TIME Magazine editor Ian Bremmer hat Propaganda entdeckt

08. Juli 2024

Mode­ra­tor (Intro): “Which side will back down first, the US and its Euro­pean allies are pro­vi­ding Ukrai­ne with money with wea­pons mili­ta­ry trai­ning and intel­li­gence sup­port, on the other side Rus­sia is insis­ting on a buf­fer zone along eas­tern Ukrai­ne and wants Kiev to aban­don aspi­ra­ti­ons of mem­bers­hip in the NATO alli­an­ce - so what does all this mean for Ukrai­ne and its future and how many more mon­ths or years of figh­t­ing befo­re both sides will sit down at a nego­tia­ting table? Today we’­re tal­king with Ian Brem­mer, pre­si­dent of the glo­bal poli­ti­cal risk firm Eura­sia group and edi­tor at lar­ge at Time Maga­zi­ne. Ian thank you so much for joi­ning us.”


Ian Brem­mer: “I think that the Rus­si­ans cer­tain­ly they’­re occu­p­y­ing a lot of Ukrai­ni­an ter­ri­to­ry ille­gal­ly. They have no right to occu­py it uh but uh the ukrai­ni­ans don’t have the capa­ci­ty to remo­ve them, so I if you’­re just loo­king at Ukrai­ne its­elf uh you would say that the Rus­si­ans are quo­te unquo­te win­ning, or cer­tain­ly the ukrai­ni­ans are losing more uh if you look at the world uh and you look at the fact that Putin just made his trip to North Korea becau­se Kim Jong-un and the Ira­ni­an supre­me lea­der are the only coun­tries in the world that are wil­ling to pro­vi­de direct mili­ta­ry assi­s­tance um to the Rus­si­ans uh and you see the hund­reds of bil­li­ons of Rus­si­an assets that have been fro­zen and now incre­a­singly func­tio­n­al­ly sei­zed uh and you see the impact of a stron­ger expan­ded NATO you would cer­tain­ly say the Rus­si­ans are losing glo­bal­ly. I mean they they are in a much worse posi­ti­on as a coun­try as a mili­ta­ry as an eco­no­my today than they were on Febru­a­ry 22nd uh you know befo­re they star­ted uh this uh mas­si­ve inva­si­on of Ukrai­ne um so I mean it’s a com­pli­ca­ted ques­ti­on uh but thus far you know it’s the ukrai­ni­ans who who have of cour­se the most chal­len­ging posi­ti­on uh in the war.”

Mode­ra­tor: “Given the steps that we were taking by way of sanc­tions and what­not befo­re, given the iso­la­ti­on we thought we were crea­ting for Rus­sia has­n’t it real­ly out­per­for­med most of our uh Wes­tern pes­si­mistic um pre­scrip­ti­ons or ana­ly­sis of Rus­si­an decline?”

