Fair and free elections - and media, and everything!

03. Mai 2024

The search term “Zaluzhny bloc” sur­faces 10 search results on goog­le. The first one of which is a News­week article:

Ukrai­ni­an Pre­si­dent Volo­dym­yr Zelen­sky would lose to the commander-in-chief he fired if an elec­tion were to be held now, accord­ing to a poll.

Zelen­sky remo­ved Vale­rii Zaluzhny from his post in Febru­a­ry fol­lowing mon­ths of spe­cu­la­ti­on about a rift bet­ween the pair, likely exa­cer­ba­ted by the general’s assess­ment to The Eco­no­mist that the war in Ukrai­ne had reached a stalemate.

Zaluzhny was repla­ced by the com­man­der of Ukrai­ni­an Land For­ces Olek­san­dr Syrs­ky but has con­ti­nued to enjoy gre­at popu­la­ri­ty among the Ukrai­ni­an public.

Ukraine’s con­sti­tu­ti­on man­da­tes pre­si­den­ti­al elec­tions to take place on the last Sunday of March in the fifth year of the incumbent’s term, which would have been March 31. Howe­ver, fol­lowing Vla­di­mir Putin’s full-scale inva­si­on, Kyiv has decla­red mar­ti­al law which pro­hi­bits elec­tions being held.

Vale­rii Zaluzhnyi, for­mer commander-in-chief, on Inde­pen­dence Day on August 24, 2023 in Kyiv, Ukrai­ne. Latest pol­ling sug­gests he would beat Pre­si­dent Volo­dym­yr Zelen­sky in an election.

But a sur­vey by the Kyiv-based firm SOCIS con­duc­ted bet­ween Febru­a­ry 22 and March 1 asked 3,000 Ukrai­ni­ans adults how they would vote in a hypo­the­ti­cal ballot.

The poll with a mar­gin of error of 2.1 per­cent found that if an elec­tion were held, 41 per­cent of respondents would have backed Zaluzhny in the first round, com­pa­red with 23.7 per­cent for Zelensky.

In Ukraine’s elec­tion, if the­re is no can­di­da­te with a majo­ri­ty, a second round would be held and this sce­n­a­rio would see Zaluzhny get over two-thirds (67.5 per­cent) of the vote, com­pa­red with rough­ly a third (32.5 per­cent) who would back the incumbent.

src: click (newsweek.com)

The sixth search result is the Rus­si­an Prav­da publi­shing a RIA Novos­ti arti­cle, sta­ting the same.

The ninth and tenth search results are sket­chy aggre­ga­tors lis­ting RT news reporting.

The second search result is an ira­ni­an news agency.

The third search result is a “ukrai­ni­an think­tank” with only one board member.

The seventh search result is the chi­ne­se Netease new­s­por­tal 163.com

But the pol­ling insti­tu­te was “Kyiv-based firm SOCIS”, which is a mem­ber of The Gal­lup Orga­niz­a­ti­on sin­ce 1994. Its parent com­pa­ny for­ked bet­ween 1999 and 2002 and is now a part of the Tay­lor Nel­son Sof­res mar­ket rese­arch group.

This is that com­pa­nies histo­ry, star­ting from 2007:

The TNS Group con­ti­nues to grow, main­ly by acqui­ring small rese­arch com­pa­nies to streng­t­hen its posi­ti­on in mar­kets in which it alrea­dy has a pre­sence. For examp­le, in Decem­ber 2007, TNS acqui­red Lan­dis Stra­te­gy & Inno­va­ti­on in the United Sta­tes, a spe­cia­list research-based consultancy.[5] In the same mon­th, TNS announ­ced that it had reached agree­ment to incre­a­se its owners­hip of Latin­Pa­nel Hol­dings from 33.3% to 100%. TNS was form­er­ly a joint ven­ture part­ner with the NPD Group and the IBOPE Group in this con­ti­nuous con­su­mer panel busi­ness ser­ving Latin Ame­ri­ca ope­ra­ting in 15 coun­tries in Latin Ame­ri­ca, and covering 96% of the region’s GDP, pro­vi­ding local and inter­na­tio­nal cli­ents with access to a house­hold rese­arch panel across the packa­ged gro­ce­ries, toi­le­tries and cos­me­tics, fresh foods and tex­ti­le retail markets.[6]

In ear­ly March 2008, TNS announ­ced the mer­ging of its North Ame­ri­can ope­ra­ting units TNS Media Intel­li­gence, TNS Media Rese­arch with the recent­ly acqui­red firms Com­pe­te and Cym­f­o­ny to crea­te TNS Media Group.[7][8]

