Moderator im Krisenmodus

11. Juni 2024

Der gela­de­ne Exper­te bei Phoe­nix spricht alle Pro­pa­gan­da­nara­ti­ve Selen­sky­js expli­zit als “Nar­ra­ti­ve für die Öffent­lich­keit” an.

Plat­ziert, dass Selen­skyj den Mau­er­fall erwäh­ne, aber selbst eine Mau­er baue. (Der Mode­ra­tor: Eine ideo­lo­gi­sche, nicht? Nur, eine ideologische!)

Spricht an, dass - auch wenn die Zuse­her damit nicht ein­ver­stan­den sein, Deutsch­land Kon­tak­te zu Russ­land hal­ten müs­se - und der Wunsch Selen­ky­js daher uner­füllt blei­ben wür­de. (Mode­ra­tor: Aber er hat immer nur Putin gesagt, nicht Russ­land, nur Putin!)

Spricht offen an “Selen­skyj hat Meis­ter und Mar­ga­ri­ta von Bul­ga­kow sicher sehr inten­siv gele­sen, dort gehe es auch um den “Kampf gegen das Böse””.

Das Gan­ze mit einem öster­rei­chi­schen Akzent…

Der Mode­ra­tor ver­suchts ein­zu­fan­gen, wo mög­lich - ist damit aber nicht sehr erfolgreich…

Habe die Ehre… Ob der Herr noch mal von Phoe­nix gela­den wird?

edit: Hier der CV des Exper­ten: click

Cant tell that to the public…

11. Juni 2024

Ok, lets say you have a draft for the final decla­ra­ti­on text of a “peace conference”.

NHK has obtai­ned the draft joint state­ment that refers to only three of the 10 points pro­po­sed in the Ukrai­ni­an peace formula.

Lets say it focu­ses on -

The three are the safe­ty of nuclear power plants, food secu­ri­ty and the release of all pri­so­ners and the return of child­ren depor­ted to Russia.

It falls short of men­tio­ning the with­dra­wal of Rus­si­an for­ces from Ukrai­ne AND the res­to­ra­ti­on of Ukraine’s ter­ri­to­ri­al inte­gri­ty.

The draft joint state­ment also says ALL par­ties need to take a part to achie­ve peace. IT STRESSES the impor­t­ance of Russia’s par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on in discussions.

Diplo­ma­tic sources say that the with­dra­wal of Rus­si­an tro­ops AND OTHER THINGS THAT UKRAINE HAVE BEEN CALLING FOR were drop­ped from the draft becau­se it took into con­si­de­ra­ti­on some emer­ging nati­ons in Asia and Midd­le East that main­tain ties with Russia.

Lets say - you as the NHK japa­ne­se press out­let sin­gle out Selen­skyj in the last para­graph as the only belie­ver in some­thing that was the 10 point peace for­mu­la (con­tai­ning all the points you sta­ted were remo­ved from the draft decla­ra­ti­on beforehand):

Ukrai­ni­an Pre­si­dent Volo­dym­yr Zelen­skyy expects the peace sum­mit to be a frame­work that will give his coun­try an upper hand in ending the war.

By actual­ly sta­ting, that Selen­skyj thinks, that he can use this frame­work to gain leverage in ending this war.

Make sure to men­ti­on that Selen­skyj thinks that - befo­re the poli­ti­cal state­ments of soli­da­ri­ty actual­ly can drop in (or out) as part of poli­ti­cal sup­port speeches.

How do you spin that arti­cle (Joint state­ment at peace sum­mit unli­kely to inclu­de with­dra­wal of Rus­si­an for­ces (NHK)) if you wri­te for the aus­tri­an Standard?

