harlekin.me

Wann spricht Selenk­syj eigent­lich das ers­te Mal von “rus­si­schen Ultimaten”?

“Die Ukrai­ne kann kein rus­si­sches Ulti­ma­tum akzeptieren”

Die Ukrai­ne wer­de Städ­te wie Mariu­pol, Char­kiw und Kiew nicht kampf­los über­ge­ben, erklärt Prä­si­dent Selen­skyj. Bei einer Ver­hand­lungs­lö­sung will er die Bevöl­ke­rung über jeden Kom­pro­miss mit Russ­land abstim­men lassen.

Von
BR24 Redaktion
Über die­ses The­ma berich­tet: BR24 am 21.03.2022 um 18:30 Uhr.

Die Ukrai­ne wird sich nach den Wor­ten ihres Staats­chefs Wolo­dym­yr Selen­skyj nicht auf “rus­si­sche Ulti­ma­ten” zur Been­di­gung des Krie­ges ein­las­sen. “Die Ukrai­ne kann kein rus­si­sches Ulti­ma­tum akzep­tie­ren”, sag­te Selen­skyj der Nachrichten-Website Suspilne.

Mos­kau wol­le unter ande­rem die “Über­ga­be” der Städ­te Mariu­pol, Char­kiw und Kiew durch die Ukrai­ne errei­chen, sag­te Selen­skyj. Dem könn­ten aber “weder die Men­schen in Char­kiw noch die in Mariu­pol oder Kiew noch ich, der Prä­si­dent”, nach­kom­men. In der Nacht zum Mon­tag hat­te die Ukrai­ne ein Ulti­ma­tum Russ­lands zur Kapi­tu­la­ti­on in der bela­ger­ten Hafen­stadt Mariu­pol zurückgewiesen.

src: click (BR24)

[Moment, woll­te Russ­land dass Kiew kapi­tu­liert, bevor ein Waf­fen­still­stand ver­han­delt wer­den kann?

Nein, natür­lich nicht, Selen­skyj war nur bereits im März 2022 “über­aus kreativ”.

Ver­glei­che:

NYT as of June 15th 2024

sowie:

Wall Street Jour­nal as of 1st of March 2024 (Ori­gi­nal­quel­le: click)]

Das fügen sie dann hier in die­se Zeit­leis­te ein, gell? Danke.

src: click

Heu­te ist die­se Phra­se (“Ulti­ma­ten”) in der ukrai­ni­schen Pro­pa­gan­da wie­der sehr gefragt - wenn man z.B. Kat­rin Eigen­dorf (der Intel­lekt auf zwei Bei­nen, drei Palet­ten, neben einer Hau­bit­ze, oder wahl­wei­se auch in einem Inter­view­pa­nel) vor­lü­gen muss “wie die Ukrai­ne Frie­den errei­chen will”.

Also erst mal in dem sie noch vier oder mehr Jah­re Auf­rei­bungs­krieg führt - natürlich.

Ich mein, so viel steht außer Fra­ge - fra­gen sie doch Gus­tav Gressel -

den Mann des­sen Aus­le­gun­gen die Sor­bon­ne ihren Stu­den­ten an die Sei­te stellt.

Dann aber auch sehr in dem sie bereits im Bür­gen­stock End­kom­mu­ni­que ver­an­kert, dass man nur mit Russ­land ver­hand­le, wenn Russ­land die ter­ri­to­ria­le Inte­gri­tät der Ukrai­ne in den Gren­zen von 1991 akzep­tiert, UND die voll­stän­di­ge Sou­ve­rä­ni­tät der Ukrai­ne - eine Armee belie­bi­ger Grö­ße, zur Befrei­ung der Krim aufrechtzuerhalten -

was natür­lich NIE UND UNTER KEINEN UMSTÄNDEN EIN UKRAINISCHES ULTIMATUM DARSTELLT…

Also dass die Ukrai­ne das ins Bür­gen­stock Kom­mu­ni­que auf­ge­nom­men hat um damit ihre (seit 2022 bestehen­de) Posi­ti­on (wir laden Russ­land erst ein, wenn Russ­land zustimmt auf der Basis einer Frie­dens­for­mel zu ver­han­deln die die ter­ri­to­ria­le Inte­gri­tät der Ukrai­ne in den Gren­zen von 1991, sowie die von der Ukrai­ne frei wähl­ba­re Grö­ße und Aus­rich­tung (“Wir erobern jetzt die Krim zurück!”) ihres Mili­tärs als Vor­be­din­gun­gen beinhal­tet) inter­na­tio­nal (von 78 Staa­ten) legi­ti­miert zu bekom­men, sag jetzt nicht ich, sagt die von US-AID finan­zier­te Euro­pean Prav­da, die die Fas­sun­gen des Bür­gen­stock Kom­mu­ni­ques vom 28. Mai und 9. Juni ver­glei­chen konnte:

Ukrai­ne Peace Sum­mit turns hard on Rus­sia. How lea­ders amen­ded the final decisi­on under criticism

THURSDAY, 13 JUNE 2024 — SERGIY SYDORENKO, EUROPEAN PRAVDA

Har­sh cri­ti­cism of the agreed draft reso­lu­ti­on of the Peace Sum­mit, voi­ced both in Ukrai­ne and by Ukraine’s allies, for­ced the orga­nisers to make con­ces­si­ons. Switz­er­land, which is orga­ni­sing the Glo­bal Peace Sum­mit, sent a radi­cal­ly revi­sed docu­ment to all capi­tals of the par­ti­ci­pa­ting coun­tries, cor­rec­ting key issu­es high­ligh­ted by Euro­pean Pravda.

The updated draft is ent­i­re­ly accep­ta­ble for Ukrai­ne. It expli­ci­tly calls the war “Rus­si­an aggres­si­on.” Loo­p­ho­les that could have paved the way for ter­ri­to­ri­al con­ces­si­ons from Ukrai­ne were remo­ved from the text. Several sta­tes that had plan­ned to attend the Peace Sum­mit in Switz­er­land have deci­ded not to go the­re after the draft decisi­on was chan­ged in favour of Ukraine.

Euro­pean Prav­da has lear­ned the details of the nego­tia­ti­ons and the decisi­on that will be adop­ted this weekend.

Behind the sce­nes of the Peace Summit
The time­li­ne of the­se events is cru­cial: it shows how urgent the chan­ges that occur­red over the past week were.

The idea to hold the Peace Sum­mit in Switz­er­land was agreed upon at the begin­ning of the year. On 10 April, Switz­er­land announ­ced the agreed date and loca­ti­on for the sum­mit. Lea­ders of about 160 coun­tries, four inter­na­tio­nal orga­ni­sa­ti­ons (UN, EU, Coun­cil of Euro­pe, OSCE), the Pope and the Ecu­me­ni­cal Patri­arch were invi­ted to the Bür­gen­stock Alpi­ne Spa. It was pre­de­ter­mi­ned that Rus­sia would not be pre­sent at the first Peace Sum­mit, which Ukrai­ne deman­ded in the first place.

Both Kyiv and Bern aimed to adopt a decisi­on fol­lowing the sum­mit. Howe­ver, the wor­d­ing nee­ded to be agreed upon by all participants.

Pre­pa­ra­ti­on for this docu­ment star­ted more than two mon­ths ago. Euro­pean Prav­da has the April draft of the joint com­mu­ni­qué, whe­re the sum­mit dates were still ten­ta­ti­ve. That docu­ment was pre­pa­red in Kyiv and was ent­i­re­ly accep­ta­ble for Ukrai­ne, adhe­ring to the important red lines for Ukrai­ni­an society.

Howe­ver, Switz­er­land per­sua­ded Ukrai­ne to sof­ten it as much as pos­si­ble, con­si­de­ring the wis­hes of all par­ti­ci­pants. On 28 May, a com­pro­mi­se ver­si­on was sent from Bern to all capi­tals, and initi­al­ly, Kyiv had to agree to it.

Ever­ything chan­ged when the public lear­ned that this draft was dan­ge­rous for Ukraine.

