Duda über den Raketeneinschlag in Polen

22. November 2022


Kreml­na­he Fake-Anrufer legen Polens Prä­si­den­ten Duda rein

Nach dem Ein­schlag einer Rake­te in Polens Grenz­ge­biet zur Ukrai­ne ist Prä­si­dent Duda in einem Tele­fo­nat von den rus­si­schen Komi­kern Vovan (Wla­di­mir Kus­ne­zow) und Lexus (Ale­xej Stol­ja­row) her­ein­ge­legt worden.

Das Duo gau­kel­te Duda in dem auf der Platt­form Rutube ver­öf­fent­lich­ten Gespräch vor, er spre­che mit Frank­reichs Prä­si­den­ten Macron. Die Prä­si­di­al­ver­wal­tung bestä­tig­te dies auf Twit­ter mit. In dem sie­ben­mi­nü­ti­gen Gespräch berich­tet Duda dem ver­meint­li­chen Macron von dem Rake­ten­ein­schlag im Grenz­ge­biet zur Ukraine.


src: click

Voll­text­über­set­zung der rus­si­schen Unter­ti­tel via Deepl:

C: Hello?
X: Hello.
C: Hel­lo, friend, how are you?
X: Hel­lo, Emma­nu­el, is that you? I have Andrzej Duda on the line.
C: Yes, yes, it’s me.
D: Hel­lo, Emma­nu­el, thank you, thank you for cal­ling. You must be awa­re, the situa­ti­on is very com­pli­ca­ted. We had an explo­si­on in Poland, near the ukrai­ni­an bor­der this after­noon. On our ter­ri­to­ry. And it was a rocket.
Without any doubt it was a rocket. Who laun­ched it, we don’t know. It was laun­ched some­whe­re to the east. And it was pro­bab­ly a rus­si­an rocket, russian-made. And the explo­si­on was very lar­ge. The cra­ter from the explo­si­on was about 20 to 25 meters long and five meters deep. A big crater.
I had a con­ver­sa­ti­on with Jens Stol­ten­berg tonight. I told him that tomor­row our ambassa­dor, will pro­bab­ly initia­te a para­graph 4 pro­ce­du­re. And we also had a con­ver­sa­ti­on with Pre­si­dent Joe Biden…
C: What is he say­ing? Is he bla­ming Russia?
D: No. He’s not.
C: Do you think it’s pos­si­ble that a ukrai­ni­an mis­si­le hit a rus­si­an mis­si­le, and it…
D: I don’t know. I don’t know. Pre­si­dent Biden said that he will be sen­ding ame­ri­can experts to assist our inves­ti­ga­ti­on. They will pro­bab­ly join the inves­ti­ga­ti­on, but I’m wai­t­ing, wai­t­ing for the results…
C: Yes. And what posi­ti­on has Zelen­sky taken? Is he accu­sing Russia?
D: He, yes, Vlo­di­mir bla­mes the rus­si­ans. He says they are com­ple­te­ly sure, that it was a rus­si­an mis­si­le laun­ched by the rus­si­ans. And he says it could­n’t have been a ukrai­ni­an mis­si­le launch.
C: Can’t be.
D: That’s what he said to me. But after all, you know his posi­ti­on. He keeps asking for arms deliveries.
Emma­nu­el… Belie­ve me, I’m extre­me­ly care­ful. I don’t bla­me the russians.
Emma­nu­el, this is war. I think both sides will bla­me each other in this - for this act of war.
C: I think we don’t want an esca­la­ti­on, an esca­la­ti­on bet­ween NATO and Rus­sia. We don’t need that.
D: Emma­nu­el, do you think I want a war with Rus­sia? No. Belie­ve me, I don’t want that. I don’t want war with Rus­sia, and I’m extre­me­ly care­ful, belie­ve me. Extre­me­ly care­ful. We’­re only tal­king about arti­cle four on my part, I’m not tal­king about arti­cle five.
C: What are you going to do if that mis­si­le turns out to be a rus­si­an missile?
D: We’­re going to talk to our allies, to you, to the Ame­ri­cans, to Pre­si­dent Biden. And I think we’­re going to have to find a solu­ti­on to this dif­fi­cult situa­ti­on. A com­mon solu­ti­on. But they’­re in a dif­fe­rent situa­ti­on than me.
C: Yes, I agree, I agree. It’s ter­ri­ble, but I saw in the news that your minis­try said that the mis­si­le was rus­si­an. The rus­si­an mis­si­le, your minis­try. It’s just…
D: Our for­eign minis­ter, he said in his state­ment, that it was a rus­si­an mis­si­le - of cour­se, becau­se it was made in Russia.
C: Yes!
D: The mis­si­le was made in Rus­sia. That said, you know that both sides have russian-made mis­si­les in this war. Both were made in Russia.
C: The S-300, yes, I know.
D: Perhaps, but you see, the­re is no clear evi­dence that it was S-300. It’s spe­cu­la­ti­on, as far as I know right now… [Duda later publicly con­fir­med that it had been two S-300 missiles.]
C: What do you think about dir­ty bombs? The dir­ty bombs that Rus­sia is claiming…
D: I’m more afraid of pro­blems at ukrai­ni­an nuclear power plants than I am of some dir­ty bomb. I’m more afraid of…
C: And what did Vlo­di­mir tell you?
D: I’m more afraid of a nuclear cata­stro­phe becau­se of an attack on a nuclear power plant. That’s what worries me.
C: So what did Vlo­di­mir tell you? What’s his plan? Does he real­ly want more escalation?
D: He told me about his cer­tain­ty that it was a rus­si­an mis­si­le and that the Rus­si­ans laun­ched it. And that’s pret­ty much it.
C: But he did­n’t pro­vi­de any evidence?
D: He said they had evidence.
Pre­si­dent Biden said he would send experts to par­ti­ci­pa­te in the inves­ti­ga­ti­on. That’s all I can say.
C: But don’t you have your own experts? For this?
D: We have our own experts. We have experts. There’s alrea­dy an inves­ti­ga­ti­on. And tomor­row morning it’s likely to be joi­ned by Ame­ri­can experts - tomor­row morning.
C: Okay. [Chuck­les] Thank you, friend. I’m get­ting very tired of both of them. Espe­cial­ly of Vlo­di­mir Zelensky.
D: Thank you, thank you! Have a good day.
C: Thank you.