On 29 April 2008 TNS announ­ced that it was in talks to mer­ge with Ger­man mar­ket rese­arch com­pa­ny GfK.[9] The announ­ce­ment was fol­lo­wed in May by two con­di­tio­nal offers from WPP to buy TNS for a com­bi­na­ti­on of cash and shares, both of which were rejec­ted by TNS’s board. The hos­ti­le WPP bid led to GfK and TNS aban­do­ning their mer­ger plans. GfK sought without suc­cess to find backing for a rival offer, lea­ving WPP’s hos­ti­le bid as the only one on the table. On 9 Octo­ber 2008 WPP decla­red that its latest bid had been suc­cess­ful and that it was buy­ing TNS for $1.93bn.[10]

TNS was bought by WPP’s Kan­t­ar Group. Many Kan­t­ar sub­si­dia­ry com­pa­nies under­went rest­ruc­tu­ring and rebranding.[citation needed]

[Die Kan­t­ar Group ist eine Grup­pe von Markt­for­schungs­un­ter­neh­men unter dem Dach des US-Finanzinvestors Bain Capi­tal [Bain Capi­tal wur­de 1984 vom US-Politiker und - Prä­si­dent­schafts­kan­di­da­ten (2012) Mitt Rom­ney mit­ge­grün­det. […] Im Jahr 2022 ver­wal­te­te Bain Capi­tal rund 165 Mil­li­ar­den US-Dollar an Inves­to­ren­ka­pi­tal.]. src: click (Wiki­pe­dia)]

In 2013, TNS acqui­red Sino­t­rust Mar­ket Research,[11] a lea­ding mar­ket rese­arch and con­sul­ting com­pa­ny in China.

src: click (Wiki­pe­dia)

But thats not all --

Results of exit polls per­for­med by this com­pa­ny during the Ukrai­ni­an pre­si­den­ti­al elec­tion in 2004 were used as one of argu­ments lea­ding to the Oran­ge Revolution.[citation nee­ded] In 2007 Due to the chan­ge in the deve­lo­p­ment stra­te­gy of the SOCIS Cen­ter, the mar­ke­ting rese­arch direc­tion was res­to­red and, accord­in­gly, the name was chan­ged to the SOCIS Cen­ter for Social and Mar­ke­ting Rese­arch and the com­pa­ny logo. Today, the SOCIS Cen­ter has ever­ything necessa­ry to con­duct various types of rese­arch - from deve­lo­ping a rese­arch pro­gram to pre­pa­ring a report. [3]

src: click (Wiki­pe­dia)

Aha­h­ah­haaa.

Cita­ti­on needed?

Ehm -- would the Pre­si­den­ti­al Elec­tion and Oran­ge Revo­lu­ti­on Impli­ca­ti­ons for Ukraine’s Tran­si­ti­on “collec­ted edi­ti­on” from Hel­mut Kurth/Iris Kem­pe (Iris Kem­pe – AGI - American-German Insti­tu­te), publis­hed by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Regio­nal office Ukrai­ne, Bela­rus, Mol­d­o­va suffice?

You know the one review­ed here by Ber­tels­mann For­schungs­grup­pe Politik?

No, not suf­fi­ci­ent? How about this:

Die Legi­ti­ma­ti­ons­säu­le ist jedoch bereits jetzt ins Schwan­ken gera­ten. Die schrump­fen­de Zustim­mung für Janu­ko­wytsch und sei­ne Par­tei der Regio­nen wur­de bei den Par­la­ments­wah­len 2012 deut­lich. Nach Par­tei­lis­ten ver­lor die Par­tei der Regio­nen die Wah­len; nur mit Hil­fe von direk­ten Man­da­ten konn­te die pro-präsidentielle Mehr­heit gebil­det wer­den (sie­he Ukraine-Analysen Nr. 109). Im Dezem­ber 2013 zeig­ten die Umfra­gen des Zen­trums für Sozial- und Markt­for­schung (SOCIS), dass Janu­ko­wytsch in einer poten­ti­el­len Stich­wahl gegen jeden der oppo­si­tio­nel­len Poli­ti­ker (außer Oleh Tjah­ni­bok von der natio­na­lis­ti­schen Par­tei »Swo­bo­da«) ver­lie­ren wür­de (sie­he Gra­fi­ken 6–9, S. 22–23).

src: click (Län­der Ana­ly­sen Nr. 127, 11.02.2014, Ukrai­ne Ana­ly­sen, ETH Zürich)

Bildschirmfoto 2024 05 03 um 10 30 59
Bildschirmfoto 2024 05 03 um 10 31 34

Nein, immer noch nicht?