Medi­en­be­richt: Abschluss­erklä­rung des Schwei­zer Frie­dens­gip­fels wird wegen Bezie­hun­gen eini­ger Staa­ten zu Russ­land kei­nen Abzug rus­si­scher Trup­pen fordern

Die gemein­sa­me Abschluss­erklä­rung der am Schwei­zer Frie­dens­gip­fel am Wochen­en­de teil­neh­men­den Staa­ten wird nicht den Abzug der rus­si­schen Trup­pen aus der Ukrai­ne for­dern, schreibt der japa­ni­sche Fern­seh­sen­der NHK unter Beru­fung auf diplo­ma­ti­sche Quel­len. Grund dafür sei­en die Bezie­hun­gen eini­ger Staa­ten in Asi­en und im Nahen Osten zu Russ­land, schreibt NHK.

Von den zehn ukrai­ni­schen Zie­len der “Frie­dens­for­mel” sol­len dem­nach nur drei in die Abschluss­erklä­rung auf­ge­nom­men wer­den: die Sicher­heit von Kern­kraft­wer­ken, die Ernäh­rungs­si­cher­heit sowie die Frei­las­sung aller Gefan­ge­nen und die Rück­kehr der nach Russ­land ver­schlepp­ten Kin­der. Weder der Abzug der rus­si­schen Trup­pen aus dem ange­grif­fe­nen Land noch die Wie­der­her­stel­lung der ter­ri­to­ria­len Inte­gri­tät wer­den laut NHK in der Abschluss­erklä­rung ent­hal­ten sein.

In einem Inter­view mit einem kasa­chi­schen Nach­rich­ten­por­tal hat­te der ukrai­ni­sche Prä­si­dent Wolo­dym­yr Selen­skyj Ende Mai erklärt, sich beim Gip­fel in der Schweiz auf drei ver­bin­den­de Punk­te zu kon­zen­trie­ren. “Vie­le Län­der, die zwi­schen der Ukrai­ne und Russ­land balan­cie­ren, sagen, dass es kom­pli­zier­te Din­ge gibt, die ohne die Rus­sen nicht gelöst wer­den kön­nen und so wei­ter. Des­halb haben wir die Din­ge, die die Län­der tren­nen könn­ten, bei­sei­te gelas­sen”, sag­te Selen­skyj damals.

src: click

Das war eh das, was Selen­skyj seit - ehm Ende Mai - ehm erklärt hat zu wollen!”

edit: Remin­der, the ukrai­ni­an prop­ga­gan­da line chan­ged on the 1st of June, so only 10 days befo­re Der Stan­dard pos­ted that article.

Other popular arguments these days

11. Juni 2024

More peop­le have to die, so less peop­le have to die, becau­se we still can have our values/strength.”

Which is an argu­ment fit for every tra­ve­ling priest, making a living bles­sing war­ri­ors ven­tu­ring to the holy land on a cru­sa­de, or any Inka death cult.

Also very popular:

The loo­se, loo­se sce­n­a­rio is the pri­ce for winning.”

Win, win is not much bet­ter than loo­sing, and we can still win.”

Win­ning takes place when the other side is defeated.”

Our way towards win­ning is - win­ning on the battle­field, or win­ning through sanc­tions, or win­ning the moral argu­ment, so the battle­field strenght can be pro­lon­ged for lon­ger, or win­ning more wea­pons through “crui­sing arround and asking for them”, or win­ning the peace­time eco­no­my during a war - with “Wie­der­auf­bau­hil­fe” that alrea­dy has to flow, or… -- win­ning is this com­plex puz­zle, whe­re we - more, of some­thing than the oppo­nent. Thats war in the 21st century.”

We alrea­dy have won.”

As long as we stick to our plan, we alrea­dy have won.”

As long as we stick to our uni­fied com­mon pro­mi­ses, we have a much bet­ter chan­ce of winning.”

Look, at us - we are so strong eco­no­mi­c­al­ly, we also will win a war.”

Loo­sing is stray­ing from the path of unity.”

Ame­ri­ca will always be with us.”

