Energiekrise PK

09. März 2022

Die Argu­men­ta­ti­ons­füh­rung um die Ecke ist immer noch sehr angesagt.

Ja - Braun­koh­le, aber dafür schnel­ler Auf­bau von Erneuerbaren.
Schnel­ler - da jetzt auch ein Sicher­heit­s­ar­gu­ment das auch die Leu­te ver­ste­hen. (“Wind = Frei­heit” und “Wind­rä­der = Sicher­heit” wer­den als PR Kon­zep­te genannt, Oppor­tu­ni­täts­kos­ten sind jetzt hof­fent­lich niedriger)
Ja, LNG Ter­mi­nals - in spä­tes­tens zwei Jah­ren und neu­es Buz­z­word, floa­ting Ter­mi­nals, das sogar noch schneller.
Kei­nes der Bun­des­län­der habe jetzt noch regio­na­le Prä­fe­ren­zen ange­merkt, der Wil­le kon­struk­tiv zu arbei­ten sei spür­bar. Erneut, nied­ri­ge­re Opportunitätskosten.

Was hier aus­ge­spart bleibt sind deut­lich höhe­re Ener­gie­kos­ten für den Aus­bau erneu­er­ba­rer Infra­struk­tur (Umwand­lungs­ver­lus­te, …), höhe­re Import­kos­ten von Schlüssel-Rohstoffen (z.B. in der Stahl­er­zeu­gung), weni­ger Ange­bot am Welt­markt, teu­re­re Trans­port­we­ge, … Mit Braun­koh­le will man nur im Fal­le einer Energie-Exportreduktion Russ­lands die Ver­sor­gungs­si­cher­heit sicherstellen.
Export­in­fra­struk­tur die erst durch lang­fris­tig teu­re­re Ener­gie­prei­se ren­ta­bel wird und jetzt aus­ge­baut wer­den muss, …

Gene­rell wirkt das Mind­set aktu­ell noch sehr von Ver­sor­gungs­si­cher­heit in die­sem Jahr bestimmt, mit dem Duk­tus, dass man jetzt in die Gän­ge kom­men müs­se, und dies auch geschehe.

Außer­dem gabs ein wie­der­keh­ren­des, theo­re­ti­sches Sank­ti­ons­kon­zept, das über “min­des­tens drei Jah­re trag­bar” sein muss, damit es als Sank­ti­on Wir­kung ent­fal­ten kön­ne in der Argu­men­ta­ti­ons­füh­rung Habecks, das sich auch auf etwai­ge noch kom­men­de Sank­tio­nen erstre­cken würde.

Spre­cher des ukrai­ni­schen Außen­mi­nis­te­ri­ums hat­ten zuvor öfters Sank­tio­nen auch wegen Signal­wir­kung gefor­dert, den Weg scheint die­se deut­sche Bun­des­re­gie­rung nicht einzuschlagen.

edit: Jö schau, bei Phoe­nix wirds angerissen…

IAEA kalmiert nach Stromausfall in Tschernobyl

09. März 2022

IAEA kal­miert nach Strom­aus­fall in Tschernobyl
Der Strom­aus­fall im Kern­kraft­werk Tscher­no­byl in der Ukrai­ne habe vor­erst kei­ne kri­ti­schen Aus­wir­kun­gen auf die Sicher­heit, teil­te die UN-Atomaufsicht am Mitt­woch in einer Erklä­rung mit.

Die Wär­me­last des Lager­be­ckens für abge­brann­te Brenn­ele­men­te und das Volu­men des Kühl­was­sers im Kern­kraft­werk Tscher­no­byl rei­chen aus, um die Wär­me effek­tiv abzu­füh­ren, ohne dass eine Strom­ver­sor­gung erfor­der­lich ist”, sag­te die IAEA in einer Erklä­rung. Außer­dem ste­he noch eine Strom­ver­sor­gung durch Die­sel­ag­gre­ga­te zur Verfügung.

src: click

1:1 vom Stan­dard kopiert.

Zuvor hat­te der offi­zi­el­le Twit­ter­ac­count des ukrai­ni­schen Par­la­ments noch mit meh­re­ren Mel­dun­gen die Nach­rich­ten­la­ge ange­heizt - Sie­he: click
Kule­ba hat die­se noch mit For­de­run­gen ver­knüpft.