Viel­leicht For­schungs­stel­le Ost­eu­ro­pa - Bre­men, And­res Witt­kow­sky, Erklä­rungs­an­sät­ze der Her­aus­bil­dung poli­ti­scher Eli­ten in der Ukrai­ne (1995)

Zitat:

Die Urtei­le über die natio­na­len ukrai­ni­schen Eli­ten sind mit­un­ter hart, aber ange­sichts des Aus­ma­ßes des wirt­schaft­li­chen Ver­falls des Lan­des nach der staat­li­chen Unab­hän­gig­keit nicht ohne Berech­ti­gung. Der inzwi­schen zum innen­po­li­ti­schen Bera­ter von Prä­si­dent Leo­nid Kutschma beru­fe­ne Direk­tor des Insti­tuts für glo­ba­le und regio­na­le Sicher­heit, Dmi­trij Wydrin, und der Prä­si­dent der ukrai­ni­schen Socis Gal­lup Insti­tuts, Miko­la Tschu­ri­low, bekla­gen gar das Feh­len einer Eli­te über­haupt: “Viel­leicht war die […] sou­ve­rä­ne Ukrai­ne 1991 das größ­te Land der Welt, das kei­ne poli­ti­sche Eli­te hat­te. Das Kon­glo­me­rat von frü­he­ren Par­tei­funk­tio­nä­ren und poli­ti­schen Dis­si­den­ten, die sich nun an der Macht befan­den, könn­te man als Prä-Elite bezeichnen.“2 Letz­te­re - so die Autoren wei­ter - konn­te die ent­schei­den­den Funk­tio­nen einer poli­ti­schen Eli­te nicht erfül­len: die der effi­zi­en­ten Ver­wal­tung, der Koor­di­na­ti­on und Inte­gra­ti­on, der opti­ma­len Ent­schei­dungs­fin­dung, Pro­gno­se und Pla­nung, der poli­ti­schen Steue­rung sowie der Kaderbildung. 

src: click (For­schungs­stel­le Ost­eu­ro­pa - Bre­men via ETH Zürich)

Nein? Immer noch nicht, ok - aber jetzt:

The first and the second rounds of pre­si­den­ti­al elec­tions in Ukrai­ne were held on Octo­ber 31 and Novem­ber 21, 2004. The results of the second round were pro­tes­ted by the oppo­si­ti­on in con­nec­tion with mas­si­ve fal­si­fi­ca­ti­ons. Massive
street pro­tests in sup­port of the oppo­si­ti­on deman­ds as well as the blo­cka­de and picke­ting of the government buil­dings (the so-called “Oran­ge Revo­lu­ti­on”) with the deman­ds to can­cel the results of the elec­tions went off in the coun­try. The Supre­me Court annul­led the Novem­ber run­off elec­tion and orde­red the third round of elec­tion (a rerun of the second round) which took place on Decem­ber 26, 2004.

[…]

Role of Exit Polls in Pre­si­den­ti­al Elec­tions in Ukraine

Under initia­ti­ve of the Demo­cra­tic Initia­ti­ves Fund four socio­lo­gi­cal com­pa­nies, inclu­ding my com­pa­ny KIIS (Kiev Inter­na­tio­nal Insti­tu­te of Socio­lo­gy), the Razum­kov Cen­ter, SOCIS (Cen­ter for Social and Poli­ti­cal Stu­dies) and the Social Moni­to­ring Cen­ter (SMC) made up a con­sor­ti­um for con­duc­ting exit
polls. This work was finan­ced by eight embas­sies and four funds. Such exit polls were car­ri­ed out in Ukrai­ne during the pre­vious elec­tions four times. 

Their results dif­fe­red from the offi­cial data by no more than 1.5-2 percent.

A half-year pri­or to the elec­tions KIIS as well as some other com­pa­nies star­ted che­cking whe­ther the peop­le were real­ly giving sin­ce­re ans­wers to a ques­ti­on for whom they were going to vote at the elec­tions. KIIS car­ri­ed out the polls using a split-half method, mea­ning that half of the respondents were inter­view­ed face-to-face and the other half by a secret bal­lot method. The lat­ter sug­gested that respondents should wri­te their ans­wer to the ques­ti­on “For whom will you vote?” on a sepa­ra­te sheet of paper and drop it in a card­board box. The ten­si­on, admi­nis­tra­ti­ve pres­su­re and intimi­da­ti­on of voters were gro­wing as the elec­tions were approa­ching. The­re­fo­re, the dif­fe­rence in ans­wers of tho­se who ans­we­red anony­mous­ly and tho­se who ans­we­red open­ly was rising. Fif­teen days pri­or to the first round the dif­fe­rence rose to 3-4 percent.
Taking into account the­se results, KIIS and the Razum­kov Cen­ter (RC) made a decisi­on to car­ry out exit polls by a secret bal­lot method while SOCIS and
the Social Moni­to­ring Cen­ter (SМC) insis­ted on con­duc­ting exit polls by an inter­view. As a result, each com­pa­ny used its own method (a usu­al inter­view or a secret bal­lot) in con­duc­ting exit polls. A sam­ple for each com­pa­ny con­sis­ted of 370 pol­ling sta­ti­ons with 12500 respondents. It amoun­ted to about 1500 pol­ling sta­ti­ons with 50000 respondents. It was sup­po­sed that the total data would be repre­sen­ta­ti­ve for each of 26 are­as of Ukraine.
As it was pre­dic­ted, of 26 can­di­da­tes par­ti­ci­pa­ting in the first round of the elec­tions only two can­di­da­tes were eli­gi­ble for the second round. The data of exit polls made by the­se com­pa­nies and the offi­cial results of the Cen­tral Elec­to­ral Com­mis­si­on (CEC) are given in the fol­lowing table:

Bildschirmfoto 2024 05 03 um 11 00 33

The­se elec­tions were accom­pa­nied by the fal­si­fi­ca­ti­ons on a lar­ge sca­le. That is why the data of the Social Moni­to­ring Cen­ter (SMC) and SOCIS, recei­ved by inter­views, yiel­ded the results which were clo­ser to the offi­cial data than results of KIIS and the Razum­kov Cen­ter recei­ved by a secret bal­lot method which gave more sin­ce­re ans­wers and hig­her respon­se rates (RR). As a result, KIIS RRs amoun­ted to 79 per­cent, the Razum­kov Cen­ter RRs to 77 per­cent, SOCIS RRs to 74 per­cent and SMC RRs to 72 percent.

At the same time two exit polls were con­duc­ted by the Rus­si­an com­pa­nies, inclu­ding the Fund of Public Opi­ni­on (FPO) and the Insti­tu­te of Social and Eco­no­mic Rese­ar­ches tog­e­ther with some uni­ver­si­ties which pre­dic­ted the vic­to­ry for Yanu­ko­vych. Later the Fund of Public Opi­ni­on reve­a­led that its data were unre­li­able and its exit poll was a failure.
Befo­re the second round of elec­tions SOCIS and the Social Moni­to­ring Cen­ter (SMC) sepa­ra­ted from the con­sor­ti­um with a scan­dal and con­duc­ted their
exit polls using face-to-face inter­views. My com­pa­ny (KIIS) and the Razum­kov Cen­ter with the orga­niz­a­tio­nal sup­port of the Demo­cra­tic Initia­ti­ves Fund con­ti­nued to car­ry out the Natio­nal Exit Poll 2004 by a secret bal­lot method. Our sam­ple con­sis­ted of 750 pol­ling sta­ti­ons with about 28000 respondents and a respon­se rate (RR) of 79 per­cent. Experts from Rus­sia (A. And­reen­ko­va of CESSI, A. Grazhdankin and E. Duke of the Leva­da Cen­ter) and Poland (Maciej Koch­a­no­wicz and Rys­zard Pieс­kow­ski of PBS) par­ti­ci­pa­ted as advi­sers and obser­vers in pre­pa­ring and con­duc­ting our exit poll in the second round of the elec­tions which yiel­ded the fol­lowing results:

Bildschirmfoto 2024 05 03 um 11 02 29

Accord­ing to the results of our exit poll announ­ced right after clo­sing of the pol­ling sta­ti­ons oppo­si­ti­on can­di­da­te Vik­tor Yush­chen­ko won the elec­tion with a lead of 10.4 percent.
On the basis of its exit poll SOCIS said that the win­ner was Yanu­ko­vych though with a small advan­ta­ge. Later SOCIS was accu­sed by the Democratic
Initia­ti­ves Fund of for­ging the data of its exit poll.

The­re were also reports on many infrin­ge­ments of the voting pro­ce­du­re during and after the election.
Mean­while, the Cen­tral Elec­to­ral Com­mis­si­on announ­ced the preli­mi­na­ry results indi­ca­ting the vic­to­ry for Yanu­ko­vych with a lead of three percent.
After the Cen­tral Elec­to­ral Com­mis­si­on had announ­ced the results of 99 per­cent pro­ces­sed bul­le­tins, Yush­chen­ko and his staff expres­sed their mistrust to the Cen­tral Elec­to­ral Com­mit­tee and cal­led the peop­le to come out to the streets to pro­test against the elec­tion falsifications.

Thus, during the­se elec­tions socio­lo­gists appeared to be invol­ved in the poli­ti­cal strugg­le. Exit polls were used for the con­trol of the elec­tion results and sub­se­quent­ly con­si­de­red by the aut­ho­ri­ties as an oppo­si­ti­on poli­ti­cal technology.

The­re­fo­re, the aut­ho­ri­ties finan­ced con­duc­ting their own alter­na­ti­ve exit polls and pro­bab­ly for­ged their data.

src: click Volo­dym­yr Paniot­to, Ukrai­ne: Pre­si­den­ti­al Elec­tions 2004 and the Oran­ge Revo­lu­ti­on (via: kiis.com.ua)

Ah.

Good times.









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