The dis­cus­sion began with an arti­cle by Euro­pean Prav­da, publis­hed on 5 June. The next day, on 6 June, Kyiv was for­ced to make public state­ments asser­ting that “Ukrai­ne will not retre­at from the Peace For­mu­la.” This fue­led dis­cus­sions in the capi­tals of Ukraine’s allies, which were also not thril­led with the wor­d­ing of the Swiss docu­ment. At least a few of them con­ta­c­ted Bern with a pro­po­sal to revi­se the joint statement.

On 9 June, Switz­er­land had sent a com­ple­te­ly new draft to all coun­tries. Amen­ding the com­mu­ni­qué took mere days, not mon­ths as before.

What has changed
The summit’s decisi­on remains unch­an­ged in for­mat and struc­tu­re. This is a two-page docu­ment dedi­ca­ted to three issu­es: nuclear secu­ri­ty, food secu­ri­ty and the pri­so­ners of war. Key issu­es that lay out­side the­se points have been addres­sed though.

Rus­si­an Aggression
– Old wor­d­ing: The May draft decisi­on of the Peace Sum­mit did not men­ti­on the word “aggres­si­on,” mea­ning the inter­na­tio­nal crime whe­re Rus­sia is the per­pe­tra­tor and Ukrai­ne the victim.

– New wor­d­ing: This has been amen­ded. The joint com­mu­ni­qué now refers to “the aggres­si­on of the Rus­si­an Fede­ra­ti­on against Ukraine”.

Ter­ri­to­ri­al Inte­gri­ty and the UN Charter
– Old wor­d­ing: the pre­vious sum­mit decisi­on ver­si­on crea­ted a legal win­dow to inclu­de Ukrai­ne aban­do­ning part of its ter­ri­to­ry in the con­di­ti­ons of “sus­tainab­le peace with Rus­sia”, if necessary.

– New wor­d­ing: the new draft decisi­on clear­ly sta­tes that the basis for sus­tainab­le peace will be only “a solu­ti­on based on the princip­le of respect for the ter­ri­to­ri­al inte­gri­ty and sov­er­eig­n­ty of all sta­tes”. [Cri­mea back to Ukrai­ne, and no neu­tra­li­ty that inclu­des “limi­ta­ti­on on mili­ta­ry forces”]

Alter­na­ti­ve Peace Formulas
– Old wor­d­ing: the pre­vious draft blur­red the mea­ning of the Peace For­mu­la and ope­ned up space for inter­na­tio­nal dis­cus­sion of all alter­na­ti­ve visi­ons of peace, such as the Chinese-Brazilian one, which envi­sa­ges a halt to the streng­t­he­ning of Ukraine’s Armed For­ces and a ces­sa­ti­on of hostilities.

– New wor­d­ing: the new wor­d­ing sta­tes that only peace pro­po­sals that com­ply with inter­na­tio­nal law (i.e. an uncon­di­tio­nal return of the 1991 bor­ders, unless revi­sed by Ukrai­ne its­elf) and the UN Char­ter (in par­ti­cu­lar, Ukraine’s uncon­di­tio­nal [no for­ce limi­ta­ti­on] right to con­ti­nue repel­ling Rus­si­an aggres­si­on and libe­ra­ting the occu­p­ied ter­ri­to­ries) will be taken into account.

Invol­ve­ment of Russia
– Old wor­d­ing: the ear­lier ver­si­on tur­ned Rus­sia from an aggres­sor into a par­ti­ci­pant in peace talks, requi­ring only vague “confidence-building mea­su­res” on nuclear and food security.

– New wor­d­ing: this sec­tion has been rewrit­ten from scratch. The Swiss agreed not to men­ti­on Rus­sia at all in the pro­vi­si­on on peace talks, ins­tead refer­ring to “all par­ties”. The­re is no lon­ger a wea­ke­ned requi­re­ment for “confidence-building mea­su­res”, but ins­tead “spe­ci­fic actions” are requi­red. And most import­ant­ly, the refe­ren­ces to a “second peace sum­mit” that hin­ted at a com­mit­ment to invi­te Rus­sia to par­ti­ci­pa­te have been removed.

Food Secu­ri­ty
– New addi­ti­on: The updated docu­ment inclu­des the state­ment that “attacks on mer­chant ships in ports and along the ent­i­re rou­te, as well as against civi­li­an ports and civi­li­an port infra­st­ruc­tu­re, are unac­cep­ta­ble”. This falls under the glo­bal food secu­ri­ty sec­tion but app­lies to all civi­li­an ves­sels, inclu­ding con­tai­ner ships or tho­se expor­ting Ukrai­ni­an metals. Con­ti­nued attacks would block Russia’s par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on in peace initiatives.

The­se signi­fi­cant chan­ges ensu­re that the new draft of the sum­mit decisi­on is more accep­ta­ble to Ukrai­ne, rein­for­cing its ter­ri­to­ri­al inte­gri­ty, addres­sing Rus­si­an aggres­si­on accu­rate­ly and main­tai­ning strin­gent con­di­ti­ons on peace nego­tia­ti­ons invol­ving Russia.

The docu­ment is accep­ta­ble for Ukraine
The Joint Com­mu­ni­qué on a Peace Frame­work in its new ver­si­on aligns with Ukraine’s inte­rests. Alt­hough the­re are still minor remarks, the main dan­gers have been addres­sed. Cur­r­ent­ly, the draft is not yet final: the­re is still a pos­si­bi­li­ty of point chan­ges on 13-14 June. Howe­ver, Euro­pean Pravda’s sources are incli­ned to belie­ve that the updated con­tent of the decisi­on will remain.

Rea­listic expec­ta­ti­ons are necessa­ry. This sum­mit will not lead to a bre­akthrough or end the war. Ukrai­ne is merely taking one of the first steps on a long path. Howe­ver, it is cru­cial that this step is in the right direc­tion and does not crea­te new problems.

The hig­her ambi­ti­on of the docu­ment came at a cost:

several coun­tries have decli­ned to par­ti­ci­pa­te in the sum­mit. As of 5 June, Switz­er­land offi­cial­ly announ­ced that it had “recei­ved more than 80 con­fir­ma­ti­ons of atten­dance at the level of heads of sta­tes and governments”, and the total num­ber of con­fir­med atten­de­es, as repor­ted by offi­cials, excee­ded 100. Howe­ver, in the fol­lowing days, this phra­se had to be remo­ved from the event’s web­site, and now it reads that “around 90 sta­tes have con­fir­med their par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on in the Sum­mit on Peace in Ukrai­ne, most of them at head of sta­te or government level”.

Sources of Euro­pean Prav­da repor­ted that, in rea­li­ty, about 15 coun­tries have “pau­sed” their atten­dance. In addi­ti­on, the num­ber of tho­se who have signal­led a demo­ti­on from the pre­si­den­ti­al or prime minis­te­ri­al level to the level of minis­ters or even their depu­ties is in the dozens.

Alt­hough it is obvious that due to the recent chan­ges, the sum­mit will be atten­ded by fewer sta­tes than initi­al­ly anti­ci­pa­ted by Ban­ko­va Street [whe­re the Ukrai­ni­an President’s Office is loca­ted] eight days ago, it is bet­ter to have a sum­mit of like-minded peop­le than to make con­ces­si­ons on issu­es that are cri­ti­cal for the state.

Ser­giy Sydorenko

Euro­pean Prav­da, Editor

src: click

Dann über­zeugt man den blon­den Intel­li­genz­bol­zen vom ZDF natür­lich, dass es sehr wich­tig sein wird, jetzt noch wei­te­re Frie­dens­for­mel­kon­fe­ren­zen abzu­hal­ten, in denen man “Einen Frie­den vor­be­rei­tet, der nicht mehr von Rus­si­schen Ulti­ma­ten beein­flusst wird” - bestä­tigt als Kule­ba heu­te noch mal kurz (sie­he Video), dass Russ­land erst zu Ver­hand­lun­gen ein­ge­la­den wird - wenn es die Vor­be­din­gun­gen akzep­tiert, die sei­ner Kapi­tu­la­ti­on gleichkommen…

Und an der Stel­le braucht man sie dann wie­der, die Phra­se, dass die Ukrai­ne kei­ne rus­si­schen Ulti­ma­ten akzep­tie­ren kön­ne, und des­halb Frie­dens­for­mel­gi­p­fel abhält, zu denen sie Russ­land sicher auch ganz bald ein­la­den wird.