In dem Zusam­men­hang fällt mir noch die­se Mel­dung vor fünf Tagen ein: click

Hof­fen wir dass es dabei bleibt, respek­ti­ve die Strom­ver­sor­gung schnell wie­der her­ge­stellt wer­den kann.

edit: Der Spie­gel hat einen län­ge­ren Arti­kel: click

Den­noch sei der Strom­aus­fall in Tscher­no­byl besorg­nis­er­re­gend und inak­zep­ta­bel, sag­te der Exper­te: »Von einem Tag auf den ande­ren wird dar­aus kein gro­ßes Strah­lungs­ri­si­ko ent­ste­hen, es geht aber um die nächs­ten Wochen und Mona­te. Der­zeit dürf­ten die Not­be­leuch­tung und wich­ti­ge Mess­auf­ga­ben wahr­schein­lich durch die Not­strom­ver­sor­gung abge­deckt sein, je nach­dem, wie lan­ge der Die­sel­vor­rat reicht.«

edit1: 12.03.2022 - Die Ener­gie­ver­sor­gung wur­de teil­wei­se wiederhergestellt.

What type of hero is Selenskyj?

09. März 2022

CNN ana­ly­sis

Men­ti­ons, in order of appearance:

- No Trump
- Churchill
- Chur­chill but with his own smart­pho­ne and a green T-shirt
- Vaclav Havel
- Lech Walesa
- Ronald Reagan
- The lone pro­tes­ter in Tia­nan­men Square
- Geor­ge Washington
- Davy Crockett

Chur­chill twice, becau­se Selen­skyj addres­sed the UK house of com­mons in a speech 12 hours ago - refe­ren­cing Chur­chills war­ti­me speech.

Ukrai­ni­an Pre­si­dent Volo­dym­yr Zelen­sky addres­sed the UK House of Com­mons via video on Tues­day, say­ing “we will fight to the end,” echo­ing for­mer Bri­tish Prime Minis­ter Win­s­ton Churchill’s famous war­ti­me speech.

We will not give up and we will not lose. We will fight until the end at sea, in the air. We will con­ti­nue figh­t­ing for our land, wha­te­ver the cost,” he said in his comments trans­la­ted by an interpreter.

src: click

edit: Die Pres­se fin­det gera­de, er sei ein begab­ter Holocaust-Metaphoriker, auf­rüt­telnd und tief emo­tio­nal berührend/betroffen machend, der auch Ham­let zitiert und Boris John­son dazu bewe­gen kann “Ich bin ein Ukrai­ner” zu sagen. Sel­be Rede.

Daher die plötzliche Trendwende im Kanon

09. März 2022

Abrupt auf­tre­ten­de Kom­pe­tenz konn­te es ja nicht gewe­sen sein. Ich war schon latent verwundert.

NYT
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Putin Has No Good Way Out, and That Real­ly Sca­res Me

If you’re hoping that the insta­bi­li­ty that Vla­di­mir Putin’s war on Ukrai­ne has wrea­ked on glo­bal mar­kets and geo­po­li­tics has pea­ked, your hope is in vain. We haven’t seen anything yet. Wait until Putin ful­ly grasps that his only choices left in Ukrai­ne are how to lose — ear­ly and small and a litt­le humi­lia­ted or late and big and deeply humiliated.

I can’t even wrap my mind around what kind of finan­cial and poli­ti­cal shocks will radia­te from Rus­sia — this coun­try that is the world’s third-largest oil pro­du­cer and pos­ses­ses some 6,000 nuclear war­heads — when it loses a war of choice that was spear­hea­ded by one man, who can never afford to admit defeat.

Why not? Becau­se Putin surely knows that “the Rus­si­an natio­nal tra­di­ti­on is unf­or­gi­ving of mili­ta­ry set­backs,” obser­ved Leon Aron, a Rus­sia expert at the Ame­ri­can Enter­pri­se Insti­tu­te, who is wri­ting a book about Putin’s road to Ukraine.

Vir­tual­ly every major defeat has resul­ted in radi­cal chan­ge,” added Aron, wri­ting in The Washing­ton Post. “The Cri­me­an War (1853-1856) pre­ci­pi­ta­ted Emperor Alex­an­der II’s libe­ral revo­lu­ti­on from abo­ve. The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) brought about the First Rus­si­an Revo­lu­ti­on. The cata­stro­phe of World War I resul­ted in Emperor Nicho­las II’s abdi­ca­ti­on and the Bols­he­vik Revo­lu­ti­on. And the war in Afgha­ni­stan beca­me a key fac­tor in Soviet lea­der Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms.” Also, retrea­ting from Cuba con­tri­bu­t­ed signi­fi­cant­ly to Niki­ta Khrushchev’s remo­val two years later.