Das erklärt die offe­ne, mit den euro­päi­schen Part­nern abge­stimm­te Posi­ti­on der US in den letz­ten Tagen (Polen hat bei der Nach­be­rei­tung mit­be­kom­men, dass Duda nicht mit dem tat­säch­li­chen Macron gespro­chen hat -). Aber die erklärt sich auch aus dem Sach­ver­halt, dh. eigent­lich heißt das auch wie­der nichts.

Bei der Gele­gen­heit habe ich auch gleich die Unter­ti­tel des Fake Anrufs mit Kule­ba vom 14.10. OCRed (sel­bes kreml­na­hes “Komi­ker­duo” - Kon­text: click).

Vor­sicht beim Extra­po­lie­ren von Kon­text, das Video weist eine metric shit­ton an Schnit­ten auf.

K: Okay, okay, that’s good. Moreo­ver, I hope to visit several Afri­can coun­tries in the first half of Octo­ber, whe­re Rus­si­an war nar­ra­ti­ves dominate.
C: Tell me, what about Afri­ca? What is the pro­blem the­re now? And I heard the­re was a pro­blem. This is what I read on Twit­ter. Zak­ha­ro­va said that Pre­si­dent Zelen­sky had not tal­ked to the Pre­si­dent of Gha­na. What does it mean? What is the problem?
K: Not Gha­na, but Sene­gal, I guess.
C: Ah!
K: Well, she, well, that’s a sepa­ra­te sub­ject of con­ver­sa­ti­on, to be honest, because…
You know, all of a sud­den, our part­ners, the United Sta­tes and the Euro­peans, a few mon­ths ago star­ted tal­king about how important it is to work with Afri­ca and to have Afri­ca on our side.
I under­stand the mea­ning of this dis­cus­sion in the con­text of sol­ving the food pro­blem. But this pro­blem has been sol­ved, well, on some kind of… in a very nar­row for­mat but solved.
But the trend con­ti­nued, and they say, let’s get Afri­ca on our side.
The­re is ano­t­her school of thought that says that you need to talk a lot with Afri­cans, con­vin­ce them of some­thing and gra­du­al­ly win them over to your side. But I see that… I see two pro­ces­ses now.
First­ly, I see some coun­tries in Afri­ca that, well, let’s say, you can real­ly con­vin­ce of some­thing, and they are open to conversation.
But I also see coun­tries that have clear­ly taken eit­her an open­ly pro-Russian, a hard-line pro-Russian stance, or a hard-line neu­tral stance.
You can’t con­vin­ce them of anything, no mat­ter how much time you spend with them. That’s it.
C: What kind of inte­res­ting things could be hap­pe­ning in Afri­ca now?
K: Of cour­se, you know how it is… The rising pri­ce of Afri­can… of atten­ti­on by Afri­can leaders.
That is, if he, so to say, is the pre­si­dent of coun­try X in Afri­ca, he sees that Rus­si­ans sud­den­ly rush to him asking to sup­port them, and then they are immedia­te­ly fol­lo­wed by Euro­peans, Ame­ri­cans, Ukrai­ni­ans asking for sup­port as well.
That is, well, in such a situa­ti­on it would be a good idea for him to start rai­sing the sta­kes and ask what pri­ce they are paying for support.
Rus­sia, what do you give me for sup­por­ting you? Then he would approach the Euro­peans and say, “Well, okay, you said, you give me 100, and the Rus­si­ans offer 150.”
So, it’s just that we… I think that in this pur­su­it of Afri­ca we rather moti­va­te a num­ber of Afri­can lea­ders to try to cash in on this situa­ti­on, and not to take one side or ano­t­her based on objec­ti­ve facts about the guilt and inno­cence of this or that country.
And it seems to me that with Afri­ca we are going a litt­le too far in this regard. All of a sud­den, they sta­ted a race for the atten­ti­on of Africa.
C: What are the goals now? Who do you want to win over to your side from the Afri­can continent?