Nach­dem sie die von der Schweiz rein­for­mu­lier­te Zusa­ge, dass Russ­land zum nächs­ten Frien­dens­for­mel­gi­p­fel gela­den wer­den soll (Vor­ver­si­on vom 28. Mai 2024), ansatz­los aus dem Kom­mu­ni­que ent­fer­nen hat las­sen. Und jetzt auf ihre Vor­be­din­gun­gen pocht, die Russ­land aner­ken­nen muss, bevor es auf einen wei­te­ren Gip­fel gela­den wer­den kann.

Die wegen denen 15 Staa­ten (2,2 Mil­li­ar­den Men­schen) ihre Unter­schrift unter dem Kom­mu­ni­quee ver­wei­gert haben. Schreibt die Euro­pean Prav­da. Die von USAID finan­ziert wird.

Ach­ja, Selen­skyj woll­te im März 2022, natür­lich auch die kom­plet­te ukrai­ni­sche Bevöl­ke­rung über alle Kon­zes­sio­nen, die Russ­land in Ver­hand­lun­gen for­dert und for­dern könn­te abstim­men lassen.

Nur eine Prä­si­den­ten­wahl im März 2024 ist sich dann wegen des Krie­ges lei­der doch nicht ausgegangen.

War­um ich das pos­te - nun - das ZDF ver­arscht jetzt die deut­sche Bevöl­ke­rung auf der gesam­ten Brei­te durch.

Die Ukrai­ne will Frie­den errei­chen, in dem sie mili­tä­risch gewinnt, selbst Ulti­ma­ten in die End­kom­mu­ni­ques ihrer Frie­dens­for­mel­kon­fe­ren­zen ein­baut (und zwar sol­che Kle­scher, dass 15 Staa­ten (2,2+ Mil­li­ar­den Men­schen) nach der Ände­rung das Abschluss-Kommuniquees die­ses nicht mehr unter­zeich­nen, und mehr als zwei Dut­zend Staa­ten die Ebe­ne der Teil­na­me auf Minis­te­ri­al­ebe­ne run­ter­stu­fen), gleich­zei­tig über unse­re Jour­na­lis­mus­preis­trä­ge­rin Kat­rin Eigen­dorf “wir müs­sen auch mit Russ­land toll und schwer ver­han­deln, spä­ter dann, wenn sie die Krim zurück­ge­ge­ben haben” Pro­pa­gan­da in der deut­schen Bevöl­ke­rung streut, und behaup­tet man arbei­te par­al­lel aber an einem sehr wesent­li­chen Frie­dens­pro­zess -- der bereits zwei Kern­punk­te beinhal­tet, denen Russ­land nur bei einer schwe­ren Nie­der­la­ge zustim­men würde.

Ver­glei­che:

Ger­hard Man­gott am 10. Mai 2024 in einem Inter­view mit dem You­tube Kanal vaku­um https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=psp2zjOgpMk (bit­te vet­ten, ich habe kei­ne Ahnung, wer die sind -) fol­gen­des fest:

Bei 49:56 in:

Ger­hard Man­gott: “Bei­de Kriegs­par­tei­en beto­nen aller­dings immer dass sie zu Ver­hand­lun­gen bereit wären nur stel­len sie dafür Vor­be­din­gung die für die jeweils ande­re Sei­te nicht akzep­ta­bel sind. Die ukrai­ni­sche Füh­rung sagt wir ver­han­deln mit Russ­land aber erst wenn alle rus­si­schen Sol­da­ten ukrai­ni­sches Ter­ri­to­ri­um ver­las­sen haben, ein­schließ­lich der Krim na das wäre gleich­be­deu­tend mit einer desas­trö­sen Kriegs­nie­der­la­ge Russ­lands - wor­über soll­te dann noch ver­han­delt wer­den und Selen­ski hat auch gesagt wir spre­chen nicht mit Vla­di­mir Putin son­dern wir spre­chen mit dem nächs­ten Füh­rer Russ­lands und das kann dau­ern und die Ukrai­ne hat dann im Herbst 2022 eine Frie­dens­for­mel vor­ge­legt so nennt sie die­sen zehn Punk­te Plan in dem sie for­dert eben Rück­zug der rus­si­schen Trup­pen aus dem gesam­ten Gebiet der Ukrai­ne, Repa­ra­tio­nen Russ­lands an die Ukrai­ne und Andung von Kriegs­ver­bre­chen im zivi­len und mili­tä­ri­schen Bereich. Das sind aus ukrai­ni­scher Sicht alles völ­lig nach­voll­zieh­ba­re For­de­run­gen die Ukrai­ne muss nur sich klar sein so eine Frie­dens­for­mel die ja gewis­ser­ma­ßen ein Dik­tat­frie­den wäre die ist nur umsetz­bar wenn die wenn die Ukrai­ne die­sen Krieg voll­stän­dig gewinnt - und danach sieht es nun wirk­lich nicht aus. Russ­land wie­der­um sagt ja wir sind bereit zu Ver­hand­lun­gen aber man betont die ukrai­ni­sche Füh­rung müs­se - wie man das so for­mu­liert die Rea­li­tä­ten am Boden aner­ken­nen näm­lich dass die vier Regio­nen Cher­son, Sapo­ri­sia, Donezk und Luhansk Teil Russ­lands sei­en, rus­si­sches Staats­ge­biet sei­en und das ist für die Ukrai­ne wie­der nicht akzep­ta­bel. Man will dort kei­ne ter­ri­to­ria­len Zuge­ständ­nis­se machen, auch die über­wie­gen­de Mehr­heit der ukrai­ni­schen Bevöl­ke­rung will das nicht, lehnt die­ses Kon­zept Land für Frie­den ab - so sind wir ein in einer Situa­ti­on wo eben nicht ver­han­delt wird, son­dern wei­ter gekämpft wird und da gibt es eben man­che die sagen es wird sich am Stel­lungs­krieg auch mit neu­er west­li­cher Militär- und Finanz­hil­fe nicht wesent­lich etwas ver­än­dern schon gar nicht zu Guns­ten der Ukrai­ne und des­we­gen müs­sen man nach einer poli­ti­schen Lösung suchen und es gibt ande­re sowohl Poli­ti­ker als auch Kol­le­gen und Kol­le­gin­nen die sagen der Wes­ten müs­se der Ukrai­ne nur genug Waf­fen lie­fern und alle mög­li­chen Waf­fen lie­fern dann kön­ne die Ukrai­ne die­sen Krieg gewin­nen und das ist der Wider­streit die­ser bei­den Lager und der­zeit ist noch immer das Lager dass die letz­te Opti­on befürhwor­tet näm­lich eine all in Ver­sor­gung der Ukrai­ne mit Waf­fen und Muni­ti­on durch den Wes­ten um die­sen Krieg zu gewin­nen ob das mög­lich ist dar­an haben aber vie­le Mili­tär­ex­per­ten Zweifel.“

Mehr kann man die Öffent­lich­keit wirk­lich nicht mehr verarschen.

Ah, doch noch - man kann die Anfüh­rungs­zei­chen von Ulti­ma­ten weg­neh­men, die sie im März 2022 bei BR24 noch hat­ten - weil Ulti­ma­ten ja jetzt Teil der ukrai­ni­schen “so will die Ukrai­ne zum Frie­den kom­men” Erzäh­lung sind.

Und damit wichtig.

Und was für die Ukrai­ne wich­tig ist, ist natür­lich wahr.

Das macht der deutsch­spra­chi­ge Jour­na­lis­mus doch gerne.

Und die Kat­rin Eigen­dorf kanns dann ja ein­fach für die die den Scheiss nicht mehr aus­hal­ten mit­glau­ben, nicht?

Dazu viel­leicht noch ein Journalismus-Preis, und ein neu­es Buch, mit einer klei­nen Vernissage…?

Die­se Gesell­schaft ist das abso­lut gro­tesk und abar­tigst Allerletzte.

