Probably the only time I will quote radio liberty/radio free europe

23. Dezember 2024

But the war has cau­sed an incre­a­se in oil pri­ces, exa­cer­ba­ted infla­ti­on, promp­ted drastic sanc­tions on Rus­sia, and spar­ked a flood of refu­gees into neigh­bo­ring coun­tries, the IMF said.

The report pro­jects that the eco­no­mies of Rus­sia and Ukrai­ne will expe­ri­ence steep con­trac­tions. Russia’s is expec­ted to shrink 8.5 per­cent this year and Ukraine’s 35 per­cent, it said.

The 19 coun­tries in the euro zone will grow but by just 2.8 per­cent in 2022, down shar­ply from the 3.9 per­cent fore­cast by the IMF in Janu­a­ry and down from 5.3 per­cent growth last year.

U.S. eco­no­mic growth is expec­ted to drop to 3.7 per­cent this year from 5.7 per­cent in 2021.

The IMF expects the growth of the Chi­ne­se eco­no­my to dece­le­ra­te to 4.4 per­cent this year from 8.1 per­cent in 2021. The latest lock­downs in Chi­na to con­trol the spread of the coro­na­vi­rus are likely to cau­se new bot­t­len­ecks in glo­bal sup­ply chains, the IMF said.

src: click

35% hier (GDP loss 2022), 35% da (Infla­ti­on über 4 Jah­re, bis 2027) - mit der Zeit kommt da rich­tig was zusammen… 

Die NTV Mode­ra­to­ren sind zeit­gleich noch sehr verwirrt:

Hin­ter­grund:

This [second, war until mid 2026] sce­n­a­rio esti­ma­tes an exter­nal finan­cing gap of $177.2 bil­li­on, com­pa­red to $148 bil­li­on under the base­li­ne, with inter­na­tio­nal reser­ves remai­ning below IMF cri­te­ria until 2027.

src: click

IMF Report: click

C. Risks to the Outlook

11. Risks to the pro­gram sce­n­a­ri­os remain excep­tio­nal­ly high and per­tain to the war, inter­na­tio­nal sup­port, and reform momen­tum. Over­all, both the base­li­ne and down­si­de sce­n­a­ri­os con­ti­nue to be sub­ject to excep­tio­nal­ly high uncer­tain­ty, inclu­ding with regard to the tra­jec­to­ry of the war and its impli­ca­ti­ons for the post-war recovery:

• The war could inten­si­fy or last lon­ger, imply­ing head­winds to eco­no­mic per­for­mance and poli­cy imple­men­ta­ti­on and posing risks to the medium-term out­look. Fur­ther attacks on ener­gy infra­st­ruc­tu­re com­po­un­ded by a har­sh win­ter, and adver­se demo­gra­phics con­sti­tu­te a spe­ci­fic risk on this front. As time goes on, scope is nar­ro­wing to reca­li­bra­te the program’s war assump­ti­ons and res­to­re medium-term exter­nal via­bi­li­ty by the end of the program.

• Inter­na­tio­nal sup­port may no lon­ger be dura­ble. The pro­gram sce­n­a­ri­os assu­me that Ukrai­ne will con­ti­nue to recei­ve signi­fi­cant finan­cial and secu­ri­ty assi­s­tance into the future. Should the appe­ti­te of Ukraine’s part­ners to con­ti­nue sup­port begin to wane, eit­her Ukrai­ne would face pres­su­res from abrupt shifts in poli­ci­es or sub­op­ti­mal respon­ses to clo­se ele­va­ted finan­cing gaps, or the tra­jec­to­ry of the war its­elf could dete­rio­ra­te. The mate­ria­liz­a­ti­on of eit­her could ent­ail sub­stan­ti­al impacts inclu­ding wea­ker eco­no­mic per­for­mance, ero­ded poli­cy buf­fers, a more fra­gi­le secu­ri­ty situa­ti­on, and social disruption.

• An ear­lier end to the war could ent­ail a wide set of out­co­mes. A poten­ti­al peace sett­le­ment could, on the one hand, result in an upsi­de sce­n­a­rio con­di­tio­nal on the avail­ab­le inter­na­tio­nal sup­port and acce­le­ra­ted reforms, a stron­ger reco­very and medium-term poten­ti­al could result from a quicker return migra­ti­on and pri­va­te invest­ment flows ancho­red by EU acces­si­on. On the other hand, des­pi­te an ear­lier end to the war, the secu­ri­ty situa­ti­on may not sta­bi­li­ze prompt­ly the­re­af­ter, or the war’s ulti­ma­te dama­ges could be even grea­ter than cur­r­ent­ly unders­tood. In this event, the­re are risks of adver­se eco­no­mic and social out­co­mes, inclu­ding lower pri­va­te invest­ment, hig­her migra­ti­on, and wea­ker reform momen­tum, ent­ail­ing a slower or incom­ple­te post-war recovery.

• The onset of reform fati­gue is a vul­nera­bi­li­ty regard­less of the evo­lu­ti­on of the war. Deli­vering the program’s objec­ti­ves will requi­re stead­fast imple­men­ta­ti­on of poli­cy adjus­t­ment and struc­tu­ral reforms over many years (inclu­ding under the down­si­de sce­n­a­rio), which may pro­ve chal­len­ging, inclu­ding for social cohesion.

Das hier sind die bei­den rele­van­ten Tabellen:

Base­li­ne (war ends 2025):
Bildschirmfoto 2024 12 23 um 18 11 27

GDP deve­lo­p­ment:
2024: 4.0%
2025: 2.5-3.5%
2026: 5.3%
2027: 4.5

Gesamt: 16%

Infla­ti­on:

2024: 10.0%
2025: 7.5%
2026: 6.6%
2027: 5.0%

Gesamt 29.1%

Down­si­de (war ends mid 2026 and things deve­lop worse in general):

Bildschirmfoto 2024 12 23 um 18 11 39

GDP deve­lo­p­ment:
2024: 4.0%
2025: -2.5%
2026: 0%
2027: 4.0%

Gesamt: 5.5%

Infla­ti­on:

2024: 10.0%
2025: 11.0%
2026: 8.5%
2027: 7.5%

Gesamt: 37%

edit: Fifth review was released on: Octo­ber 18, 2024
Sixth review was released on: Decem­ber 20, 2024









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