NZZ im Krisen-PR Modus?
Den Beweis dafür liefert Kent in seinem Rücktrittsschreiben gleich selber. Der vermeintliche sicherheitspolitische Experte behauptet allen Ernstes, dass bereits bei der Entscheidung zur Irak-Invasion von 2003 die Israeli die Fäden gezogen hätten. Es ist eine bösartige Verdrehung der Tatsachen, da Israel damals in Wirklichkeit keineswegs begeistert über den von der Regierung Bush beschlossenen Krieg gewesen war.
Kent geht noch weiter und beklagt, dass seine Ehefrau Shannon in einem «von Israel fabrizierten Krieg» umgekommen sei. Er bezieht sich auf einen tödlichen Anschlag in Nordsyrien im Jahr 2019, dem die junge Unteroffizierin zum Opfer fiel. Doch jener Kriegseinsatz war mitnichten ein finsteres israelisches Machwerk. Die Schuld trugen nicht die Juden, sondern die Terroristen des IS, die mit ihrer Schreckensherrschaft eine ausländische Intervention notwendig gemacht hatten. Dass Kent sogar den Tod seiner Frau für abstruse Theorien instrumentalisiert, wirkt infam.
Die Demokraten wussten es früher besser
Kent ist offensichtlich ein Extremist, der überall die bösen Israeli am Werk sieht.
src: click (NZZ)
Wasn hier los?
AMY GOODMAN: Today, an exclusive hour with General Wesley Clark, the retired four-star general. He was Supreme Allied Commander of NATO during the Kosovo War. He has been awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom. In 2004, he unsuccessfully ran for the Democratic presidential nomination. He recently edited a series of books about famous U.S. generals, including Dwight Eisenhower and Ulysses Grant, both of whom became president after their military careers ended.
On Tuesday, I interviewed Wesley Clark at the 92nd Street Y Cultural Center here in New York City before a live audience and asked him about his presidential ambitions.
AMY GOODMAN: What do you think of these generals who run for president?
GEN. WESLEY CLARK: I like them. It’s happened before.
AMY GOODMAN: Will it happen again?
GEN. WESLEY CLARK: It might.
AMY GOODMAN: Later in the interview, I followed up on that question.
AMY GOODMAN: Will you announce for president?
GEN. WESLEY CLARK: Well, I haven’t said I won’t.
AMY GOODMAN: What are you waiting for?
GEN. WESLEY CLARK: I’m waiting for several different preconditions, which I’m not at liberty to discuss. But I will tell you this: I think about it every single day.
AMY GOODMAN: Well, for the rest of the hour, we’ll hear General Wesley Clark in his own words on the possibility of a U.S. attack on Iran; the impeachment of President Bush; the use of cluster bombs; the bombing of Radio Television Serbia during the Kosovo War under his command; and much more. I interviewed General Clark on Tuesday at the 92nd Street Y in New York.
AMY GOODMAN: Now, let’s talk about Iran. You have a whole website devoted to stopping war.
GEN. WESLEY CLARK: Www.stopiranwar.com.
AMY GOODMAN: Do you see a replay in what happened in the lead-up to the war with Iraq — the allegations of the weapons of mass destruction, the media leaping onto the bandwagon?
GEN. WESLEY CLARK: Well, in a way. But, you know, history doesn’t repeat itself exactly twice. What I did warn about when I testified in front of Congress in 2002, I said if you want to worry about a state, it shouldn’t be Iraq, it should be Iran. But this government, our administration, wanted to worry about Iraq, not Iran.
I knew why, because I had been through the Pentagon right after 9/11. About 10 days after 9/11, I went through the Pentagon, and I saw Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz. I went downstairs just to say hello to some of the people on the Joint Staff who used to work for me, and one of the generals called me in. He said, “Sir, you’ve got to come in and talk to me a second.” I said, “Well, you’re too busy.” He said, “No, no.” He says, “We’ve made the decision we’re going to war with Iraq.” This was on or about the 20th of September. I said, “We’re going to war with Iraq? Why?” He said, “I don’t know.” He said, “I guess they don’t know what else to do.” So I said, “Well, did they find some information connecting Saddam to al-Qaeda?” He said, “No, no.” He says, “There’s nothing new that way. They just made the decision to go to war with Iraq.” He said, “I guess it’s like we don’t know what to do about terrorists, but we’ve got a good military, and we can take down governments.” And he said, “I guess if the only tool you have is a hammer, every problem has to look like a nail.”
