Yes you say - but what is propaganda?

23. Juni 2024

Form­er­ly the rulers were the lea­ders. They laid out the cour­se of histo­ry, by the simp­le pro­cess of doing what they wan­ted. And if nowa­days the suc­ces­sors of the rulers, tho­se who­se posi­ti­on or abi­li­ty gives them power, can no lon­ger do what they want without the appro­val of the mas­ses, they find in pro­pa­gan­da a tool which is incre­a­singly power­ful in gai­ning that appro­val. The­re­fo­re, pro­pa­gan­da is here to stay.

It was, of cour­se, the asto­un­ding suc­cess of pro­pa­gan­da during the war that ope­ned the eyes of the intel­li­gent few in all depart­ments of life to the pos­si­bi­li­ties of regi­men­ting the public mind. The Ame­ri­can government and nume­rous patrio­tic agen­ci­es deve­lo­ped a tech­ni­que which, to most per­sons accus­to­med to bidding for public accep­t­ance, was new. They not only appealed to the indi­vi­du­al by means of every approach-visual, gra­phic, and auditory-to sup­port the natio­nal endea­vor, but they also secu­red the coope­ra­ti­on of the key men in every group -per­sons who­se mere word car­ri­ed aut­ho­ri­ty to hund­reds or thousands or hund­reds of thousands of fol­lo­wers. They thus auto­ma­ti­cal­ly gai­ned the sup­port of fra­ter­nal, reli­gious, com­mer­cial, patrio­tic, social and local groups who­se mem­bers took their opi­ni­ons from their accus­to­med lea­ders and spo­kes­men, or from the perio­di­cal publi­ca­ti­ons which they were accus­to­med to read and belie­ve. At the same time, the mani­pu­la­tors of patrio­tic opi­ni­on made use of the men­tal cli­ches and the emo­tio­nal habits of the public to pro­du­ce mass reac­tions against the alle­ged atro­ci­ties, the ter­ror and the tyran­ny of the enemy. It was only natu­ral, after the war ended, that intel­li­gent per­sons should ask them­sel­ves whe­ther it was not pos­si­ble to app­ly a simi­lar tech­ni­que to the pro­blems of peace. 

(Pro­pa­gan­da - Edward Ber­nays, 1928, Liv­er­light, first edi­ti­on, Chap­ter II - The new Propaganda)

Gut, Pro­pa­gan­da hat natür­lich wie­der nie­mand entdeckt.

The bonus lie

23. Juni 2024

So - we need to get back all Ukrai­ni­an ter­ri­to­ries, becau­se after Butscha, the­re is no way the peace talks could have con­ti­nued. Right?

Sure, if you like to hold on to your self delu­si­ons and fairytales… 

So…

1.

But Mr. Zelen­sky, visi­t­ing Bucha on April 4, said the talks would go on, even as Rus­sia dis­mis­sed the Bucha atro­ci­ties as a sta­ged “pro­vo­ca­ti­on.”

src: click (NYT, June 15th 2024)

Well, that - but…

2.

He also said at the time, days after the Butscha mas­sa­c­re was dis­co­ve­r­ed in ear­ly April of 2022, he sug­gested that Putin might not be ful­ly awa­re of the warcri­mes that his sol­di­ers are com­mit­ting. And we still need to talk to Putin.

Qui­te quick­ly, but cer­tain­ly over the cour­se of the next weeks that fol­lo­wed, his views, evol­ved part­ly under the influ­ence of his advi­sors. You know this is -- like any admi­nis­tra­ti­on the­re are dif­fe­rent opi­ni­ons, and they were dis­cus­sing what to do, what should be our posi­ti­on in terms of nego­tia­ti­ons and -- the pos­si­bi­li­ty of tal­king to Putin. Is he a mons­ter, is he a sta­tes­men, what is he?! A dic­ta­tor. And their views evol­ved qui­te quick­ly [but cer­tain­ly over the cour­se of the next weeks], to the point whe­re I think by the start of sum­mer cer­tain­ly Selen­skyj had deci­ded, that - NO, it is not pos­si­ble to talk to Putin.”

src: click (Simon Shus­ter at the Atlan­tic Council)

You know - that Simon Shuster:

Simon Shus­ter is a seni­or cor­re­spon­dent at TIME. He covers inter­na­tio­nal affairs, with a focus on Rus­sia and Ukraine. 

src: click

You know - that Simon Shuster:

Amid all the pres­su­re to root out cor­rup­ti­on, I assu­med, perhaps nai­vely, that offi­cials in Ukrai­ne would think twice befo­re taking a bri­be or pocke­ting sta­te funds. But when I made this point to a top pre­si­den­ti­al advi­ser in ear­ly Octo­ber, he asked me to turn off my audio recor­der so he could speak more free­ly. “Simon, you’re mista­ken,” he says. “Peop­le are ste­aling like there’s no tomorrow.” 

Even the firing of the Defen­se Minis­ter did not make offi­cials “feel any fear,” he adds, becau­se the pur­ge took too long to mate­ria­li­ze. The Pre­si­dent was war­ned in Febru­a­ry that cor­rup­ti­on had grown rife insi­de the minis­try, but he dithe­red for more than six mon­ths, giving his allies mul­ti­ple chan­ces to deal with the pro­blems quiet­ly or exp­lain them away. By the time he acted ahead of his U.S. visit, “it was too late,” says ano­t­her seni­or pre­si­den­ti­al adviser.

[…]

Amid all the pres­su­re to root out cor­rup­ti­on, I assu­med, perhaps nai­vely, that offi­cials in Ukrai­ne would think twice befo­re taking a bri­be or pocke­ting sta­te funds. But when I made this point to a top pre­si­den­ti­al advi­ser in ear­ly Octo­ber, he asked me to turn off my audio recor­der so he could speak more free­ly. “Simon, you’re mista­ken,” he says. “Peop­le are ste­aling like there’s no tomorrow.” 

Even the firing of the Defen­se Minis­ter did not make offi­cials “feel any fear,” he adds, becau­se the pur­ge took too long to mate­ria­li­ze. The Pre­si­dent was war­ned in Febru­a­ry that cor­rup­ti­on had grown rife insi­de the minis­try, but he dithe­red for more than six mon­ths, giving his allies mul­ti­ple chan­ces to deal with the pro­blems quiet­ly or exp­lain them away. By the time he acted ahead of his U.S. visit, “it was too late,” says ano­t­her seni­or pre­si­den­ti­al adviser.

src: click

Which on Octo­ber 30th 2023 was the FIRST EVER arti­cle in the eng­lish spea­king estab­lish­ment press, that even ack­now­led­ged, that the ukrai­ni­an offen­si­ve might not be going as plan­ned - exact­ly one day befo­re The Eco­no­mist publis­hed its Inter­view with Zaluzhny.

3. Dmy­t­ro Kule­ba on the day after Bucha:

[…] Safa­ri by rus­si­an sol­di­ers against human civi­li­ans, against civi­li­ans - it’s unspeaka­ble. And I was com­mit­ted even befo­re the Bucha mas­sa­c­re, by the way it’s - the right spel­ling is but­cher not buc­ca, I was com­mit­ted to pro­se­cu­ting all rus­si­an atro­ci­ties and war cri­mi­nals, and to doing ever­ything that I could as for­eign minis­ter to bring them to account, but now - uh I will be doing it until my last breath.”

src: click

So - you see, … when nobo­dy at the time actual­ly used the argu­ment that it was “But­cha that was the rea­son why - we have to stop peace nego­tia­ti­ons, to dri­ve out the last rus­si­an from our coun­try - befo­re we can think about talks, becau­se But­cha is how all Rus­si­an sol­di­ers behave in Ukrai­ne!” (or any part of that - at all). And ever­yo­ne actual­ly sta­ted the com­ple­te oppo­si­te in public spee­ches on the record. 