Ich mein irgend­wie müs­sen sie (also Hyper­bo­le Media, an die das ZDF die Pro­duk­ti­on aus­ge­la­gert hat) ja das “es ist an Russ­land geschei­tert “Emotions-Narrativ”” eta­bliert bekom­men und das war dann im Video kurz vor Ende genau der rich­ti­ge Satz dafür…! [Was jetzt nicht bedeu­tet, dass das rus­si­sche Nar­ra­tiv rich­tig ist - nur die Begrün­dung von ZDFheu­te ist… Ent­schei­den sie selbst.]

ZDFheu­te am 24.06.2024:

Neben all die­sen offe­nen Punk­ten [im Vor­ver­trag, soweit waren sie in der Bericht­erstat­tung sau­ber, also 14 Minu­ten - kei­ne Pro­ble­me mit dem For­mat] gab es außer­dem eine wach­sen­de Skep­sis auf ukrai­ni­scher Sei­te, wie ernst­haft die Rus­sen über­haupt an einer Lösung inter­es­siert waren.

src: click

New York Times am 15.06.2024:

“We didn’t know if Putin was serious,” said the for­mer seni­or U.S. offi­cial. “We couldn’t tell, on eit­her side of the fence, whe­ther the­se peop­le who were tal­king were empowered.”

One Ukrai­ni­an nego­tia­tor said he belie­ved the nego­tia­ti­ons were a bluff on Mr. Putin’s part, but two others descri­bed them as serious.” 

src: click

ZDFheu­te am 24.06.2024:

So schien die rus­si­sche Dele­ga­ti­on z.B selbst gar kei­nen engen Kon­takt zu Putin zu haben - auch sol­len aus­ge­han­del­te Kom­pro­mis­se nach Vor­la­ge im Kreml vom rus­si­schen Prä­si­den­ten abge­lehnt wor­den sein. Soll­ten die­se Ver­hand­lung viel­leicht doch eher nur als Ablen­kungs­ma­nö­ver dienen?

src: click

New York Times am 15.06.2024:

But Mr. Zelen­sky, visi­t­ing Bucha on April 4, said the talks would go on, even as Rus­sia dis­mis­sed the Bucha atro­ci­ties as a sta­ged “pro­vo­ca­ti­on.”

“Col­leagues, I spo­ke to RA,” Ukraine’s lead nego­tia­tor, Davyd Arak­ha­mia, wro­te on April 10 in a Whats­App mes­sa­ge to the Ukrai­ni­an team. “He spo­ke yes­ter­day for an hour and a half with his boss.”

“RA” was Roman Abra­mo­vich, the Rus­si­an bil­lion­aire who play­ed a behind-the-scenes role in the talks. His “boss,” Mr. Putin, was urging the nego­tia­tors to con­cen­tra­te on the key issu­es and work through them quick­ly, Mr. Arak­ha­mia wro­te. (A mem­ber of the Whats­App group show­ed that mes­sa­ge and others to repor­ters for The Times.)

A spo­kes­per­son for Mr Abra­mo­vich said his role “was limi­ted to intro­du­cing repre­sen­ta­ti­ves from both par­ties to each other” and that fol­lowing that initi­al sta­ge, he “was not invol­ved in the process.”

Mr. Arakhamia’s mes­sa­ge sug­gested that Mr. Putin was micro­ma­na­ging not only Russia’s inva­si­on, but also its peace talks. At ano­t­her point, Russia’s lead nego­tia­tor, Mr. Medi­n­sky, inter­rup­ted a video con­fe­rence by clai­ming that Mr. Putin was pho­ning him directly.”

“The boss is cal­ling,” Mr. Medi­n­sky said, accord­ing to two Ukrai­ni­an negotiators.

Mr. Putin’s invol­ve­ment and inten­ti­ons during the 2022 talks were sub­jects of deba­te in Kyiv and Washing­ton, Ukrai­ni­an and Ame­ri­can offi­cials said. Was he tru­ly inte­res­ted in a deal? Or was he merely try­ing to bog Ukrai­ne down while his tro­ops regrouped?

“We didn’t know if Putin was serious,” said the for­mer seni­or U.S. offi­cial. “We couldn’t tell, on eit­her side of the fence, whe­ther the­se peop­le who were tal­king were empowered.”

One Ukrai­ni­an nego­tia­tor said he belie­ved the nego­tia­ti­ons were a bluff on Mr. Putin’s part, but two others descri­bed them as serious.

src: click

ZDFheu­te am 24.06.2024:

Was woll­te Russ­land in den Gesprächen?

Gus­tav Gres­sel: Im Grun­de woll­ten sie dass die Ukrai­ne kapi­tu­liert. Sie haben gese­hen dass sie doch stär­ker ist als sie gedacht haben, und des­halb haben sie gemeint: “Wir las­sen Selen­ski einen Ver­trag unter­schrei­ben, der for­mell ein Waf­fen­still­stand ist, aber infor­mell die Vor­aus­set­zun­gen für eine Macht­über­nah­me durch Russ­land schafft [bei einem dar­auf­fol­gen­den Angriff im Jah­re Schnee, dank gerin­ger Armee­grö­ße in den Ver­hand­lungs­po­si­tio­nen Russ­lands, auch wenn laut ZDF Heu­te die Sicher­heits­ga­ran­tien ja noch gar­nicht fer­tig ver­han­delt waren…] indem er die Ukrai­ne in eine sehr aus­sichts­lo­se Posi­ti­on manö­vriert und wie die Rus­sen gese­hen haben, dass das sich Selens­kij nicht drauf ein­lässt, hat man die Ver­hand­lun­gen noch fortgesetzt.

src: click

Damit wider­spricht sich ZDF heu­te “Back­ground­check” dann gleich noch im sel­ben Bei­trag selbst:

Bild­text tran­skri­biert (ZDFheu­te “Back­ground­check”):

17. Mai 2022 Gesprä­che been­det - Olek­sij Dani­low (bis März 2024 Sekre­tär des Natio­na­len Sicherheits- und Ver­tei­di­gungs­rats der Ukrai­ne): “Ein Abkom­men mit Russ­land ist unmög­lich, nur eine Kapi­tu­la­ti­on kann akzep­tiert werden”

Und ZDFheu­te wider­spricht damit Sabi­ne Adler (lang­jäh­ri­ge Ost Euro­pa Exper­tin Deutsch­land­funk) am 04. April 2024:

[…] und John­son hat in der Tat gesagt er fin­det Ver­hand­lun­gen über­haupt nicht gut. Die Ver­hand­lun­gen wur­den zunächst auf Eis gelegt und dann pas­sier­te im Sep­tem­ber etwas näm­lich es es geschah die Ein­ver­lei­bung nicht nur von den soge­nann­ten Volks­re­pu­bli­ken Lug­ansk und Donetzk in die Rus­si­sche Föde­ra­ti­on son­dern auch Cher­son und Sapo­rischsch­ja, die noch nicht mal erobert waren und sie wis­sen es viel­leicht oder sie wis­sen es nicht - was ein­ver­leibt wird hat Ver­fas­sungs­rang in Russ­land das heißt also das ist nicht irgend­was, was da beschlos­sen wur­de und gefei­ert wur­de, son­dern das war der damit ist der schrift­li­che ver­fas­sungs­mä­ßi­ge Auf­trag die­se Gebie­te zu erobern, zu erobern und da hat Zelens­kiJ nicht die Frie­dens­ge­sprä­che abge­bro­chen son­dern er hat gesagt mit Putin ver­hand­le ich nicht mehr!”

src: click

Gut, deutsch­spra­chi­ger Jour­na­lis­mus, was will man machen. Quel­len­be­le­ge lie­fern? Sie haben doch nur den Gus­tav Gres­sel gefragt, und der hat­te das noch so in Erinnerung.….….….…! 

Da haben sie dar­aus dann einen “Back­ground Check” (For­mat) gemacht, net woar?

Die­se Gesell­schaft ist das abso­lut gro­tesk und abar­tigst Allerletzte.

Ich ertrag den Scheiss nicht mehr.