So I came back to see him a few weeks later, and by that time we were bombing in Afghanistan. I said, “Are we still going to war with Iraq?” And he said, “Oh, it’s worse than that.” He reached over on his desk. He picked up a piece of paper. And he said, “I just got this down from upstairs” — meaning the secretary of defense’s office — “today.” And he said, “This is a memo that describes how we’re going to take out seven countries in five years, starting with Iraq, and then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and, finishing off, Iran.” I said, “Is it classified?” He said, “Yes, sir.” I said, “Well, don’t show it to me.” And I saw him a year or so ago, and I said, “You remember that?” He said, “Sir, I didn’t show you that memo! I didn’t show it to you!”
AMY GOODMAN: I’m sorry. What did you say his name was?
GEN. WESLEY CLARK: I’m not going to give you his name.
[…]
src: click (Democracy Now)
Money Quote: Amy: “[…] This is coming as the Bush administration and Saudi Arabia are pumping money for covert operations into many areas of the middle east, including Libanon, Syria and Iran, in an effort to strengthen Saudi supported Sunni Islam groups, and weaken Iranian backed Shias, some of the covert money has been given to Jihadist groups in Lebanon, with ties to al Qaida. Fighting the Shias, by funding with prince Bandar and then with US money not appreved by congress, funding the Sunnis connected to al Qaida.”
Gut, wer kann schon in eine AI “list me 20 Saudi supported Sunni Islam groups in a table” eingeben, ich meine…
Und wie die Google Gemini AI erst halluziniert, wenn du sie nach Key Attribution findings fragst!
Gut, Israel war ja auch kaum involviert, …
Israel provided support to Syrian rebels, many of them extremist Islamists, when they were fighting former Tehran-friendly President Bashar Al Assad and has also said it would like to divide the country along ethnic lines.
In Lebanon Iranian proxy Hezbollah has been neutered militarily by the Israel Defence Forces and sidelined politically as the US pushes for the organisation’s disarmament.
However, Netanyahu’s ultimate goal is regime change in Iran. He first warned in 1992, when he was a parliamentary member, that Iran was three to five years away from a nuclear bomb. Then in his 1995 book, Fighting Terrorism, Netanyahu warned that Iran was “five to seven years at most” from assembling a nuclear weapon.
In 2006, US General Wesley Clarke received a classified memo outlining a new military strategy of toppling seven countries over five years. Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Iran were again perceived as being hostile to Israel and the US.
src: click
Dabei weiss doch jeder, dass Israel ganz klar gegen den Irak Krieg war! Der die USA in der Region gebunden hat.
Verdammte halluzinierende google Gemini AI schon wieder, …
Google Gemini weiter:
Die Verbindung zu Israel ist der zentrale Punkt, an dem Kritiker und investigative Journalisten ansetzen, um den Ursprung des von Wesley Clark beschriebenen Plans zu erklären. Die Verbindung läuft über das Dokument „A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm“ (1996).
1. Die Autoren und die Adressaten
Das „Clean Break“-Memo wurde nicht für die US-Regierung geschrieben, sondern für den israelischen Premierminister Benjamin Netanjahu.
- Die Autoren: Eine Arbeitsgruppe unter der Leitung von Richard Perle (später Defense Policy Board). Mit dabei waren Douglas Feith (später Pentagon) und David Wurmser (später Berater von Dick Cheney).
- Der Zweck: Den Friedensprozess von Oslo zu beenden und stattdessen eine Politik der „Stärke“ und des Regimewechsels einzuleiten.
2. Strategische Deckungsgleichheit
Die im Memo von 1996 vorgeschlagenen Ziele spiegeln fast exakt die Länder wider, die Wesley Clark 2001 auf der Pentagon-Liste sah:
- Irak: Absetzung von Saddam Hussein als wichtigstes strategisches Ziel.