Brem­mer: “Not real­ly uh I mean look I I I take your point Ste­ve, I think you’­re right that um in the west uh peop­le want to see Rus­sia fail and the­re­fo­re they por­tray Rus­sia as fai­ling and of cour­se it should be almost defi­ni­tio­nal that if your ana­ly­sis neat­ly uh lines up with what you want to see hap­pe­ning you should throw your ana­ly­sis in the bin becau­se it’s pro­pa­gan­da right, I mean that’s that’s never the case uh life is always more com­pli­ca­ted now uh it is the real issue um the Rus­si­an Rus­sia right now has a war eco­no­my and they’­ve lost you know rough­ly a mil­li­on able-bodied men uh sca­red of the draft uh who have been tra­ve­ling to coun­tries like the Emi­ra­tes and Arme­nia and Geor­gia and any­whe­re they can go which of cour­se real­ly hurts the Rus­si­an eco­no­my long term this is if you look under the hood of the Rus­si­an eco­no­my uh this this is a coun­try that is not doing well but but the wil­ling­ness of the United Sta­tes and Euro­pe to take eco­no­mic pain to hurt the Rus­si­ans is mini­mal, it’s mini­mal. So I mean you’­ve got sanc­tions but tho­se sanc­tions are not stop­ping the Rus­si­ans from expor­ting um oil um and gas to most of the world uh at a dis­count becau­se the West knows, that if they were to try to stop the Rus­si­ans from expor­ting to India and Chi­na and and cer­tain­ly the Ame­ri­cans and Euro­peans have the capa­ci­ty to put the secon­da­ry sanc­tions on to make that hap­pen, but it would lead to a glo­bal reces­si­on which the US and the Euro­peans don’t want. If you cut off the ura­ni­um then who’s going to fuel the nuclear reac­tors in the west the Ame­ri­cans are still buy­ing ura­ni­um from Rus­sia if you cut off the food and the fer­ti­li­zer then you’­re going to see a lot more star­va­ti­on in the glo­bal South, which the Ame­ri­cans and the Euro­peans don’t want, so the rea­li­ty is - the wil­ling­ness of the Ame­ri­cans and Euro­peans to punish the Rus­si­ans eco­no­mi­c­al­ly is sur­pri­sin­gly limi­ted, given the rhe­to­ric. It’s under­stand­a­ble but it’s limi­ted and in that con­text the Rus­si­ans of cour­se have a much lon­ger leash on being able to con­ti­nue to pro­se­cu­te this war against a much smal­ler much wea­ker Ukrai­ne. I mean the sur­pri­se has been that the ukrai­ni­ans have been able to get a bunch of their land back and fight the Rus­si­ans to a standstill. Some of that is Ukrai­ni­an um you know sort of uh wil­ling­ness, mora­le, becau­se they’­re figh­t­ing for their land and the Rus­si­ans aren’t, I mean the Rus­si­ans are essen­ti­al­ly figh­t­ing as mer­ce­n­a­ries right and part of it has been the wil­ling­ness of the West to con­ti­nue to pro­vi­de a sur­pri­sing amount of money, Aid and Mili­ta­ry Sup­port direct­ly for Ukrai­ne um and and that of cour­se we’­ve seen the the grea­ter wil­ling­ness over time of of NATO to do things that they would have con­si­de­red red lines even mon­ths ago.”

Mode­ra­tor: “Is the­re a wob­b­li­ness right now both insi­de Euro­pe and also in the United Sta­tes frank­ly that makes the sus­taina­bi­li­ty of this posi­ti­on uh some­thing that might play into Putin’s hands gene­ral­ly speaking?”

Brem­mer: “The far­t­her you are from Rus­sia the less you care right, I think that that’s not sur­pri­sing uh and the lon­ger the war goes on the more other things like the US elec­tion, like the war in the Midd­le East uh go to the head­lines and cer­tain­ly if you talk to the Biden Admi­nis­tra­ti­on they’­ve been spen­ding more time in the last eight mon­ths on the Midd­le East, the seni­or most offi­cials across the board than they have on Russia/Ukraine so I mean that that that of cour­se also plays a role now the Euro­peans it may sur­pri­se you uh Ste­ve the Euro­peans over­all are pro­vi­ding more money they’­re spen­ding more on Ukrai­ne than the Ame­ri­cans are um and again you know that stands to rea­son they have much more to lose uh but it is true that it took some six mon­ths for the Ame­ri­cans to get that $61 bil­li­on packa­ge through it did have very strong bipar­ti­san sup­port from The Ame­ri­cans on the Demo­cra­tic and Repu­bli­can side but no gua­ran­tees that would con­ti­nue cer­tain­ly not under a Trump Admi­nis­tra­ti­on and poten­ti­al­ly not even under a Biden Admi­nis­tra­ti­on. It’s also get­ting a lot har­der for the ukrai­ni­ans to con­ti­nue to rai­se young men to be able and wil­ling to fight and to train them uh to be on the front lines Ukrai­ne is a much smal­ler popu­la­ti­on than Rus­sia it’s also a demo­cra­cy. Russia’s an aut­ho­ri­ta­ri­an regime it’s much easier for Rus­sia to enga­ge in for­ced uh human traf­fi­cking um and to take eth­nic mino­ri­ties from the midd­le Vol­ga Sibe­ri­an for­ce them to fight much easier for them to take peop­le from pri­son, for­ce them to fight, ukrai­ni­ans have a har­der time doing that and it’s a much smal­ler coun­try so for many rea­sons if you look over 2025, you would say pro­bab­ly the ukrai­ni­ans are going to have a har­der time main­tai­ning the pre­sent front lines, than the Rus­si­ans are going to have uh the Rus­si­ans are going to have an easier time taking more land. I think peop­le are worried about that and you also see with the­se the most recent so-called peace uh mee­ting in Switz­er­land that you know the­re were fewer coun­tries that atten­ded um and the glo­bal South, a num­ber of core coun­tries like India for examp­le like Chi­na did­n’t sign on or did­n’t show up um to the even­tu­al memo­ran­dum of agree­ment. As the war per­sists, you know, ukrai­ni­ans are get­ting more skit­tish about figh­t­ing it and the rest of the world is moving more towards “we need a cease­fire” so of cour­se if you’­re Putin you you under­stand that play­ing the long game is an advan­ta­ge for you uh which which means that the desi­re of the West to make Ukrai­ne appe­ar stron­ger and and able to dama­ge Rus­sia, but at some point move towards nego­tia­ti­ons um I think is is in their inte­rest you know.”

