What to do, when the ground is moving

11. September 2025

Accord­ing to - you know…

I mean, what could go wrong..

Laut Kal­las haben wir z.B. “the lar­gest used reser­ve cur­ren­cy in the world”.

We have never spent enough on mili­ta­ry spen­ding, and what we have spent has not been spent inefficiently!”

We must pro­du­ce six times as much in our key capa­bi­li­ty gaps, like pre­cisi­on gui­ded mis­si­les.” (Capa­bi­li­ty gaps means, we dont have the intel­li­gence infra­st­ruc­tu­re, the mili­ta­ry com­mu­ni­ca­ti­on chan­nels, the sat­tel­li­te infra­st­ruc­tu­re, … But at the end of the road - six times the mis­si­les - whilest still facing a capa­bi­li­ty gap.)

Euro­pes secu­ri­ty con­ta­cts with coun­tries like Japan are not just like - you know tech­ni­cal agree­ments, but “an examp­le of the EUs fun­da­men­tal com­mit­ment to alli­an­ces” (in the south chi­na sea?).

Coun­tries in the world are loo­king to diver­si­fy their tra­de rela­ti­ons­hip” implied, so they look towards the EU. Issue - no more growth eco­no­mies any­whe­re in in the majo­ri­ty of wes­tern eco­no­mies. So why would India, Mexi­co, South Asia and Afri­ca look at the EU as a bene­fit? Right becau­se of higer trans­port cos­ts and more strict regu­la­ti­on regimes. The EU can be the best second source for so many - ehm high qua­li­ty goods they source!

Next sen­tence: “We are also buil­ding our stra­te­gi­cal auto­no­my through alli­an­ces on key raw mate­ri­als too!” Stra­te­gic auto­no­my through buil­ding alli­an­ces. To get access to key raw mate­ri­als. Love it!

Next sen­tence: “And Euro­pe always comes with a posi­ti­ve offer, we do not want to deple­te the resources!”

No - we just need 10x World pro­duc­tion on all key mate­ri­als for elec­tri­fi­ca­ti­on to make our green eco­no­my dreams come true, but asi­de from that.. we always lea­ve a bit extra!

Yes its get­ting har­der to come to an agree­ment on Ukrai­ni­an war finan­cing” - “But sin­ce the war, we have always moved clo­ser together!”.

Yes in Gaza, we are not united, but this is an obvious test of our euro­pean values!” (So we dont have to be. Becau­se its a test.)

Euro­pe has been the most acti­ve actor in the world on the Gaza issue”. (Sure.….……)

On the aid and the poli­ti­cal lea­verage fronts.” (Suuuu­re.….….…..)

The­re­fo­re, I Kal­las have ope­ned diplo­ma­tic chan­nels with isra­el, so we can talk.” (Suuuuuuuuuuuurrrrreee.…. [Never have any exis­ted before.])

Euro­pe couldnt chan­ge Isra­els tra­jec­to­ry in Gaza, becau­se Euro­pe doesnt have unity” (SSSSUUUUUURRREE.…)

In for­eign poli­cy (in gene­ral) we need to deve­lop both tools. Car­rots and sticks. Sim­ply put, if a coun­try con­si­ders sup­por­ting war in Euro­pe, we depri­ve them of fun­ding.”. [No nega­ti­ve feed­back­loo­ps any­whe­re, Tra­de, Ener­gy, key rare earth minerals, …]

If you act tog­e­ther with us in the glo­bal sphe­re, we have initia­ti­ves they can bene­fit from.” (Not one men­tio­ned by name. Is it G20? G6+ surely, …)

Dear friends. A new glo­bal order is in the making, but how we respond to this is ent­i­re­ly up to us. We have what it takes - that has never been in doubt - if we are united. Now we must grow out geo­po­li­ti­cal power and work on how we can be united, or chan­ge rules so we can adopt decisi­ons. Other­wi­se we are just not taken seriously.”

Serious­ly?

Now on to the interview:

First ques­ti­on in the inter­view on Ukrai­ne. How do we tack­le this issue?

Kal­las: “Well, coali­ti­ons of the wil­ling are not so bad, look - the Euro­zo­ne was a coali­ti­on of the wil­ling, Schen­gen was a coali­ti­on of the wil­ling, so others can join too…”

Which mea­su­res:

All of the abo­ve and we need to be very creative.”

Wars end, becau­se one side runs out of money, so we have to also look at crypto.”

No we havent put any sum onto this” (asked how much of the 2 tril­li­on allo­ca­ted defen­se spen­ding should be spent in Europe.)

But loo­king at the amount of money that comes to the mar­ket, ther is oppor­tu­ni­ty to use it for both, becau­se the cake is actual­ly big­ger! So it is also - I would take down the fears that some of our part­ners have, that this is pro­tec­tio­n­ism, and you are exclu­ding us.”

Ok, Chi­na issue - how do we tack­le it?

Chi­na pro­du­ces 50% of the worlds Che­mi­cals come from Chi­na. 90% of Solar panels. Cri­ti­cal raw mate­ri­als. If you look at the num­bers, in order to address that we need to work tog­e­ther with--

United Sta­tes, India, UK, Cana­da, Japan, Korea, Aus­tra­lia, New Zea­land, Mexi­co -- if you add the num­bers, tog­e­ther we are strong enough to address the chi­ne­se worry.”

(Lach­an­fall rausgeschnitten.)

I have even asked Ame­ri­cans, if you are worried about that, you need all of us too, and we are also worried about that.”

