Wie kann man die Gesellschaft noch verarschen?

19. August 2023

Ich hab heu­te mal den Brze­zinski Text von 1997 aus­ge­gra­ben den Jef­frey D. Sachs immer referenziert:

A Geo­stra­te­gy for Eura­sia, Zbi­gniew Brze­zinski, For­eign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 1997), pp. 50-64 (15 pages)

Hier im Voll­text: click

Er liest sich in der Tat so als wür­den in der US Admi­nis­tra­ti­on Leu­te sit­zen, die sich auf des­sen Basis die zukünf­ti­ge Geo­stra­te­gie zurecht­zim­mern woll­ten. Das High­light ist der Schluss, aber bevor wir dazu kommen:


Vor 18 Stun­den via al Jazeera:

Lea­ders of US, South Korea and Japan hail sum­mit as ‘tur­ning point’

Coun­tries pledge to deepen part­ners­hip at his­to­ric Camp David talks, while con­dem­ning actions of Chi­na and North Korea.

src: click

Hier der ange­teas­te Schluss des über 25 Jah­re alten Brze­zinski Texts:

In the long term, Eurasia’s sta­bi­li­ty would be enhan­ced by the emer­gence, perhaps ear­ly in the next cen­tu­ry, of a trans-Eurasian secu­ri­ty sys­tem. Such a trans­con­ti­nen­tal secu­ri­ty arran­ge­ment might invol­ve an expan­ded nato, lin­ked by coope­ra­ti­ve secu­ri­ty agree­ments with Rus­sia, Chi­na, and Japan. But to get the­re, Ame­ri­cans and Japa­ne­se must first set in moti­on a tri­an­gu­lar political-security dia­lo­gue that enga­ges Chi­na. Such three-way American-Japanese-Chinese secu­ri­ty talks could even­tual­ly invol­ve more Asi­an par­ti­ci­pants, and later lead to a dia­lo­gue with the Orga­niz­a­ti­on for Coope­ra­ti­on and Secu­ri­ty in Euro­pe. That, in turn, could even­tual­ly pave the way for a seri­es of con­fe­ren­ces by Euro­pean and Asi­an sta­tes on secu­ri­ty issu­es. A trans­con­ti­nen­tal secu­ri­ty sys­tem would thus begin to take shape.

Defi­ning the sub­s­tance and insti­tu­tio­na­li­zing the form of a trans-Eurasian secu­ri­ty sys­tem could beco­me the major archi­tec­tu­ral initia­ti­ve of the next cen­tu­ry. The core of the new trans­con­ti­nen­tal secu­ri­ty frame­work could be a stan­ding com­mit­tee com­po­sed of the major Eura­si­an powers, with Ame­ri­ca, Euro­pe, Chi­na, Japan, a con­fe­de­r­a­ted Rus­sia, and India collec­tively addres­sing cri­ti­cal issu­es for Eurasia’s sta­bi­li­ty. The emer­gence of such a trans­con­ti­nen­tal sys­tem could gra­du­al­ly relie­ve Ame­ri­ca of some of its bur­dens, while per­pe­tua­ting bey­ond a genera­ti­on its decisi­ve role as Eurasia’s arbi­tra­tor. Geo­stra­te­gic suc­cess in that ven­ture would be a fit­ting lega­cy to America’s role as the first and only glo­bal superpower.



Japan should not be America’s unsin­ka­ble air­craft car­ri­er in the Far East, nor should it be America’s princi­pal Asi­an mili­ta­ry part­ner. Efforts to pro­mo­te the­se Japa­ne­se roles would cut Ame­ri­ca off from the Asi­an main­land, vitia­te the pro­spects for reaching a stra­te­gic con­sen­sus with Chi­na, and frus­tra­te America’s abi­li­ty to con­so­li­da­te sta­bi­li­ty in Eurasia.

Japan does not have a major poli­ti­cal role to play in Asia, given the regio­nal aver­si­on it con­ti­nues to evo­ke becau­se of its beha­vi­or befo­re and during World War II. Japan has not sought the kind of recon­ci­lia­ti­on with Chi­na and Korea that Ger­ma­ny sought with Fran­ce and is see­king with Poland. Like insu­lar Bri­tain in the case of Euro­pe, Japan is poli­ti­cal­ly irrele­vant to the Asi­an main­land. Howe­ver, Tokyo can car­ve out a glo­bal­ly influ­en­ti­al role by coope­ra­ting clo­se­ly with the United Sta­tes on the new agen­da of glo­bal con­cerns per­tai­ning to deve­lo­p­ment and peace­kee­ping while avoiding any coun­ter­pro­duc­ti­ve efforts to beco­me an Asi­an regio­nal power. Ame­ri­can sta­tes­manship should steer Japan in that direction.