Mode­ra­tor: “NATO’s Secreta­ry Gene­ral Jens Stol­ten­berg recent­ly said, the­se efforts, the­se recent efforts do not make NATO a par­ty to the con­flict, but they will enhan­ce our sup­port to Ukrai­ne to uphold its right to self-defense. So the­re seems to be a lot of thea­ter around whe­ther NATO is par­ty to the con­flict, not par­ty to the con­flict, even though many EU mem­ber sta­tes that are mem­bers of NATO are pro­vi­ding the­se wea­pons and sup­port and even though Ukrai­ne is going to be a very hot topic right at the cen­ter of the NATO uh Sum­mit here in Washing­ton, I’m just inte­res­ted par­ti­cu­lar­ly as we’­ve seen new arma­ments going into Ukrai­ne that can be used for long-term hits insi­de Rus­sia, how long that fic­tion is going to last.”

Brem­mer: “Um you know it’s true that the­re are no boots on the ground um that you know NATO is not firing the­se wea­pons direct­ly, but they’­re pro­vi­ding the wea­pons, they’­re allowing the ukrai­ni­ans to use them uh on Rus­sia direct­ly in respon­se to Rus­si­an inva­si­on of Ukrai­ne, so I mean I think it’s clear that it’s beco­m­ing a pro­xy war um and it’s also clear that NATO is hea­vi­ly and direct­ly inves­ted in Ukrai­ne being able to defend them­sel­ves and take their land back so is it a fic­tion that NATO is not invol­ved? Yeah! That’s a fic­tion. Having said that is it a legi­ti­ma­te war for Rus­sia? No. I mean when Rus­sia says how dare you attack Cri­mea and we’­re going to bla­me you United Sta­tes for pro­vi­ding the attacks that that you know allo­wed the ukrai­ni­ans to hit Cri­mea… Cri­mea is Ukrai­ni­an ter­ri­to­ry it was it was anne­xed ille­gal­ly by the Rus­si­ans so I mean, you know the fact that the Rus­si­ans are making you know the for­eign minis­ter Ser­gey Lav­rov is making that argu­ment you know just shows how much in bre­ach of inter­na­tio­nal law the the Rus­si­ans con­ti­nue to be, I mean the fact is that the North Kore­ans and Ira­ni­ans are two of the only coun­tries in the world that actual­ly sup­port Russia’s posi­ti­on in the war of Ukrai­ne. Chi­na does not. Chi­na tra­des with Rus­sia. China’s one of Russia’s best friends and yet the Chi­ne­se have con­sist­ent­ly said that they ful­ly respect Ukrai­ni­an ter­ri­to­ri­al Inte­gri­ty. The for­eign minis­ter has said that inclu­des Cri­mea, so I mean the fact is that the Rus­si­ans are figh­t­ing an ille­gi­ti­ma­te, ille­gal War and the fact that Ukrai­ne is not a mem­ber of NATO and has no way to get into nato in the near term makes them wea­ker, but but NATO is pro­vi­ding direct sup­port for Ukrai­ne in much the way that the Ame­ri­cans under Bush Seni­or were pro­vi­ding sup­port to Kuwait when Sad­dam Hussein’s Iraq ille­gal­ly inva­ded -- the big dif­fe­rence of cour­se is that Sad­dam Hussein’s Iraq was­n’t a nuclear power and was a hell of a lot mili­ta­ri­ly wea­ker so it was easy to push them out and over­run them that is not the case with Putin’s Russia.”

Mode­ra­tor “Is the­re any equa­ti­on that you’­re awa­re of that would allow NATO mem­bers to bring in a Ukrai­ne without defi­ned Bor­ders or without you know inter­na­tio­nal­ly accept bor­ders in what is still kind of poten­ti­al­ly a high con­flict zone?”

