Weil Friedrich Merz gerade das Argument aufgemacht hat

27. Februar 2022

dass die Ukrai­ne sich zum Ver­zicht auf Atom­waf­fen durch­ge­run­gen hat, und die Inva­si­on ihr Geschenk war… (sie­he: click)

In 1993, Inter­na­tio­nal rela­ti­ons theo­rist and Uni­ver­si­ty of Chi­ca­go pro­fes­sor John Mear­s­hei­mer publis­hed an arti­cle inclu­ding his pre­dic­tion that a Ukrai­ne without any nuclear deter­rent was likely to be sub­jec­ted to aggres­si­on by Rus­sia, but this was very much a mino­ri­ty view at the time.[8]

A stu­dy publis­hed in 2016 in the jour­nal World Affairs argued that, in the opi­ni­on of the aut­hors, the denu­clea­riz­a­ti­on of Ukrai­ne was not a “stu­pid mista­ke”, and that it is unclear that Ukrai­ne would be bet­ter off as a nuclear sta­te.[9] The stu­dy argued that the push for Ukrai­ni­an inde­pen­dence was with a view to make it a nonnu­clear sta­te.[9] Accord­ing to the aut­hors, the United Sta­tes would also not have made Ukrai­ne an excep­ti­on when it came to the denu­clea­riz­a­ti­on of other post-Soviet sta­tes such as Bela­rus and Kazakh­stan.[9] The deter­rent value of the nuclear wea­pons in Ukrai­ne was also ques­tion­ab­le, as Ukrai­ne would have had to spend 12 to 18 mon­ths to estab­lish full ope­ra­tio­nal con­trol over the nuclear arse­nal left by the Rus­si­ans.[9] The ICBMs also had a ran­ge of 5,000–10,000 km (initi­al­ly tar­ge­ting the United Sta­tes), which meant that they could only have been re-targeted to hit Russia’s far east.[9] The air-launched crui­se mis­si­les (ALCMs) left by the Rus­si­ans had been dis­ab­led by the Rus­si­ans during the col­lap­se of the Soviet Uni­on, but even if they had been recon­fi­gu­red and made to work by the Ukrai­ni­ans, it is unli­kely that they would have had a deter­rent effect.[9] Had Ukrai­ne deci­ded to estab­lish full ope­ra­tio­nal con­trol of the nuclear wea­pons, it would have faced sanc­tions by the West and perhaps even a with­dra­wal of diplo­ma­tic reco­gni­ti­on by the United Sta­tes and other NATO allies.[9] Ukrai­ne would also likely have faced reta­lia­to­ry action by Rus­sia.[9] Ukrai­ne would also have strug­gled with repla­cing the nuclear wea­pons once their ser­vice life expi­red, as Ukrai­ne did not have a nuclear wea­pons pro­gram.[9] In exchan­ge for giving up its nuclear wea­pons, Ukrai­ne recei­ved finan­cial com­pen­sa­ti­on, as well as the secu­ri­ty assuran­ces of the Buda­pest Memo­ran­dum.[9]

src: click

Das zu wis­sen kann man von Fried­rich Merz natür­lich nicht erwarten.

Das Buda­pes­ter Memo­ran­dum wur­de jetzt gebrochen.

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