I dare them to respond

27. Februar 2026

Ukraine’s Euro­pean back­ers have urged Kyiv to reject Russia’s demand to cede all of the Don­bas. Kaja Kal­las, the EU high repre­sen­ta­ti­ve for for­eign affairs, has cal­led tra­ding Ukrai­ni­an ter­ri­to­ry for peace a “trap.” Ger­man Chan­cellor Fried­rich Merz, French Pre­si­dent Emma­nu­el Macron, and Euro­pean Com­mis­si­on Pre­si­dent Ursu­la von der Ley­en have repeated­ly decla­red that “inter­na­tio­nal bor­ders must not be chan­ged by for­ce.” Some worry that giving in to Putin now will, as hap­pen­ed after a pre­vious genera­ti­on of Euro­pean lea­ders made a deal with Hit­ler in Munich in 1938, only whet the Rus­si­an leader’s appe­ti­te for more Ukrai­ni­an and even NATO ter­ri­to­ry down the road.

A more rea­son­ab­le objec­tion is that the remai­ning Ukrainian-held Don­bas “fort­ress cities” of Kra­ma­tor­sk and Slo­vi­ansk con­sti­tu­te cri­ti­cal links in Ukraine’s defen­se. Urban war­fa­re is cos­t­ly, making cities high­ly defen­si­ble, and in today’s drone-dominated battle­field, they offer cover and pro­tec­tion as con­cen­tra­ti­on points for tro­ops. Given Ukraine’s man­power woes, defen­ding for­ti­fied islands may seem like a good opti­on. But pre­ser­ving the Don­bas fort­ress cities is no rea­son to con­ti­nue the war. It is pos­si­ble to pro­tect ter­ri­to­ry far­t­her behind the front­li­ne without them with dedi­ca­ted for­ti­fi­ca­ti­ons. Rus­sia has also demons­tra­ted that even fort­ress cities can be sur­roun­ded, iso­la­ted, and clea­red through the infil­tra­ti­on of small units, as it has done recent­ly in Cha­siv Yar, Huli­a­po­le, Pokrovsk, and Siversk—and may yet suc­ceed in doing in Kos­ti­an­ty­ni­vka and Kupyansk.

The loss of the rest of Donetsk, alt­hough assu­red­ly a blow to Ukrai­ni­an self-esteem, would not necessa­ri­ly open the door to Kyiv for Moscow. Bet­ween Octo­ber 2024 and Octo­ber 2025, the Rus­si­ans took con­trol of 1,703 squa­re miles of Ukrai­ni­an ter­ri­to­ry. The rema­in­der of unoc­cu­p­ied Ukrai­ne east of the Dnie­per River con­sists of 57,066 squa­re miles of ter­ri­to­ry. At last year’s rate of Rus­si­an advan­ce, it would take more than 30 years for Moscow to com­ple­te such a conquest.

Wes­tern Euro­pean panic not­with­stan­ding, Rus­sia essen­ti­al­ly clai­ming vic­to­ry in the Don­bas would pose litt­le thre­at to the rest of the con­ti­nent. The Don­bas is not the Sude­ten­land becau­se the cur­rent Rus­si­an tac­tics are not­hing like the blitz­krieg, which gar­ne­red Nazi Ger­ma­ny huge chunks of ter­ri­to­ry very quick­ly. It would take Rus­sia deca­des to con­quer the rest of Ukrai­ne, so any direct thre­at to most other coun­tries in Euro­pe would mani­fest its­elf far into the future.

Yet the­re can be litt­le doubt that Rus­sia can achie­ve more limi­ted aims by for­ce of arms. Rough­ly 2,866 squa­re miles of Donetsk remain under Kyiv’s con­trol. If Rus­si­an for­ces con­ti­nue at last year’s rate of advan­ce, they could take it in a year and a half, a rea­son­ab­le time frame. They may also grab more chunks of Khar­kiv, Sumy, and Zapo­rizhzhia. Doing so would cost Rus­sia addi­tio­nal blood and tre­a­su­re, to be sure, but it would impo­se grea­ter rela­ti­ve cos­ts on Ukrai­ne, which Kyiv can ill afford.

The Ukrai­ni­ans and their allies must now ask them­sel­ves what ano­t­her year of war will achie­ve and at what pri­ce. The­re is evi­dence of a gro­wing sen­se among seni­or Ukrai­ni­an offi­cials, inclu­ding Kirill Buda­nov, the pre­si­den­ti­al chief of staff and for­mer head of mili­ta­ry intel­li­gence, that alt­hough Ukrai­ni­an deep strikes and attacks on Moscow’s “shadow fleet” of oil tankers—the unmar­ked ves­sels Rus­sia uses to eva­de sanctions—hurt Rus­sia, they will not end the war any time soon.

With its lar­ger objec­ti­ves out of reach, Ukrai­ne faces the pro­spect of ceding ter­ri­to­ry, which would be pain­ful for Kyiv. But it does not have to mean the end of Ukrai­ne as an inde­pen­dent coun­try. A Ukrai­ne shorn of its eas­tern regi­ons could con­ti­nue Kyiv’s westward-looking state-building pro­ject. Even befo­re the Rus­si­an inva­si­on in 2022, Ukrai­ne was alrea­dy shif­ting its eco­no­mic cen­ter of gra­vi­ty away from the rust-belt Don­bas and toward the post­in­dus­tri­al cen­ter and west. And with com­pre­hen­si­ve poli­ti­cal and eco­no­mic reforms; a serious anti­cor­rup­ti­on effort, espe­cial­ly in the mili­ta­ry sec­tor; and a cam­pai­gn to con­struct defen­si­ve posi­ti­ons opti­mi­zed for dro­nes and low-density war­fa­re and to invest sub­stan­ti­al funds and orga­niz­a­tio­nal effort into battle­field inno­va­tions, Ukrai­ne could be in a stron­ger posi­ti­on to pro­tect its­elf were it atta­cked again. Accep­t­ing a bad peace deal now would at least give Kyiv this chan­ce at a bet­ter future. Rejec­ting one now would only pro­long a cos­t­ly and losing war.

src: click (FA)

EVERYBODY knew it. They fuck­ing smi­led and kept silent.

edit: Es gibt aber natür­lich auch wien­der gute Nach­rich­ten. Der Stan­dard spielt heu­te ein lus­ti­ges Spiel. Es nennt sich, wie lan­ge kann unse­re Redak­ti­on das aus der Öfent­lich­keit raus­hal­ten:

Bildschirmfoto 2026 02 27 um 19 49 36
src: click

Aber das macht ja nichts, das ist eh nur Wahl­be­ein­flus­sung in Ungarn.









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