- Syrien: Isolation durch den Sturz Husseins und Druck über den Libanon.
- Libanon: Schwächung der Hisbollah durch Angriffe auf syrische Interessen.
- Iran: Langfristige Bedrohung, die nach dem Fall des Iraks angegangen werden müsse.
3. Die „Brücke“ ins Pentagon (2001–2003)
Der journalistische Vorwurf (u.a. von Seymour Hersh und Jason Vest) lautet: Die Neokonservativen brachten eine Strategie, die ursprünglich zur Sicherung Israels gedacht war, nach 9/11 als offizielle US-Militärdoktrin ein.
Vergleichstabelle
Aspekt „Clean Break“ (1996) Wesley Clarks Liste (2001/2003) Hauptziel Sicherung Israels durch Regimewechsel US-Vorherrschaft im Nahen Osten Schlüsselfiguren Perle, Feith, Wurmser Perle, Feith, Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld Erster Schritt Sturz Saddam Husseins Invasion des Irak Folgeziele Syrien, Libanon, Iran Syrien, Libanon, Libyen, Somalia, Sudan, Iran
SCHLIMM DIESE HALLUZINIERENDEN GOOGLE AIS!
Quelle / Autor Titel / Medium Kernaussage zur Israel-Verbindung Richard Perle et al. (1996) A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm (IASPS) Das Originaldokument: Entwickelt für Benjamin Netanjahu; fordert den Sturz Saddam Husseins als Priorität für Israels Sicherheit. Brian Whitaker (2002) “Playing Skittles with Monarchs” (The Guardian) Analysiert, wie die Autoren des israelischen Strategiepapiers (Perle, Feith) diese Ziele in die Bush-Regierung einbrachten. Jason Vest (2002) “The Men From JINSA and CSP” (The Nation) Dokumentiert die engen Verbindungen zwischen pro-israelischen Denkfabriken und den Architekten des Irakkriegs im Pentagon. Patrick J. Buchanan (2003) “Whose War?” (The American Conservative) Kritisiert offen, dass die Neokonservativen den US-Apparat für eine Agenda nutzen, die primär Israels regionalen Interessen dient. Akiva Eldar (2002) “Perle’s Clean Break” (Haaretz) Eine israelische Perspektive darauf, wie das 1996er-Papier zur Blaupause für die US-Außenpolitik unter George W. Bush wurde. Seymour Hersh (2007) “The Redirection” (The New Yorker) Untersucht die strategische Kooperation zwischen USA und Israel bei der Destabilisierung von Syrien und Iran. Stephen Walt & John Mearsheimer (2006) “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy” (London Review of Books) Wissenschaftliche Analyse des Einflusses pro-israelischer Akteure auf die Entscheidung zur Invasion des Irak und weiterer Länder. Ian Buruma (2003) “How to believe in War” (The New York Times) Beschreibt die ideologische Brücke zwischen israelischen Sicherheitsinteressen und der neokonservativen “Demokratisierung” des Nahen Ostens. Jim Lobe (2003) “The Globalists vs. The Nationalists” (Asia Times) Detailliert die Rolle von David Wurmser und Douglas Feith bei der Verknüpfung israelischer und amerikanischer Militärziele. Democracy Now! (2007) “Gen. Wesley Clark Weighs Presidential Bid” Das Clark-Interview, das die Liste der sieben Länder (Irak, Syrien, Libanon etc.) mit der Agenda des Verteidigungsministeriums verknüpfte.
Dann die NZZ weiter:
>Er bezieht sich auf einen tödlichen Anschlag in Nordsyrien im Jahr 2019, dem die junge Unteroffizierin zum Opfer fiel. Doch jener Kriegseinsatz war mitnichten ein finsteres israelisches Machwerk. Die Schuld trugen nicht die Juden, sondern die Terroristen des IS, die mit ihrer Schreckensherrschaft eine ausländische Intervention notwendig gemacht hatten.
IN SYRIEN?!