(Lea­ving out that litt­le gem of a “you bet­ter dont tell the public nugget” -- 

https://harlekin.me/allgemein/wie-man-1000-russische-tote-aus-einer-bbc-dokumentation-raushaelt/

Which then lead to secon­da­ry lies - when ukrai­ni­ans hos­ted a Gre­gor Gysi visit, whe­re when asked about why the­re were so many bur­ned out tanks in Bucha - when the Rus­si­ans sup­po­sed­ly left “on their own” his ukrai­ni­an gui­de told Gysi - that tho­se would have been “Wag­ner For­ces”… Some­thing no one ever said, sta­ted, repeated, indi­ca­ted, or even hin­ted at -- in any other instance ever - befo­re or after. What luck for Gysi to get told some­thing no one else has ever publicly sta­ted, during his visit in But­cha - when he pro­bab­ly asked a bit too much.… (It likely was BS on part of the gui­de, but it left an impres­si­on on Gysi - which Clau­dia Major did her utmost best to instant­ly bur­ry under some “yeah - but thats not even important any­mo­re” BS - live in the Spie­gel TV Inter­view Stu­dio. Fun times… src: click)

While it was actual­ly Selen­skyj hims­elf sta­ting on the record that - 

He also said at the time, days after the Butscha mas­sa­c­re was dis­co­ve­r­ed in ear­ly April of 2022, he sug­gested that Putin might not be ful­ly awa­re of the warcri­mes that his sol­di­ers are com­mit­ting. And we still need to talk to Putin.”

an opi­ni­on which then chan­ged “by the start of Sum­mer for sure” (thats 1st of April 2022 (the Bucha mas­sa­c­re beco­mes known) plus 81 days until the 21th of June (start of sum­mer in that year)), “part­ly under the influ­ence of his advisers”

over the cour­se of the next weeks that fol­lo­wed, his views, evol­ved part­ly under the influ­ence of his advisors.

src: click (Simon Shus­ter at the Atlan­tic Council)

-- that opi­ni­on, gets com­ple­te­ly wiped from the wider public record - to just estab­lish the OPPOSITE as being the actu­al rea­son, why Ukrai­ne NEEDED TO BREAK OFF peace talks with russia.

Its becau­se of Butscha, right?!

Two mon­ths ago - from me wri­ting this now, Sabi­ne Adler (long­stan­ding East Euro­pe Expert, Deutsch­land­funk - und Exper­te dem die deut­schen Medi­en ver­trau­en!), actual­ly put this out the­re (at 1:20:00 in):

Sabi­ne Adler: Also die die Ukrai­ne ist in Frie­dens­ge­sprä­che gegan­gen, noch im Febru­ar. [Bonus, Putin asked for them to be estab­lis­hed on the second day of the war. Fun.] Die­se Frie­dens­ge­sprä­che haben ange­fan­gen in Gomel, da hat man sich mehr­fach getrof­fen und die das Ange­bot der Ukrai­ne durch Selens­kij hat gelau­tet - Ver­zicht auf Nato­mit­glied­schaft, Neu­tra­li­tät und Aus­klam­me­rung der Krim, das war also ein rie­sen Zuge­ständ­nis was im im Übri­gen für Selens­kij ein gro­ßes Risi­ko war, weil er gegen die eige­ne Ver­fas­sung ver­sto­ßen hat, in der Ver­fas­sung steht die Nato­it­glied­schaft als Ver­fas­sungs­ziel - er ist damit rein­ge­gan­gen, weil er die­ses wei­te­re Töten auf jeden Fall ver­hin­dern woll­te. Die­se Ver­hand­lun­gen haben unge­fähr geführt, sind gelau­fen zunächst in Weißruss- in Bela­rus und dann in der Tat in der Tür­kei, dazwi­schen wis­sen Sie was Anfang April war? Butscha! Irpin! Ber­d­jansk. All die­se Geschich­ten waren da und da haben die Ukra da haben -- bit­te das ist der

[Ein­wurf des Fragestellers]

Sabi­ne Adler: Genau las­sen Sie mich kurz no jetzt bin ich jetzt mal, sie woll­ten jetzt ihr State­ment und ich wie­der - ich sage jetzt etwas auf ihr State­ment. Und Butscha und Irpin und all das was da deut­lich gewor­den ist, hat für die Ukrai­ne - es unmög­lich gemacht zunächst wei­ter zu ver­han­deln das heißt also und Butscha war Anfang April und Boris Boris John­son war Mit­te oder Ende April [09th of April so eight days after Butscha] in Kiev nur mal das dazu dann hat man wei­ter dann hat man gesagt und und die­se, die­se Ange­bo­te die die ihnen gemacht hat, haben die rus­si­schen Unter­händ­ler jeweils ent­ge­gen­ge­nom­men und sie haben gesagt ja das ist etwas ganz vor­sich­tig vor­sich­tig das neh­men wir mit, das kön­nen wir mal so wei­ter­ge­ben - da sind sie sofort zurück­gefif­fen wor­den als sie nur die­se rela­tiv neu­tra­le Kom­men­tie­rung gemacht haben! [Yeah, the NYT sta­tes, that Putin told the head of his dele­ga­ti­on to quick­ly bring the peace agree­ment fur­ther along at that time and not stall, and that the ukrai­ni­an dele­ga­ti­on lead knew about that - but yeah… Why not invent abso­lu­te bull­shit ins­tead?]. Dann Ende April [9th of April] da sagen sie ist John­son - sie ver­or­ten den sehr viel wei­ter frü­her [yeah and you 20 days later you abso­lut com­ple­te and utter…] war John­son in in in Kiev und John­son hat in der Tat gesagt er fin­det Ver­hand­lun­gen über­haupt nicht gut. Die Ver­hand­lun­gen wur­den zunächst auf Eis gelegt und dann pas­sier­te im Sep­tem­ber etwas näm­lich es es geschah die Ein­ver­lei­bung nicht nur von den soge­nann­ten Volks­re­pu­bli­ken Lug­ansk und Donetzk in die Rus­si­sche Föde­ra­ti­on son­dern auch Cher­son und Sapo­rischsch­ja, die noch nicht mal erobert waren und sie wis­sen es viel­leicht oder sie wis­sen es nicht - was ein­ver­leibt wird hat Ver­fas­sungs­rang in Russ­land das heißt also das ist nicht irgend­was, was da beschlos­sen wur­de und gefei­ert wur­de, son­dern das war der damit ist der schrift­li­che ver­fas­sungs­mä­ßi­ge Auf­trag die­se Gebie­te zu erobern, zu erobern und da hat Zelens­kiJ nicht die Frie­dens­ge­sprä­che abge­bro­chen son­dern er hat gesagt mit Putin ver­hand­le ich nicht mehr!” 

src: click

Even the­re - no men­ti­on of “we need to break off the peace talks and get back all Ukrai­ni­an ter­ri­to­ries, becau­se after Butscha, the­re is no way peace talks could have con­ti­nued” but actual­ly the opposite.

We will not men­ti­on for a minu­te that the actu­al order of events at the time was:

- 29th of March 2022: Pre­si­den­ti­al advi­ser of Selesnkyj deman­ds “hea­vy wea­pons to dri­ve all rus­si­ans out of Ukrai­ne” at a Con­fe­rence in Istanbul

Ukrai­ni­an pre­si­den­ti­al advi­ser calls for hea­vier wea­pon­ry from the West as Rus­sia shifts mili­ta­ry focus

Our part­ners must final­ly under­stand that the ‘Afgha­niz­a­ti­on’ they want and the long-lasting exhaus­ting con­flict for Rus­sia will not hap­pen,” Pod­olyak said. “Rus­sia will lea­ve all Ukrai­ni­an ter­ri­to­ries except the south and east. And will try to dig in the­re, put in air defen­se and shar­ply redu­ce the loss of its equip­ment and personnel.”

src: click

Right around when this was happening:

After each mili­ta­ry set­back, a mem­ber of Ukraine’s nego­tia­ting team said, Mr. Putin “redu­ced his demands.”

src: click (NYT)

- 31st of March 2022 (befo­re But­cha beco­mes known): 

Atlan­tic Coun­cil picks up that Ukrai­ni­an demand and spreads the demand, that “the wes­tern allies now need to deli­ver “hea­vy attack wea­pon­ry”” for the first time EVER, becau­se - and I quo­te “Putin will win unless the West sends Ukrai­ne offen­si­ve weapons!”.

(Thats by the way - when peace talks were pro­gres­sing “excep­tio­nal­ly well” -- accord­ing to the NYT)
src: click

- 1st of April: But­cha beco­mes known.