The­re was Kenya, I know. And who can be? What is your goal? And our coun­try, it… Have you spo­ken to Secreta­ry Blin­ken about this?
How can we make this happen?
K: Yes, yes, we are tal­king with him, and, in fact, the argu­ment that we need to work more with Afri­ca came, first of all, from the Euro­pean Uni­on and the United Sta­tes that star­ted tel­ling us that Afri­ca is important, Afri­ca is not with us, we need to win over Afri­ca, let’s do this.
The­re­fo­re, in this situa­ti­on, several inte­rests con­ver­ge for us: The first inte­rest is, well, basi­cal­ly, get­ting to know sub-Saharan Afri­ca again - that is, the first task is to return to Africa.
The second task is, of cour­se, to pro­be the­se coun­tries for a pos­si­ble purcha­se of cer­tain wea­pons from their soviet-made stocks.
Well, the third task is, in fact, to pro­mo­te our nar­ra­ti­ve - exp­lain who is right, who is wrong, and secu­re… In order to main­tain their sup­port in poli­ti­cal for­mats; pri­ma­ri­ly in the UN Gene­ral Assem­bly, and in others, at other levels, in the Afri­can Uni­on and so on. But for now, the­se are the tasks.
C: Tell me, what is the situa­ti­on at the front now? I know about the coun­ter­of­fen­si­ve. I am awa­re that your intel­li­gence is working well, and in Cri­mea… And about your plans,.. From your per­spec­ti­ve, how long will this last? What does your situa­ti­on look like now? What is your take on that?
K: Well, I’ll tell you frank­ly that in clo­se coope­ra­ti­on with our part­ners, pri­ma­ri­ly with the United Sta­tes, Gre­at Bri­tain - when the Rus­si­ans start an offen­si­ve, they move in the clas­sic “soviet style” mas­si­ve head-on, fron­tal ass­ault. We are try­ing… As one Bri­tish gene­ral said, you can­not win over Rus­sia if you fight like a litt­le Russia.
Well, that’s why we are try­ing to act dif­fer­ent­ly, and becau­se of this, our counter-offensive ope­ra­ti­ons do not look as impres­si­ve as Rus­si­an ones— moved for­ward and cap­tu­red some ter­ri­to­ry but, by and lar­ge, as far as I under­stand, we are moving for­ward, moving for­ward in the south.
The goal is to libe­ra­te at least part of the Kher­son regi­on on the right bank of the Dnie­per. But, you know, the war taught me not to make projections.
What loo­ks like a suc­cess­ful offen­si­ve today may stop tomor­row. And what loo­ks like a small local ope­ra­ti­on can deve­lop into a large-scale offen­si­ve. So, we pray…
C: And what do you think about Cri­mea? Is Cri­mea an immedia­te goal right now or not?
K: No. I think Cri­mea is not an immedia­te ope­ra­tio­nal target.
C: But the­re are attacks, the­re are attacks. Yes, I know, and the­re is a sabo­ta­ge unit… the­re is intel­li­gence, and the­re are sabo­ta­ge cases.
I am awa­re that some ope­ra­ti­ons are under­way the­re at the moment as well. And I see that the­re are also many intel­li­gence peop­le in Russia.
*cut* [A very obvious one, so I’m indi­ca­ting it]
K: But, for examp­le, if you ask me who is blowing up some­thing in Cri­mea or Bel­go­rod, then in a pri­va­te con­ver­sa­ti­on, to the extent of how pri­va­te a Zoom call can be, I will tell you that yes, it’s us.
Well, first­ly, Cri­mea is a source of ammu­ni­ti­on for the Rus­si­an army in Ukrai­ne and an air base for their air­craft from which they per­form sorties.
Accord­in­gly, the dest­ruc­tion of bases, ammu­ni­ti­on depots, and avia­ti­on in Cri­mea has a direct impact on our com­bat rea­di­ness, Russia’s com­bat rea­di­ness on the main­land part of Ukraine.
