Ok, thats not good.

10. Juni 2024

Gus­tav Gres­sel by now is arguing like a Cas­san­dra with a death wish.

His arguing remains strin­gent, whe­re smal­ler defi­ned sec­to­ral aspects are con­ce­rend, but it ven­tures into tal­king the same way about sce­n­a­ri­os that might unfold in the future. (He doesnt always do that, but he does in the Chi­na will attack Tai­wan sce­n­a­rio, which he is almost cer­tain will be in our future - if Ukrai­ne doesnt win (or if it wins - it almost doesnt seem to mat­ter)). Thats not the main issue though - many peop­le do - but Gres­sel in his argu­ments sug­gests a cer­tain­ty thats not actual­ly the­re when he jumps the big­ger logic gaps. Whats more worry­ing is, that his arguing seems to resort from a “pre­ven­ti­on of geno­ci­de” stance - thats emotionally/depression dri­ven -- and then natu­ral­ly gra­vi­ta­te to a “I’ll argue up ever­ything thats nee­ded for a sce­n­a­rio whe­re the Ukrai­ne at least has a chan­ce to win - as the only real solution”.

So this seems to be how his argu­ment is structured.

The­re are other “fixed points” in his arguing, that are him copy­ing US for­eign poli­ti­cal stances/worries in regards to Chi­na - and just becau­se of a belie­ve in tho­se - rai­ses a sub­jec­ti­ve risk level -- which then rules out sce­n­a­ri­os like a fro­zen con­flict for him, becau­se it would beco­me more ris­ky over time, with the US pivo­ting to the Indopacific.

And from that he goes strai­ght into “emo­tio­nal­ly felt” arguing of “pre­ven­ting geno­ci­de” again, whe­re “Ukrai­ne would not gain much by a draw - becau­se of all the atro­ci­ties hap­pe­ning in the occu­p­ied territories.

So he does this stran­ge loop, whe­re US for­eign poli­cy worries beco­me truth, and this rai­ses the built in risk for a nego­tia­ted solu­ti­on sub­stan­ti­al­ly over time - for both a “both sides dont win sce­n­a­rio”, and a rus­sia wins sce­n­a­rio - and that still would mean the occu­p­ied ter­ri­to­ries arent “freed”, so if we’d do ever­ything to pro­long the war - the Ukrai­ne at least still has a figh­t­ing chance…

And then, when arguing for the figh­t­ing chan­ce - he has almost no argu­ments rea­dy - so its “it might work, becau­se it can work” not­hing based on num­bers, effec­ti­ve man­power strength, pro­duc­tion rates -- thats all stuff he fluffs on (or wis­hes to know by the end of this year), so in essence - he doesnt want to think or ague about (qui­te yet) - but its his main argument…

- a simi­lar thing is hap­pe­ning here:

Whe­re Micha­el Kof­man ser­ves about the same role.

The out is dif­fe­rent, but the func­tion wit­hin the dis­cus­sion is the same.

So every time, when someo­ne ven­tures into a more for­ward inter­pre­ta­ti­on of a con­flict reso­lu­ti­on thats not “fight until ukrai­ne wins” -- Kof­man pulls out the -- but if Rus­sia wins, or isnt punis­hed for going against the rule of law here, Chi­na will go to war too card, and we cant let that happen.

Both are based on presump­ti­ons of the future, which are not strai­ght for­ward, or easi­ly deter­mi­na­ti­ve. They are essen­ti­al­ly fears that get chan­n­eled - becau­se of US poli­cy worries. (The rami­fi­ca­ti­ons do not only affect the US they affect us in euro­pe as well - but the nar­ra­ti­ve ori­gi­na­ted in the US).

The argu­ments made by both to “bridge” that gap into the “likely future sce­n­a­rio” are not strai­ght for­ward logic any­mo­re - they are “belie­ves” - in both cases. From which then cer­tain pro­ba­bi­li­ty assess­ments are drawn.

In the end Gres­sel seems to argue most­ly toward “we need to pre­vent fur­ther geno­ci­de - any way we can” - and risk miti­ga­ti­on means, sup­port Ukrai­ne so it can win - becau­se more long term sce­n­a­ri­os car­ry too much risk, when it comes to estab­li­shing peace trough some sort of deter­rent for 10 years or lon­ger -- which Gres­sel then com­bi­nes with, “we have to con­ti­nue any­ways - becau­se geno­ci­de that will fol­low in other sce­n­a­ri­os (aka - when not all of Ukrai­ne is freed)”.

And Kof­man in the end argues from a “secu­ri­ty gua­ran­tees are hard to give” “becau­se we might need fur­ther assets in the indo paci­fic in the future” stance, arguing that war needs to be pro­lon­ged, to redu­ce the risk of chi­na attacking Tai­wan - which is qui­te the logic jump. And very much detached from the pro­blem at hand.