- 1st or 2nd of April, Selen­skyj makes his speech that peace talks still need to con­ti­nue (accord­ing to the NYT)

- 9th of April Bojo arri­ves and says “some­thing - that sound­ed like “Lets Fight!” to Davyd Arak­ha­mi­ia, lea­der of the Ser­vant of the Peop­le fac­tion who led the Ukrai­ni­an dele­ga­ti­on at “peace” talks with the Rus­si­ans in Bela­rus and Tür­ki­ye in 2022.

- 15th of April:

Simi­lar to the month-earlier ver­si­on, the April 15 draft inclu­des text in red high­ligh­t­ing issu­es in dis­pu­te. But such mar­kings are almost ent­i­re­ly absent from the treaty’s first pages, whe­re points of agree­ment emerged.

Nego­tia­tors agreed that Ukrai­ne would decla­re its­elf per­ma­nent­ly neu­tral, though it would be allo­wed to join the Euro­pean Union.

Much of the trea­ty would “not app­ly” to Cri­mea and ano­t­her to-be-determined swath of Ukrai­ne — mea­ning that Kyiv would accept Rus­si­an occup­a­ti­on of part of its ter­ri­to­ry without reco­gni­zing Rus­si­an sov­er­eig­n­ty over it.

But cru­cial sti­cking points remained.

[…]

The big­gest pro­blem, howe­ver, came in Arti­cle 5. It sta­ted that, in the event of ano­t­her armed attack on Ukrai­ne, the “gua­ran­tor sta­tes” that would sign the trea­ty — Gre­at Bri­tain, Chi­na, Rus­sia, the United Sta­tes and Fran­ce — would come to Ukraine’s defense.

To the Ukrai­ni­ans’ dis­may, the­re was a cru­cial depar­tu­re from what Ukrai­ni­an nego­tia­tors said was dis­cus­sed in Istan­bul. Rus­sia inser­ted a clau­se say­ing that all gua­ran­tor sta­tes, inclu­ding Rus­sia, had to appro­ve the respon­se if Ukrai­ne were atta­cked. In effect, Moscow could inva­de Ukrai­ne again and then veto any mili­ta­ry inter­ven­ti­on on Ukraine’s behalf — a see­min­gly absurd con­di­ti­on that Kyiv quick­ly iden­ti­fied as a dealbreaker.

Rus­sia tried to secu­re a veto on Ukraine’s secu­ri­ty gua­ran­tees by inser­ting a clau­se requi­ring unani­mous consent.

The Gua­ran­tor Sta­tes and Ukrai­ne agree that in the event of an armed attack on Ukrai­ne, each of the Gua­ran­tor Sta­tes … on the basis of a decisi­on agreed upon by all Gua­ran­tor Sta­tes, will pro­vi­de … assi­s­tance to Ukrai­ne, as a per­ma­nent­ly neu­tral sta­te under attack…”

With that chan­ge, a mem­ber of the Ukrai­ni­an nego­tia­ting team said, “we had no inte­rest in con­ti­nuing the talks.”

src: click

SO WITH A BUNCH OF CRICIAL STICKING POINTS REMAINING - THIS IS THE POINT WHERE UKRAINIAN NEGOTIATORS DECIDED - NO, NO MORE - THAT ATTEMPT AT SLIPPING IN A VETO IS THHAAAAAA BREEEEAKING POINT! NO MORE PEACE TALKS!

THEN CHRONOLOGICALLY THIS HAPPENS:

Davyd Arak­ha­mi­ia: The goal of the­se nego­tia­ti­ons was to crea­te a sen­se of suc­cess in the initi­al phase.

He said that you need to make them feel that they can talk to us. Becau­se if you remem­ber, in the first few mon­ths, the Rus­si­ans pushed the mes­sa­ge that the Zelen­sky government was ille­gi­ti­ma­te, after the Mai­dan, after the coup, and so on. And after the second Ses­si­on it seems Putin came out on TV and said that we reco­gni­ze Zelen­skys government as legi­ti­ma­te and we will nego­tia­te with it. 

Nata­li­ia Mosei­chuk: So this pha­se was successful. 

Davyd Arak­ha­mi­ia: Yeah, this was the first goal and the second goal was to buy time. So we were basi­cal­ly buil­ding a smokescreen.

src: click (Not rebu­ked to this day.)

Then the Ukrai­ne starts attacking again. Becau­se the wea­pons arri­ved. Being suc­cess­full in Cher­son (Offen­si­ve: 27. Juli 2022 – 11. Novem­ber 2022).

Then the the Ukrai­ne starts attacking again. being VERY suc­cess­full in Char­kiew (6. Sep­tem­ber 2022 – 2. Okto­ber 2022).

Then on 30th of Sep­tem­ber 2022 Putin decla­res Donetsk, Kher­son, Luhansk and Zapo­rizhzhia oblasts annexed.

And then Selen­skyj still doesnt offi­cial­ly break off the peace nego­tia­ti­ons, they just con­ti­nue ghos­ting every mee­ting of it sin­ce the end of April, so Selen­skyj can remain “the PEACE pre­si­dent” - in all of fuck­ing public dia­log in ger­man media. HORRAY HORRAY. --

Sor­ry - we for­get all of that of course --

and still belie­ve, that the Ukraine

HAD TO STOP NEGOTIATIONS, BECAUSE THEY SAW HOW THE RUSSIAN SOLDIER BEHAVED IN HIS NATURAL HABITAT IN BUTCHA! WHICH IS A BLUEPRINT FOR HOW THE RUSSIAN BEHAVES IN THE ENTIRETY OF UKRAINE! -

Even though Selen­skyj sta­ted this - after Butscha -

He also said at the time, days after the Butscha mas­sa­c­re was dis­co­ve­r­ed in ear­ly April of 2022, he sug­gested that Putin might not be ful­ly awa­re of the warcri­mes that his sol­di­ers are com­mit­ting. And we still need to talk to Putin.

src: click (Simon Shus­ter at the Atlan­tic Council)

And it took the ukrai­ni­an pro­pa­gan­da depart­ment until the start of sum­mer (thats 81 days after Butscha) for the public messaging to change.

Even though - 14 days after But­cha (15th of April), the Ukria­ni­an dele­ga­ti­on knew that it didnt want to con­ti­nue nego­tia­ti­ons, becau­se of Rus­si­as demand for a veto, which was the ACTUAL deal­b­rea­ker (new wes­tern Pro­pa­gan­da line, why not…)

Even though Davyd Arak­ha­mi­ia clear­ly stated

Davyd Arak­ha­mi­ia: Yeah, this was the first goal and the second goal was to buy time. So we were basi­cal­ly buil­ding a smokescreen.

src: click (Not rebu­ked to this day.)

Even though Selen­skyj still didnt break off Peace talks “offi­cial­ly” after on 30th of Sep­tem­ber 2022 Putin decla­res Donetsk, Kher­son, Luhansk and Zapo­rizhzhia oblasts annexed.

Quo­te:

Und dann pas­sier­te im Sep­tem­ber etwas näm­lich es es geschah die Ein­ver­lei­bung nicht nur von den soge­nann­ten Volks­re­pu­bli­ken Lug­ansk und Donetzk in die Rus­si­sche Föde­ra­ti­on son­dern auch Cher­son und Sapo­rischsch­ja, die noch nicht mal erobert waren und sie wis­sen es viel­leicht oder sie wis­sen es nicht - was ein­ver­leibt wird hat Ver­fas­sungs­rang in Russ­land das heißt also das ist nicht irgend­was, was da beschlos­sen wur­de und gefei­ert wur­de, son­dern das war der damit ist der schrift­li­che ver­fas­sungs­mä­ßi­ge Auf­trag die­se Gebie­te zu erobern, zu erobern und da hat Zelens­kiJ nicht die Frie­dens­ge­sprä­che abge­bro­chen son­dern er hat gesagt mit Putin ver­hand­le ich nicht mehr!” 

src: click
(Sabi­ne Adler long­stan­ding East Euro­pe Expert, Deutsch­land­funk on the 5th of April 2024)

AND YOU FUCKING BELIEVE THIS?!