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c2ldj04p0q2o
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) (Organization for the Liberation of the Levant) and Hurras al-Din (Guardians of Religion) are two effective organizations in Idlib that are important not only with respect to the Syrian crisis, but also in terms of the regional and international security. The main reason for this is that both organizations are effective in the province of Idlib. One of the most critical issues to resolve the Syrian crisis is the Idlib question. The other point that makes the two organizations important is the fact that one carried the flag of al-Qaeda in the past, while the other is still carrying that flag in Syria. These organizations, which were ideological partners before and were fighting under the same roof, have entered an escalating rivalry and a hot conflict process in 2020.
The core al-Qaeda elements of HTS broke up with HTS by arguing that HTS had moved away from the al-Qaeda ideology and had taken pragmatic steps in line with the agreements signed within the framework of the Astana process, and established Hurras al-Din on 27th February 2018. HTS has regarded Hurras al-Din as a threat since its inception and has tried to dissolve this organization because Hurras al-Din has the power to pick militants from HTS. There were many armed clashes between the parties, which eventually ended in a ceasefire. Until the last and major conflict on 3rd June 2020, there had been a tense relationship between the two sides on account of small clashes and mutual arrests.
Criticism by Hurras al-Din of HTS can be gathered under the following topics:
1. HTS accepts and implements the Sochi Agreement and prevents the opposition from starting a war against the regime.
2. HTS does not attack Russian patrols but ensures the security of the patrol mission.
3. Some ISIS militants have been handed over to the International Coalition.
4. HTS is part of international efforts aimed at eliminating Hurras al-Din.Accusations by HTS against Hurras al-Din are as follows:
1. HTS declares Hurras al-Din to be a “non-believer” organization.
2. Hurras al-Din causes division within HTS and encourages HTS members to join Hurras al-Din.
3. Hurras al-Din hosts all radical militants and gives room for them.
4. Hurras al-Din provides movement area for the ISIS cells in Idlib and facilitates their actions.Relations between the parties have become more tense with each passing day because of the statements by the leading personalities of the two organizations and the mutual accusations through the media, and eventually, the first major conflict emerged in June 2020.
Causes of Conflict and Conflict Process
The Ansar al-Tawhid group announced its establishment on 3rd May 2020. Shortly thereafter, on 23rd June 2020, Hurras al-Din announced the creation of a new operation room called “Fesbutu” consisting of Ansar al-Din Front, Ansar al-Islam, al-Jihad Coordination (militants that seceded from HTS under the leadership of Abu al-Abd Ashidaa), al-Muqatileen al-Ansar Brigade (militants that seceded from HTS under the leadership of Jamal Zayneye, nicknamed as Abu Malik al-Talli) and Hurras al-Din.There were some problems going back a long way between HTS’s leader, al-Jolani, and Abu Malik al-Talli. Abu Malik al-Talli received USD 8 million in exchange for releasing the captive soldiers of the Lebanese army while he was the commander of the al-Nusra Front (former name of HTS) in Qalamoun, but the money was not delivered to the leadership of the al-Nusra Front. Moreover, Al-Talli continued fighting with the regime forces at a time when he was required to stop fighting in accordance with a decision taken in respect thereof. However, an agreement was reached later between HTS’s leader, al-Jolani, and Abu Malik al-Talli. This agreement required that al-Talli would not join Hurras al-Din or form a new organization. Hence, HTS arrested al-Talli as soon as he declared that he had joined the operation room “Fesbutu”. Two days before this, HTS had also arrested Abu Salah al-Uzbeki, one of the commanders of the Fesbutu Operation Room who was wanted by Interpol for being responsible for the bombing in Russia.
Hurras al-Din made a statement on behalf of the Fesbutu Operation Room and gave an ultimatum to HTS to release al-Uzbeki and al-Talli. Two days after HTS failed to respond to the warning, the Fesbutu Operation Room began to set up a barricade near Arab Saeed, a small village west of Idlib. In the meantime, Hurras al-Din arrested dozens of HTS members. HTS reciprocated by blocking the roads to the village of Arab Saeed with barricades.