Brem­mer: “Look my my point here, Ste­ve, is is that I belie­ve that Ukrai­ne will be par­ti­tio­ned uh I don’t think the ukrai­ni­ans will will agree to that. I don’t think that you know the Inter­na­tio­nal Com­mu­ni­ty is going to sud­den­ly respect Rus­si­an sov­er­eig­n­ty over Ukrai­ni­an land but the rea­li­ty is they’­re not going to get their land back um there’s no way to do it uh the­re isn’t the will and I -- that that sad­dens me, I think it’s wrong but it’s rea­li­ty, it’s ana­ly­sis right, so if Ukrai­ne is going to be par­ti­tio­ned how do you give the ukrai­ni­ans a future that is both sta­ble and pro­duc­ti­ve for their peop­le, for their coun­try and you need to give them the money to rebuild num­ber one um after the dest­ruc­tion that has occur­red and the fact that Rus­si­an assets that have been fro­zen uh that are being sei­zed will be used for that recon­struc­tion is whol­ly appro­pria­te in my mind. You need to inte­gra­te Ukrai­ne ful­ly into the Euro­pean Uni­on, which will help them beco­me more a demo­cra­cy which will help them beco­me a stron­ger eco­no­my uh with rules rule of law um that and less cor­rup­ti­on uh that the rest of the world can do busi­ness with and you need some form of hard gua­ran­tees, hard gua­ran­tees that in the part of Ukrai­ne that Rus­sia has not occu­p­ied that that the West will defend the ukrai­ni­ans um as an ally and I don’t know exact­ly what part of Ukrai­ni­an ter­ri­to­ry that will be, will that be the who­le 80% that Rus­sia does­n’t occu­py right now, will it be some dimi­nis­hed pie­ce - but the­re has to be some abi­li­ty that ukrai­ni­ans know that going for­ward the Ame­ri­cans and the Allies real­ly have their back in a way that in 2014 and in 2022 they cer­tain­ly did not. NATO mem­bers­hip is the best way to even­tual­ly affect that in my view um but that can pro­bab­ly only occur when we have a cease­fire bet­ween Rus­sia and Ukrai­ne, that is not con­tin­gent but it none­theless is a rea­li­ty, so that that’s what I’m tal­king about Ste­ve. It can’t just be you know like the The Buda­pest memo­ran­dum, when the Ame­ri­cans and the Brits and the the Rus­si­ans all said oh if you give up your nuclear wea­pons we’ll make sure we defend you, but the there’s no gua­ran­tees the­re they gave up their nukes and then the Rus­si­ans inva­ded and the West was like oh well oh well right, I mean that real­ly under­mi­nes what a com­mit­ment from the United Sta­tes means I mean not Rus­sia becau­se no one takes their com­mit­ment serious­ly, but in princip­le an Ame­ri­can com­mit­ment should mean some­thing and to Ukrai­ne over the last cou­p­le deca­des it has not.”

Mode­ra­tor: “Ian if Donald Trump wins the pre­si­den­ti­al elec­tion in the United Sta­tes in Novem­ber, what does that mean for Ukrai­ne? In this equa­ti­on, well Donald Trump wants to end the war in Ukrai­ne and that means he will tell Selen­skyj: “You’­ve got to accept the pre­sent ter­ri­to­ri­al line or I’m not going to give you any more sup­port.”. So cease­fire, start nego­tia­ti­ons uh no more figh­t­ing and if the Rus­si­ans -- he will say the same thing uh you’­ve got to accept a cease­fire uh no move­ment of the ter­ri­to­ry um or or there’s going to be much tougher sanc­tions against you, real sanc­tions on the Cen­tral Bank uh, take them out of Swift uh for finan­cial tran­sac­tions the oil export we tal­ked about befo­re Robert O’Bri­en uh who was of cour­se Trump’s Natio­nal Secu­ri­ty advi­ser has been recent­ly opi­ning on that publicly but Trump and and team have been say­ing this pri­va­te­ly for mon­ths now. Now the the dif­fe­rence is that the ukrai­ni­ans are going to be deeply uncom­for­ta­ble with that rea­li­ty uh as will many Euro­peans, while Putin is much more likely to say - gre­at yeah I can, I’m wil­ling to have that con­ver­sa­ti­on so it it does essen­ti­al­ly uh give the the whe­re the Rus­si­ans have got­ten to more legi­ti­ma­cy than any other Ame­ri­can pre­si­dent demo­crat or repu­bli­can would accept.”