Alt­hough cur­r­ent­ly a pas­si­ve play­er, India has an important role in the Eura­si­an sce­ne. Without the poli­ti­cal sup­port it recei­ved from the Soviet Uni­on, India is con­tai­ned geo­po­li­ti­cal­ly by Chinese-Pakistani coope­ra­ti­on. The sur­vi­val of Indian demo­cra­cy is in its­elf important, in that it refu­tes bet­ter than volu­mes of aca­de­mic deba­te the noti­on that human rights and demo­cra­cy are exclu­si­ve­ly Wes­tern. India pro­ves that anti­de­mo­cra­tic “Asi­an values,” pro­pa­ga­ted by spo­kes­men from Sin­g­a­po­re to Chi­na, are sim­ply anti­de­mo­cra­tic and not necessa­ri­ly Asi­an. India’s fail­u­re would be a blow to democracy’s pro­spects in Asia and would remo­ve a power that con­tri­bu­tes to Asia’s balan­ce, espe­cial­ly given China’s rise. India should be enga­ged in dis­cus­sions per­tai­ning to regio­nal sta­bi­li­ty, not to men­ti­on the pro­mo­ti­on of more bila­te­ral con­nec­tions bet­ween the Ame­ri­can and Indian defen­se communities.

Erneu­ter *Hus­ten­an­fall*

Auch Russ­land hat in dem Paper eine tol­le Posi­ti­on, die Anne App­le­baum bereits vor einem Jahr der rus­si­schen Exi­le­li­te in Pod­cast­form verkauft:

We should be decen­te­ring all of this

Aber das eben bereits seit 1997, …

In the­se cir­cum­s­tan­ces, Russia’s first prio­ri­ty should be to moder­ni­ze its­elf rather than to enga­ge in a futi­le effort to regain its sta­tus as a glo­bal power. Given the country’s size and diver­si­ty, a decen­tra­li­zed poli­ti­cal sys­tem and free-market eco­no­mics would be most likely to unleash the crea­ti­ve poten­ti­al of the Rus­si­an peop­le and Russia’s vast natu­ral resour­ces. A loo­se­ly con­fe­de­r­a­ted Russia—composed of a Euro­pean Rus­sia, a Sibe­ri­an Repu­blic, and a Far Eas­tern Republic—would also find it easier to cul­ti­va­te clo­ser eco­no­mic rela­ti­ons with its neigh­bors. Each of the con­fe­de­r­a­ted enti­ties would be able to tap its local crea­ti­ve poten­ti­al, stif­led for cen­tu­ries by Moscow’s hea­vy bureau­cra­tic hand. In turn, a decen­tra­li­zed Rus­sia would be less sus­cep­ti­ble to impe­ri­al mobilization.

Was erlau­be Putin, dass er sein Land eigent­lich nicht wie von den US vor­ge­se­hen in drei “con­fe­de­r­a­ted enti­ties” split­tet, die dann ihr “local crea­ti­ve poten­ti­al” ent­fal­ten kön­nen und damit somit kom­pa­ti­bler zu unse­ren geo­po­li­ti­schen Vor­stel­lun­gen wären.

Ich suche noch den pas­sen­de O-Ton her­aus, aber die Ent­wick­lung in ein kul­tu­rell defi­nier­tes, regio­na­le­res Russ­land wird von ihr hier angepitched:

edit: Not in this inter­view as I remem­be­red, I’m re-screening more I’ve seen with Applebaum.

