fill in an audience on historical interpretations, failing to ever mention that a public speech has PR character, and usually isnt written by the public official that is giving the speech.
Also of note - the first speaker illustrates three potential motives for “Putins actions” two of which are deemed “oversimplistic, but not necessarily wrong” and only one of which allows for a US stance of “Biden could have done nothing to prevent this”, namely - the “Crazy Putin” narrative. Skipping over that one, the result of all three of them (even the backed into a corner one), would be - that there is no possible way out of the current situation spiraling upwards in intensity (“Putin can not back down.”). For some reason my mind always starts questioning - if there also hadnt been a possibility of deescalating two of the named potential motivations of Russia in the recent past. So just move your vantage point for that assessment one month into the past.
Cant help it.
The more I watch panels with historians, the more my opinion of the trade just slowly disintegrates - to me it has become more and more an occupation, citing literature, preferably old, without the slightest concept of who writes speeches, why they are held, what desired effects a public statement was crafted for - in one specific case in here, its watching someone making an argument ending up at Noahs arch in the end, putting in an “I know, crazy - right” laugh to indicate that they dont believe that, but then cite the rest of the text that was crafted to end up at that point (“we the chosen people”) verbatim, and in a matter of fact way, because - look, its still old and esteemed.
Still worth a watch though.
edit: Oh, and Putins “insane, feverish” [referring to the one hour long speech] “notion of Ukraine as a historical part of russia”, wasnt invented by Putin himself, but has “very deep historical roots”, “Putin reverted to the old language [linguistically]”. “After 1991 the ukranian government insisted, that Ukraine be referred to as the Ukraine, that is in ukranian - a historical distinct entity, Putin reverted to the old language, novukrania [sic?] that is to say, the land on the periphery”. Then “followed by a comparison to the german fashist image of an “emasculated germany”, that was connected to an image of “restoring former greatness””. With this, “Putin shed his public role as the calculating strategist, and instead stepped into the role, and took up the mantle of being once more, the glorious savior of russia, the mythical warrior figure of the bogatyr, the gatherer of slavic people under the great russian banner. There was no word in his speech about Nato, or western aggression, only one brief mention in the end about supporting Donezk and Lugansk. Next morning of course, after the speech on Tuesday the 24th it became clear what was behind the speech, not a military operation to protect these russian speaking lands, but a full scale invasion, to recover the lost russian hinterlands.”
But then to hold them in a semi permanent destabilized state, not to get drawn “into another Afghanistan”, because for a permanent occupation (and stabilization) he lacks the numbers. Allegedly. Which is where changing public opinion in russia comes in. (If seen as a long term strategy, and not just aiding peace talks.)