20th of June 2024 (Nicht vom Trump thumb­nail scho­cken las­sen. :), Kurt Vol­ker war ehe­ma­li­ger U.S. Spe­cial Repre­sen­ta­ti­ve for Ukrai­ne und U.S. Ambassa­dor to NATO in 2008-2009):

Kurt Vol­ker: “Almost all of the Allies lea­ve asi­de Ger­ma­ny, the US and Hun­ga­ry, all of the other allies sup­port an invi­ta­ti­on for Ukrai­ne to join NATO at the Washing­ton Sum­mit, be an invi­ta­ti­on to start acces­si­on talks. This is what was in the Rasmusen/Jermak working group paper which I was a part of recom­men­ding this approach for NATO, but the US is not in favor of that right now, the Biden Admi­nis­tra­ti­on is not, nor is Ger­ma­ny - and of cour­se Hun­ga­ry is a spe­cial case we don’t have to go into that. Um but he [Biden, when publicly sta­ting (against US poli­cy) the Ukrai­ne should not be part of Nato] was pro­bab­ly thin­king about the pres­su­re that they’­re under now. But in my view and again this is just me I’m a pri­va­te citi­zen I’m not repre­sen­ting the US government but I don’t see a way that you have a per­ma­nent peace in Euro­pe - let alo­ne Ukrai­ne, but a per­ma­nent peace in Euro­pe unless Ukrai­ne is a part of NATO. We have to have clear lines, we have to have an absence of gray zones whe­re Putin is temp­ted to start a war - uh we have to bring Ukrai­ne into NATO as part of the stra­te­gy for res­to­ring peace in Europe.”

Con­text:

Ali­na Polya­ko­va (Pre­si­dent and CEO of the Cen­ter for Euro­pean Poli­cy Ana­ly­sis (CEPA): I think that signals to me that the­re is gro­wing agree­ment that the only way that we can mana­ge Rus­sia is by going back to the Cold War era stra­te­gy of con­tain­ment, that begins first, defea­ting Rus­sia in Ukrai­ne and second, ree­sta­b­li­shing deter­an­ce by deni­al in Euro­pe that means har­de­ning the Eas­tern flank first and fore­mo­st. Third har­de­ning the soft tar­gets of Rus­si­an influ­ence across the glo­be - uh influ­ence ope­ra­ti­ons in the infor­ma­ti­on space, cyber ope­ra­ti­ons that the Rus­si­ans have beco­me very sophisti­ca­ted at, pushing back against Russia’s use of PMC’s [pri­va­te mili­ta­ry con­trac­tors] to prop up aut­ho­ri­ta­ri­an governments across the glo­be and under­mi­ne demo­cra­tic lea­ders­hip - and fourth, under­mi­ning Rus­si­an domi­nan­ce in its for­mer empi­re, becau­se as long as we have so-called grey zone Sta­tes a hor­ri­ble term but, non-allied sta­tes that are not part of NATO that are not part of the EU in the Euro­pean con­ti­nent this is what pro­vi­des fod­der for Rus­si­an aggres­si­on so Mol­d­o­va is very much under thre­at as we speak, cer­tain­ly Bel­la­rus has alrea­dy beco­me a vassel sta­te of Rus­sia and then we have of cour­se Geor­gia and the other coun­tries of the Cau­ca­sus as well.

[…]

And Rus­sia will come back for NATO.

Han­no Pev­kur, Minis­ter of Defence of the Repu­blic of Esto­nia (30.05.2023):

“What Rus­sia wants to achie­ve, the poli­ti­cal goals, let’s be honest - and they, the­se poli­ti­cal goals of Rus­sia have never chan­ged, they want to have a grey-zone bet­ween Rus­sia and NATO, they want to have a con­trol over this grey-zone and this is what they want to achie­ve. And they want to have some “secu­ri­ty gua­ran­tees” for them­sel­ves, sor­ry this is not the Free World and this is what Ukrai­ne is figh­t­ing for at the moment, that they are figh­t­ing for - the Free World and rule-based world and this is why we sup­port Ukrai­ne so this is obvious and then this is why we can never accept this approach of Rus­sia, loo­king at inter­na­tio­nal law.”

src:

(at 43:50 in)

See also: click

Too bad I’m not at You­tube and cant set an alert fil­ter for “grey-zone” on every panel inter­view video uploa­ded from now on. 😉

using @VladVexler as an “impar­ti­al expert” in their “Truth and pro­pa­gan­da” seri­es (see video above).

@VladVexler of cour­se being wide­ly known for his gre­at impar­ti­al pod­casts with @AnnafromUkraine (thats Anna from com­mu­ni­ca­ti­ons) and @JakeBore [United Sta­tes Air For­ce vete­ran who ser­ved as a Nuclear and Mis­si­le Ope­ra­ti­ons Offi­cer (13N)], as well as that guy from Sili­con Curtain.

See: [Gre­at and impar­ti­al] Friends of Ukrai­ne Round­ta­ble #2

Vlad Vex­ler of cour­se also wide­ly known for publi­ca­ly ridi­cu­ling Chomsky -

[Only legit, with gre­at and impar­ti­al blue ski­es over yel­low sun­flower­field background.]

Becau­se Chom­sky sta­ted that Selen­skyj was open to peace nego­tia­ti­ons, which obvious­ly wasnt true becau­se accord­ing to Vlad Vex­ler Selen­skyj was figh­t­ing for the mere sur­vi­val of Ukrai­ne. Except that it was. (See NYT as of June 15th 2024).

With Vlad Vex­ler you then get pre­sen­ted this in this way:

Putin’s actions are des­troy­ing Russia’s future and incre­a­singly odds that Rus­sia may not exist at all and the­re isn’t even a more striking Omis­si­on in that argu­ment and that is - Ukrai­ni­an agen­cy sin­ce 2014! Ukrai­ne has come tog­e­ther in a Civic Bond powe­red by anti-colonial sen­ti­ment and it’s only an ungroun­ded news­pa­per clip­ping approach to poli­ti­cal under­stan­ding that could lead Norm Chom­sky to say that Ukrai­ne wants peace more than weapons.

For refe­rence, the Inter­view Vlad Vex­ler quo­tes Chom­sky from (and under­lies with sinis­ter music) was held in May 2022 - when accord­ing to Simon Shus­ter - you know - that Simon Shuster:

Simon Shus­ter is a seni­or cor­re­spon­dent at TIME. He covers inter­na­tio­nal affairs, with a focus on Rus­sia and Ukraine. 

src: click

[But also accord­ing to the NYT as of June 15th 2024 of course.]

Selen­ky­js view still was that the Ukrai­ne nee­ded to talk to Putin - to pre­vent a wider war.

“He also said at the time, days after the Butscha mas­sa­c­re was dis­co­ve­r­ed in ear­ly April of 2022, he sug­gested that Putin might not be ful­ly awa­re of the warcri­mes that his sol­di­ers are com­mit­ting. And we still need to talk to Putin.

Qui­te quick­ly, but cer­tain­ly over the cour­se of the next weeks that fol­lo­wed, his views, evol­ved part­ly under the influ­ence of his advi­sors. You know this is -- like any admi­nis­tra­ti­on the­re are dif­fe­rent opi­ni­ons, and they were dis­cus­sing what to do, what should be our posi­ti­on in terms of nego­tia­ti­ons and -- the pos­si­bi­li­ty of tal­king to Putin. Is he a mons­ter, is he a sta­tes­men, what is he?! A dic­ta­tor. And their views evol­ved qui­te quick­ly [but cer­tain­ly over the cour­se of the next weeks], to the point whe­re I think by the start of sum­mer cer­tain­ly Selen­skyj had deci­ded, that - NO, it is not pos­si­ble to talk to Putin. (and thats 81 days after Butscha, which beca­me known on April the 1st 2022.)”

src: click (Simon Shus­ter at the Atlan­tic Council)

Arte of cour­se being the demo­cra­tic wes­tern out­let that not only brings you a Selen­skyj Attract Image Docu­men­ta­ry fea­turing Marie­lui­se Beck from the Zen­trum Libe­ra­le Moder­ne - you know, this Zen­trum Libe­ra­le Moderne:

but also the offi­cial war nar­ra­ti­ve of the Wer­te­wes­ten in the form of “we tal­ked to the peop­le in the room” documentaries.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=reoI_5xssOg
(Ori­gi­nal source: click)

Whe­re at 3min20 in the­re exists this won­der­ful passage:

Spre­cher: “Seit der Beset­zung der Krim 2014 bit­tet die Ukrai­ne die USA ihr Jave­lin Panzer-Abwehrraketen zu lie­fern. Prä­si­dent Oba­ma lehnt zuerst ab, weil er eine Eska­la­ti­on der Span­nun­gen mit Russ­land befürch­tet. Nun [20.06.2017] legt Poro­sche­nen­ko Trump sei­nen Wunsch vor.”

