi­li­ty to desta­bi­li­ze Wes­tern demo­cra­tic sys­tems and, ulti­mate­ly, wea­ke­n­ing its long-term hold on power.

src: click (Chat­ham­house)









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