HTS tried to give the following message to Turkey and the international community as an exit strategy in the face of Turkey’s pressure on it to abide by agreements: “HTS is the only force that can provide the security of the Turkish-Russian joint patrol, disband extremist groups and prevent their provocative actions against the regime”. HTS raided in this regard the headquarters of Hurras al-Din on 24th June 2020 and arrested dozens of their members. Hurras al-Din reached the Central Prison west of Idlib and managed to control the al-Kunsura plant, al-A’laf checkpoint and the entire village of Arab Saeed in retaliation for this action. HTS needed a few days to recover from this shock. The next day, HTS deployed its forces and strove to retake the checkpoints, and besieged the village of Arab Saeed and attacked there with mortar shells and tanks. Consequently, one of the commanders of Hurras al-Din, Abu Zaid Al-Urduni, was killed while HTS lost three militants. Clashes intensified further with the resistance of Hurras al-Din. The rivalry proceeded to a new phase with the expansion of clashes to the areas where members of the Fesbutu Operation Room were located and due to the fight over the al-Yaqubiyya checkpoint.
Madrasah students and some opposition groups started to take steps towards peace as the clashes were continuing, and owing to these initiatives, the Fesbutu Operation Room declared that the clashes had stopped. The statement by the “Damascus Soldiers” led by Muslim al-Shishani and the “Caucasian Soldiers” led by Abdul Malik al-Shishani stated that “they were ready to end the conflict between the two sides and prevent the shedding of Muslim blood”. A 24-hour ceasefire was declared following these attempts and then an agreement was made.
The parties agreed on the condition that the Fesbutu Operation Room would evacuate the military and security checkpoints and withdraw its forces. The Fesbutu Operation Room also agreed to draw back its all militants from the village of Arab Saeed under the assurance of the “Damascus soldiers” and the “Caucasian soldiers”. According to the Agreement made, all fifty Hurras al-Din militants left the village of Arab Saeed, except those from the village. Hurras al-Din centres in Arab Saeed were also handed over to HTS.
Soon after signing the agreement, HTS raided several centres of Ansar al-Din and the settlements north of Jisr al-Shughur, such as al-Janudiyya, al-Yaqubiyya and Armanaz, targeting Hurras al-Din and Ansar al-Islam. HTS legitimized these operations by arguing that “the agreement signed was only comprising the village of Arab Saeed, not other regions”. HTS arrested the militants of the Fesbutu Operation Room as part of the operations, and thus violated, in essence, the agreement. HTS also raided the al-Jihad Coordination Centre led by Abu al-Abd, and arrested the militants in the Centre, seized all ammunition, besieged the checkpoints of the Coordination, and had them evacuated. Moreover, HTS besieged the house where Abu al-Abd was staying and wanted him to surrender, but he managed to escape.
The following stand out when we reciprocally look at the strengths and weaknesses of the two organizations:
Strengths of HTS
1. HTS has heavy weapons, armoured vehicles, tanks, and armoured personnel carriers.
2. It possesses economic opportunities that enable it to continue a conflict for a long time.
3. It has field control and is widely spread over the geographical area.
4. It has a strong leader / leadership and the militants display high loyalty to the leader.
5. It has media power and thus was able to mislead the Idlib public opinion that Hurras al-Din was violating the agreements and corrupting in the areas liberated.Weaknesses of HTS
1. At least half of HTS militants have refused to fight against Hurras al-Din.
2. HTS is perceived as an organization that follows the instructions of the international community and Turkey.
3. The conflict between HTS and Hurras al-Din coincided with the assassination of the Hurras al-Din leaders by the US.
4. HTS broke the truce after the Fesbutu Operation Room had accepted the attempts to reach a compromise. This was indeed one of the key reasons why a considerable part of HTS militants refrained from conflicting with Hurras al-Din.Strengths of Hurras al-Din
1. Hurras al-Din does not disown its arrested militants and intra-organizational solidarity is strong.
2. Militants of Hurras al-Din have got the motivation to fight to their last breath with a strong belief in martyrdom.
3. It has military experience and is capable of showing flexibility in manoeuvres and to withdraw when necessary.
4. It has influence over extremist militants in HTS and is able to convince them not to join battle. As an example, we can cite the refusal by Abdul Rahman bin Awf, a militant fraction affiliated to HTS, to participate in conflicts.Weaknesses of Hurras al-Din
1. It has neither heavy weapons nor economic opportunities enabling it to continue the war.
2. Local commanders in the settlements controlled by Hurras al-Din did not want war in their own regions; hence they opted for signing agreements with HTS. The transfer of the settlements near the Turkish border, i.e. Haram, Koko and Armanaz, to HTS through agreements can be cited as an example in this regard.
