Fiona cares to interject

04. Dezember 2024

Panel Inter­view of the his­to­ri­ans that have eaten the con­text by the spoon­fulls society.

Luci­an Kim, Kennan Insti­tu­te pres­ents his new book.

Fio­na Hill, intro­du­ces him to the public, as one of her main sources, then wat­ches over his statements.

Luci­an Kim, then starts to give a his­to­ri­cal rundown, of how the war came to be.

Here is the struc­tu­re of his argument:

I remind you, not my words, his.

- Ever­ything was swell the bor­der was open, peop­le went back and forth bet­ween rus­sia and ukrai­ne, peop­le had a jol­ly good time.
- Then Selen­skyj was voted into power. At first, he was seen as a rus­si­an tool, becau­se he wan­ted to make a deal with rus­sia, but then his views chan­ged. [No rea­son named, why his views chan­ged, well some ULTRANATIONALIST pro­tests out­si­des of some government buil­dings may­be - I’ve heard tho­se can, on occa­si­on, ruin your day! On Fran­ce 24. By a docu­men­ta­ry filmma­ker. *cough* (link not at hand, but it was one of tho­se 4 pun­dits and a mode­ra­tor deba­te panels they do, with the only intel­li­gent mode­ra­tor, go and find it for me, plea­se - it was this year, only a few weeks, may­be mon­ths ago)]
- Then of cour­se Selen­skyj HAD to reneg on Misnk II he sim­ply had to ren­ego­tia­te the agreement.
- But Putin didnt want to ren­ego­tia­te Minsk II, part­ly becau­se of Sevas­to­pol whe­re the rus­si­an fleet was sta­tio­ned, which was of stra­te­gi­cal impor­t­ance in his thinking.
- So Ukrai­ne didnt want to fol­low the Minsk II agree­ments, while rus­sia was in vio­la­ti­on [chan­ge of argu­ment, pre­vious­ly Selen­skyj wan­ted to reneg Minsk II], the­re was no rea­son for Ukrai­ne to ful­fill Minsk II.
- Then Putin used the troop move­ments as a pres­su­re tactic
- Then Selen­skyj put Wik­tor Med­wedt­schuk under House arrest, so rus­sia lost all of its remai­ning soft power.
- Also about 5 minu­tes ear­lier: Putins decisi­on to attack was made at some point in 2021, Putin didnt want this war to go on for over 3 years, thats why he cal­led it a spe­cial mili­ta­ry ope­ra­ti­on [again not my words, Luci­an Kim]

AT THAT POINT FIONA CARES TO INTERJECT.

Yes, you see - the­re are many things peop­le see as rea­sons for why various deve­lo­p­ments hap­pen­ed sin­ce 2014 [we were in the years 2021-2022 in the retel­ling of the sto­ry, mind you], and Putins rea­so­ning shifted [names them, then dis­re­gards them as not important], but the­re also is some­thing evo­lu­tio­na­ry, not devo­lu­tio­na­ry about Putin, becau­se look at what Putin said about the histo­ry, how do you think his idea of histo­ry was shifted!?!=?!?! Are the­re peop­le who shaped that?

And now quote:

Luci­an Kim: “Thats a gre­at ques­ti­on! Of cour­se ever­yo­ne is always try­ing to get into Putins mind. [no, not ever­yo­ne - just Fio­na], but if you think about whe­re Putin was when he star­ted his term in office and whe­re his mind was in 2022, when he star­ted, Putin was thought of as a prag­ma­tic lea­der, insi­de of rus­sia, but also, cer­tain­ly in Ukrai­ne, he was actual­ly a very popu­lar poli­ti­ci­an in Ukrai­ne, and cer­tain­ly in the West peop­le thought of him as someo­ne you could make deals with, mutual­ly bene­fi­cial deals with, and it appears that Putin was inte­res­ted in some sort of natio­nal revi­val […] and what I try to descri­be in my book, one of the cha­rac­ters that came into play here was Igor Gir­kin, for­mer FSB offi­cer, that play­ed a key role in the take­over of Cri­mea, and in forming the ins­er­gen­cy in the Don­bas, and I descri­be him as - ahm, an ULTRANATIONALIST, someo­ne belie­ving in rus­si­an auto­cra­cy, in rus­si­an empi­re, .. and even at that time, he was a freak, and he was used by the Krem­lin, he was used as a use­full figu­re by the Krem­lin, and even beca­me the defen­se minis­ter of the socal­led Donezk Repu­blic [WOOW! LOOK AT THIS THOUGHT LEADER! (Krem­lin pup­pet)] and when the Krem­lin didnt need him, they dro­ped him, they made clear, that he was doing his own thing, and the sepe­ra­tists in the Don­bas nee­ded their own sepa­ra­tist lea­ders… And at that time Gir­kin was a freak on the frin­ges (2014) […] and at the end of that peo­ri­od he would actual­ly say a lot of things, that Ale­xej Nawal­ny would say, natio­nal revi­val of rus­sia, … I descri­be Putin going across the spec­trum. We are all in this spec­trum of rus­si­an natio­na­lism. But going from Ale­xej Nawal­ny who had a euro­pean visi­on over to Gir­kin, who had the visi­on of empi­re … […] Thats how I would descri­be his [Putins] path.

