Neuer Kriegsverlängerungs-Grund

21. Februar 2025

Frisch und saf­tig, holen sie sich ihren neu­en noch heute!

Außer­dem wer­de er Trump sagen, dass wenn er die Ukrai­ne von Kreml­chef Wla­di­mir Putin ein­neh­men las­se, Russ­land “für die Euro­pä­er unauf­halt­bar” sei. Denn Russ­land wer­de “die Ukrai­ne und ihre Armee, die eine der größ­ten in Euro­pa ist, mit all unse­rer Aus­rüs­tung, ein­schließ­lich der ame­ri­ka­ni­schen Aus­rüs­tung, zurück­er­obern. Das ist ein rie­si­ger stra­te­gi­scher Feh­ler”, sag­te Macron.

src: click (derstandard.at)

Wir müs­sen die­sen Krieg zu Ende füh­ren, weil die US so vie­le Waf­fen in die Ukrai­ne gelie­fert haben!

Ob die US dem Macron ver­ra­ten wer­den, dass ihr moder­nes Gerät (remo­te) dis­ab­led wer­den kann?

Es bleibt spannend.

Selenskyj bullshitting Bessent, Vance and Rubio

21. Februar 2025

via Axi­os:

What they’­re say­ing: “Scott Bes­sent actual­ly went the­re and was trea­ted rather rude­ly becau­se essen­ti­al­ly they told him ’no,’ ” Trump told repor­ters on Wed­nes­day. “He came back empty. They would­n’t sign the document.”

- Several days later, when Zelen­sky met Vice Pre­si­dent Van­ce and Secreta­ry of Sta­te Mar­co Rubio in Munich, they pre­sen­ted him with a less bin­ding draft memo­ran­dum of under­stan­ding about the mining of mine­rals, a Ukrai­ni­an offi­cial said.
- Zelen­sky told Van­ce and Rubio he could­n’t sign becau­se such an agree­ment must be appro­ved by par­lia­ment, per the Ukrai­ni­an constitution.
- “That was news to us that Zelensky’s team never told us befo­re that mee­ting,” a Trump admi­nis­tra­ti­on offi­cial said. “It did­n’t seem like it was in good faith.”
- The White House and Zelensky’s office did not respond to requests for comment.

src: click

Fun.

A few Moments later:

Sta­te of play: Trump said on Wed­nes­day night that he was try­ing to “resur­rect” the mine­rals deal.

- A Ukrai­ni­an offi­cial, a U.S. offi­cial and two sources with know­ledge told Axi­os that in recent days nego­tia­ti­ons con­ti­nued, with the U.S. pre­sen­ting Ukrai­ne with an updated ver­si­on that addres­sed some of Zelensky’s concerns.
- Ano­t­her source said some arti­cles that had con­cer­ned the Ukrai­ni­ans — inclu­ding that the deal was under the juris­dic­tion of the New York court — were removed.

The latest: Zelen­sky met on Thurs­day in Kyiv with U.S. envoy Keith Kel­logg and dis­cus­sed the mine­rals agree­ment, the battle­field situa­ti­on, the return of pri­so­ners of war and secu­ri­ty gua­ran­tees for Ukrai­ne as part of a future peace agree­ment.

- After the mee­ting, Zelen­sky issued a state­ment thanking the U.S. for its assi­s­tance and bipar­ti­san support.
- “Ukrai­ne is rea­dy for a strong, effec­ti­ve invest­ment and secu­ri­ty agree­ment with the Pre­si­dent of the United Sta­tes. We have pro­po­sed the fas­test and most con­struc­ti­ve way to achie­ve results. Our team is rea­dy to work 24/7,” he said.
- Waltz clai­med Kel­logg had hel­ped Zelen­sky rea­li­ze the war nee­ded to end.

Gut, sowas braucht man in deutsch­spra­chi­gen Medi­en nie zu berich­ten. Schla­gen sie sich ein­fach die Idee aus dem Kopf.

Wenn sie das in deutsch­spra­chi­gen Medi­en berich­ten, hat sich das gefäl­ligst so anzu­hö­ren: https://www.derstandard.at/jetzt/livebericht/3000000258238/1000371083/gespraeche-zw

Ukrai­ne kurz vorm End­sieg, Bewe­gung in den Verhandlungen!”

edit: Dan­ke an Eric Gujer - fürs Stel­lung beziehen

Bildschirmfoto 2025 02 21 um 09 19 55
src: click

Die juristische Rechtfertigung der Ukraine keine Wahlen abhalten zu müssen

21. Februar 2025

und war­um sie deutsch­spra­chi­ge Jour­na­lis­ten weder ver­ste­hen, noch kor­rekt wie­der­ge­ben können.

Nach­trag zu:

Unge­wöhn­li­che Wor­te auch von BR24:

Trump beschimpf­te den ukrai­ni­schen Prä­si­den­ten Wolo­dym­yr Selen­skyj und zwei­fel­te im Ein­klang mit Putins Pro­pa­gan­da des­sen Legi­ti­mi­tät an. Selen­sky­js Amts­zeit ist tat­säch­lich abge­lau­fen, dazu gibt es jedoch höchst unter­schied­li­che Bewertungen.