3. It follows a jihadist ideology, its objectives contradict the interests of the Syrian revolution, and it considers itself an international organization.Cost of the Conflicts
The clashes ended at least in the village of Arab Saeed after an agreement was inked between the parties. The parties agreed that the Arab Saeed people would stay at their homes and the Hurras al-Din’s quarters in the village would be closed.The biggest loss of Hurras al-Din was indeed the closure or damage of its quarters in Haram, Arab Saeed, Al-Yaqubiyya, Armanaz and Koko. Moreover, Hurras al-Din had to return the heavy weapons it had seized from HTS. It also failed to rescue Abu Malik al-Talli and Abu Salah al-Uzbeki, who were the reason for starting the war, from the hands of HTS. Lastly, mention should be made that Hurras al-Din remained limited to a narrow geographical area.
Looking at the outcome of the HTS-Hurras al-Din conflict, we can make an assessment that HTS has the edge over Hurras al-Din in terms of military strength. Nevertheless, it seems that HTS has failed to achieve its goals when looking at the essence of the matter. Because arresting all the leading staff of Hurras al-Din and getting the centres and military points of Hurras al-Din in some critical locations under control were HTS’s primary objectives. The Hurras al-Din leaders of note continue their activities and the organization maintains its important centres.
Scenarios for the Future of Rivalry between HTS and Hurras al-Din
The relationship between HTS and Hurras al-Din based on mutual threat perception will continue although conflicts between them have been halted for now. The balance of power is in favour of HTS in the fight between the parties. HTS will continue its fight against Hurras al-Din because this organization poses a threat to HTS and to deliver a massage to the international community that “it can be a tool in fighting the radicals”. Three different methods can be followed in the fight of HTS against Hurras al-Din.The first option is that HTS dissolves Hurras al-Din and purges its leading staff of by infiltrating the regions of that organization. The materialization rate of this scenario is low because militants of Hurras al-Din are extremely devout and motivated, and the leadership of the organization attaches particular importance to privacy and takes high security measures.
The second scenario is that HTS unleashes a wide-scale military operation aimed at eliminating Hurras al-Din after pulling it into areas with no civilian settlement. This scenario has a higher probability rate compared to the first one. However, its probability is still not sufficiently high due to the fact that HTS is seen as “the police of the international community and Turkey,” it is difficult to limit Hurras al-Din to a geographical region, and Hurras al-Din can significantly harm HTS even though not able to defeat HTS, as it is strong in terms of combativeness.
The final scenario is that HTS continues to raid the regions of Hurras al-Din and follows a strategy that aims at weakening / eliminating Hurras al-Din over time. In this context, HTS can restrict Hurras al-Din over time by small-scale conflicts, arresting the second- and third-degree militants of Hurras al-Din and putting economic pressure on it. Considering the course of rivalry between HTS and Hurras al-Din, we can say that this scenario is most likely to be realized. Reasons for this are as follows:
1. It is the scenario in which the risk of conflict and the loss of militants is minimal. HTS will prefer this scenario.
2. HTS will be able to avoid mediation attempts of mediators, sheikhs, and dissidents to halt clashes.If we look from the viewpoint of Hurras al-Din, there seems to be only one viable strategy. Hurras al-Din will build a fortification in a geographically rugged terrain and conduct assassinations against the HTS leaders. Al-Jolani will be the primary target of Hurras al-Din because eliminating al-Jolani may bring about the dissolution of HTS.
When we observe the relationship among themselves, we see that organizations with “Salafi jihadist” ideologies often compete and fight against each other. Conflicts among Salafi jihadist groups in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, and Syria are clear examples of this reality. Despite some changes made by HTS in its own organization and its ideological transformation, some of its militants are still extremist, a situation which would trigger more clashes with other dissident Syrian groups in the Idlib region.
src: click (The Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM))
edit: Wait, Piers Morgan to the rescue???!??! WTF?