Ame­ri­ca will not always be with us, so we have to buy more from Ame­ri­ca.” (Using Ame­ri­ca ins­tead of the US for that good “old timey” feel to that argument. 😉 )

Ame­ri­ca will always be on the side of Ukrai­ne, becau­se Ame­ri­ca is on the side of values.”

Ame­ri­ca might not always be on the side of Ukrai­ne, if the other devil wins, but may­be it still will help us, if we pay more…”

Paying more is the only just thing from a values perspective.”

Our com­mon values are, what keeps us on top, when run­ning the world.”

Dis­u­ni­ty is a sin”.

Dis­u­ni­ty is not a sin, when Ame­ri­ca prac­ti­ces it - becau­se they give most. So we have to pray more for them to come back.”

Our values, dont lead to dou­ble standards.”

Tal­king is easy, so you go and rai­se more funds instead.”

My child­ren, our child­ren, your child­ren, our nati­on in Free­dom - for demo­cra­cy, for our children.”

We need to give more!”

We need to give more, faster!”

We should not argue around giving more fas­ter any­mo­re, becau­se lea­ders now should have to be able to have more stra­te­gic ambiguity.”

Giving all would be a game changer!”
(Thats actual­ly argued, btw - see:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mdP2NE-LS0o )

Making more wea­pons and fun­ne­ling them into war­zo­nes, is making peace.”

We need to acce­le­ra­te the rate of wea­pon pro­duc­tion, becau­se the enemy does so too. He is for­cing us!”

We didnt suc­ceed so far, becau­se of all that damn dis­loyal­ty, and not sti­cking to the plan fast enough.”

We stuck to the plan, but we didnt esca­la­te what we were deli­vering fast enough.”

We dont need tho­se deba­tes about what “esca­la­ting deli­ve­ries of wea­pons, sli­ce by sli­ce means” in our public - let experts deci­de, whats needed”.

(Then you end up with Gres­sel, whos arguing on the ver­ge of man­dness and depression…

Or with Kof­man who argues, you need to win in this war, or war will be much more likely for us, and we dont want war. Becau­se it would be big­ger than your war.)

We have more male heroes than fema­le heroes.” (Again liter­al­ly - Stan­dard, yesterday -

https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000223423/in-der-ukraine-gibt-es-mehr-helden-als-heldinnen )

The oppo­nent is much worse off than we are.”

The oppo­nent doesnt look like he can do this for much lon­ger - may­be only 3-4 years - which means, we are winning.”

The Ukrai­ne is the best coun­try in the world at paying wages to government workers -- again, literally -

06.10 Uhr: Welt­bank lobt vor Auf­bau­kon­fe­renz Wider­stands­fä­hig­keit der Ukraine

Die Welt­bank hat vor der Ukraine-Wiederaufbaukonferenz in Ber­lin die Wider­stands­fä­hig­keit des von Russ­land ange­grif­fe­nen Lan­des geprie­sen und Kiew dazu auf­ge­for­dert, wei­ter an sei­nem Reform­kurs fest­zu­hal­ten. “Der Ukrai­ne ist es gelun­gen, mit viel Unter­stüt­zung der inter­na­tio­na­len Gemein­schaft ihre Kern­dienst­leis­tun­gen auf­recht­zu­er­hal­ten”, sag­te Anna Bje­r­de, Spit­zen­ma­na­ge­rin bei der Welt­bank, in Washing­ton. Die Ukrai­ne habe eine “unglaub­li­che Erfolgs­bi­lanz” bei der pünkt­li­chen Aus­zah­lung von Ren­ten und Sozi­al­trans­fers. Beam­te könn­ten jeden Tag zur Arbeit kom­men und wür­den auch bezahlt. 

src: click

Win­ning is resi­li­en­ce.” (“Unglaub­li­che Erfolgs­bi­lanz” bei der pünkt­li­chen Aus­zah­lung von Ren­ten und Sozialtransfers.)

Win­ning is suffering.”

The one who can suf­fer more will win in the end.”