[…]

Für Selen­skyj wird das katastrophal”
Putin habe inter­na­tio­nal über­haupt kein Pro­blem, mit höchst zwei­fel­haf­ten Staats­män­nern ins Gespräch zu kom­men, so Blog­ger Ana­to­li Nes­mi­jan (121.000 Fans): Russ­land ver­hand­le mit dem neu­en Macht­ha­ber Syri­ens, Ahmed Al-Sharaa, der vor kur­zem noch als “Ter­ro­rist” gegol­ten habe und sich für min­des­tens vier Jah­re kei­ner Wahl stel­len wol­le. Auch mit den Tali­ban in Afgha­ni­stan spre­che Mos­kau, ohne jemals demo­kra­ti­sche Maß­stä­be einzufordern.

Der ukrai­ni­sche Prä­si­dent wäre aber gut bera­ten gewe­sen, so Nes­mi­jan, wenn er sich eine Bestä­ti­gung des Ver­fas­sungs­ge­richts geholt hät­te: “Selen­skyj ver­hielt sich aber nicht wie ein gewöhn­li­cher Poli­ti­ker, son­dern ent­schied, dass er das Recht habe, sei­ne Macht­be­fug­nis­se ein­fach aus eige­nem Antrieb aus­zu­wei­ten, und jetzt wird das für ihn katastrophal.”

src: click

Can­ce­ling of the BR24 Jour­na­list in 3, 2, 1…

Yay! Yay! Yay! We got our will.

Oh, sor­ry - ich sehe gera­de, der BR Jour­na­list hat Job­si­cher­heit, denn er lügt beim rele­van­ten Teil… Und ist damit gott­sei­dank wie­der inner­halb der Wir­kungs­norm ukrai­ni­scher Propaganda.

Aller­dings schreibt die ukrai­ni­sche Rechts­la­ge vor, dass Wah­len frü­hes­tens sechs Mona­te nach Auf­he­bung des Kriegs­rechts abge­hal­ten wer­den können.

src: click

Das ist der rele­van­te Para­graph im Arti­kel des BR24 Journalisten.

Und er ist kom­plett falsch.

Der Link in ihm belegt nicht was der Para­graph behaup­tet (dort gibts nur ein “soll” State­ment). Aber in ihm gibt es einen wei­ter­füh­ren­den link auf ein Tele­gram pos­ting von David Arak­ha­mi­ya als Originalquelle.

Das fol­gen­den Inhalt hat:

David Arak­ha­mi­ya - 16. Febru­ar 2025:

I see the­re is some talk about elec­tions again.

Not for the first time during the war.

So let me remind you once again that, first of all, elec­tions are impos­si­ble during mar­ti­al law. [Kon­text: Spe­cial Envoy Keith Kel­logg hat­te gefor­dert, nach einem Waf­fen­still­stand Wah­len abzu­hal­ten src: click (Reu­ters), sowie: Kon­text zur Rechts­la­ge: click (TVP World) [wich­ti­ger Kniff: Arti­cle 19 of Ukraine’s mar­ti­al law legis­la­ti­on ist nicht Ver­fas­sungs­recht oder gleich­wer­tig --] -- lei­der legi­ti­miert das Selen­sky­js unend­lich Amts­zeit nicht, wes­halb Arak­ha­mi­ya ergänzt - and second­ly, …] And second­ly, wit­hin the frame­work of the Jean Mon­net Dia­lo­gue, the lea­ders of all fac­tions and groups agreed that elec­tions would be held no ear­lier than six mon­ths after the end of mar­ti­al law.

I recom­mend ever­yo­ne to read the docu­ment again

https://www.rada.gov.ua/uploads/documents/74725.pdf

Trans­la­ted with DeepL.com (free version)

Lässt man sich das Doku­ment von ChatGPT 4o auf eng­lish über­set­zen steht da folgendes:

Sit­zung im Novem­ber 2023 (Dh. bereits unter Kriegs­recht, und nach dem Ver­bot aller Oppo­si­ti­ons­par­tei­en die Selen­skyj nicht gepasst haben (sie­he: click (TAZ))):

We, the lea­ders­hip of the Ver­k­hov­na Rada of Ukrai­ne, the heads and dele­ga­ted repre­sen­ta­ti­ves of par­lia­men­ta­ry fac­tions and groups of the Ver­k­hov­na Rada of Ukrai­ne of the 9th con­vo­ca­ti­on, have gathe­red for the Jean Mon­net Dia­lo­gue for Peace and Demo­cra­cy for the ninth time sin­ce Octo­ber 2016, and for the third time during the ten­u­re of the 9th con­vo­ca­ti­on of the Ver­k­hov­na Rada of Ukrai­ne. This was the second in-person mee­ting sin­ce the begin­ning of the unpro­vo­ked full-scale mili­ta­ry aggres­si­on by the Rus­si­an Fede­ra­ti­on against Ukraine.

The fact that this mee­ting took place under such extra­or­di­na­ry cir­cum­s­tan­ces unders­cores our unwa­vering and firm com­mit­ment to working tog­e­ther, regard­less of poli­ti­cal dif­fe­ren­ces, to seek con­sen­sus, build trust, and streng­t­hen the unity of demo­cra­tic for­ces in Ukrai­ne. Our goal is also to acti­va­te the necessa­ry reform pro­ces­ses wit­hin the frame­work of the Jean Mon­net Dialogue.