Mode­ra­tor: “You know rough­ly I mean I don’t want to missta­te you, but you know actual­ly - what you just defi­ned Trump is doing, seems to appro­xi­ma­te what you think will hap­pen in the end any­way, I mean it’s sort of - am I get­ting that wrong?”

Brem­mer: “Uh you’­re get­ting it wrong, becau­se um I think what Trump will do, will not be coor­di­na­ted with America’s allies uh Trump is a uni­la­te­ra­list, he does­n’t like a strong Euro­pe, he cer­tain­ly does­n’t want to work clo­se­ly with the EU, he lik­ed Bre­x­it, he -- when he speaks with Macron he’s like “when are you going to do a bre­x­it” - right? So Biden’s approach has been very much a mul­ti­la­te­ral approach that makes NATO stron­ger becau­se it coor­di­na­tes with all NATO allies, NATO allies are not con­vin­ced that Trump wants NATO to exist and he would make tho­se decisi­ons on Ukrai­ne by hims­elf without the align­ment um in fact with oppo­si­ti­on from the poles, from the balts and the rest. So I worry that even if the out­co­me visa Ukrai­ne loo­ks simi­lar, the rea­li­ty is that the Ukrai­ne war isn’t just about Ukrai­ne, if it was we would­n’t spend any time on it. It’s much more about the West the trans­at­lan­tic rela­ti­ons­hip NATO and Rus­sia and in this regard uh Trump is much more of a thre­at to the per­sis­tence of that rela­ti­ons­hip of that rea­li­ty, than a second Biden term.

Mode­ra­tor: “Let me ask you quick­ly about Russia’s Fro­zen Cen­tral Bank assets the majo­ri­ty of which I under­stand are in Bel­gi­um there’s been dis­cus­sion over the­re of you know taking the growth and gains as oppo­sed to the princip­le of tho­se, and using them to sup­port Ukrai­ne others want to take who­le­sa­le Rus­si­an assets and deploy them to Ukrai­ne and there’s a big split in the kind of glo­bal finan­cial sec­tor, I would say - you know we have some for­mer secreta­ry of Tre­a­su­ry in the US Like Lar­ry Sum­mers who are wil­ling to basi­cal­ly take tho­se Rus­si­an assets you have others like his for­mer boss secreta­ry Bob Rubin who think that opens up a Pandora’s Box and real­ly crea­tes ano­t­her desta­bi­liz­a­ti­on, essen­ti­al­ly the com­mons of the Glo­bal Finan­cial archi­tec­tu­re -- I’d love to get your take on that.”

Brem­mer: “Well it’s it’s alrea­dy hap­pen­ed uh we saw at the G7 uh mee­ting in the past weeks that the­re is an agree­ment um to basi­cal­ly col­la­te­ra­li­ze uh the Rus­si­an assets uh and give a loan of some 50 bil­li­on to Ukrai­ne that will be paid off with the inte­rest of tho­se assets that will be gua­ran­te­ed not paid back to the Rus­si­ans, the princi­pal for at least 30 years uh when you’­re when you’­re free­zing the princip­le of someone’s assets for 30 years and you’­re using the inte­rest, you’­re sei­z­ing the assets. So the­re isn’t actual­ly, I mean this is a it’s a nice - you know sort of a hand waving kind of legal fix um to the dis­agree­ment that you spo­ke of, the rea­li­ty is that the­re is grea­ter con­cern slash urgen­cy from the Euro­peans than the Ame­ri­cans that what hap­pens if you don’t have long-term sup­port for Ukrai­ne, this is one way to get around that -- that even if Trump says I’m not going to pro­vi­de more sup­port, you’­re going to see long-term sup­port that is paid out on the back of the Rus­si­an assets, that have been fro­zen slash sei­zed and yes that is a pre­ce­dent it’s a pre­ce­dent that could wea­ken the Euro over time, it’s a pre­ce­dent that could lead the Rus­si­ans to sei­ze Euro­pean assets and other assets in Rus­sia that here to for they have not taken, tho­se steps and it also could lead other coun­tries around the world to say, well if you just sei­zed Russia’s assets in con­tra­ven­ti­on to inter­na­tio­nal law, why would­n’t you sei­ze mine going for­ward, may­be I’m not as safe as I had been um in your coun­try or coun­tries now the fact that Chi­na uh is an aut­ho­ri­ta­ri­an sys­tem um that does­n’t have a a con­ver­ti­ble cur­ren­cy and that Rus­sia breaks inter­na­tio­nal law all the time does­n’t necessa­ri­ly make you feel more com­for­ta­ble about sud­den­ly put­ting your assets in tho­se coun­tries, but cer­tain­ly uh you know this is the kind of thing that could make you think that cryp­to could see a spike uh you know, things like a Sin­g­a­po­re­an cur­ren­cy other smal­ler safe havens, but the­re just the­re isn’t a lar­ge alter­na­ti­ve to the dol­lar and the euro in a in a rule of law and Demo­cra­tic space.”