We cant talk to the enemy, they dont want to talk, thats why we dont invi­te them to talks.” (again - literally.)

All the enemy ever does is lie.”

All the enemy ever unders­tood was being bro­ken through a con­ti­nua­tion of vio­lence. (Abyss ich hör dir trapsen).”

We can win this war.”

They can still win this war.”

We’­ve alrea­dy won this war.”

Tal­king about all of THIS is aiding the enemy.”

Tal­king about any of this is UNDERSTANDING the enemy.”

Under­stan­ding the enemy is a sin.”

The enemy are orks or nazis.” (Again, literally --

Tho­se are the peop­le we give our “high lite­ra­tu­re pri­ces” to: 

https://harlekin.me/allgemein/wie-kann-man-die-gesellschaft-noch-verarschen/ )

Deplatt­forming works. Shit - look at the elec­tion results!”

The cen­ter still holds!”

Wea­pon pro­duc­tion in Ukrai­ne is key to victory.”

Wea­pon pro­duc­tion in euro­pe needs to be step­ped up, the­re is no way around that.”

The Ukrai­ni­an is the best sol­dier on the planet.”

Ukrai­ni­ans who have fled, need to be made to return to Ukrai­ne to fight (des­pi­te this vio­la­ting a human right, again literally…).”

Don’t con­cern yourself with tho­se matters.”

Don’t con­cern yourself with app­lied propaganda.”

You need a holiday -”

The enemy cant esca­la­te anymore.”

We are now win­ning, becau­se now we are the ones that are escalating.”

The enemy has esca­la­ti­on domi­nan­ce. Which means they are the ones also being able to end this at any point”.

The enemy can stop this at all times, by just giving up and going home. - Again, liter­al­ly - thats a deba­ters favou­rite in poli­ti­cal deba­tes the­se days:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FvcGrCjoOhE )

The enemy wont use nuclear wea­pons, becau­se the world poli­ce would retaliate.”

The enemy wont use nuclear wea­pons, becau­se chi­na doesnt want them to.” (Becau­se then Japan and South Korea would want nuclear wea­pons as well.)

If we dont win, South Korea would want nuclear wea­pons as well, becau­se it under­stands, that nuclear wea­pons are the only defen­se against an enemy with nuclear weapons.”

I we dont win, other coun­tries will use nuclear wea­pons as a shield to per­form con­ven­tio­nal wars for land grabs.”

Chi­na is an enemy - becau­se its not part of our sanc­tions union.”

Deli­vering dual use goods is enab­ling the enemy.”

Dont buy from your enemy.”

Dont tra­de with the enemy.”

(The US just needs to buy a litt­le more ura­ni­um, hold on!)

Dont tra­de with the ones aiding the enemy.”

We need more tra­de with India. (So it tra­des less with our enemies, but also look how many they are! And young folks even!)”

This is a fight bet­ween demo­cra­ci­es and autocracies.”

You cant talk to autocrats.”

The­re are talks with the enemy - look at all tho­se pri­so­ner exchanges.”

The peace con­fe­rence is not a peace con­fe­rence, but might lead to a peace conference.”

Switz­er­land wants to hand over the peace con­fe­rence, but doesnt get any reply from Sau­di Ara­bia in that regard.” (Again - liter­al­ly - yesterday”:

https://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/vom-buergenstock-nach-riad-die-schweiz-will-den-friedensprozess-wohl-an-die-saudi-weitergeben-ld.1834341

Switz­er­land is not neu­tral any­mo­re, becau­se it is part of the EU sanc­tions regime.” (Wait, a minu­te - that one is actual­ly not a logi­cal fallacy…)

We need to win, so the right of the stron­gest doesnt get estab­lis­hed against our societies.”

This is the task of the peace uni­on, that the Euro­pean Uni­on has always been.” (The EU up to this war was liter­al­ly not allo­wed to pay for or dis­tri­bu­te wea­pon­ry in any way. The peace faci­li­ty was a fund that was lar­ge­ly “unde­fi­ned” in terms of pur­po­se, so it was the easiest vehi­cle to use to get around that.)