We sin­ce­rely wel­co­me the posi­ti­ve and objec­ti­ve report of the Euro­pean Com­mis­si­on on Ukraine’s aspi­ra­ti­ons for EU mem­bers­hip and appre­cia­te the reco­gni­ti­on of the many efforts that Ukrai­ne has alrea­dy under­ta­ken to meet the mem­bers­hip cri­te­ria of the Euro­pean Uni­on. We also ack­now­ledge that the­re is still a signi­fi­cant amount of work ahead, requi­ring extra­or­di­na­ry efforts and effec­ti­ve coope­ra­ti­on among all bran­ches of government.

We ful­ly under­stand that a suc­cess­ful path toward the Euro­pean Uni­on and the North Atlan­tic Alli­an­ce must be built on the broa­dest pos­si­ble poli­ti­cal con­sen­sus and public sup­port. The­re­fo­re, the lea­ders­hip, fac­tions, and groups of the Ver­k­hov­na Rada of Ukrai­ne will make con­cre­te efforts to set an examp­le of unity and inclu­si­vi­ty among all demo­cra­tic for­ces in Par­lia­ment. We also belie­ve that acti­ve and sys­te­ma­tic invol­ve­ment of civil socie­ty orga­niz­a­ti­ons in Ukraine’s acces­si­on pro­cess to the EU and NATO is cru­cial and will con­tri­bu­te to bet­ter informing all seg­ments of socie­ty about EU and NATO-related mat­ters. The Ver­k­hov­na Rada should stri­ve to crea­te appro­pria­te mecha­nisms for coope­ra­ti­on with civil socie­ty organizations.

We ack­now­ledge that trans­pa­ren­cy and accoun­ta­bi­li­ty of Ukraine’s demo­cra­tic insti­tu­ti­ons, espe­cial­ly the Ver­k­hov­na Rada, are of cri­ti­cal impor­t­ance for Ukraine’s suc­cess­ful acces­si­on to both the Euro­pean Uni­on and NATO. We agreed that the Ver­k­hov­na Rada should estab­lish insti­tu­tio­nal and pro­ce­du­ral frame­works that align with the­se goals and ensu­re com­pli­an­ce with the nume­rous obli­ga­ti­ons ari­sing from the EU enlar­ge­ment pro­cess and NATO accession.

[…]

We reco­gni­ze the gro­wing impor­t­ance of par­lia­men­ta­ry diplo­ma­cy in rea­li­zing Ukraine’s aspi­ra­ti­ons for EU mem­bers­hip and NATO acces­si­on and, in par­ti­cu­lar, in ful­fil­ling the func­tions assi­gned to the Ver­k­hov­na Rada. Poli­ti­cal dia­lo­gue and exch­an­ges of expe­ri­ence on EU-related issu­es with par­lia­men­ta­ri­ans from EU coun­tries and the Euro-Atlantic space are high­ly bene­fi­cial for all par­ties and con­tri­bu­te to a bet­ter under­stan­ding of the issu­es on the agenda.

Par­lia­men­ta­ry diplo­ma­cy should aim for an inclu­si­ve approach, ensu­ring pro­por­tio­nal repre­sen­ta­ti­on in par­lia­men­ta­ry assem­blies, inter­na­tio­nal forums, and inter­par­lia­men­ta­ry diplo­ma­tic events. At the same time, par­lia­men­ta­ry diplo­ma­cy must be car­ri­ed out exclu­si­ve­ly to pro­tect Ukraine’s inde­pen­dence and sov­er­eig­n­ty, defend its inte­rests and citi­zens, res­to­re ter­ri­to­ri­al inte­gri­ty wit­hin the inter­na­tio­nal­ly reco­gni­zed bor­ders of 1991, and pro­mo­te Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspi­ra­ti­ons. It should streng­t­hen Ukraine’s image as a coun­try com­mit­ted to demo­cra­cy even in the most chal­len­ging times.

Reco­gni­zing the deepe­ning coope­ra­ti­on bet­ween the Ver­k­hov­na Rada of Ukrai­ne and the Euro­pean Par­lia­ment, and in anti­ci­pa­ti­on of a future docu­ment on expan­ding coope­ra­ti­on bet­ween the Spea­ker of the Ver­k­hov­na Rada and the Pre­si­dent of the Euro­pean Par­lia­ment, par­ti­ci­pants of the Dia­lo­gue express their rea­di­ness to take an acti­ve part in coope­ra­ti­on, par­ti­cu­lar­ly in the for­mat of par­lia­men­ta­ry obser­va­ti­on mis­si­ons to the Euro­pean Par­lia­ment and staff trai­ning pro­grams for the Ver­k­hov­na Rada Secretariat.