YOU FUCKING ASSININE FUCKING IDIOTS,

YOU --

Die­se Gesell­schaft ist das abso­lut gro­tesk und abar­tigst ALLERLETZTE.

And the bonus lie always was, that Ukrai­ne did this, becau­se it couldnt bare see­ing the Rus­si­an army beha­ving ever­y­whe­re else just like they did in But­cha, whe­re the Ukrai­ni­an Army kil­led two ent­i­re bat­tali­ons (1000 rus­si­an sol­di­ers) using HIMARS from a forest patch near­by first -- causing the rus­si­ans to go cra­zy. Accord­ing to an assess­ment of Mar­kus Reis­ner - of cour­se not in nor­mal prime Time Tele­vi­si­on --- no, we keep that infor­ma­ti­on for our “bel­lum jus­tum - Impuls­vor­trag Oberst Mar­kus Reis­ner zum Krieg in der Ukrai­ne at the “Platt­form Christ­de­mo­kra­tie”” of course.

YOU FUCKS.

And then we tre­at ever­yo­ne who knows that - like an abso­lu­te fuck­ing Putin apo­lo­gist, tool, idi­ot, leper, …

BECAUSE YOU FUCKING ATE UP THAT PROPAGANDA LIKE A FUCKING KIPFERL AT BREAKFAST - you utter, utter, scumm.

Ach­ja, und da Kai­ser Franz Joseph is ja in den Krieg - weil sie sei­nen Sohn getö­tet haben - net woa? 

Gre­at to final­ly get a grasp on the wider publics - utter, utter intelligence.

Gut, Pro­pa­gan­da hat jetzt aber lei­der wie­der nie­mand entdeckt.

Und die Geschich­te mit den signa­len­den US (“US and NATO offi­cials strugg­le to deci­pher the sta­tus of peace nego­tia­ti­ons bet­ween Rus­sia and Ukrai­ne”), die am 20. März 2022 “plötz­lich nicht mehr gewusst haben wo die Ukrai­ne steht” (hat­te da doch der Prä­si­dent Selen­sky ver­laut­bart eine “neu­tra­le Ukrai­ne” sei etwas wor­über er nach­den­ke), wor­auf am sel­ben Tag (!) der ehe­ma­li­ge ukrai­ni­sche Ver­tei­di­gungs­mi­nis­ter Zago­rod­nyuk, jetzt Atlan­tic Coun­cil Mit­glied, bei Times Radio vor­spre­chen und die ukrai­ni­sche Posi­ti­on erläu­tern musste:

(15 mal “Cant trust Putin!” in 5 Sätzen!)

- die erspar ich dem Leser lie­ber auch noch.

You dont say…

22. Juni 2024

NYT publis­hed ano­t­her deep­di­ve on the the peace nego­tia­ti­ons in April of 2022.

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/06/15/world/europe/ukraine-russia-ceasefire-deal.html

The draft inclu­ded limits on the size of the Ukrai­ni­an armed for­ces and the num­ber of tanks, artil­le­ry bat­te­ries, war­s­hips and com­bat air­craft the coun­try could have in its arse­nal. The Ukrai­ni­ans were pre­pa­red to accept such caps, but sought much hig­her limits.

A for­mer seni­or U.S. offi­cial who was brie­fed on the nego­tia­ti­ons, noting how Rus­si­an for­ces were being repel­led across nort­hern Ukrai­ne, said Mr. Putin see­med to be “sali­vat­ing” at the deal.

Ame­ri­can offi­cials were alar­med at the terms. In mee­tings with their Ukrai­ni­an coun­ter­parts, the seni­or offi­cial recal­led, “We quiet­ly said, ‘You under­stand this is uni­la­te­ral dis­ar­ma­ment, right?’”

Lea­ders in Poland — ear­ly and strong sup­por­ters of Ukrai­ne — fea­red that Ger­ma­ny or Fran­ce might try to per­sua­de the Ukrai­ni­ans to accept Russia’s terms, accord­ing to a Euro­pean diplo­mat, and wan­ted to pre­vent that from happening.

To that end, when Poland’s pre­si­dent, Andrzej Duda, met with NATO lea­ders in Brussels on March 24, he held up the March 17 text, said the diplo­mat, who was present.

Which of you would sign it?” Mr. Duda asked his coun­ter­parts, the diplo­mat said.

None of the NATO lea­ders spo­ke up.

A Bre­akthrough in Istanbul?

A few days later, on March 29, Rus­sia and Ukraine’s repre­sen­ta­ti­ves met at an Istan­bul palace on the Bos­po­rus. To some, the talks felt like a bre­akthrough dri­ven by Russia’s battle­field struggles.

After each mili­ta­ry set­back, a mem­ber of Ukraine’s nego­tia­ting team said, Mr. Putin “redu­ced his demands.”

In Istan­bul, the Rus­si­ans see­med to endor­se Ukraine’s model of neu­tra­li­ty and secu­ri­ty gua­ran­tees and put less empha­sis on their ter­ri­to­ri­al deman­ds. After­ward, Mr. Medi­n­sky, Russia’s lead nego­tia­tor, said Ukraine’s offer of neu­tra­li­ty meant it was “rea­dy to ful­fill tho­se princi­pal deman­ds that Rus­sia insis­ted on for all the past years.”

Ukrai­ne sum­ma­ri­zed the pro­po­sed deal in a two-page docu­ment it cal­led the Istan­bul Com­mu­ni­qué, which it never publis­hed. The sta­tus of Cri­mea was to be deci­ded over a 10- or 15-year peri­od, with Ukrai­ne pro­mi­sing not to try to reta­ke the pen­in­su­la by for­ce; Mr. Zelen­sky and Mr. Putin would meet in per­son to fina­li­ze a peace trea­ty and strike a deal on how much Ukrai­ni­an ter­ri­to­ry Rus­sia would con­ti­nue to occupy.

The com­mu­ni­qué, pro­vi­ded to The Times by a Ukrai­ni­an nego­tia­tor, descri­bed a mecha­nism in which other coun­tries would inter­vene mili­ta­ri­ly if Ukrai­ne were atta­cked again — a con­cept that the Ukrai­ni­ans poin­ted­ly desi­gna­ted as Arti­cle 5, a refe­rence to the mutu­al defen­se agree­ment in Arti­cle 5 of the NATO treaty.

In ear­ly April, after Rus­sia with­drew from the out­skirts of Kyiv, images of mas­sa­c­red civi­li­ans in the sub­urb of Bucha, some with their hands tied with white cloth, sho­cked the world. For Ukrai­ni­ans, the idea that their coun­try could strike a com­pro­mi­se with Rus­sia see­med more remo­te than ever.

But Mr. Zelen­sky, visi­t­ing Bucha on April 4, said the talks would go on, even as Rus­sia dis­mis­sed the Bucha atro­ci­ties as a sta­ged “pro­vo­ca­ti­on.”

see also:

Qui­te quick­ly, but cer­tain­ly over the cour­se of the next weeks that fol­lo­wed, Selen­sky­js views evol­ved, part­ly under the influ­ence of his advisors

(as a second source)

Col­leagues, I spo­ke to RA,” Ukraine’s lead nego­tia­tor, Davyd Arak­ha­mia, wro­te on April 10 in a Whats­App mes­sa­ge to the Ukrai­ni­an team. “He spo­ke yes­ter­day for an hour and a half with his boss.”

RA” was Roman Abra­mo­vich, the Rus­si­an bil­lion­aire who play­ed a behind-the-scenes role in the talks. His “boss,” Mr. Putin, was urging the nego­tia­tors to con­cen­tra­te on the key issu­es and work through them quick­ly, Mr. Arak­ha­mia wro­te. (A mem­ber of the Whats­App group show­ed that mes­sa­ge and others to repor­ters for The Times.)

BUT THEN OH NO!

Mr. Putin’s invol­ve­ment and inten­ti­ons during the 2022 talks were sub­jects of deba­te in Kyiv and Washing­ton, Ukrai­ni­an and Ame­ri­can offi­cials said. Was he tru­ly inte­res­ted in a deal? Or was he merely try­ing to bog Ukrai­ne down while his tro­ops regrouped?

We didn’t know if Putin was serious,” said the for­mer seni­or U.S. offi­cial. “We couldn’t tell, on eit­her side of the fence, whe­ther the­se peop­le who were tal­king were empowered.”