Mode­ra­tor: “Let me just ask you final­ly about the NATO Sum­mit in Washing­ton Ian, and I’m inte­res­ted in how you see this play­ing out poli­ti­cal­ly insi­de the United Sta­tes does NATO beco­me a grea­ter poli­ti­cal­ly divi­si­ve uh item in Ame­ri­can poli­tics or does uh the White House somehow win by having this Sum­mit in Washing­ton during a pre­si­den­ti­al elec­tion race?”

Brem­mer: “Uh I think the fact that the Ame­ri­cans got the money and the arms to Ukrai­ne and that the front lines are pret­ty sta­ble, makes this a litt­le bit less urgent, than the Midd­le East war is right now I think that the Netan­ja­hu, the Israe­li Prime Minister’s trip, to the United Sta­tes to speak to Con­gress on July 24th will have more impact on the race uh than the NATO Sum­mit uh I think the NATO Sum­mit is more important long-term and struc­tu­ral­ly, but you were asking me spe­ci­fi­cal­ly about the elec­tions, also keep in mind uh NATO is not only lar­ger now with two new coun­tries in the nor­dics that have joi­ned uh but also NATO coun­tries are spen­ding a lot more in defen­se. A big pie­ce of that is becau­se of the Rus­si­an inva­si­on but some of that is becau­se of Ame­ri­can pres­su­re and if Trump beco­mes pre­si­dent you know one of the things he can say is yeah NATO is stron­ger now becau­se of me, he can take credit so it’s not clear to me that a second Trump term will be say­ing NATO’s no good they’­re not spen­ding any money if Trump wants to take credit for some of NATO’s suc­ces­ses, he can.

Mode­ra­tor: Well, we’ll end it here. Thank you so much foun­der and pre­si­dent of the Eura­sia group Ian Brem­mer, real­ly appre­cia­te you joi­ning us today always.”

Brem­mer: “Good to see you Steve.”

Mode­ra­tor: “So what’s the bot­tom line, the war in Ukrai­ne is about much more than a Rus­si­an inva­si­on or Ukraine’s inte­rest in tying its­elf into Euro­pe and NATO. Ukrai­ne is now the batt­le­ground of a clas­sic pro­xy con­flict bet­ween the United Sta­tes and Rus­sia. Yes other allies are invol­ved, but this is fun­da­ment­al­ly about the sphe­res of influ­ence of the US and Rus­sia and we’­ve seen this play out over and over again in the past. Sure the Soviet Uni­on lost mas­si­ve ter­ri­to­ry and glo­bal pres­ti­ge when its Empi­re final­ly col­lap­sed in exhaus­ti­on after deca­des of com­pe­ti­ti­on with the West, but the end­ga­me is rare­ly a clear vic­to­ry for one side or the other. Ever­y­bo­dy says they want peace but nobo­dy wants to sur­ren­der so they keep going. Neit­her side is likely to get all at once. This con­flict ends with nego­tia­ti­ons with both sides kee­ping some­thing and both sides losing some­thing that’s what neit­her side will admit yet and that’s the bot­tom line.

Bleibt noch eine Fra­ge - wird der Krieg von den Freun­den des Wer­te­wes­tens pro­lon­giert um der Ukrai­ne die Mög­lich­keit einer bes­se­ren Ver­hand­lungs­op­ti­on in die Hand zu geben, wenn doch Russ­land long term ver­hand­lungs­tech­nisch in eine bes­se­re Posi­ti­on kom­men könn­te, oder pro­lon­giert man den Krieg um die Rate der rus­si­schen Abnut­zung zu erhö­hen und damit das Risi­ko noch ein­mal einem Angriff aus­ge­setzt zu sein zu redu­zie­ren. Die Ant­wort ist mei­ner Mei­nung voll­kom­men ein­deu­tig, wenn man sich ein­mal Kalas oder Sikorsky ange­se­hen hat.

Grüs­se an sei­ne Frau bitte.

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