REASON GIVEN: NONE WHATSOEVER

Let me inter­ject for a moment here, in Octo­ber of 2021 Ukrai­ne was using US deli­ve­r­ed Jave­lins in the Don­bas, and gave US Mili­ta­ry jour­nals inter­views, that they were high­ly effec­ti­ve at figh­t­ing the sepa­ra­tists there.

Which Chom­sky made sur­face as an argu­ment in the inter­na­tio­nal debate.

22. 11. 2021: the-drive.com (some mili­ta­ry news web­site): Ukrai­ni­an Tro­ops Have Been Firing American-Made Jave­lin Mis­si­les At Russian-Backed Forces
Ukrai­ni­an Bri­ga­dier Gene­ral Kyry­lo Buda­nov tal­ked about the ope­ra­tio­nal use of Jave­lins as part of a recent inter­view with Mili­ta­ry Times, which he con­duc­ted through an inter­pre­ter. Buda­nov, who runs the Chief Direc­to­ra­te of Intel­li­gence of the Minis­try of Defence of Ukrai­ne, also known by its Ukrai­ni­an acro­nym GUR MOU, used the oppor­tu­ni­ty to call for more help from the U.S. government as he sound­ed like the alarm about the Kremlin’s unusu­al deploy­ments of lar­ge num­bers of mili­ta­ry units to are­as oppo­si­te Russia’s bor­ders with Ukrai­ne in recent weeks.

src: click

That enough of a rea­son? I mean, losing all soft pres­su­re tools, having the mili­ta­ry pres­su­re of units at the bor­der not work, and fore­see­ab­ly losing the Don­bas to Ukrai­ni­an tro­ops, becau­se they used US made Jave­lins for the first time? In the Don­bas. Whe­re Gir­kin form­er­ly was the rus­si­an instal­led “defen­se minis­ter”? Becau­se of yeah, that thing, that stra­te­gic impor­t­ance of Sevas­to­pol you men­tio­ned ear­lier.… (Cri­mea can not be secu­red, when Ukrai­ne holds the Don­bas -- Sluice Gates, all water nee­ded for irri­ga­ti­on (grain, corn, ..) are in the Don­bas.) And Ukrai­ne didnt want to stop after regai­ning the Don­bas. Kin­da obviously.

Yeah just lets not men­ti­on that the mili­ta­ry power balan­ce was over­tur­ned (rus­si­an backed sepe­ra­tists, not the full rus­si­an Army against the Ukrai­ni­an Army, now with Jave­lins, no big­gy… It was just the for­mer Ukrai­ni­an Defen­se minis­ter who said the fol­lowing on 24.11.2019

The aid, inclu­ding counter-artillery bat­te­ry radar, night-vision gear and patrol boats, has sin­ce [in the later parts of the Trump admi­nis­tra­ti­on] been unf­ro­zen and is making a real dif­fe­rence to Ukrai­ni­an for­ces figh­t­ing Russian-backed sepa­ra­tists in eas­tern districts.

But it is the Jave­lin which appears to be a game-changer, Ukraine’s defence minis­ter told CBC News.

In cer­tain are­as, they can make a cri­ti­cal dif­fe­rence,” said Andriy Zagorodnyuk.

src: click)

-- oh and by the way - they werent allo­wed to use tho­se Jave­lins until the US clea­red them for use insi­de of Ukrai­ne, even when rus­sia hadnt inva­ded (“offi­cial­ly”) in Decem­ber of 2021. Yeah, I have no Idea, why Gur­kin could sud­den­ly con­vin­ce Putin, that the Krem­lin should chan­ge strategy, …

No idea, whatsoever.…

That fac­to­id, just slip­ped my mind.

And Luci­an Kims, for that matter.

