Gustav Gressel by now is arguing like a Cassandra with a death wish.
His arguing remains stringent, where smaller defined sectoral aspects are concerend, but it ventures into talking the same way about scenarios that might unfold in the future. (He doesnt always do that, but he does in the China will attack Taiwan scenario, which he is almost certain will be in our future - if Ukraine doesnt win (or if it wins - it almost doesnt seem to matter)). Thats not the main issue though - many people do - but Gressel in his arguments suggests a certainty thats not actually there when he jumps the bigger logic gaps. Whats more worrying is, that his arguing seems to resort from a “prevention of genocide” stance - thats emotionally/depression driven -- and then naturally gravitate to a “I’ll argue up everything thats needed for a scenario where the Ukraine at least has a chance to win - as the only real solution”.
So this seems to be how his argument is structured.
There are other “fixed points” in his arguing, that are him copying US foreign political stances/worries in regards to China - and just because of a believe in those - raises a subjective risk level -- which then rules out scenarios like a frozen conflict for him, because it would become more risky over time, with the US pivoting to the Indopacific.
And from that he goes straight into “emotionally felt” arguing of “preventing genocide” again, where “Ukraine would not gain much by a draw - because of all the atrocities happening in the occupied territories.
So he does this strange loop, where US foreign policy worries become truth, and this raises the built in risk for a negotiated solution substantially over time - for both a “both sides dont win scenario”, and a russia wins scenario - and that still would mean the occupied territories arent “freed”, so if we’d do everything to prolong the war - the Ukraine at least still has a fighting chance…
And then, when arguing for the fighting chance - he has almost no arguments ready - so its “it might work, because it can work” nothing based on numbers, effective manpower strength, production rates -- thats all stuff he fluffs on (or wishes to know by the end of this year), so in essence - he doesnt want to think or ague about (quite yet) - but its his main argument…
- a similar thing is happening here:
Where Michael Kofman serves about the same role.
The out is different, but the function within the discussion is the same.
So every time, when someone ventures into a more forward interpretation of a conflict resolution thats not “fight until ukraine wins” -- Kofman pulls out the -- but if Russia wins, or isnt punished for going against the rule of law here, China will go to war too card, and we cant let that happen.
Both are based on presumptions of the future, which are not straight forward, or easily determinative. They are essentially fears that get channeled - because of US policy worries. (The ramifications do not only affect the US they affect us in europe as well - but the narrative originated in the US).
The arguments made by both to “bridge” that gap into the “likely future scenario” are not straight forward logic anymore - they are “believes” - in both cases. From which then certain probability assessments are drawn.
In the end Gressel seems to argue mostly toward “we need to prevent further genocide - any way we can” - and risk mitigation means, support Ukraine so it can win - because more long term scenarios carry too much risk, when it comes to establishing peace trough some sort of deterrent for 10 years or longer -- which Gressel then combines with, “we have to continue anyways - because genocide that will follow in other scenarios (aka - when not all of Ukraine is freed)”.
And Kofman in the end argues from a “security guarantees are hard to give” “because we might need further assets in the indo pacific in the future” stance, arguing that war needs to be prolonged, to reduce the risk of china attacking Taiwan - which is quite the logic jump. And very much detached from the problem at hand.
So - if both of those arguments are pretty “loopy” and more or less self fulfilling gambits for keeping the war running for longer, regardless of anything that actually happens…
I very much think, that we need people who work on different scenarios, right about now…
Kind of - this approach:
15.20 Uhr: Friedensforscher - Ukraine braucht verlässliche Sicherheitsgarantien
Friedensforscher raten zu verlässlichen Sicherheitsgarantien des Westens für die von Russland überfallene Ukraine. Dies sei Voraussetzung dafür, dass das Land mittelfristig Friedensverhandlungen mit Russland aufnehmen könne, heißt es in ihrem heute in Berlin veröffentlichten Friedensgutachten 2024. Die Wissenschaftler empfehlen, militärische Logik und diplomatische Ansätze klug miteinander zu verzahnen, den Druck auf Russland etwa in Form von Sanktionen aufrechtzuerhalten und die Ukraine weiterhin militärisch zu unterstützen. Sie teilten dazu mit: “Schon jetzt sollten Form und Inhalt von Friedensverhandlungen vorbereitet und etwaige Drittparteien ausgelotet werden.”
src: click
Although without predefined outcomes. Just talk about those things, let people come in contact with those sets of arguments again… (Security guaranties have an importance thats higher than that - I know.)
Sadly - Switzerland doesnt seem to be the platform to initiate that -
But - something has to change here…
The quality of the arguing for why we NEED a prolongued war - is pretty bad right now - just looking at the internal logic of the arguing.
Gressel seems to be emotionally driven to “save ukrainian people” and do everything to reduce “the probability of a catastrophic security failure ten years down the road, once china attacks taiwan, and or russia attacks again” -- but the arguing on how Ukraine might do this - and what a “Ukraine wins” scenario looks like (will russia rearm again, will it split, will it descend into chaos, what time frame would be needed, …) is basically not there. So the drive seems emotional, verging on not rational.
And Kofman is just ankering the “if russia gets away with this (which can mean neither side wins, or russia wins scenarios equally)” argument over and over again, the likelyhood of a US China war increases - so Ukraine has to fight on. And thats bad, because it already is entirely decoupled from the conflict at hand, and projecting something thats not easily projectable.
So both at least in some sense are kind of insane…?
You can step out of that kind of zero sum logic - do they know that?
Gressel seems to really really believe what he’s come up with (I cant judge the “risk of russia wanting to escalate militarily again - after a negotiated solution” thats very prominent in one part of his thinking -- I have to admit).
Kofman seems to be a victim of “felt self importance” as in hes heard the argument a couple of times, hes repeated the argument a couple of times, and now he really likes it. But he has to use bravado to convince others, that this is the likely outcome we are inevitably looking at. So could also be the case of has fallen victim to propaganda.
Judging the “risk” of a “the war in ukraine cant end with a negotiation, or a win for russia, because then the US is more likely to be drawn into a war in the indo pacific” scenario is more likely. Its pretty much insane.
It sees the world through a “military options only”, and leaders are emotionally driven by victories only lens - and then he moves halfway across the ocean an argues, for the prolonging of a war in a different hemisphere for that reason. Pretty insane..
So - get the main experts on the topic some rest, and bring in other people, maybe…? Aside from that Ukraine seems to believe, that any loss will be equal to them seizing to exist right now (- at least in the presidents mind, which doesnt mean much, but still)…
Neither of them seems to be outright be putting out propaganda here - both of those are strongly held believes.