We also agree to con­ti­nue the insti­tu­tio­nal reform of the Ver­k­hov­na Rada with rene­wed vigor, streng­t­he­ning par­lia­men­ta­ry over­sight func­tions, as reflec­ted in the Euro­pean Commission’s report. We aim to reach con­sen­sus on the rights of the oppo­si­ti­on and the adop­ti­on of an ethi­cal code. We belie­ve that time­ly decisi­ons on the­se and other reform mea­su­res will not only enhan­ce the effec­ti­ve­ness of the Ver­k­hov­na Rada but also incre­a­se public trust in it.

We are par­ti­cu­lar­ly awa­re of the strain pla­ced on Ukraine’s demo­cra­tic insti­tu­ti­ons by the unpro­vo­ked full-scale mili­ta­ry aggres­si­on of the Rus­si­an Fede­ra­ti­on. The intro­duc­tion of mar­ti­al law is a direct con­se­quence of this aggression.

While the fight against the aggres­sor con­ti­nues, demo­cra­tic institutions—primarily the Ver­k­hov­na Rada and its deputies—must con­ti­nue to ful­fill their con­sti­tu­tio­nal duties and make the necessa­ry decisi­ons to ensu­re Ukraine’s mili­ta­ry vic­to­ry and pave the way for EU and NATO mem­bers­hip. We are the­re­fo­re con­vin­ced that at this sta­ge, ensu­ring the sta­bi­li­ty of the poli­ti­cal sys­tem and demo­cra­tic pro­ces­ses is of para­mount importance.

To this end, the lea­ders­hip of the Ver­k­hov­na Rada, par­lia­men­ta­ry poli­ti­cal lea­ders, and fac­tions and groups of the 9th con­vo­ca­ti­on com­mit to refrai­ning from actions that could dis­credit the Parliament’s acti­vi­ties both domesti­cal­ly and inter­na­tio­nal­ly. To ensu­re this sta­bi­li­ty until the next con­vo­ca­ti­on of the Ver­k­hov­na Rada is elec­ted, we have agreed to crea­te mecha­nisms that will ade­qua­te­ly reflect demo­cra­ti­cal­ly elec­ted par­lia­men­ta­ry plu­ra­lism wit­hin the Ver­k­hov­na Rada.

We have also agreed that future free and fair natio­nal elec­tions (par­lia­men­ta­ry and pre­si­den­ti­al) should be held after the war ends and mar­ti­al law is lifted, with suf­fi­ci­ent time for pre­pa­ra­ti­on (at least six mon­ths after the end of mar­ti­al law). The­se elec­tions should be con­duc­ted based on the exis­ting Elec­to­ral Code while pre­ser­ving key ele­ments of natio­nal and local elec­to­ral sys­tems, inclu­ding res­to­ring pro­vi­si­ons that ensu­re fair com­pe­ti­ti­on among can­di­da­tes wit­hin par­ty lists.

Unter­zeich­net:

Iry­na HERASHCHENKO, Mem­ber of Par­lia­ment of Ukraine,
Co-chair of the par­lia­men­ta­ry fac­tion “Euro­pean Solidarity”

Olek­san­dra USTINOVA, Mem­ber of Par­lia­ment of Ukraine,
Head of the par­lia­men­ta­ry fac­tion “Holos”

Volo­dym­yr ARESHONKOV, Mem­ber of Par­lia­ment of Ukraine,
Par­lia­men­ta­ry group “Dovi­ra”

Mykhailo PAPIEV, Mem­ber of Par­lia­ment of Ukraine,
Par­lia­men­ta­ry group “Plat­form for Life and Peace”

Ser­hii KALCHENKO, Mem­ber of Par­lia­ment of Ukraine,
Par­lia­men­ta­ry fac­tion “Ser­vant of the People”

Ivan­na KLYMPUSH-TSINTSADZE, Mem­ber of Par­lia­ment of Ukraine,
Par­lia­men­ta­ry fac­tion “Euro­pean Solidarity”

Andrii PARUBII, Mem­ber of Par­lia­ment of Ukraine,
Par­lia­men­ta­ry fac­tion “Euro­pean Solidarity”

Volo­dym­yr TSABAL, Mem­ber of Par­lia­ment of Ukraine,
Par­lia­men­ta­ry fac­tion “Holos”

Vadym HALAICHUK, Mem­ber of Par­lia­ment of Ukraine,
Par­lia­men­ta­ry fac­tion “Ser­vant of the People”

Vik­to­ria PODHORNA, Mem­ber of Par­lia­ment of Ukraine,
Par­lia­men­ta­ry fac­tion “Ser­vant of the People”

Ser­hii SOBOLEV, Mem­ber of Par­lia­ment of Ukraine,
Par­lia­men­ta­ry fac­tion “Bat­kivsh­chy­na” [Unter­schrift fehlt.]

Lary­sa BILOZIR, Mem­ber of Par­lia­ment of Ukraine,
Par­lia­men­ta­ry group “Dovi­ra”

Anna SKOROKHOD, Mem­ber of Par­lia­ment of Ukraine,
Par­lia­men­ta­ry group “For the Future”

So leids mir tut, das ist kein ukrai­ni­sches Gesetz.

Schon gar nicht eines von Verfassungsrang.

Aber der Jour­na­list hat sich das Doku­ment wie­der nicht über­setz­ten las­sen, also ist die Ukrai­ne hier im Recht, und die­ses Sit­zungs­pro­to­koll sei “ukrai­ni­sches Recht”.