The only rela­ted sec­tion in this inter­view is this one:

I don’t want any cha­os I don’t want some kind of dis­as­ter, you know I - I just want rus­sia to cea­se to to think of its­elf as an empi­re, you know i want rus­sia to be in that sen­se a post-imperial um coun­try whe­re the main goals of the rus­si­an lea­ders­hip are the pro­spe­ri­ty and hap­pi­ness of rus­si­ans you know I want the, I want I don’t want it to be the accu­mu­la­ti­on of money for a small eli­te or the abi­li­ty to pro­ject mili­ta­ry power into ukrai­ne, or the Bal­tic sta­tes or Kazakh­stan or any­bo­dy else -um I want, Iwant rus­si­an lea­ders to think about how do they deve­lop their own coun­try how do they make rus­sia safer hap­pier, richer, clea­ner um how do they make it a bet­ter place I want them to think dif­fer­ent­ly about what it means to be the lea­der of - becau­se i feel that rus­si­ans have been um have been, you know have real­ly been bad­ly trea­ted by their lea­ders­hip um and you know they they deser­ve some­thing bet­ter, they deser­ve a they deser­ve lea­ders who want them to be pro­spe­rous and who aren’t you know ste­aling and inva­ding other coun­tries and so that’s what i would like to see whe­ther you know ever­ything else is secon­da­ry to that, you know, whe­ther rus­sia you know hazard does­n’t have some kind of wea­pon or whe­ther it has or does­n’t have um some kind of you know one lea­der, ano­t­her lea­der, I care less about that um, I would but I would i would sim­ply like it to beco­me the I would like the pur­po­se of lea­ders­hip insi­de rus­sia to be dif­fe­rent, um - what i don’t know is how you get the­re um yeah it is true it is true that in rus­si­an histo­ry all of the most important major chan­ges have come after the loss of a mili­ta­ry con­flict or after some kind of mili­ta­ry defeat so whe­ther it’s 1905, 1917 you know 1989 after afgha­ni­stan um - it’s often mili­ta­ry defeat that leads rus­si­an lea­ders­hip to chan­ge or at least it cau­ses some kind of chan­ge and I can only hope that that will be the case here and I hope it’s that kind of chan­ge I hope that it leads the rus­si­an eli­te to ask them­sel­ves is this the kind of coun­try that we want to be, or do we want to be a dif­fe­rent kind of country.

Schon sehr - ehm - schön aber noch nicht der gesuch­te “Russ­land muss sich wie­der mehr regio­nal aus­rich­ten” Aspekt den ich gesucht habe… 🙂

edit2: Ah, schau mal einer an, es war nicht App­le­baum die im brze­zinski­schen Sin­ne, bei der rus­si­schen Expat Eli­te, ein regio­na­li­sier­tes, weni­ger zen­tra­li­sier­tes, und daher sehr viel krea­ti­ve­res Russ­land gean­kert hat, es war der ver­fick­te Timo­thy Snyder.

( Sie­he auch:

https://harlekin.me/allgemein/diese-verfickte-verlogene-scheiss-hurengesellschaft/ )

Und ich habs damals bereits auf­ge­ar­bei­tet, dh. ich hät­te gar nicht wie­der res­cree­nen müssen:

We should be decen­te­ring all of this

Sny­der ver­kauft dabei fol­gen­de Konzepte:

Russ­land benö­ti­ge eine neue Aus­rich­tung, eine vor allem anti­im­pe­ria­lis­ti­sche Aus­rich­tung, bei der sie uns in Afri­ka nicht mehr in die Que­re kom­men, das zu “ent­wer­fen” wird die Auf­ga­be der rus­si­schen Exi­le­li­te sein, an die wir uns (App­le­baum und Sny­der) bereits heu­te wenden.

Sny­der ankert vor elf Mona­ten auch bereits wie die­ses neu­es Russ­land aus­zu­se­hen hat -- näm­lich sich nicht mehr als geein­te Welt­macht ver­ste­hend, son­dern mit viel mehr “regio­na­len Zen­tren”, die alle eine “regio­na­le Geschich­te als die Bevöl­ke­rung einen­des Kon­zept benö­ti­gen” -- west­li­che His­to­ri­ker wür­den gera­de dar­an arbei­ten, das sei gera­de ein span­nen­des und inter­es­san­tes Feld. [His­to­ri­scher Revisionismus?] 

Wer kann aber denn jetzt bele­gen, dass der ver­fi­cke Sny­der Brze­zinski auch gele­sen hat und ihn bei­spiels­wei­se auf der Yes Con­fe­rence wider­holt selbst referenziert?

Hmm.… Click.

Die­se Gesell­schaft ist das abso­lut abgrund­tief gro­tesk Allerletzte.

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