One Ukrai­ni­an nego­tia­tor said he belie­ved the nego­tia­ti­ons were a bluff on Mr. Putin’s part, but two others descri­bed them as serious.

Much of the trea­ty would “not app­ly” to Cri­mea and ano­t­her to-be-determined swath of Ukrai­ne — mea­ning that Kyiv would accept Rus­si­an occup­a­ti­on of part of its ter­ri­to­ry without reco­gni­zing Rus­si­an sov­er­eig­n­ty over it.

But cru­cial sti­cking points remai­ned. Rus­sia wan­ted the firing ran­ge of Ukraine’s mis­si­les to be limi­ted to 25 miles, while Ukrai­ne wan­ted 174 miles — enough to hit tar­gets across Cri­mea. Rus­sia still wan­ted Ukrai­ne to repeal laws rela­ted to lan­guage and natio­nal iden­ti­ty, and to pull back Ukrai­ni­an tro­ops as part of a cease-fire.

The big­gest pro­blem, howe­ver, came in Arti­cle 5. It sta­ted that, in the event of ano­t­her armed attack on Ukrai­ne, the “gua­ran­tor sta­tes” that would sign the trea­ty — Gre­at Bri­tain, Chi­na, Rus­sia, the United Sta­tes and Fran­ce — would come to Ukraine’s defense.

To the Ukrai­ni­ans’ dis­may, the­re was a cru­cial depar­tu­re from what Ukrai­ni­an nego­tia­tors said was dis­cus­sed in Istan­bul. Rus­sia inser­ted a clau­se say­ing that all gua­ran­tor sta­tes, inclu­ding Rus­sia, had to appro­ve the respon­se if Ukrai­ne were atta­cked. In effect, Moscow could inva­de Ukrai­ne again and then veto any mili­ta­ry inter­ven­ti­on on Ukraine’s behalf — a see­min­gly absurd con­di­ti­on that Kyiv quick­ly iden­ti­fied as a dealbreaker.

Rus­sia tried to secu­re a veto on Ukraine’s secu­ri­ty gua­ran­tees by inser­ting a clau­se requi­ring unani­mous consent.

With that chan­ge, a mem­ber of the Ukrai­ni­an nego­tia­ting team said, “we had no inte­rest in con­ti­nuing the talks.”

And then ghosted.

The two quintessential lies

22. Juni 2024

So the argu­ment goes as follows:

- Rus­sia was going into Ukrai­ne to con­quer it ent­i­re­ly and then more

Addi­tio­nal infor­ma­ti­on: 190.000 to 220.000 tro­ops arent enough to con­quer OR hold any major city in the Ukrai­ne - much less the ent­i­re­ty of Ukrai­ne. See Mearsheimer/Kathie Hal­per video below. In which the first refe­ren­ces the fol­lowing para­graph from a Wall Street Jour­nal arti­cle, publis­hed on the 2nd of June 2024:

Of cour­se, Putin still wants Khar­kiv,” Oleh Syn­e­hu­bov, the head of the mili­ta­ry admi­nis­tra­ti­on for the region—which is also cal­led Kharkiv—said of Rus­si­an Pre­si­dent Vla­di­mir Putin. Syn­e­hu­bov noted that Rus­sia has deploy­ed only a frac­tion of the tro­ops nee­ded to storm the city, which he esti­ma­ted could requi­re up to half a mil­li­on soldiers.

src: click (Archiv)

(Khar­kiv, back befo­re the rus­si­an inva­si­on had about half the popu­la­ti­on of Kiev.)

So then the argu­ment extends:

- This isnt about “ter­ri­to­ry” (“con­que­ring all of it and more”) this is about kee­ping Ukrai­ne a sov­er­eign sta­te - see Pau­la Dobri­an­sky, For­mer Under Secreta­ry of Sta­te for Glo­bal Affairs; Seni­or Fel­low at Har­vard Ken­ne­dy School’s Bel­fer Cen­ter for Sci­ence and Inter­na­tio­nal Affairs; Vice Chair, Atlan­tic Coun­cil Scow­croft Cen­ter for Stra­te­gy & Secu­ri­ty -- in the fol­lowing Open to Deba­te (for­mer Intel­li­gence Squa­red) debate:

star­ting at 30:28 in

- The in depth argu­ment here goes as fol­lows. When Putin inva­ded Ukrai­ne - we saw leaf­lets being drop­ped in regi­ons east of Kiev that were tel­ling Ukrai­ni­an tro­ops to stand down, becau­se the government in Kiew (mili­ta­ry) would not exist any­mo­re - so any resis­tance to the inva­si­on “would be ent­i­re­ly futi­le, becau­se it alrea­dy “was over””, fur­ther­mo­re, the intent of the rus­si­an “attack on Kiev” would have been the same as with the take­over of Cri­mea 2014, name­ly to dis­rupt public life, make the stan­ding ukrai­ni­an government flee, or be kil­led (alle­ged­ly the US did take out several rus­si­an assas­si­na­ti­on units in Kiev wit­hin the first three days) - and then let the government be taken over, or revol­ted against by essen­ti­al­ly Ukrai­ni­an Krem­lin puppets.

Which leads to

- Rus­sia wasnt about to “con­quer Ukrai­ne” it was about to attempt a mili­ta­ry coup and take­over - using a shock and awe stra­te­gy, much like the one they used in Cri­mea befo­re. That eit­her would have cemen­ted a rus­sia friend­ly lea­ders­hip in Kiev, or wider advan­ces in the east amongst the resul­ting cha­os. (220.000 tro­ops (and only half of tho­se in the Kiev area) still being not near­ly enough to occu­py a Kiev (popu­la­ti­on of 3 mil­li­on) that was resis­ting its occupiers.)

Which then con­flicts with “thats impe­ri­al rus­sia wan­ting to con­quer several coun­tries, so Putin gets his rus­si­an empi­re back -- becau­se the­re posi­tively was no con­que­ring attempt (in the clas­si­cal sen­se) going on -- becau­se rus­sia had far to few tro­ops for that in its army at the time, and in the field -- see:

- The “addi­tio­nal coun­tries rus­sia wan­ted to take over” were Geor­gia and Mol­d­o­wa (land bridge to trans­nis­tria). Poland, Esto­nia, and Lit­hua­nia, were loo­sing their sh*t becau­se of Kali­nin­grad, but they all were Nato coun­tries you wouldnt inva­de with an army of 190.000 peop­le, which had about half of its tro­ops busy in the east of Ukrai­ne at that point.

That then let to the “things werent going remo­te­ly to plan” scenario --

whe­re two tracks of peace con­fe­ren­ces were put into place - whe­re rus­sia could be “pres­sed back down” to the fol­lowing demands:

- Neu­tral Ukraine
- Cri­mea thats not tal­ked about for many years
- secu­ri­ty gua­ran­ties by the west/troop size limits that would allow Ukrai­ne to defend its­elf in the future

Whe­re the point of con­ten­ti­on whe­re all of that bro­ke were the secu­ri­ty gua­ran­ties. Or as wes­tern Pro­pa­gan­da likes to put it “Putin deman­ded such a low troop count on the ukrai­ni­an mili­ta­ry, that on a sub­se­quent attack he would have been able to con­quer it any­how” - so “becau­se of that Ukrai­ne had to ghost rus­sia, and then drop the nego­tia­ti­ons”. In actual­li­ty by then Ukrai­ne was in the midd­le of their own offen­si­ve so.…..

As Davyd Arak­ha­mi­ia put it “the Ukrai­ne was using the nego­tia­ti­ons as a Smo­ke­s­creen to buy time to get more Wea­pons into Ukrai­ne” or, as Davyd Arak­ha­mi­ia did frame it in the same inter­view - Rus­sia tried to nego­tia­te a peace, whe­re upon a second attack Ukrai­ne would not exist anymore.

Tho­se two points he brought up in the inter­view with the ukrai­ni­an broad­cas­ter were never refu­t­ed by Davyd Arak­ha­mi­ia. He only tried to put “Let’s fight” - so his recal­ling of a Boris John­son state­ment into a slight­ly dif­fe­rent con­text after­wards (John­son would have said this to him in a mee­ting about “how to best get the rus­si­ans out of Ukraine”).