Toll, wie das läuft im deutsch­spra­chi­gen Journalismus!

Und was ist jetzt eigent­lich diese -

Sit­zung im Rah­men des Jean Mon­net Dialogues?

The Jean Mon­net Dia­lo­gue and Inter-Party Dia­lo­gue seeks to streng­t­hen the abi­li­ty of poli­ti­cal lea­ders to deve­lop true inter-party dia­lo­gue and to build the con­sen­sus necessa­ry for genera­ting a demo­cra­tic par­lia­men­ta­ry cul­tu­re and trust. It also pro­vi­des a plat­form for poli­ti­cal group lea­ders to seek con­sen­sus on natio­nal prio­ri­ty poli­ci­es and insti­tu­tio­nal reforms, to be imple­men­ted sub­se­quent­ly by Parliament.

The Jean Mon­net Dia­lo­gue for Peace and Demo­cra­cy is a par­lia­men­ta­ry media­ti­on instru­ment. It brings tog­e­ther poli­ti­cal lea­ders from part­ner coun­tries’ par­lia­ments in cycles of dia­lo­gue faci­li­ta­ted by Mem­bers of the Euro­pean Par­lia­ment. They are com­po­sed of pre­pa­ra­to­ry con­sul­ta­ti­ons lea­ding to in came­ra mee­tings with con­cre­te out­co­mes and follow-up.

src: click

Ein­fach eine Sit­zung einer fuck­ing Dialogplattform.

edit: Money­quo­te:

Colum­bia Under­gra­dua­te Law Review:

Octo­ber 16, 2024 - Kathe­ri­ne Griv­kov: Uphol­ding Demo­cra­tic Legi­ti­ma­cy Under Mar­ti­al Law: Ukraine’s Legal Man­da­te for the 2024 Pre­si­den­ti­al Election

The Ukrai­ni­an government has con­ti­nuous­ly rei­tera­ted its ratio­na­le for not hol­ding the 2024 pre­si­den­ti­al elec­tion in Ukrai­ne. First, the government has reli­ed on the Ukrai­ni­an Con­sti­tu­ti­on to sup­port the elec­tion can­cel­la­ti­on pro­cess. [2] In addi­ti­on to using the Ukrai­ni­an Con­sti­tu­ti­on to defend the can­cel­la­ti­on of its elec­tions, the government argues that logisti­cal­ly, it would be near­ly impos­si­ble to hold a war­ti­me elec­tion becau­se many Ukrai­ni­an citi­zens have fled the coun­try to seek asyl­um in neigh­bo­ring coun­tries. Fur­ther­mo­re, tho­se who are acti­ve duty Ukrai­ni­an sol­di­ers would also have immense trou­ble par­ti­ci­pa­ting in an elec­tion as they fight on the front-lines. [3] Yet the­se arguments––no mat­ter how rational––do not excu­se the government from uphol­ding its inter­na­tio­nal and legal obli­ga­ti­ons. Demo­cra­tic alter­na­ti­ves need to be pre­sen­ted to Ukrai­ni­an citi­zens, which is some­thing that Pre­si­dent Volo­dym­yr Zelen­skyy hims­elf has ack­now­led­ged. Zelen­skyy has attemp­ted to collect feed­back from Ukrai­ni­an citi­zens, even tho­se who have beco­me refu­gees, using government-operated digi­tal plat­forms; nota­b­ly, his government has “… worked to digi­ti­ze Ukrai­ni­an demo­cra­cy by crea­ting (or updating) state-run apps that are acces­si­ble to all citi­zens.” [4] If, during a glo­bal pan­de­mic, coun­tries were able to hold free and fair elec­tions, Ukrai­ne and its demo­cra­tic part­ners can work tog­e­ther to crea­te elec­to­ral solutions. 