In the com­ing weeks it will beco­me more and more obvious that our big­gest pro­blem with Putin in Ukrai­ne is that he will refu­se to lose ear­ly and small, and the only other out­co­me is that he will lose big and late. But becau­se this is sole­ly his war and he can­not admit defeat, he could keep doub­ling down in Ukrai­ne until … until he con­tem­pla­tes using a nuclear weapon.

Why do I say that defeat in Ukrai­ne is Putin’s only opti­on, that only the timing and size is in ques­ti­on? Becau­se the easy, low-cost inva­si­on he envi­sio­ned and the wel­co­me par­ty from Ukrai­ni­ans he ima­gi­ned were total fan­ta­sies — and ever­ything flows from that.

Putin com­ple­te­ly unde­re­sti­ma­ted Ukraine’s will to be inde­pen­dent and beco­me part of the West. He com­ple­te­ly unde­re­sti­ma­ted the will of many Ukrai­ni­ans to fight, even if it meant dying, for tho­se two goals. He com­ple­te­ly over­esti­ma­ted his own armed for­ces. He com­ple­te­ly unde­re­sti­ma­ted Pre­si­dent Biden’s abi­li­ty to gal­va­ni­ze a glo­bal eco­no­mic and mili­ta­ry coali­ti­on to enab­le Ukrai­ni­ans to stand and fight and to devas­ta­te Rus­sia at home — the most effec­ti­ve U.S. coalition-building effort sin­ce Geor­ge H.W. Bush made Sad­dam Hus­sein pay for his fol­ly of sei­z­ing Kuwait. And he com­ple­te­ly unde­re­sti­ma­ted the abi­li­ty of com­pa­nies and indi­vi­du­als all over the world to par­ti­ci­pa­te in, and ampli­fy, eco­no­mic sanc­tions on Rus­sia — far bey­ond anything governments initia­ted or mandated.

When you get that many things wrong as a lea­der, your best opti­on is to lose ear­ly and small. In Putin’s case that would mean with­drawing his for­ces from Ukrai­ne immedia­te­ly; offe­ring a face-saving lie to jus­ti­fy his “spe­cial mili­ta­ry ope­ra­ti­on,” like clai­ming it suc­cess­ful­ly pro­tec­ted Rus­si­ans living in Ukrai­ne; and pro­mi­sing to help Rus­si­ans’ brethren rebuild. But the ine­s­ca­pa­ble humi­lia­ti­on would surely be into­le­ra­ble for this man obses­sed with res­to­ring the digni­ty and unity of what he sees as the Rus­si­an motherland.

Inci­dent­al­ly, the way things are going on the ground in Ukrai­ne right now, it is not out of the realm of pos­si­bi­li­ty that Putin could actual­ly lose ear­ly and big. I would not bet on it, but with every pas­sing day that more and more Rus­si­an sol­di­ers are kil­led in Ukrai­ne, who knows what hap­pens to the figh­t­ing spi­rit of the con­scripts in the Rus­si­an Army being asked to fight a dead­ly urban war against fel­low Slavs for a cau­se that was never real­ly exp­lai­ned to them.

Given the resis­tance of Ukrai­ni­ans ever­y­whe­re to the Rus­si­an occup­a­ti­on, for Putin to “win” mili­ta­ri­ly on the ground his army will need to sub­due every major city in Ukrai­ne. That inclu­des the capi­tal, Kyiv — after pro­bab­ly weeks of urban war­fa­re and mas­si­ve civi­li­an casu­al­ties. In short, it can be done only by Putin and his gene­rals per­pe­tra­ting war cri­mes not seen in Euro­pe sin­ce Hit­ler. It will make Putin’s Rus­sia a per­ma­nent inter­na­tio­nal pariah.

Moreo­ver, how would Putin main­tain con­trol of ano­t­her coun­try — Ukrai­ne — that has rough­ly one-third the popu­la­ti­on of Rus­sia, with many resi­dents hos­ti­le to Moscow? He would pro­bab­ly need to main­tain every one of the 150,000-plus sol­di­ers he has deploy­ed the­re — if not more — forever.

The­re is sim­ply no pathway that I see for Putin to win in Ukrai­ne in any sus­tainab­le way becau­se it sim­ply is not the coun­try he thought it was — a coun­try just wai­t­ing for a quick deca­pi­ta­ti­on of its “Nazi” lea­ders­hip so that it could gent­ly fall back into the bosom of Mother Russia.

So eit­her he cuts his los­ses now and eats crow — and hope­ful­ly for him escapes enough sanc­tions to revi­ve the Rus­si­an eco­no­my and hold onto power — or faces a fore­ver war against Ukrai­ne and much of the world, which will slow­ly sap Russia’s strength and col­lap­se its infrastructure.