This is the worst stretch of time for Ukrai­ne - it only will get bet­ter from now on.”

Befo­re it gets bet­ter it will get worse though.”

This is the time, whe­re the Ukrai­ne needs to fight to be able to set up a new struc­tu­red army, to fight bet­ter in the future.”

This is the time, whe­re we eva­lua­te, if the Ukrai­ne is capa­ble of doing this.”

The Ukrai­ne has to deci­de what it does on its own.”

The Ukrai­ne can only use HIMARs in Rus­sia when defen­ding bor­der regi­ons, tar­ge­ting advan­cing for­ces. The Urkai­ne can not use US ATA­CAMs for tar­gets in Rus­sia. The Ukrai­ne can use French and Bri­tish Scalp to attack tar­gets in russia.”

This is not a pro­xy war.”

What do you do for the war effort.”

If you dont like it, go back to russia.”

The Ukrai­ne is figh­t­ing for our demo­cra­cy and freedom.”

The Ukrai­ne is the last back­stop of demo­cra­cy and free­dom in the world.”

Loo­sing would mean loo­sing demo­cra­cy and free­dom, and our rule of law.”

Loo­sing would mean, no one would respect us any­mo­re (thats the tra­de uni­on that is the EU, that this is said about, btw).”

Just a litt­le bit longer.”

And now the good news:

Pro­pa­gan­da hat im deutsch­spra­chi­gen Medi­en­raum immer noch nie­mand entdeckt.

edit: And of cour­se the main logi­cal fall­a­cy the­se days --

Rus­sia will be able to rearm its­elf fas­ter than the west, in a peri­od that might lead into ano­t­her war.”

which seems to be a stand in for “not many more Ukrai­ni­ans left in “inter­war” Ukrai­ne then (migra­ti­on)”, becau­se pri­va­te inves­tors need 10 years for their ROI, and might see the risk pre­do­mi­nant­ly, and not build Ukrai­ne back up again - if the next war alrea­dy loo­ms on the horizon.

Becau­se - how on earth does this hold true other­wi­se? Ukrai­ne will always need less man­power for the same capa­bi­li­ty than rus­sia - so if rus­sia pro­du­ces three times the amount of wea­pon­ry we are still at pari­ty - wasnt that the wes­tern logic all along?

So in a war whe­re defen­se has pro­ven so much more via­ble than offen­se, why are we worried about a sce­n­a­rio, whe­re rus­sia might pro­du­ce more to pivot into war again, thats may­be on the horizon.

Its not becau­se we need more time to get our defen­se pro­duc­tion going, it seems. (No one is struggling to build that up currently.)

So the main rea­son to worry about that is that rus­sia might beco­me bet­ter at war­fa­re against the west over time?

No… This is oppor­tu­ni­ty dri­ven. “We could still get a vic­to­ry out of this!” Not “vic­to­ry is the only way to sur­vi­ve (and prosper, …)”.

But giving rus­sia more breat­hing room, might reset their posi­ti­on, which is a rela­ti­ve loss in our eyes to the “keep them under attri­ti­on” sce­n­a­rio. But that deri­ves from still loo­king at a pos­si­ble vic­to­ry perspective.

If we dont do that, all thats rai­sed from our per­spec­ti­ve is “risk of losing the next time around”, but not becau­se of struc­tu­ral deve­lo­p­ments that would fol­low and be ine­vi­ta­ble, but becau­se we dont know if we can drum up the Ukrai­ni­ans into a “defen­se for­ce of the west” posi­ti­on any­mo­re - and if that fails, cos­ts (stem­ming from risk) incre­a­se manyfold.

Right?

Ok, thats not good.

10. Juni 2024

Gus­tav Gres­sel by now is arguing like a Cas­san­dra with a death wish.