By can­ce­ling its 2024 pre­si­den­ti­al elec­tion, Ukrai­ne has vio­la­ted mul­ti­ple inter­na­tio­nal legal coven­ants and trea­ties to which it is a signa­to­ry. Ukrai­ne rati­fied the United Nati­ons (UN) Inter­na­tio­nal Covenant on Civil and Poli­ti­cal Rights in 1973. [5] Accord­ing to Arti­cle 4, “[in] time of public emer­gen­cy … the Sta­tes Par­ties to the pre­sent Covenant may take mea­su­res dero­ga­ting from their obli­ga­ti­ons … pro­vi­ded that such mea­su­res are not incon­sis­tent with their other obli­ga­ti­ons under inter­na­tio­nal law.” [6] Dero­ga­ti­on is “… the sus­pen­si­on or sup­pres­si­on of a law under par­ti­cu­lar cir­cum­s­tan­ces.” [7] Dif­fe­rent inter­na­tio­nal laws often con­tain dero­ga­ti­on clau­ses which per­mit sta­tes to avoid legal respon­si­bi­li­ties during times of cri­sis. While dero­ga­ti­on is per­mit­ted in cer­tain cir­cum­s­tan­ces, this arti­cle is one among an array in the covenant, and the­se arti­cles must be weig­hed equal­ly. Sec­tion (b) of Arti­cle 25 sta­tes that sta­te signa­to­ries should pro­vi­de the oppor­tu­ni­ty “to vote and to be elec­ted at genui­ne perio­dic elec­tions which shall be by uni­ver­sal and equal suf­fra­ge and shall be held by secret bal­lot.” [8] Ukrai­ne is dero­ga­ting from its obli­ga­ti­ons and in turn, is vio­la­ting the inter­na­tio­nal law to which it sub­scri­bes. Hol­ding regu­lar elec­tions is a cri­ti­cal com­po­nent to ensu­ring that coun­tries do not vio­la­te the civil rights of their citi­zens. In essence, can­ce­ling plan­ned elec­tions is the oppo­si­te of regu­la­ri­ty. In addi­ti­on to the Inter­na­tio­nal Covenant on Civil and Poli­ti­cal Rights, Ukrai­ne rati­fied Pro­to­col 1 to the Euro­pean Con­ven­ti­on for the Pro­tec­tion of Human Rights and Fun­da­men­tal Free­doms in 1997. Arti­cle 3 of Pro­to­col 1 sta­tes that par­ties are obli­ga­ted to “hold free elec­tions at rea­son­ab­le inter­vals by secret bal­lot.” [9] Inter­na­tio­nal law rein­for­ces Ukraine’s respon­si­bi­li­ty to hold elec­tions at regu­lar inter­vals, an obli­ga­ti­on that a coun­try which aspi­res to join libe­ral demo­cra­tic insti­tu­ti­ons should uphold. 

Des­pi­te the mili­ta­ry and poli­ti­cal signi­fi­can­ce of mar­ti­al law [not Ukrai­nes con­sti­tu­tio­nal set limits], Ukrai­ne is still legal­ly respon­si­ble to uphold demo­cra­cy. In 2022, Ukrai­ni­an Pre­si­dent Volo­dym­yr Zelen­skyy sub­mit­ted a draft reso­lu­ti­on to the Ukrai­ni­an legis­la­tu­re, Ver­k­hov­na Rada, regar­ding the decla­ra­ti­on of war; it ulti­mate­ly fai­led to beco­me law. [10] Sin­ce the sta­te of war decla­ra­ti­on was not imple­men­ted as initi­al­ly anti­ci­pa­ted, Ukrai­ne still remains under mar­ti­al law. Accord­ing to Arti­cle 1 of the Law of Ukrai­ne, mar­ti­al law is a “spe­cial legal regime” that “pro­vi­des for the pro­vi­si­on of appro­pria­te sta­te aut­ho­ri­ties, mili­ta­ry com­mand … [and] local self-government of the powers necessa­ry to … [tem­pora­ri­ly restrict] the con­sti­tu­tio­nal rights and free­doms of a per­son and citi­zen.” [11] Simi­lar­ly, Arti­cle 8 secu­res the right to imple­ment “… tem­pora­ry restric­tions on the con­sti­tu­tio­nal rights and free­doms of a per­son and a citi­zen, as well as the rights and legal inte­rests of legal enti­ties.” [12] Both Arti­cle 1 and Arti­cle 8 empha­si­ze the tem­pora­ry restric­tion of rights and liber­ties during times of mili­ta­ry cri­sis. In this case, it appears that the term ‘tem­pora­ry’ is con­ti­nu­al­ly being rede­fi­ned by Ukrai­ne as it navi­ga­tes an ever-changing mili­ta­ry land­s­cape. The­re­fo­re, Arti­cle 11 ensu­res that the cur­rent Pre­si­dent of Ukrai­ne and his powers “can­not be limi­ted in the con­di­ti­ons of mar­ti­al law.” [13] Yet, the absence of a limit on the­se “tem­pora­ry” restric­tions is inher­ent­ly incom­pa­ti­ble with the respon­si­bi­li­ty to hold regu­lar and free elec­tions under inter­na­tio­nal law. Arti­cle 22 sta­tes that “[any] attempt to use the impo­si­ti­on of mar­ti­al law to sei­ze power ent­ails lia­bi­li­ty under the law.” [14] In Octo­ber 2023, mar­ti­al law was exten­ded, and in turn, the Ver­k­hov­na Rada was unab­le to hold its par­lia­men­ta­ry elec­tion. [15] Like­wi­se, this exten­si­on of mar­ti­al law can­ce­led the 2024 pre­si­den­ti­al elec­tions. Based on Arti­cle 22, exten­ding mar­ti­al law to off­set a par­lia­men­ta­ry or pre­si­den­ti­al elec­tion is an unlaw­ful sei­zu­re of power. While Pre­si­dent Zelen­sky was pre­vious­ly elec­ted by the Ukrai­ni­an peop­le, he is no lon­ger the right­ful­ly elec­ted lea­der of their coun­try. His power is gran­ted by vir­tue of mar­ti­al law exten­si­ons, not by the votes of the Ukrai­ni­an peop­le. Most import­ant­ly, even under mar­ti­al law, restric­tions on civil and con­sti­tu­tio­nal rights should be tem­pora­ry, not indefinite. 