So, so far - we have two quin­te­sen­ti­al lies on part of wes­tern propaganda --

1. That Putin was out the­re to con­quer back his very own gre­at rus­sia. (Which is a lie, becau­se the attack was desi­gned as a Shock and awe quick topp­ling of the Ukrai­ni­an government - so was the take­over in Geor­gia (influ­ence ope­ra­ti­on) lea­ving only Mol­d­o­va for a mili­ta­ry take­over - IF Putin dindt want to chal­len­ge Nato with an army of 190.000 peop­le which then also would have had to hold Ukrai­ne against its will - a job that would requi­re rough­ly 400.000+ men, if you were an occu­p­y­ing force.

2. The Ukrai­ne needs its “natio­nal sov­er­eig­n­ty” to sur­vi­ve. So this is the Ukrai­ne cant beco­me a neu­tral coun­try argu­ment - becau­se the Ukrai­ne has to be able to deci­de the strength of its mili­ta­ry on its own - to be able to sur­vi­ve a second rus­si­an attack in the Future. That is a lie, becau­se this could also be sol­ved with secu­ri­ty gua­ran­ties -- which the Ukrai­ne has very bad expe­ri­en­ces with. (The Ukrai­ne essen­ti­al­ly gave up its nuclear wea­pons, as a pre­re­qui­si­te for beco­m­ing an inde­pen­dent sta­te, and got “secu­ri­ty gua­ran­ties” by the US, the UK and a few other coun­tries, in return - that were desi­gned not be worth all that much, becau­se of how they were phra­sed.) A neu­tral Ukrai­ne would be pos­si­ble - if we sol­ved the secu­ri­ty gua­ran­ties issue.

With the second remai­ning issue in that case being rus­si­an poli­ti­cal influ­ence that in a neu­tral Ukrai­ne would still remain active.

Around tho­se two lies, all of the wes­tern framing is build around. The “ukrai­ne has to deci­de on its own” framing, the “nato has an open door poli­cy, and every coun­try must be able to deci­de on its own, if it wants to enter nato” framing, the Putin wants to get back a grea­ter rus­sia framing, becau­se he thinks like a tsar (thats also framing), the Putin is cra­zy framing (the Ukrai­ni­ans are Nazis Nar­ra­ti­ve was acti­ve in Cri­mea, short­ly befo­re the take­over, becau­se it sho­cked popu­la­ti­ons into com­pla­cen­cy - that was the main aim of the rus­sia Pro­pa­gan­da push through its media out­lets in Cri­mea -- so as it was acti­ve back in 2014 - of cour­se that nar­ra­ti­ve was used for the full­sca­le attack on Ukrai­ne as well -- again, as about half of rus­si­as initi­al for­ces were acti­ve in the east. (So popu­la­ti­ons would have asked why - and the “Nazis” nar­ra­ti­ve was alrea­dy in place sin­ce 2014 (and pro­ved very use­ful back then).))

While intern­al­ly in the deci­ding bodies the argu­ment is actual­ly as follows:

At 35min in:

Ali­na Polya­ko­va (Pre­si­dent and CEO of the Cen­ter for Euro­pean Poli­cy Ana­ly­sis (CEPA): I think that signals to me that the­re is gro­wing agree­ment that the only way that we can mana­ge Rus­sia is by going back to the Cold War era stra­te­gy of con­tain­ment, that begins first, defea­ting Rus­sia in Ukrai­ne and second, ree­sta­b­li­shing deter­an­ce by deni­al in Euro­pe that means har­de­ning the Eas­tern flank first and fore­mo­st. Third har­de­ning the soft tar­gets of Rus­si­an influ­ence across the glo­be - uh influ­ence ope­ra­ti­ons in the infor­ma­ti­on space, cyber ope­ra­ti­ons that the Rus­si­ans have beco­me very sophisti­ca­ted at, pushing back against Russia’s use of PMC’s [pri­va­te mili­ta­ry con­trac­tors] to prop up aut­ho­ri­ta­ri­an governments across the glo­be and under­mi­ne demo­cra­tic lea­ders­hip - and fourth, under­mi­ning Rus­si­an domi­nan­ce in its for­mer empi­re, becau­se as long as we have so-called grey zone Sta­tes a hor­ri­ble term but, non-allied sta­tes that are not part of NATO that are not part of the EU in the Euro­pean con­ti­nent this is what pro­vi­des fod­der for Rus­si­an aggres­si­on so Mol­d­o­va is very much under thre­at as we speak, cer­tain­ly Bel­la­rus has alrea­dy beco­me a vassel sta­te of Rus­sia and then we have of cour­se Geor­gia and the other coun­tries of the Cau­ca­sus as well.

[…]

And Rus­sia will come back for NATO.

Han­no Pev­kur, Minis­ter of Defence of the Repu­blic of Esto­nia (30.05.2023):

What Rus­sia wants to achie­ve, the poli­ti­cal goals, let’s be honest - and they, the­se poli­ti­cal goals of Rus­sia have never chan­ged, they want to have a grey-zone bet­ween Rus­sia and NATO, they want to have a con­trol over this grey-zone and this is what they want to achie­ve. And they want to have some “secu­ri­ty gua­ran­tees” for them­sel­ves, sor­ry this is not the Free World and this is what Ukrai­ne is figh­t­ing for at the moment, that they are figh­t­ing for - the Free World and rule-based world and this is why we sup­port Ukrai­ne so this is obvious and then this is why we can never accept this approach of Rus­sia, loo­king at inter­na­tio­nal law.”

src:

(at 43:50 in)

or:

Pau­la Dobri­an­sky, For­mer Under Secreta­ry of Sta­te for Glo­bal Affairs; Seni­or Fel­low at Har­vard Ken­ne­dy School’s Bel­fer Cen­ter for Sci­ence and Inter­na­tio­nal Affairs; Vice Chair, Atlan­tic Coun­cil Scow­croft Cen­ter for Stra­te­gy & Security

But by the way that’s not - for­gi­ve me - that’s not the point. The point here is also not about sei­z­ing of ter­ri­to­ry too, I’d like to say that here it’s about a sov­er­eign country’s poli­ti­cal future, its own right to make its choices. Putin has out­right said that Ukrai­ne does­n’t exist as a coun­try - he has said that over and over and over so it’s not just about ter­ri­to­ry, it is also about sov­er­eign coun­try poli­ti­cal choices and an inva­si­on that actual­ly star­ted back in 2014 and right up to the present.

here at 32min in.

So that Ukrai­ne has to remain a sov­er­eign coun­try (to deci­de on its own mili­ta­ry strenght, to never be poli­ti­cal­ly influ­en­ced by rus­sia ever again (only by credi­tors.. 😉 ) then also extents to whats hap­pe­ning right now -

here are the chan­ges from the draft of the Bür­gen­stock con­fe­rence that Switz­er­land pro­vi­ded to all invi­ted sta­tes on the 28th of May com­pa­red to the final draft --

https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/06/13/7187968/

Here is what Sit­z­er­land had put in the­re initi­al­ly and what the Ukrai­ne has lob­bied to replace it with:

2. Ter­ri­to­ri­al Inte­gri­ty and the UN Charter

– Old wor­d­ing: the pre­vious sum­mit decisi­on ver­si­on crea­ted a legal win­dow to inclu­de Ukrai­ne aban­do­ning part of its ter­ri­to­ry in the con­di­ti­ons of “sus­tainab­le peace with Rus­sia”, if necessary.

– New wor­d­ing: the new draft decisi­on clear­ly sta­tes that the basis for sus­tainab­le peace will be only “a solu­ti­on based on the princip­le of respect for the ter­ri­to­ri­al inte­gri­ty and sov­er­eig­n­ty of all states”.

src: click

also

3. Alter­na­ti­ve Peace Formulas

– Old wor­d­ing: the pre­vious draft blur­red the mea­ning of the Peace For­mu­la and ope­ned up space for inter­na­tio­nal dis­cus­sion of all alter­na­ti­ve visi­ons of peace, such as the Chinese-Brazilian one, which envi­sa­ges a halt to the streng­t­he­ning of Ukraine’s Armed For­ces and a ces­sa­ti­on of hostilities.