[Con­text: This was the aformen­tio­ned “wish” in Novem­ber of 2019, six mon­ths after the Poro­schen­ko pre­si­den­cy, in the ear­ly sta­ges of the Selen­skyj presidency:

24.11.2019

The aid, inclu­ding counter-artillery bat­te­ry radar, night-vision gear and patrol boats, has sin­ce [in the later parts of the Trump admi­nis­tra­ti­on] been unf­ro­zen and is making a real dif­fe­rence to Ukrai­ni­an for­ces figh­t­ing Russian-backed sepa­ra­tists in eas­tern districts.

But it is the Jave­lin which appears to be a game-changer, Ukraine’s defence minis­ter told CBC News.

“In cer­tain are­as, they can make a cri­ti­cal dif­fe­rence,” said Andriy Zagorodnyuk.

src: click (CBC) End of Context]

Fio­na Hill: “Poro­schen­ko schwitz­te buch­stäb­lich und wirk­te sehr ner­vös. ich erin­ne­re mich genau an sei­nen Gesichts­aus­druck als er her­ein­kam - er war sehr beklom­men denn für ihn stand viel auf dem Spiel.”

Poro­schen­ko: “Damals gab es bereits die rus­si­sche Besat­zung. Die Krim war besetzt und der Don­bas war besetzt.”

H. R. McMas­ter (Natio­nal Secu­ri­ty Advi­sor, Trump): “Der Prä­si­dent nahm Poro­schen­ko sehr freund­lich auf. Er war ein erfolg­rei­cher Geschäfts­mann genau wie Trump und auf der Ebe­ne ver­stan­den sie sich.”

Poro­schen­ko: “Ich sag­te: Mr Pre­si­dent wir brau­chen töd­li­che Waf­fen. Jave­lin ist eine sehr wirk­sa­me Panzerabwehrrakete.”

H. R. McMas­ter: “Prä­si­dent Poro­schen­ko gelang es Trump die Aus­wir­kun­gen der rus­si­schen Besat­zung auf die Ukrai­ne dar­zu­le­gen. Prä­si­dent Trump erkann­te die Bedro­hung und die Not­wen­dig­keit der Abschreckung”

Poro­schen­ko: “Als ich das Oval Office ver­ließ, war ich wie beflü­gelt, denn Prä­si­dent Trump hat­te mir das Jave­lin Sys­tem zuge­sagt. Das war ein groß­ar­ti­ger Tag.”

Spre­cher: “Doch die Rea­li­tät sieht anders aus. Als er zwei Wochen spä­ter zum G20 Gip­fel anreist, hat Trump den Ver­trag noch immer nicht unter­zeich­net hier soll er Putin erst­mals per­sön­lich begegnen.”

Fio­na Hill: “Wir erhiel­ten Hin­wei­se von der rus­si­schen Dele­ga­ti­on, dass Prä­si­dent Putin Waf­fen­lie­fe­run­gen an die Ukrai­ne, vor allem Jave­lin Rake­ten sehr kri­tisch sehen würde.”

John Kel­ly (Secreta­ry of Home­land Secu­ri­ty, Trump): “Der Prä­si­dent war sich der Tat­sa­che bewusst dass eine Unter­stüt­zung der Ukrai­ne Russ­land ver­är­gern wür­de und er woll­te wohl oder übel gute Bezie­hun­gen zu Putin aufbauen.”

John Kel­ly: “Trump heg­te die trü­ge­ri­sche Hoff­nung gute per­sön­li­che Bezie­hun­gen zu Putin sei­ne Hal­tung mäßi­gen würden.”

Spre­cher: “Das natio­na­le Sicher­heits­team ver­sucht Trump zu über­zeu­gen sein Ver­spre­chen an Poro­schen­ko zu halten.” 

John Kel­ly: “Ich mach­te klar, solan­ge es kei­nen Angriff gegen die Sou­ve­rä­ni­tät der Ukrai­ne gab, wer­de kein rus­si­scher Pan­zer von Jave­lin Rake­ten getrof­fen und auch kein rus­si­scher Sol­dat von Muni­ti­on aus den USA.”

H. R. McMas­ter: “Mein Argu­ment war dass Schwä­che Russ­land pro­vo­ziert ich glau­be Russ­land hat die Ukrai­ne 2014 ange­grif­fen weil Putin glaub­te die Ame­ri­ka­ner wür­den ohne­hin nicht reagie­ren, des­we­gen war es wich­tig die Ver­tei­di­gungs­fä­hig­keit der Ukrai­ne die Abschre­ckung zu stär­ken. Trump stimm­te zu.”

Spre­cher: “Ende 2017 gibt Trump den Befehl zur Lie­fe­rung töd­li­cher Waf­fen [Jave­lins, the Game­ch­an­ger in the Don­bas] an die Ukraine.”

Andrej Kelin (for­mer Amba­sa­dor of the Rus­si­an Fede­ra­ti­on to the UK): “Aus unse­rer Sicht hat­te Trump mit die­ser Ent­schei­dung eine rote Linie über­schrit­ten, er wur­de dazu über­re­det Jave­lin Rake­ten zu lie­fern und das war nur der Anfang der Auf­rüs­tung der Ukrai­ne. Der Anfang eines sehr gefähr­li­chen Wegs.”

John Bol­ton (Natio­nal Secu­ri­ty Advi­sor): “Putin betrach­te­ten die Lie­fe­rung schwe­rer Waf­fen an die Ukrai­ne als Bedro­hung. Er hielt die Ukrai­ne für ein ille­ga­les Staats­ge­bil­de das der Sowjet­uni­on dass Russ­land zu Unrecht ent­ris­sen wor­den war. Der Zer­fall der Sowjet­uni­on war für Putin die größ­te geo­po­li­ti­sche Kata­stro­phe des 20 Jahrhunderts.”

Chom­sky of cour­se being the intel­lec­tu­al that then prompt­ly finds out through litera­ry ana­ly­sis - and prompt­ly also makes public - that this concession -

John Kel­ly: “Ich mach­te klar, solan­ge es kei­nen Angriff gegen die Sou­ve­rä­ni­tät der Ukrai­ne gab, wer­de kein rus­si­scher Pan­zer von jeve­lin Rake­ten getrof­fen und auch kein rus­si­scher Sol­dat von Muni­ti­on aus den USA.”

- was vio­la­ted by Ukrai­ne in Novem­ber of 2021 (or slight­ly ear­lier), try­ing to free the Don­bas - refe­ren­cing this article:

Ukrai­ni­an Tro­ops Have Been Firing American-Made Jave­lin Mis­si­les At Russian-Backed Forces

The dis­clo­sure that Ukrai­ni­an tro­ops have been employ­ing Jave­lin mis­si­les in com­bat comes as fears grow that Rus­si­an could launch a new invasion.

JOSEPH TREVITHICK

POSTED ON NOV 22, 2021 6:18 PM EST

The head of Ukraine’s top mili­ta­ry intel­li­gence agen­cy has con­fir­med, for what appears to be the first time, that Ukrai­ni­an tro­ops in the country’s eas­tern Don­bass regi­on have fired American-made Jave­lin anti-tank mis­si­les at Rus­si­an or Russian-supported for­ces. The­se mis­si­les, along with other advan­ced wea­pons that the Ukrai­ni­an mili­ta­ry has acqui­red in recent years, such as Tur­kish Bay­raktar TB2 armed dro­nes, would be important fac­tors in the out­co­me of any future major mili­ta­ry con­fron­ta­ti­on with Rus­sia. Fears are gro­wing that the Krem­lin could at least be pre­pa­red to launch a new, large-scale inva­si­on of eas­tern Ukrai­ne as ear­ly as January.