As he seems hell­bent on the lat­ter, I am ter­ri­fied. Becau­se the­re is only one thing worse than a strong Rus­sia under Putin — and that’s a weak, humi­lia­ted, dis­or­der­ly Rus­sia that could frac­tu­re or be in a pro­lon­ged inter­nal lea­ders­hip tur­moil, with dif­fe­rent fac­tions wrest­ling for power and with all of tho­se nuclear war­heads, cybercri­mi­nals and oil and gas wells lying around.

Putin’s Rus­sia is not too big to fail. It is, howe­ver, too big to fail in a way that won’t shake the who­le rest of the world.

src: click

Noch eine Logikfolge

09. März 2022

Weil Real­po­li­tik kei­ne Rol­le mehr spie­len darf.

Und wir auf die Diens­te hören.

Zie­hen wir

The EU out­lined a plan on Tues­day to cut Rus­si­an gas imports by two-thirds wit­hin a year as it seeks to redu­ce its depen­den­cy on the country’s fuel sup­plies after Moscow’s inva­si­on of Ukraine.

[…]

The commission’s pro­po­sed saving is dou­ble that sug­gested by the Inter­na­tio­nal Ener­gy Agen­cy last week in its 10-point plan, and comes as gas pri­ces hit record levels on rising glo­bal demand and the pos­si­bi­li­ty of Rus­sia cut­ting off sup­plies. The pro­po­sal also reli­es on cur­bing ener­gy usa­ge, by lowe­ring ther­mo­stats and impro­ving house­hold insulation.

src: click

in enger Koor­di­na­ti­on mit den ver­ei­nig­ten Staaten

Demo­crats plan to move on Rus­sia bill in US House tomor­row after vote count was uncer­tain Tuesday
From CNN’s Manu Raju

The US House will now move on a bill to clamp down on Rus­sia tomor­row after House Spea­ker Nan­cy Pelo­si said ear­lier that the bill would come to the floor tonight.

The rea­son for the chan­ge: They had ori­gi­nal­ly tried to appro­ve it under “sus­pen­si­on of the rules,” which requi­res two-third sup­port to pass. But a Demo­cra­tic lea­ders­hip aide says that Repu­bli­cans would not com­mit to giving them enough votes to get the bill through under suspension.

So they now plan to move the bill under a rule tomor­row so it can pass with a simp­le majority.

Fol­lowing US Pre­si­dent Joe Biden’s announ­ce­ment today that his admi­nis­tra­ti­on is ban­ning Rus­si­an ener­gy imports, Pelo­si said in a let­ter to col­leagues that the House would vote on a bill that fol­lows simi­lar steps. The bill would ban imports of Rus­si­an ener­gy, take steps to scru­ti­ni­ze Russia’s role in the World Tra­de Orga­niz­a­ti­on, and reaut­ho­ri­ze the Magnit­s­ky Act to streng­t­hen sanc­tions on Russia.

What is the Magnit­s­ky Act? The act, signed into law in Decem­ber 2012, blocks ent­ry into the US and free­zes the assets of cer­tain Rus­si­an government offi­cials and busi­ness­men accu­sed of human rights violations.

src: click
sie­he auch: click
edit Brei­te Zustim­mung bei der fina­len Abstim­mung.

die Schrau­ben noch ein­mal an.

sie­he auch: Hin­ter­grund

Viel­leicht dre­hen 28 MIG-29 ja die Situation?

The han­do­ver of Poland’s 28 Soviet-made MiG-29s signals the Wes­tern resol­ve to do more to deter Rus­sia. But mili­ta­ri­ly it is unli­kely to be a game-changer becau­se the num­ber of air­craft isn’t that big and they are infe­ri­or to more sophisti­ca­ted Rus­si­an air­craft and could be easy prey for the Rus­si­an Air Force. 

src: click

edit: US leh­nen Kampf­jet Swap auf­grund mög­li­cher Rechts­fol­gen nun ab.

USA wei­sen Polens Kampfjet-Angebot zurück

Exper­ten sehen unge­klär­te juris­ti­sche Fra­gen und logis­ti­sche Pro­ble­me. Polen hat­te ange­bo­ten, MiG29-Jets den USA zu über­las­sen, um sie via Zwi­schen­stopp der Ukrai­ne zu liefern

src: click

(Ich bin mir auch sicher, dass der Stan­dard in dem Arti­kel Anfüh­rungs­zei­chen in einer Unter­über­schrift falsch gesetzt hat.

Selen­skyj bat “ver­zwei­felt” um Flugzeuge

Ver­zwei­felt wird hier ja wohl kein direk­tes Zitat sein.)