His arguing remains strin­gent, whe­re smal­ler defi­ned sec­to­ral aspects are con­ce­rend, but it ven­tures into tal­king the same way about sce­n­a­ri­os that might unfold in the future. (He doesnt always do that, but he does in the Chi­na will attack Tai­wan sce­n­a­rio, which he is almost cer­tain will be in our future - if Ukrai­ne doesnt win (or if it wins - it almost doesnt seem to mat­ter)). Thats not the main issue though - many peop­le do - but Gres­sel in his argu­ments sug­gests a cer­tain­ty thats not actual­ly the­re when he jumps the big­ger logic gaps. Whats more worry­ing is, that his arguing seems to resort from a “pre­ven­ti­on of geno­ci­de” stance - thats emotionally/depression dri­ven -- and then natu­ral­ly gra­vi­ta­te to a “I’ll argue up ever­ything thats nee­ded for a sce­n­a­rio whe­re the Ukrai­ne at least has a chan­ce to win - as the only real solution”.

So this seems to be how his argu­ment is structured.

The­re are other “fixed points” in his arguing, that are him copy­ing US for­eign poli­ti­cal stances/worries in regards to Chi­na - and just becau­se of a belie­ve in tho­se - rai­ses a sub­jec­ti­ve risk level -- which then rules out sce­n­a­ri­os like a fro­zen con­flict for him, becau­se it would beco­me more ris­ky over time, with the US pivo­ting to the Indopacific.

And from that he goes strai­ght into “emo­tio­nal­ly felt” arguing of “pre­ven­ting geno­ci­de” again, whe­re “Ukrai­ne would not gain much by a draw - becau­se of all the atro­ci­ties hap­pe­ning in the occu­p­ied territories.

So he does this stran­ge loop, whe­re US for­eign poli­cy worries beco­me truth, and this rai­ses the built in risk for a nego­tia­ted solu­ti­on sub­stan­ti­al­ly over time - for both a “both sides dont win sce­n­a­rio”, and a rus­sia wins sce­n­a­rio - and that still would mean the occu­p­ied ter­ri­to­ries arent “freed”, so if we’d do ever­ything to pro­long the war - the Ukrai­ne at least still has a figh­t­ing chance…

And then, when arguing for the figh­t­ing chan­ce - he has almost no argu­ments rea­dy - so its “it might work, becau­se it can work” not­hing based on num­bers, effec­ti­ve man­power strength, pro­duc­tion rates -- thats all stuff he fluffs on (or wis­hes to know by the end of this year), so in essence - he doesnt want to think or ague about (qui­te yet) - but its his main argument…

- a simi­lar thing is hap­pe­ning here:

Whe­re Micha­el Kof­man ser­ves about the same role.

The out is dif­fe­rent, but the func­tion wit­hin the dis­cus­sion is the same.

So every time, when someo­ne ven­tures into a more for­ward inter­pre­ta­ti­on of a con­flict reso­lu­ti­on thats not “fight until ukrai­ne wins” -- Kof­man pulls out the -- but if Rus­sia wins, or isnt punis­hed for going against the rule of law here, Chi­na will go to war too card, and we cant let that happen.

Both are based on presump­ti­ons of the future, which are not strai­ght for­ward, or easi­ly deter­mi­na­ti­ve. They are essen­ti­al­ly fears that get chan­n­eled - becau­se of US poli­cy worries. (The rami­fi­ca­ti­ons do not only affect the US they affect us in euro­pe as well - but the nar­ra­ti­ve ori­gi­na­ted in the US).

The argu­ments made by both to “bridge” that gap into the “likely future sce­n­a­rio” are not strai­ght for­ward logic any­mo­re - they are “belie­ves” - in both cases. From which then cer­tain pro­ba­bi­li­ty assess­ments are drawn.