– New wor­d­ing: the new wor­d­ing sta­tes that only peace pro­po­sals that com­ply with inter­na­tio­nal law (i.e. an uncon­di­tio­nal return of the 1991 bor­ders, unless revi­sed by Ukrai­ne its­elf) and the UN Char­ter (in par­ti­cu­lar, Ukraine’s uncon­di­tio­nal right to con­ti­nue repel­ling Rus­si­an aggres­si­on and libe­ra­ting the occu­p­ied ter­ri­to­ries) will be taken into account.

src: click

Tho­se are now points that are acti­ve in the final com­mu­ni­que that 78 coun­tries signed at Bür­gen­stock - and accord­ing to Ser­giy Sydo­ren­ko (Ukrai­ni­an Jour­na­list, spon­so­red by USAID), same source arti­cle, also the main rea­son, that 15 coun­tries refu­sed to sign, and more than two dozen of coun­tries down­gra­ded their par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on from Presidential/Ministerial level to minis­ters or even their deputies.

With he final gag being the following:

Vik­to­ria Kir­ner vor 14 Stunden

Ukrai­ne: Ein Land des glo­ba­len Südens könn­te zwei­ten Frie­dens­gip­fel ausrichten
Die Ukrai­ne ist der Ansicht, dass ein zwei­tes Gip­fel­tref­fen, bei dem Kiews Vor­schlä­ge für einen Frie­den mit Russ­land erör­tert wer­den sol­len, von einem Land des glo­ba­len Südens aus­ge­rich­tet wer­den könn­te, wie ein hoch­ran­gi­ger Beam­ter der Nach­rich­ten­agen­tur Interfax-Ukraine am Frei­tag sag­te. Das berich­tet die Nach­rich­ten­agen­tur Reuters.

Mehr als 90 Län­der nah­men letz­te Woche am ers­ten Gip­fel in der Schweiz teil, da die Ukrai­ne eine brei­te Unter­stüt­zung für ihren Plan zur Been­di­gung des Krie­ges sucht.

Mos­kau, das nicht ein­ge­la­den war, bezeich­ne­te das Ergeb­nis des Gip­fels - ein Kom­mu­ni­qué, das von den meis­ten Teil­neh­mern unter­zeich­net, aber ins­be­son­de­re von Indi­en, Bra­si­li­en und Saudi-Arabien abge­lehnt wur­de - als “nahe­zu null”.

Wir haben meh­re­re Län­der [die sich als Gast­ge­ber anbie­ten], und ich kann mit hoher Wahr­schein­lich­keit sagen, dass ein sol­cher Gip­fel in einem der Län­der des glo­ba­len Südens statt­fin­den könn­te”, wur­de der Prä­si­den­ten­be­ra­ter Ihor Zhovk­va von Interfax-Ukraine zitiert.

Die Ukrai­ne wol­le, dass der nächs­te Gip­fel vor Ende des Jah­res ein­be­ru­fen wer­de, sag­te er und füg­te hin­zu, dass Russ­land ein­ge­la­den wer­den kön­ne, wenn es bereit sei, den von der Ukrai­ne vor­ge­leg­ten Fahr­plan zu berück­sich­ti­gen und kei­ne Ulti­ma­ten zu stellen.

src: click

The­re are now ongo­ing “Peace con­fe­ren­ces” - twice a year - with chan­ging host sta­tes. Whe­re the Ukrai­ne will always invi­te their “guar­di­an sta­tes”, based on the Bür­gen­stock Com­mu­ni­quee (and Selen­sky­js 10 point peace for­mu­la), whe­re the Ukrai­ne - cur­r­ent­ly sta­tes, at this very minu­te, it will only ever invi­te Rus­sia, if rus­sia agrees to the “Peace for­mu­la frame­work” estab­lis­hed at Bür­gen­stock -- which in its­elf alrea­dy inclu­des that it has to be based on “the princip­le of respect for the ter­ri­to­ri­al inte­gri­ty” and “sov­er­eig­n­ty of all states”. 

With the first one being the stand in for “the Ukrai­ne needs Cri­mea and the Don­bas back, befo­re we can invi­te Rus­sia to our peace for­mu­la con­fe­rence”, and the second part “sov­er­eig­n­ty of all sta­tes” being the stand in for:

3. Alter­na­ti­ve Peace Formulas

– Old wor­d­ing: the pre­vious draft blur­red the mea­ning of the Peace For­mu­la and ope­ned up space for inter­na­tio­nal dis­cus­sion of all alter­na­ti­ve visi­ons of peace, such as the Chinese-Brazilian one, which envi­sa­ges a halt to the streng­t­he­ning of Ukraine’s Armed For­ces and a ces­sa­ti­on of hos­ti­li­ties.

New wor­d­ing: the new wor­d­ing sta­tes that only peace pro­po­sals that com­ply with inter­na­tio­nal law (i.e. an uncon­di­tio­nal return of the 1991 bor­ders, unless revi­sed by Ukrai­ne its­elf) and the UN Char­ter (in par­ti­cu­lar, Ukraine’s uncon­di­tio­nal right to con­ti­nue repel­ling Rus­si­an aggres­si­on and libe­ra­ting the occu­p­ied ter­ri­to­ries) will be taken into account.

We need to be allo­wed to deci­de how lar­ge our army is, and what its aim/goal is in the future.”

And only if rus­sia agrees to that frame­work, it can be invi­ted to the next “peace conference”.

Die Ukrai­ne wol­le, dass der nächs­te Gip­fel vor Ende des Jah­res ein­be­ru­fen wer­de, sag­te er und füg­te hin­zu, dass Russ­land ein­ge­la­den wer­den kön­ne, wenn es bereit sei, den von der Ukrai­ne vor­ge­leg­ten Fahr­plan zu berück­sich­ti­gen und kei­ne Ulti­ma­ten zu stellen.

To ensu­re this, the Ukrai­ne insis­ted on remo­ving the fol­lowing pas­sa­ge from the ori­gi­nal draft of the final com­mu­ni­quee Switz­er­land sent out to all atten­ding sta­tes on the 28th of May - entirely:

4. Invol­ve­ment of Russia
– Old wor­d­ing: the ear­lier ver­si­on tur­ned Rus­sia from an aggres­sor into a par­ti­ci­pant in peace talks, requi­ring only vague “confidence-building mea­su­res” on nuclear and food security.

– New wor­d­ing: this sec­tion has been rewrit­ten from scratch. The Swiss agreed not to men­ti­on Rus­sia at all in the pro­vi­si­on on peace talks, ins­tead refer­ring to “all par­ties”. The­re is no lon­ger a wea­ke­ned requi­re­ment for “confidence-building mea­su­res”, but ins­tead “spe­ci­fic actions” are requi­red. And most import­ant­ly, the refe­ren­ces to a “second peace sum­mit” that hin­ted at a com­mit­ment to invi­te Rus­sia to par­ti­ci­pa­te have been removed.

src: click

So why crea­te tho­se “peace sum­mits” at all?