Iden­ti­fy­ing whe­ther Ukrai­ne is legal­ly per­mit­ted to dero­ga­te from its legal obli­ga­ti­ons under inter­na­tio­nal law is cri­ti­cal in asses­sing the vali­di­ty of restric­ting elec­tions. Nota­b­ly, Arti­cle 15 of the Euro­pean Con­ven­ti­on on Human Rights per­mits Sta­tes to dero­ga­te in “excep­tio­nal cir­cum­s­tan­ces” and in “a tem­pora­ry, limi­ted and super­vi­sed man­ner.” [16] Not only should the dero­ga­ti­on be tem­pora­ry, but it should also be supervised––an ele­ment with which Ukrai­ne is struggling as its anti-corruption enti­ties have fai­led to uphold their man­da­tes. [17] Moreo­ver, “any dero­ga­ti­ons may not be incon­sis­tent with the State’s other obli­ga­ti­ons under inter­na­tio­nal law.” [18] Ukrai­ne is obli­ga­ted under inter­na­tio­nal law to hold regu­lar elec­tions. Fur­ther­mo­re, sin­ce Rus­sia did not make a sta­te of war decla­ra­ti­on which would for­mal­ly ack­now­ledge its aggres­si­on on Ukrai­ne, Ukrai­ne is even more limi­ted in its dero­ga­ti­on abi­li­ties. Nota­b­ly, in the case Cyprus v. Tur­key (1983)––against the back­drop of Tur­kish inva­si­on into Cyprus in 1974––Cyprus accu­sed Tur­key of vio­la­ting several arti­cles of the Euro­pean Com­mis­si­on on Human Rights. 

[…]

What dif­fers from the situa­ti­on in Ukrai­ne is that the afo­re­men­tio­ned court held that the United King­dom did not vio­la­te Arti­cle 5 and Arti­cle 3 of the Euro­pean Con­ven­ti­on on Human Rights, which pro­tect liber­ty and secu­ri­ty, whe­re­as Ukraine’s elec­tion can­cel­la­ti­on does. In can­ce­ling its 2024 pre­si­den­ti­al elec­tion, Ukrai­ne is direct­ly strip­ping its citi­zens of liber­ty. By vio­la­ting this inter­na­tio­nal law, Ukrai­ne is deny­ing its citi­zens the civil rights they should main­tain in a demo­cra­tic sta­te. Fur­ther­mo­re, Ukrai­ne is put­ting its coun­try in a ris­ky secu­ri­ty posi­ti­on. Ukraine’s refu­sal to adhe­re to the rule of law could cau­se secu­ri­ty con­cerns for the coun­try, as major allies con­si­der with­drawing aid and sup­port to Ukrai­ne if they belie­ve Ukrai­ne is vio­la­ting inter­na­tio­nal law with its elections. 

As Ukrai­ne seeks to join alli­an­ces such as the EU and NATO, it must uphold the demo­cra­tic princi­ples of its peers even in extre­me cir­cum­s­tan­ces. For instance, the Trea­ty on Euro­pean Uni­on rein­for­ces the impor­t­ance of uphol­ding demo­cra­cy by respec­ting civil rights for all mem­ber sta­tes: “The Uni­on is foun­ded on the values of respect for human digni­ty, free­dom, demo­cra­cy, equa­li­ty, the rule of law and respect for human rights.” [22] Mem­ber sta­tes must be com­mit­ted to uphol­ding the­se values. If Ukrai­ne wants to gain EU mem­bers­hip in the near future, it must adhe­re to the princi­ples and rules by which EU mem­ber sta­tes govern them­sel­ves; hol­ding free and fair elec­tions is fun­da­men­tal to attai­ning mem­bers­hip. Exten­ded dero­ga­ti­on is not an ade­qua­te solu­ti­on for pro­lon­ged con­flicts or wars. Nota­b­ly, many sta­tes have been misus­ing Arti­cle 15 to dero­ga­te for very exten­ded peri­ods of time, and long after the acu­te emer­gen­cy has ended. [23] While Ukrai­ne is in cri­sis, it can­not sole­ly rely on limi­t­ing civil rights to govern the nati­on during wartime.

[…]

src: click

Strangely enough the France 24 concept of presenting tweaked out, shell shocked soldiers as PR for pro ukraine frech policy making doesnt work so well

20. Februar 2025

I won­der why…

Espe­cial­ly on a day whe­re this is the reac­tion from the US side:

It takes years to reinte­gra­te. Not into socie­ty - into nor­mal life. And thats one of the luck­ier ones, becau­se he had an emo­tio­nal outlet.

edit: Unge­wöhn­li­che Wor­te auch von BR24:

Trump beschimpf­te den ukrai­ni­schen Prä­si­den­ten Wolo­dym­yr Selen­skyj und zwei­fel­te im Ein­klang mit Putins Pro­pa­gan­da des­sen Legi­ti­mi­tät an. Selen­sky­js Amts­zeit ist tat­säch­lich abge­lau­fen, dazu gibt es jedoch höchst unter­schied­li­che Bewertungen.