This is the batt­le of nar­ra­ti­ves for the glo­bal south and all of the rest of the world real­ly. I was in Ase­an mee­ting, and one thing that was inte­res­ting, that rus­sia was adress­sing chi­na, that you and us, rus­sia an chi­na, we fought the second world war - we won against the Nazis - and I was like “OK THAT IS SOMETHING NEW” but then I was like, yes - first you can, if you know histo­ry, it rai­ses a lot of ques­ti­on­marks in your head - but I can tell you - nowa­days I can tell you peop­le no lon­ger read, and remem­ber histo­ry that much. And you can see that they buy the­se narratives!”

Gut - den Rest las­sen wir ein­fach von einer AI aus­fül­len - ich hab kei­ne Lust mehr..

Key Cri­ti­cisms of Kaja Kallas’s Key­note Speech at the EUISS 2025 Annu­al Conference

1. His­to­ri­cal Igno­ran­ce or Mis­re­pre­sen­ta­ti­on of World War II Allies

Cri­ti­cism: Kal­las was accu­sed of down­play­ing or omit­ting the Soviet Uni­on (Rus­sia) and China’s roles as key Allied vic­tors in WWII, framing them ins­tead as oppor­tu­nistic or secon­da­ry play­ers. This was seen as a deli­be­ra­te dis­tor­ti­on to fit an anti-Russia/China nar­ra­ti­ve, under­mi­ning her credi­bi­li­ty on his­to­ri­cal mat­ters cen­tral to Euro­pean secu­ri­ty discussions.
Sub­stan­tia­ti­on: In the speech and rela­ted inter­views, Kal­las repor­ted­ly admit­ted unawa­reness of Rus­sia and China’s “win­ning side” con­tri­bu­ti­ons, lea­ding to claims of “remar­kab­le his­to­ri­cal igno­ran­ce” or “deli­be­ra­te dis­ho­nes­ty.” Cri­tics argued this ero­des trust in EU lea­ders­hip, espe­cial­ly when invo­king WWII-era les­sons for cur­rent thre­ats. Such framing risks alie­na­ting part­ners and echo­ing bia­sed Wes­tern nar­ra­ti­ves without nuance.

2. Ste­reo­ty­pi­cal and Cari­ca­tu­red Por­tra­yals of Rus­sia and China

Cri­ti­cism: Kal­las descri­bed Rus­si­ans as “super good in social sci­en­ces but bad at tech­no­lo­gy” and Chi­ne­se as “very good at tech­no­lo­gy but not that good in social sci­en­ces.” This was cri­ti­ci­zed as reduc­ti­ve, Trump-like ste­reo­typ­ing that lacks ana­ly­ti­cal depth, bor­ders on racism, and wea­kens the speech’s geo­po­li­ti­cal arguments.
Sub­stan­tia­ti­on: Com­men­ta­tors cal­led it a “bizar­re cari­ca­tu­re” and “blan­ket gene­ra­liz­a­ti­on” with “no merits whatsoever,” noting it tur­ned a serious dis­cus­sion on dis­in­for­ma­ti­on into an “inco­he­rent stream of con­scious­ness” full of half-sentences and vague dis­mis­sals. This approach was seen as self-sabotaging for EU diplo­ma­cy, prio­ri­ti­zing rhe­to­ric over evidence-based analysis.

3. Inco­he­rence and Lack of Sub­stan­ti­ve Depth

Cri­ti­cism: The speech was faul­ted for vagueness, con­tra­dic­tions (e.g., framing thre­ats in broad terms without clear solu­ti­ons), and fai­ling to deli­ver action­ab­le points. Cri­tics ques­tio­ned how it pas­sed as “respec­ta­ble” given its “slop” qua­li­ty, espe­cial­ly in a high-stakes forum.
Sub­stan­tia­ti­on: Reviews high­ligh­ted “many con­tra­dic­tions” in the 2025 secu­ri­ty sec­tion, with no clear argu­ments or coun­ter­ar­gu­ments. This made it hard to extract “five cohe­rent bul­let points,” bla­ming not public atten­ti­on spans but the con­tent its­elf for being unen­ga­ging and superficial.

4. Per­cei­ved Incom­pe­tence and Unsui­ta­bi­li­ty for the Role

Cri­ti­cism: Broa­der attacks labe­led Kal­las “over­whel­med and unsui­ta­ble,” a “light-weight” cho­sen for com­pli­an­ce rather than exper­ti­se, and emble­ma­tic of “DEI-driven appoint­ments” that prio­ri­ti­ze diver­si­ty over merit. Her hand­ling of Ukrai­ne fati­gue (con­tras­ting her 2023 opti­mism with 2025 admis­si­ons) was cited as evi­dence of flip-flopping.
Sub­stan­tia­ti­on: Reac­tions inclu­ded calls for resi­gna­ti­on, noting her dis­re­gard for histo­ry (e.g., “bal­ka­niz­a­ti­on” remarks) makes her a “ter­ri­ble stra­te­gist for defen­se.” This ties into ongo­ing cri­ti­ques of her aggres­si­ve anti-Russia stance chal­len­ging EU unity.

src: click

Moment, der Rau­scher vom Stan­dard hat dazu auch eine Meinung:

Bildschirmfoto 2025 09 11 um 13 57 06
src: click

Kri­tik ist aber immer dann nicht ange­bracht, wenn die Fora tat­säch­lich bedeu­tend wer­den. Dann heißts immer “Schul­ter an Schul­ter ste­hen” und Posi­ti­on gleich­schal­ten, bei den klei­ne­ren The­men wie Wirt­schaft und Sozia­les fal­len wir dann eh wie­der auseinander…

Komisch, dass das bei dem vor­han­de­nen Per­so­nal nicht bes­ser wird…









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