That is, this has a defi­ni­te mili­ta­ry pur­po­se. Moreo­ver, it also has a psy­cho­lo­gi­cal goal as it sends a very clear signal that the­re are no untouch­a­ble ter­ri­to­ries. But the­re is no goal to libe­ra­te Cri­mea, say wit­hin a mon­th, this is not about that. Now we are tal­king about under­mi­ning the com­bat capa­bi­li­ty of the main Rus­si­an tro­ops deploy­ed, which are figh­t­ing in the main­land part of Ukrai­ne, and about the psy­cho­lo­gi­cal effect, a clear signal that we will return, we have alrea­dy retur­ned with wea­pons, and after that we will return with troops.
C: How can we help you? What can our coun­try do?
K: I think the­re are two mat­ters… three mat­ters whe­re the United Sta­tes should con­ti­nue to have the lea­ding role. I say “con­ti­nue” becau­se, well, objec­tively, no one has done more than the United Sta­tes. That is, the first mat­ter is, of cour­se, wea­pons. And it seems to me that the United Sta­tes should now over­co­me their psy­cho­lo­gi­cal bar­ri­er. I just can­not exp­lain their refu­sal with ano­t­her ratio­na­le behind it. They should pro­vi­de wea­pons to Ukrai­ne in one of the fol­lowing aid packa­ges… at least announ­ce the trans­fer to Ukrai­ne of the Patri­ot air defen­se sys­tems and long-range mis­si­les in one of the fol­lowing packages.
That is, we gua­ran­tee that we will not use them against the ter­ri­to­ry of the Rus­si­an Fede­ra­ti­on, but if we have them, then we will be able to shoot through the occu­p­ied ter­ri­to­ries of Ukrai­ne to the maxi­mum depth, des­troy­ing Rus­si­an reser­ves there.
Well, the third thing in the long term is, of cour­se, the Abrams tanks. Even some old ones, we will glad­ly take them. But we see that some­whe­re in Washing­ton, well, we suspect whe­re spe­ci­fi­cal­ly, they are blo­cking the­se sup­plies. You can pro­vi­de HIMARS sys­tems, but for some rea­son you can­not pro­vi­de Patri­ots. Alt­hough, so to say, three mon­ths ago you could not sup­ply HIMARS sys­tems either.
The second mat­ter is, of cour­se, to desi­gna­te Rus­sia as a sta­te spon­sor of ter­ro­rism. It would be very, very serious and a power­ful deter­rent fac­tor, a deter­rent step against Rus­sia, it would be the best way to stop and, so to say, demo­ti­va­te inter­na­tio­nal tra­ding com­pa­nies from cir­cum­ven­ting sanctions,
becau­se they would all bear the risk of secon­da­ry sanc­tions to be impo­sed by the United Sta­tes. Third­ly, the third mat­ter is, of cour­se, macro-financial sup­port for the eco­no­my becau­se you can only fight as long as you have money, money for the war. The mobilization…
C: Well, what is your take on the cur­rent situa­ti­on? You… How long will your reser­ves last you?
I think that with the cur­rent… with the money alrea­dy pro­mi­sed to us by the United Sta­tes, the Euro­pean Uni­on as a uni­on and a num­ber of coun­tries of the Euro­pean Uni­on indi­vi­du­al­ly, we will hold out till the end of the year more or less.
Well, we will be able to main­tain the finan­cial balan­ce, but after that we will need to enter the IMF pro­gram. That is, in fact, the part­ners finan­ce us till the end of the year, and we must use this time till the end of the year to fina­li­ze the pro­gram with the IMF and have a large-scale IMF pro­gram next year.

(Vor­sicht, die inhalt­li­che Inte­gri­tät der in den Vide­os zur Ver­fü­gung gestell­ten Unter­ti­tel kann von mir nicht geprüft werden.)

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