In the end Gres­sel seems to argue most­ly toward “we need to pre­vent fur­ther geno­ci­de - any way we can” - and risk miti­ga­ti­on means, sup­port Ukrai­ne so it can win - becau­se more long term sce­n­a­ri­os car­ry too much risk, when it comes to estab­li­shing peace trough some sort of deter­rent for 10 years or lon­ger -- which Gres­sel then com­bi­nes with, “we have to con­ti­nue any­ways - becau­se geno­ci­de that will fol­low in other sce­n­a­ri­os (aka - when not all of Ukrai­ne is freed)”.

And Kof­man in the end argues from a “secu­ri­ty gua­ran­tees are hard to give” “becau­se we might need fur­ther assets in the indo paci­fic in the future” stance, arguing that war needs to be pro­lon­ged, to redu­ce the risk of chi­na attacking Tai­wan - which is qui­te the logic jump. And very much detached from the pro­blem at hand.

So - if both of tho­se argu­ments are pret­ty “loo­py” and more or less self ful­fil­ling gam­bits for kee­ping the war run­ning for lon­ger, regard­less of anything that actual­ly happens…

I very much think, that we need peop­le who work on dif­fe­rent sce­n­a­ri­os, right about now…

Kind of - this approach:

15.20 Uhr: Frie­dens­for­scher - Ukrai­ne braucht ver­läss­li­che Sicherheitsgarantien
Frie­dens­for­scher raten zu ver­läss­li­chen Sicher­heits­ga­ran­tien des Wes­tens für die von Russ­land über­fal­le­ne Ukrai­ne. Dies sei Vor­aus­set­zung dafür, dass das Land mit­tel­fris­tig Frie­dens­ver­hand­lun­gen mit Russ­land auf­neh­men kön­ne, heißt es in ihrem heu­te in Ber­lin ver­öf­fent­lich­ten Frie­dens­gut­ach­ten 2024. Die Wis­sen­schaft­ler emp­feh­len, mili­tä­ri­sche Logik und diplo­ma­ti­sche Ansät­ze klug mit­ein­an­der zu ver­zah­nen, den Druck auf Russ­land etwa in Form von Sank­tio­nen auf­recht­zu­er­hal­ten und die Ukrai­ne wei­ter­hin mili­tä­risch zu unter­stüt­zen. Sie teil­ten dazu mit: “Schon jetzt soll­ten Form und Inhalt von Frie­dens­ver­hand­lun­gen vor­be­rei­tet und etwai­ge Dritt­par­tei­en aus­ge­lo­tet werden.”

src: click

Alt­hough without pre­de­fi­ned out­co­mes. Just talk about tho­se things, let peop­le come in con­ta­ct with tho­se sets of argu­ments again… (Secu­ri­ty gua­ran­ties have an impor­t­ance thats hig­her than that - I know.) 

Sad­ly - Switz­er­land doesnt seem to be the plat­form to initia­te that - 

https://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/vom-buergenstock-nach-riad-die-schweiz-will-den-friedensprozess-wohl-an-die-saudi-weitergeben-ld.1834341

But - some­thing has to chan­ge here…

The qua­li­ty of the arguing for why we NEED a pro­longued war - is pret­ty bad right now - just loo­king at the inter­nal logic of the arguing.

Gres­sel seems to be emo­tio­nal­ly dri­ven to “save ukrai­ni­an peop­le” and do ever­ything to redu­ce “the pro­ba­bi­li­ty of a cata­stro­phic secu­ri­ty fail­u­re ten years down the road, once chi­na attacks tai­wan, and or rus­sia attacks again” -- but the arguing on how Ukrai­ne might do this - and what a “Ukrai­ne wins” sce­n­a­rio loo­ks like (will rus­sia rearm again, will it split, will it descend into cha­os, what time frame would be nee­ded, …) is basi­cal­ly not the­re. So the dri­ve seems emo­tio­nal, ver­ging on not rational.