During a pho­ne con­ver­sa­ti­on on 2 Janu­a­ry 2022 bet­ween the US and Ukrai­ni­an pre­si­dents, Pre­si­dent Biden decla­red that the US and its allies ‘will respond decisi­ve­ly if Rus­sia fur­ther inva­des Ukrai­ne’. Alrea­dy during his can­di­da­cy, Joe Biden was outs­po­ken about Ukraine’s role in US for­eign poli­cy and ack­now­led­ged the pos­si­bi­li­ty of pro­vi­ding secu­ri­ty assi­s­tance and wea­pons. Pre­si­dent Zelen­skyy visi­ted Washing­ton in Sep­tem­ber 2021 and met Pre­si­dent Biden. The Joint State­ment on the US-Ukraine Stra­te­gic Part­ners­hip reaf­fir­med US sup­port for ‘Ukraine’s right to deci­de its own future for­eign poli­cy cour­se free from out­side inter­fe­rence, inclu­ding with respect to Ukraine’s aspi­ra­ti­ons to join NATO’. Moreo­ver, Pre­si­dent Biden announ­ced a US$60 mil­li­on secu­ri­ty assi­s­tance packa­ge, inclu­ding addi­tio­nal Jave­lin anti-armour sys­tems and forth­co­m­ing joint hard­ware pro­duc­tion through Ukro­boron­prom. Washing­ton reco­gni­s­es Ukrai­ne as ‘cen­tral to the glo­bal strugg­le bet­ween demo­cra­cy and auto­cra­cy’. In late Decem­ber 2021, defen­si­ve mili­ta­ry aid worth US$200 mil­li­on was appro­ved, with deli­ve­ries alrea­dy arri­ving. In Janu­a­ry 2022, the US appro­ved the sen­ding of American-made anti-tank and anti-aircraft mis­si­les to Ukrai­ne by the Bal­tic States.

src: EU Par­lia­ment Brie­fing “EU-Ukraine rela­ti­ons and the security
situa­ti­on in the coun­try” 02.02.2022

edit: On the point, that Putins goal with the mili­ta­ry inva­si­on was to install a pup­pet can­di­da­te in Kiew, I agree. Might likely still be his goal (sabo­ta­ge the inde­pen­dence of Ukrai­ne). But. Ukrai­ne with Odes­sa and the Donau har­bors can pos­si­b­ly retain inde­pen­dence eco­no­mi­c­al­ly. Issue then beco­mes, mili­ta­ry pres­su­re, mili­ta­ry con­trol over black sea tra­de, and soft power influ­ence over a “for­ced neu­tral” Ukrai­ne. All but the last one can be sol­ved by secu­ri­ty gua­ran­ties. Last one could be sol­ved by “par­ti­al Ukrai­ne” beco­m­ing a mem­ber of NATO and the EU, but not if Selen­skyj keeps insis­ting, only the ent­i­re Ukrai­ne can beco­me part of NATO.

edit: Ers­te Publi­kums­fra­ge von Nata­li­ya Gume­nyuk (1|2)! Mei­ne güte Zufäl­le gibts! Ich glau­be das wur­de von Russ­land sicher posi­tiv gelesen!

edit2: Atlan­tic Coun­cil BLEH from June 20 2024, on why Ukrai­ne REALLY needs the Don­bas. If you havent gues­sed it by now, its becau­se of Hilter…

Of cour­se, the­re is an oce­an of sus­pi­ci­on bet­ween Moscow and Kyiv. Ukrai­ne deeply distrusts Rus­sia, as Russia’s 2014 sei­zu­re of Cri­mea, sup­port for the Don­bas insur­gen­cy, and 2022 full-scale inva­si­on of Ukrai­ne vio­la­te the 1994 Buda­pest Memo­ran­dum, in which Rus­sia agreed to respect Ukraine’s bor­ders and sovereignty. 

Worse, some pos­si­ble peace terms, such as gran­ting Rus­sia per­ma­nent con­trol of the eco­no­mi­c­al­ly valu­able and mili­ta­ri­ly important Don­bas regi­on, would shift the balan­ce of power in Russia’s favor. Ukrai­ne would be espe­cial­ly unli­kely to accept this kind of deal, becau­se it would expand a streng­t­he­ned Russia’s incen­ti­ves to break the deal down the line. This was one rea­son why Chur­chill refu­sed to nego­tia­te, as he fea­red that Nazi lea­der Adolf Hit­ler would demand Bri­tish colo­nies and naval dis­ar­ma­ment in any peace deal, lea­ving Bri­tain hel­pless to resist even­tu­al Ger­man deman­ds for total Bri­tish capitulation.

src: click









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