Ukrai­ni­an Bri­ga­dier Gene­ral Kyry­lo Buda­nov tal­ked about the ope­ra­tio­nal use of Jave­lins as part of a recent inter­view with Mili­ta­ry Times, which he con­duc­ted through an inter­pre­ter. Buda­nov, who runs the Chief Direc­to­ra­te of Intel­li­gence of the Minis­try of Defence of Ukrai­ne, also known by its Ukrai­ni­an acro­nym GUR MOU, used the oppor­tu­ni­ty to call for more help from the U.S. government as he sound­ed like the alarm about the Kremlin’s unusu­al deploy­ments of lar­ge num­bers of mili­ta­ry units to are­as oppo­si­te Russia’s bor­ders with Ukrai­ne in recent weeks.

src: click

Second source: Peter Zei­han here at 17min in.

The second big deploy­ment of rus­si­an army units on the ukrai­ni­an bor­der hap­pens from Okto­ber to mid Novem­ber 2021. US deli­ve­r­ed Jave­lins were likely used in Don­bas, by the Ukrai­ne, star­ting from Octo­ber 2021.

The US then prompt­ly covers this up and two mon­ths later allows the Ukrai­ne to dis­tri­bu­te Jave­lins throughout Ukrai­ne more free­ly - and use them - even without an offi­cial Rus­si­an inva­si­on being under­way (but that was a chan­ge from their pre­vious posi­ti­on, that was only imple­men­ted in decem­ber of 2021):

04. 12. 2021 (Poli­ti­co) - Can Ukrai­ne deploy U.S.-made wea­pons against the Russians?

The­re are no geo­gra­phic restric­tions on the deploy­ment of the mis­si­les, which means Ukrai­ni­an for­ces can trans­port, dis­tri­bu­te and use them any time.

As Rus­sia amas­ses the hig­hest num­ber of tro­ops on Ukraine’s bor­der sin­ce 2014, the ques­ti­on for Kyiv now beco­mes: Is it time to start put­ting U.S.-made wea­pons in the field?

Ukrai­ne purcha­sed 210 Jave­lin anti-tank mis­si­les and 37 laun­chers from the U.S. in 2018 for appro­xi­mate­ly $47 mil­li­on, and the Sta­te Depart­ment appro­ved the sale of a second batch of 150 mis­si­les and 10 launch units in late 2019. But with them came a varie­ty of restric­tions on their usa­ge, inclu­ding that they be stored in wes­tern Ukrai­ne, far from the front lines.

The Jave­lin is a shoulder-fired mis­si­le that uses infra­red gui­d­ance to tar­get and des­troy an enemy tank from up to 3 miles away. For­mer Pre­si­dent Donald Trump first appro­ved the sale of the wea­pon to Ukrai­ne after his pre­de­ces­sor, for­mer Pre­si­dent Barack Oba­ma, refu­sed the request, due to fears that pro­vi­ding let­hal aid to Kyiv would pro­vo­ke Moscow.

Wess Mit­chell, who ser­ved as the Trump administration’s top Sta­te Depart­ment offi­cial over­see­ing Euro­pean and Eura­si­an affairs, noted that the Jave­lins and other let­hal wea­pons are desi­gned not for first use but to deter Moscow from encroa­ching on Ukrai­ni­an territory.

But while Washing­ton urges Kyiv to use the Jave­lins only for defen­si­ve pur­po­ses and requi­res that the wea­pons be stored in a secu­re faci­li­ty away from the con­flict, the­re are no geo­gra­phic restric­tions on the actu­al deploy­ment of the mis­si­les, U.S. offi­cials said, which means that Ukrai­ni­an for­ces can trans­port, dis­tri­bu­te and use them at any time.

“Jave­lins are defen­si­ve wea­pons and the United Sta­tes expects Ukrai­ne to deploy them respon­si­b­ly and stra­te­gi­cal­ly when nee­ded for defen­si­ve pur­po­ses,” said Pen­ta­gon spo­kes­per­son Mike Howard.

If the Jave­lins were to be moved, it doesn’t necessa­ri­ly mean they’d be used — in Kyiv’s esti­ma­ti­on, the thres­hold for actual­ly firing the wea­pons has not yet been met, accord­ing to two Ukrai­ni­ans fami­li­ar with the dis­cus­sions. The red line, they said, would be if Rus­si­an tanks cros­sed over into Ukrai­ni­an territory.

The cur­rent Rus­si­an move­ment in Eas­tern Euro­pe is exact­ly the kind of sce­n­a­rio the Jave­lin sale was desi­gned to coun­ter, said two for­mer seni­or U.S. defen­se offi­cials fami­li­ar with the agreement.

src: click (Poli­ti­co)

Not only that: 

But while Washing­ton urges Kyiv to use the Jave­lins only for defen­si­ve pur­po­ses and requi­res that the wea­pons be stored in a secu­re faci­li­ty away from the conflict

- but also this was in play at that time:

John Kel­ly: “Ich mach­te klar, solan­ge es kei­nen Angriff gegen die Sou­ve­rä­ni­tät der Ukrai­ne gab, wer­de kein rus­si­scher Pan­zer von jeve­lin Rake­ten getrof­fen und auch kein rus­si­scher Sol­dat von Muni­ti­on aus den USA.”

So ARTE of cour­se doesnt catch this. But Chom­sky does.

So then he gets publicly cha­rac­ter assas­si­na­ted by Vlad Vex­ler, whom ARTE then also prompt­ly fea­tures in their “Truth and Pro­pa­gan­da” Documentary.

After which Vlad Vex­ler shows up in the Friends of Ukrai­ne Round­ta­ble #2 fea­turing Anna from com­mu­ni­ca­ti­ons, which ARTE of cour­se doesnt rea­li­ze, as they are too busy green­ligh­t­ing a Selen­skyj Attract Image Docu­men­ta­ry fea­turing Marie­lui­se Beck from the Zen­trum Libe­ra­le Moder­ne.

As that doesnt work, Chom­sky now real­ly gets on the US Pro­pa­gan­da shit­list, get­ting essen­ti­al­ly the shou­ting down by an idi­ot tre­at­ment - by a Radio Free Europe/Radio liber­ty employee:

You know - Radio Free Europe/Radio Liber­ty, the only us ame­ri­can broad­cas­ter that is publicly fun­ded by the US government and stran­ge­ly enough is only broad­cas­ting abroad - but in the past mon­ths, also stran­ge­ly enough final­ly had secu­red enough fun­ding to also expand to romania:

22th of June 2024 here at 24 min in:

Jamie Fly (For­mer Radio Free Euro­pe / Radio Liber­ty CEO):

“I think it’s important uh con­text, his­to­ri­cal con­text for the US Roma­ni­an rela­ti­ons­hip, when I was pre­si­dent of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liber­ty, we retur­ned uh to Roma­nia, relaun­ched our Roma­ni­an lan­guage ser­vice - I had many occa­si­ons whe­re I was able to visit uh Bucha­rest and the thing I think Ame­ri­cans need to under­stand is Roma­ni­ans LOVE Free­dom uh and it’s uh now in their uh DNA uh and that was an important bond given the work of Radio Free Euro­pe uh during the Com­mu­nist era, and it was - I had this expe­ri­ence in many coun­tries I ope­ra­ted in, but Roma­nia was perhaps the most fer­vent. When I went to Roma­nia as pre­si­dent of Radio Free Euro­pe, peop­le would descri­be to me with tears in their eyes the role that Ame­ri­can Broad­cas­ting play­ed during a very dark uh peri­od and uh were always asking us to do more the­re and I was exci­ted that we were able to to return during my ten­u­re um so and I think that rela­tes to why Roma­nia [!] now has sta­ked out such a clear lea­ders­hip role uh in the regi­on, advan­cing uh the values that uh us pro­gramming cer­tain­ly repre­sen­ted during that time so it’s it’s gre­at to be uh with you, so may­be I’ll start broad­ly just with the sta­te of the US Roma­nia uh rela­ti­ons­hip which you kind of touched on at the end but I was struck by your note that US enga­ge­ment needs to be basi­cal­ly reli­able, pre­dic­ta­ble and not to get par­ti­san or - not to say make you say anything too undi­plo­ma­tic but um the US is always dis­trac­ted uh and even though the US is very enga­ged uh in sup­port of Ukrai­ne right now, Chi­na is uh a gro­wing chal­len­ge drawing attention.”