And Kof­man is just anke­ring the “if rus­sia gets away with this (which can mean neit­her side wins, or rus­sia wins sce­n­a­ri­os equal­ly)” argu­ment over and over again, the likel­y­hood of a US Chi­na war incre­a­ses - so Ukrai­ne has to fight on. And thats bad, becau­se it alrea­dy is ent­i­re­ly deco­u­pled from the con­flict at hand, and pro­jec­ting some­thing thats not easi­ly projectable.

So both at least in some sen­se are kind of insane…?

You can step out of that kind of zero sum logic - do they know that?

Gres­sel seems to real­ly real­ly belie­ve what he’s come up with (I cant judge the “risk of rus­sia wan­ting to esca­la­te mili­ta­ri­ly again - after a nego­tia­ted solu­ti­on” thats very pro­mi­nent in one part of his thin­king -- I have to admit).

Kof­man seems to be a vic­tim of “felt self impor­t­ance” as in hes heard the argu­ment a cou­p­le of times, hes repeated the argu­ment a cou­p­le of times, and now he real­ly likes it. But he has to use bra­va­do to con­vin­ce others, that this is the likely out­co­me we are ine­vi­ta­b­ly loo­king at. So could also be the case of has fal­len vic­tim to propaganda.

Jud­ging the “risk” of a “the war in ukrai­ne cant end with a nego­tia­ti­on, or a win for rus­sia, becau­se then the US is more likely to be drawn into a war in the indo paci­fic” sce­n­a­rio is more likely. Its pret­ty much insane.

It sees the world through a “mili­ta­ry opti­ons only”, and lea­ders are emo­tio­nal­ly dri­ven by vic­to­ries only lens - and then he moves half­way across the oce­an an argues, for the pro­lon­ging of a war in a dif­fe­rent hemi­s­phe­re for that rea­son. Pret­ty insane..

So - get the main experts on the topic some rest, and bring in other peop­le, may­be…? Asi­de from that Ukrai­ne seems to belie­ve, that any loss will be equal to them sei­z­ing to exist right now (- at least in the pre­si­dents mind, which doesnt mean much, but still)…

Neit­her of them seems to be out­right be put­ting out pro­pa­gan­da here - both of tho­se are stron­gly held believes.

Oh fuck…

10. Juni 2024

13.35 Uhr: Ukrai­ni­sche Luft­waf­fe will F-16-Jets im Aus­land stationieren

Die Ukrai­ne will eini­ge der F-16-Kampfflugzeuge, die sie von ihren west­li­chen Ver­bün­de­ten erhal­ten soll, auf aus­län­di­schen Stütz­punk­ten sta­tio­nie­ren. Dies kön­ne die Jets vor rus­si­schen Angrif­fen schüt­zen, sag­te Ser­hij Holub­zow vom Kom­man­do der ukrai­ni­schen Luft­streit­kräf­te. Holub­zow sag­te bei Radio Free Europe/Radio Liber­ty, die F-16-Jets auf aus­län­di­schen Stütz­punk­ten könn­ten ver­wen­det wer­den, um beschä­dig­te Flug­zeu­ge zu erset­zen, wäh­rend die­se repa­riert wer­den, sowie für die Aus­bil­dung ukrai­ni­scher Piloten.

Russ­lands Prä­si­dent Putin hat­te mehr­fach gedroht, dass Mos­kau Angrif­fe auf Ein­rich­tun­gen in Nato-Ländern erwä­gen könn­te, wenn dort in der Ukrai­ne ein­ge­setz­te Kampf­flug­zeu­ge sta­tio­niert wären. Die­se Basen könn­ten zu einem “legi­ti­men Ziel” wer­den, sag­te er im März. Bel­gi­en, Däne­mark, die Nie­der­lan­de und Nor­we­gen haben der Ukrai­ne mehr als 60 F-16-Kampfflugzeuge zuge­sagt. Ukrai­ni­sche Pilo­ten wer­den der­zeit an den Jets geschult, bevor die Lie­fe­run­gen beginnen.

src: click

Again.