So - if both of tho­se argu­ments are pret­ty “loo­py” and more or less self ful­fil­ling gam­bits for kee­ping the war run­ning for lon­ger, regard­less of anything that actual­ly happens…

I very much think, that we need peop­le who work on dif­fe­rent sce­n­a­ri­os, right about now…

Kind of - this approach:

15.20 Uhr: Frie­dens­for­scher - Ukrai­ne braucht ver­läss­li­che Sicherheitsgarantien
Frie­dens­for­scher raten zu ver­läss­li­chen Sicher­heits­ga­ran­tien des Wes­tens für die von Russ­land über­fal­le­ne Ukrai­ne. Dies sei Vor­aus­set­zung dafür, dass das Land mit­tel­fris­tig Frie­dens­ver­hand­lun­gen mit Russ­land auf­neh­men kön­ne, heißt es in ihrem heu­te in Ber­lin ver­öf­fent­lich­ten Frie­dens­gut­ach­ten 2024. Die Wis­sen­schaft­ler emp­feh­len, mili­tä­ri­sche Logik und diplo­ma­ti­sche Ansät­ze klug mit­ein­an­der zu ver­zah­nen, den Druck auf Russ­land etwa in Form von Sank­tio­nen auf­recht­zu­er­hal­ten und die Ukrai­ne wei­ter­hin mili­tä­risch zu unter­stüt­zen. Sie teil­ten dazu mit: “Schon jetzt soll­ten Form und Inhalt von Frie­dens­ver­hand­lun­gen vor­be­rei­tet und etwai­ge Dritt­par­tei­en aus­ge­lo­tet werden.”

src: click

Alt­hough without pre­de­fi­ned out­co­mes. Just talk about tho­se things, let peop­le come in con­ta­ct with tho­se sets of argu­ments again… (Secu­ri­ty gua­ran­ties have an impor­t­ance thats hig­her than that - I know.) 

Sad­ly - Switz­er­land doesnt seem to be the plat­form to initia­te that - 


But - some­thing has to chan­ge here…

The qua­li­ty of the arguing for why we NEED a pro­longued war - is pret­ty bad right now - just loo­king at the inter­nal logic of the arguing.

Gres­sel seems to be emo­tio­nal­ly dri­ven to “save ukrai­ni­an peop­le” and do ever­ything to redu­ce “the pro­ba­bi­li­ty of a cata­stro­phic secu­ri­ty fail­u­re ten years down the road, once chi­na attacks tai­wan, and or rus­sia attacks again” -- but the arguing on how Ukrai­ne might do this - and what a “Ukrai­ne wins” sce­n­a­rio loo­ks like (will rus­sia rearm again, will it split, will it descend into cha­os, what time frame would be nee­ded, …) is basi­cal­ly not the­re. So the dri­ve seems emo­tio­nal, ver­ging on not rational.

And Kof­man is just anke­ring the “if rus­sia gets away with this (which can mean neit­her side wins, or rus­sia wins sce­n­a­ri­os equal­ly)” argu­ment over and over again, the likel­y­hood of a US Chi­na war incre­a­ses - so Ukrai­ne has to fight on. And thats bad, becau­se it alrea­dy is ent­i­re­ly deco­u­pled from the con­flict at hand, and pro­jec­ting some­thing thats not easi­ly projectable.

So both at least in some sen­se are kind of insane…?

You can step out of that kind of zero sum logic - do they know that?

Gres­sel seems to real­ly real­ly belie­ve what he’s come up with (I cant judge the “risk of rus­sia wan­ting to esca­la­te mili­ta­ri­ly again - after a nego­tia­ted solu­ti­on” thats very pro­mi­nent in one part of his thin­king -- I have to admit).

Kof­man seems to be a vic­tim of “felt self impor­t­ance” as in hes heard the argu­ment a cou­p­le of times, hes repeated the argu­ment a cou­p­le of times, and now he real­ly likes it. But he has to use bra­va­do to con­vin­ce others, that this is the likely out­co­me we are ine­vi­ta­b­ly loo­king at. So could also be the case of has fal­len vic­tim to propaganda.

Jud­ging the “risk” of a “the war in ukrai­ne cant end with a nego­tia­ti­on, or a win for rus­sia, becau­se then the US is more likely to be drawn into a war in the indo paci­fic” sce­n­a­rio is more likely. Its pret­ty much insane.

It sees the world through a “mili­ta­ry opti­ons only”, and lea­ders are emo­tio­nal­ly dri­ven by vic­to­ries only lens - and then he moves half­way across the oce­an an argues, for the pro­lon­ging of a war in a dif­fe­rent hemi­s­phe­re for that rea­son. Pret­ty insane..

So - get the main experts on the topic some rest, and bring in other peop­le, may­be…? Asi­de from that Ukrai­ne seems to belie­ve, that any loss will be equal to them sei­z­ing to exist right now (- at least in the pre­si­dents mind, which doesnt mean much, but still)…

Neit­her of them seems to be out­right be put­ting out pro­pa­gan­da here - both of tho­se are stron­gly held believes.

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