So then Chom­sky and I get a stroke.

Chom­sky for real, and recovering:

Noam Chom­sky Lea­ves Hos­pi­tal After Suf­fe­ring Stroke

The world-renowned lin­gu­ist and dis­si­dent Noam Chom­sky was dischar­ged from a São Pau­lo hos­pi­tal in Bra­zil on Tues­day as he con­ti­nues to reco­ver from a stro­ke last year that impac­ted his abi­li­ty to speak. His wife Vale­ria recent­ly told a news­pa­per in Bra­zil that the 95-year-old Chom­sky still fol­lows the news and rai­ses his left arm in anger when he sees images of Israel’s war on Gaza. Fal­se reports that Chom­sky had died went viral online on Tuesday.

src: click

Me only figu­ra­tively for the sake of com­ing to the end of this posting.

But at least, we can all still watch impar­ti­al ARTE.

The Uni­ver­si­ty Vien­na is cur­r­ent­ly boo­king the full ukrai­ni­an “Art and Pro­pa­gan­da” packa­ge (they actual­ly will orga­ni­ze ever­ything, you just book them via your local embas­sy) for its stu­dents, to make sure all minds are pri­med to think the right way, and ever­yo­ne still claps, when 

good old, not at all poli­ti­cal pro­pa­gan­dist Maria Mez­ents­e­va from gre­at Ser­vant of the Peop­le party -

src: click

tells your average aus­tri­an uni­ver­si­ty audi­ence, that - quote:

“The peace for­mu­la which pre­si­dent Selen­skyj initia­ted alrea­dy in 2022, you know alrea­dy the amount of the warcri­mes, accord­ing to the pro­se­cu­tor gene­ral office and the data we are get­ting wee­kly - we are tal­king about 130.000 regis­tered warcri­mes. And it means not only you know dama­ged pro­per­ties or unfor­tu­n­a­te­ly rela­ted sexu­al vio­lence crime. Amongst vic­tims, by the way the­re are child­ren, boys and girls - which is abso­lute­ly devastating.

And this pro­ves to us, that only in uni­fied efforts we can defeat the Evil. The Evil which influ­en­ced our ener­gy sys­tem - our com­mon food secu­ri­ty. Our dai­ly life. Our peace. On the sub­con­ti­nent of Euro­pe. And affec­ted the pro­ject which euro­peans have been buil­ding for 75 years.

I tru­ly belie­ve that only tog­e­ther, “alles zusam­men”, only like this we can defeat, the hig­hest crime, which is the crime of aggres­si­on, by estab­li­shing inter­na­tio­nal tri­bu­nal for this par­ti­cu­lar crime. Becau­se ever­ything we are tal­king about in terms of war cri­mes, dai­ly com­mit­ted by rus­si­an army - this has a begin­ning, and it began with the first inva­si­on into Ukrai­ne in 2014. Inva­si­on into Geor­gia in 2008. In the nine­ties this was Mol­d­o­va - we dont want this list to continue.

The­re­fo­re I high­ly salu­te also the decisi­on of the aus­tri­an govenrment to join this spe­cial regis­ter for warcri­mes, whe­re Ukrai­ni­ans - the vic­tims, can recei­ve for mate­ri­al and non mate­ri­al los­ses the com­pen­sa­ti­ons. And this is extre­me­ly important friends, becau­se we are all united in the under­stan­ding, that rus­sia has to pay. Not aus­tri­an tax payers! Not french col­leagues, not Ger­mans, not aus­tra­li­ans, or ame­ri­cans - but rus­si­an funds and fro­zen assets should ser­ve that purpose.

Thank you very much, for brin­ging this issue via pho­to­graphs, via images of ukrai­ni­an dai­ly life - and thank you very much for acti­vi­ties of your embas­sy - here in Kiev and else­we­re in the regi­ons, also in my home city Char­kiew, which its­elf and the regi­on of Char­kiew is under dai­ly shel­ling, thats why we call for more sup­port for civi­li­ans. It means air defen­se, you know - that this is not direct­ly lets say an address to Aus­tria, but also to many, many allies - whe­re Aus­tria hel­ps us to lob­by this important issu­es to pro­tect ener­gy infra­st­ruc­tu­re, to edu­ca­ti­on faci­li­ties -- so final­ly child­ren in Char­kiew will come up from under­ground schools in metro sta­ti­ons, and be able to stu­dy offline.

Dear friends, I’m sure todays evening will bring you a litt­le bit clo­ser to the emo­ti­ons we feel dai­ly. I salu­te you from the capi­tol Kiev, whe­re we con­ti­nue to con­duct our par­lia­men­ta­ry ses­si­on, I want to thank the ambassa­dor, and I want to thank of cour­se to the orga­ni­zers, und Vie­len Dank für Uni­ver­si­tät and all the guests who have gathe­red today.

I pro­mi­se to prac­ti­ce my ger­man more and next time to con­duct my speech in german.

Noch ein­mal vie­len Dank für alles - sie machen für unse­re Leu­ten und Kin­der. So about child­ren, and that would be my last -- uhmn red line.

Thank you so much for sup­por­ting the initia­ti­ve to bring kids back, the civi­li­ans and war pri­so­nors who are kept sin­ce 2014 by rus­sia ille­ga­ly -- is devas­ta­ting. The child­ren sto­ries are even more devastating.

I would like to thank you for rai­sing the voice for this 19.000 child­ren who are kept in rus­sia and in Bela­rus illegally.

Thank you for sup­por­ting this initia­ti­ves to bring this child­rens back. I’m sure the num­ber of 500 of them who alrea­dy retur­ned back home will incre­a­se, but we should make it tog­e­ther with respon­si­ble orga­niz­a­ti­ons like UN and ICRC.

Noch ein­mal vie­len Dank, it was a big honor to speak in front of you.”

Just your usu­al, very nor­mal photoart-agent for a bro­ther and sis­ter duo orga­ni­zing a pho­to exhi­bi­ti­on in the Uni­ver­si­ty of Vien­na, I’d say.

Pro­pa­gan­da (weni­ger Inhalt, aber FORM!) hat ja wie­der nie­mand entdeckt.

Am Aller­we­nigs­ten das gesam­te ver­sam­mel­te Rektorat.

Ich stell mir da jetzt vor, wie das ein Jus, oder ein IR Pro­fes­sor in ner Vor­le­sung auf­ar­bei­tet - ohne über den Pro­pa­gan­da Anteil zu stolpern…

Das schafft auch nur mehr ein gelern­ter Österreicher.

edit: Oh groß­ar­ti­ge Neu­ig­kei­ten! Die Öster­rei­chisch Ukrai­ni­sche Gesell­schaft hat ein Buch zum Selbst­kos­ten­preis her­aus­ge­bracht, das bereits in den Ober­stu­fen von öster­rei­chi­schen Gym­na­si­en ver­teilt und behan­delt wird! Manch­mal hat man aber auch ein­fach Glück als neu­er Schulbuchverlag…

edit2: Auch wun­der­schön: “Herr Pro­se­cu­tor Gene­ral, ich weiß nicht ob sie noch zwei Minu­ten haben, aber wie sehen sie eigent­lich ihre Rol­le in der Ukrai­ni­schen Gesell­schaft, mehr so “emo­tio­nal sta­bi­li­sie­rend”, oder --?” “Yes thank you for this very important ques­ti­on. We have 10 more minu­tes. I will try to ans­wer important ques­ti­on.” -- then the Pro­se­cu­tor Gene­ral starts rea­ding the ans­wer from the screen in front of him… (Eye movement.)

Gut wer­den sie an die­ser Stel­le sagen - dann ist es eigent­lich an der Zeit noch­mal vier Jah­re Krieg im Detail zu pla­nen - nicht?

Dan­ke Gus­tav - über­nimm du dich mal - ehm, sor­ry, über­nimm du das mal.