[…]

Für Selen­skyj wird das katastrophal”
Putin habe inter­na­tio­nal über­haupt kein Pro­blem, mit höchst zwei­fel­haf­ten Staats­män­nern ins Gespräch zu kom­men, so Blog­ger Ana­to­li Nes­mi­jan (121.000 Fans): Russ­land ver­hand­le mit dem neu­en Macht­ha­ber Syri­ens, Ahmed Al-Sharaa, der vor kur­zem noch als “Ter­ro­rist” gegol­ten habe und sich für min­des­tens vier Jah­re kei­ner Wahl stel­len wol­le. Auch mit den Tali­ban in Afgha­ni­stan spre­che Mos­kau, ohne jemals demo­kra­ti­sche Maß­stä­be einzufordern.

Der ukrai­ni­sche Prä­si­dent wäre aber gut bera­ten gewe­sen, so Nes­mi­jan, wenn er sich eine Bestä­ti­gung des Ver­fas­sungs­ge­richts geholt hät­te: “Selen­skyj ver­hielt sich aber nicht wie ein gewöhn­li­cher Poli­ti­ker, son­dern ent­schied, dass er das Recht habe, sei­ne Macht­be­fug­nis­se ein­fach aus eige­nem Antrieb aus­zu­wei­ten, und jetzt wird das für ihn katastrophal.”

src: click

Weil ich das sel­be vor 10 Tagen noch den Arsch­lö­chern von Die Pres­se, dem östrrei­chi­schen Pres­se­rat, und dem Dreckskerl der mich beim AMS nicht mehr als Jour­na­list för­dern woll­te zukom­men habe las­sen (“Putin habe ja im April 2022 nicht ver­han­deln wol­len, er erken­ne ja Selen­skyj nicht an” Pres­se Idio­ten beim frei asso­zia­tiv kom­bi­nie­ren (damals erkann­te Russ­land Selen­skyj als gewähl­ten Ver­tre­ter der Ukrai­ne an (Lav­rov via tur­kish press agen­cy writ­e­up of an Al Jaze­e­ra inter­view), da das eine Vor­be­din­gung für die Ver­hand­lun­gen war, die damals nicht gebro­chen wur­de - wie jeder Ver­hand­ler in Anka­ra auf Nach­fra­ge bestä­ti­gen kann, aber mit denen will seit 2022 kein west­li­ches jour­na­lis­ti­sches Out­let reden, ich frag mich ja war­um… Ach nein, tu ich nicht.) - dont worry, it has some com­ple­xi­ty to it, so media is unab­le to report it cor­rect­ly, and ins­tead goes for the pro­pa­gan­da line as usu­al) -- ohne jeg­li­che Reak­ti­on -- FICKT EUCH ihr heu­cheln­den, ver­fick­ten, dre­cki­gen Hurenschweine.

Ich gehe sogar damit kon­form, dass ich wie der bei BR24 zitier­te rus­si­sche (!) Blog­ger der Mei­nung bin, dass das ein spä­tes rus­si­sches Pro­pa­gan­da­nar­ra­tiv war, das sich zu effek­tiv fürs die eigent­lich inten­dier­te Wir­kung ent­wi­ckelt hat. Ich wür­de weder auf Trumps, noch auf rus­si­scher Sei­te direkt für Neu­wah­len in der Ukrai­ne lob­by­ie­ren. Damit machst dus nur zu früh zu öffent­lich zum The­ma. Ob Selen­skyj nach einem etwai­gen Frie­dens­schluss Geschich­te ist oder nicht, ent­schei­den so und so bereits (indi­rekt) die aus­ver­han­del­ten Bedingungen.

Das soll­te nie­mand als Vor­be­din­gung dik­tie­ren müssen.

Aber trotz­dem ist mei­ne Mei­nung, nach Recher­che, zu viel für die­se auf­ge­klär­te Gesell­schaft, die mich viel lie­ber als “Pro­blem” berei­ni­gen würde.

Naja, die­se Gesell­schaft ist und bleibt halt das abso­lut gro­tesk und abar­tigst Aller­letz­te. Wenns nicht ins uni­ver­sal geglaub­te Pro­pa­gan­da Nar­ra­tiv passt, dann muss es ja falsch sein. Und jeder der was ande­res erzählt ver­hilft Putin zum Sieg und muss als Per­son zer­stört wer­den, nicht?

Can­ce­ling of the BR24 Jour­na­list in 3, 2, 1… We want to lis­ten to more shells­ho­cked sol­di­ers from the front popu­la­ri­zing ukrai­ni­an Propaganda!

Yay! Yay! Yay! We got our will.

Fast

20. Februar 2025

Bildschirmfoto 2025 02 20 um 14 34 03
Bildschirmfoto 2025 02 20 um 14 37 57
src: click

Da hat wohl das HOW TO pic­to­ri­al für den digi­tal nati­ve Stan­dard Redak­teur aus der Wal­dorf­schu­le gefehlt.

Hand aufs Herz, mit dem Dau­men nach oben fürs respon­si­ve Design.

E931ffa0 5e52 4abd 8a81 0d1f74dd329f

Publi­shing Direc­ti­ves sind auch was für Sucker, die kann man ja nicht mal tanzen.

In der “Digi­tal Nati­ve” Kom­mu­ni­ka­ti­on auch bes­ser bekannt als “Mein iPad kann nur Voll­bild, sieht super aus - FUCK JETZT HAT ERS GEDREHT!”.