(If only 78 coun­tries out of 193 UN coun­tries signed and the tal­ked about points at tho­se con­fe­ren­ces still remain points from Selen­sky­js 10 Point peace for­mu­la, which now only beco­me more con­tro­ver­si­al (inter­na­ti­nal tri­bu­nals reques­ted, repe­ra­ti­on pay­ments reques­ted, cri­mea and don­bas back alrea­dy part of the “glo­bal peace sum­mit frame­work” (ter­ri­to­ri­al inte­gri­ty), we deci­de how big our mili­ta­ry is alrea­dy part of the “glo­bal peace sum­mit” frame­work, the last rus­si­an sol­dier has to lea­ve Ukrai­ne -- all having to be agreed on by Rus­sia -- BEFORE Rus­sia can be invited.…)

see also:

Ukrai­ni­an ambassa­dor to esto­nia in the fol­lowing Pod­cast on the 12th of June, nine hours after Andrij Jer­mak sta­ted “we want to invi­te rus­sia to the second peace for­mu­la con­fe­rence” for the first time: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_782Vs76ask at 16:20 min. in - 

So Rus­sia may be invi­ted for the next - for the second peace sum­mit, but — befo­re we should agree on the frame­work of this nego­tia­ti­on pro­cess and on joint inter­na­tio­nal plan for peace in Ukrai­ne. ONLY at this sta­ge, rus­sia can be invi­ted, and can be part of this process.“

-- if you need a second source…

Well thats easy…

As the wes­tern two quint­essen­ti­al pro­pa­gan­da lies

1. The tsar Putin is hell­bent on con­que­ring back gre­at rus­sia (Putin has sta­ted about five times in the past two weeks, that he would not attack Nato, and that he would be rea­dy for a sei­ze fire after he has the four Ukrai­ni­an oblasts rus­sia “offi­cial­ly anne­xed” under his con­trol (see also this Reu­ters exclu­si­ve), and that he is rea­dy to talk with the US about the euro­pean secu­ri­ty struc­tu­re, if tho­se talks also would inclu­de Ukrai­ne, … )

and

2. Ukrai­ne NEEDS to stay poli­ti­cal­ly sov­er­eign - which in the final Bür­gen­stock com­mu­ni­quee - as a phra­se - was a stand in for “Ukrai­ne needs to be able to deci­de what size of mili­ta­ry it has, and for what purpose”

Beco­me more and more obvious over time (becau­se Rus­sia will not able to con­quer other euro­pean sta­tes anymore) ---

more and more of the public will demand peace talks.

And for that we alrea­dy have the “glo­bal peace for­mu­la frame­work” in which rus­sia has to agree to “ter­ri­to­ri­al inte­gri­ty and Ukraine’s uncon­di­tio­nal right to con­ti­nue repel­ling Rus­si­an aggres­si­on and libe­ra­ting the occu­p­ied ter­ri­to­ries (sov­er­eig­n­ty) has been writ­ten in, which rus­sia HAS TO AGREE TO, to even be invited.

And so the two quint­essen­ti­al wes­tern pro­pa­gan­da lies can con­ti­nue for ano­t­her two years.

Peace con­fe­ren­ces” being held with chan­ged out host coun­tries, twice a year. Until rus­sia suc­cumbs to the wes­tern - sor­ry “Glo­bal Peace For­mu­la Frame­work” demands.

Wer­te­ge­sell­schaft. Ken­nen sie sich aus.

But the public will be strung along by the sin­gle out thats left - and that is, that if you dont do it exact­ly that way --

RUSSIA WILL COME FOR NATO COUNTRIES.

Which is and always was thre­at infla­ti­on, and the­re­fo­re wes­tern pro­pa­gan­da. Why is it less likely that “rus­sia will do it again” - well, this is a war of attri­ti­on which loses rus­sia peop­le at the rate of 800 per day on a good day (thats over the ent­i­re bor­der). And second -- have you che­cked the demo­gra­phic charts for rus­sia recent­ly? In five years time only 8% of their male popu­la­ti­on is capa­ble of being draf­ted anymore.

They cur­r­ent­ly had a popu­la­ti­on spike at 37-38 years old, and alrea­dy are a coun­try in ter­mi­nal demo­gra­phic decli­ne, which is why Kras­t­ev even sug­gested that the attack on Ukrai­ne was moun­ted to get more young peop­le back into rus­si­as fold, when the war started.

Thats the army thats batt­ling NATO in 2030?

8% only coun­ting males is 11 mil­li­on peop­le, 2/3 (thats the ger­ma­ny in WW2 rate, which had 13 mil­li­on sol­di­ers with a stan­ding popu­la­ti­on of 40 mil­li­on males) of which you need to keep the eco­no­my going - that lea­ves you with 3.7 mil­li­on poten­ti­al soldiers.

Against Poland with a popu­la­ti­on of 37 mil­li­on (2.4 mio males in the same draf­ting bra­cket) with Nato allies? Strai­ght into WW3?

Oh yeah - I for­got - this is becau­se of the wes­tern rule of law that has to be uphold, for about 3-4 more years, then the cur­rent rate of attri­ti­on will make sure rus­sia will be unab­le to mount an addi­tio­nal attack over the next 10 years… (Not becau­se of peop­le, but becau­se of the cur­rent attri­ti­on rate on mili­ta­ry equip­ment (cur­rent pro­duc­tion rates alrea­dy accoun­ted for).)

And on top of this - Chi­na loo­ks at all this and then tells rus­sia, yes - sure, go ahead and attack our second lar­gest export mar­ket, so our first lar­gest export mar­ket gets drawn into a war as well.

Statistical uptick of russians “about to attack”, and russian airplanes “about to fire” very likely in the upcoming days…

21. Juni 2024

Ukrai­ne may fire US-provided mis­si­les into Rus­sia whe­re­ver it is com­ing under attack, Pen­ta­gon says

src: click (ABC)

This is not about geo­gra­phy. It’s about com­mon sen­se,” said spo­kes­man Army Maj. Char­lie Dietz. “If Rus­sia is attacking or about to attack from its ter­ri­to­ry into Ukrai­ne, it only makes sen­se to allow Ukrai­ne to hit back [on the attacking par­ty that was only “about to attack them” so - I think we call that first stri­ke­ab­le, right?] against the for­ces that are hit­ting it from across the border.”

Addi­tio­nal­ly, they can use air defen­se sys­tems sup­plied by the United Sta­tes to take Rus­si­an pla­nes out of the sky, even if tho­se Rus­si­an pla­nes are in Rus­si­an air­space, if they’re about to fire into Ukrai­ni­an air­space,” Dietz said in a statement.

I’m tel­ling you, that rus­si­an was about to fire! Good thing I saw him, befo­re he did!

So - ukrai­ni­an attacks on rus­sia are now limi­ted by “wait a minu­te, do you think we might need tho­se rockets to attack sup­ply rou­tes in Crimea”?

Ah, good were the days - when a Car­lo Masa­la would tell ger­man audi­en­ces, that the batt­le over Lyman was “very” important, becau­se from the­re - Ukrai­nes liter­al­ly could reach all train hubs, they alrea­dy could attack befo­re, becau­se they alrea­dy were wit­hin ran­ge before…

Now new in the port­fo­lio of “This by no means is sala­mi sli­ce tac­tics, this is a “Lear­ning Cur­ve”” regar­ding what Ger­ma­ny needs to green­light for the Ukrai­ni­ans to use at any given moment: They can now use ever­ything, to fire at anything - if they think - it was about to fire at Ukraine.

Eska­la­ti­ons­spi­ra­le? I wo -- “Lern­kur­ve”, hat uns Clau­dia Major von der Stif­tung Wis­sen­schaft und Poli­tik doch bei­gebracht!

edit: Wait -- lets not for­get the “This is not about geo­gra­phy. It’s about com­mon sen­se,…” part! So -- what was the pro­vo­ca­ti­on that lead to the US esca­la­ting in that fashion? You know, from only allowing mis­si­les to attack rus­si­an for­ces in rus­sia, near Char­kiev? Oh, right… The­re was none. The esca­la­ti­on real­ly was just “about com­mon sen­se” and did not need any “geo­gra­phic restric­tions” becau­se they were soooo two weeks ago.

edit: Es gibt aber auch wie­der gute Nach­rich­ten. Der Stan­dard wider­spricht gera­de Forbes…

Don’t Fear Russia’s 3.3-Ton Glide-Bomb. It’s Mas­si­ve Over­kill When A 1.1-Ton Glide-Bomb Will Kill You Just Fine. (For­bes)

Russ­land setz­te neue ton­nen­schwe­re Bom­be im Krieg ein (Der Standard)

Auch des­we­gen hat Kiew neben einer ver­stärk­ten Flug­ab­wehr auch immer wie­der gefor­dert, mit west­li­chen Waf­fen auch mili­tä­ri­sche Zie­le über rus­si­schem Gebiet angrei­fen zu können.

Aso - wegen der Bom­be die eh kei­nen Unter­schied macht.

Klar, war­um bin ich nicht drauf gekommen…

But as a glide-bomb, the FAB-3000 also would be unwie­l­dy and likely lacking in ran­ge [30km]. Don’t worry about the 3.3-ton FAB-3000. Ins­tead, worry about the Rus­si­an glide-bombs that aren’t imp­rac­ti­cal for ever­y­day use: the FAB-500, FAB-1000 and FAB-1500.

src: click