Der Russe hat uns’ Gas abgedreht

16. November 2024

Was die Ukrai­ne ab dem 1. Jän­ner 2025 so und so gemacht hätte.

Weils aber der Rus­se jetzt bereits gemacht hat, ist es ein “öster­rei­chi­scher Befrei­ungs­schlag” so der Stan­dard bereits ges­tern: click

Weils nur 90% des bis­he­ri­gen Bezugs seit August die­sen Jah­res waren, ist die OMV auch “bes­tens dar­auf vor­be­rei­tet”, so der Stan­dard heu­te.

Weil die EU ja bereits ange­kün­digt hat, Euro­pa wol­le jetzt unter Trump viel mehr US Flüs­sig­gas abnehmen.

Was Biden wäh­rend sei­ner Amts­zeit mit dem Ver­weis auf Umwelt­auf­la­gen ein­ge­fro­ren hat (Men­ge), da Flüs­sig­gas­lie­fe­run­gen ohne spe­zi­el­le Tan­ker die die Eva­po­ra­ti­on mit Glo­cken abfan­gen aus den US vom Methan­ab­druck in CO2 Equi­va­lent eh nur zwi­schen Stein­koh­le und Braun­koh­le liegen.

Weil Russ­land nicht weni­ger Gas lie­fern wird, son­dern nur über ande­re Kanä­le (Ita­li­en hat sei­ne Lie­fe­r­in­fra­struk­tur nach Öster­reich bereits aus­ge­baut, Russ­land nimmt als Infra­struk­tur­pro­jek­te Pipe­lines in die Tür­kei in Angriff. Die Ent­fer­nung zwi­schen Tür­kei und Ita­li­en beträgt 1260 km. Das sind ja Wel­ten.) Was Russ­land aber weni­ger Ein­nah­men aus den Gas Expor­ten beschert, da mehr Leu­te mitschneiden.

Wobei die OMV mit einer lang­fris­ti­gen Erhö­hung des Gas­prei­ses in dem Fall von bis zu 10% gerech­net hat, und er edit: in den letz­ten zwei Wochen eh nur um 20% gestie­gen ist (spike, dh. das lang­fris­ti­ge Preis­ni­veau wird sich erst noch weisen.)

Ver­such die­se Infor­ma­ti­on mal heu­te aus den Stan­dard­be­rich­ten raus­zu­le­sen: click Allei­ne wie der Stan­dard den aktu­el­len Preis­an­stieg ver­schlei­ert. Zucker.

Hof­fen wir, dass die OMV rich­tig pro­jec­ted hat, und wir in Öster­reich 10% mehr bezah­len, wäh­rend Russ­land mehr als 10% Mar­ge ent­ge­hen, und die EU das noch als Ver­hand­lungs­mas­se gegen trump­sche US Zöl­le ins Tref­fen füh­ren kann, wäh­rend sich der Durch­schnitts­bür­ger erfreut zeigt, das mia uns vom Rus­sen befreit haben.

1A jour­na­lis­ti­sche Leis­tung wie­der. Boo­mer kauft Abo.

TLDR, so lan­ge sche­men, bis man sowas in Hand­schlag­qua­li­tät erst mal hin­bringt. Wobei eh der Rus­se, oder? Schließ­lich hat der uns das Gas abge­dreht. Die­ser ver­damm­te Rus­se schon wieder…

edit: Ups, ich hab noch den Indus­trie­gas­preis ver­ges­sen. Der ist in Deutsch­land dop­pelt so hoch wie vor dem Krieg, also wars im Okto­ber, vor dem aktu­el­len spike. Also nicht nur auf den TTF Preis schau­en. Vgl. 1|2 Es gibt aber natür­lich auch wie­der gute Nach­rich­ten, der Preis von LNG lan­ded in NW Euro­pe (also noch nicht Öster­reich) is eh noch dar­über.… (oxford ener­gy)

Gut, das muss in Öster­reich heu­te natür­lich wie­der kein Medi­um berich­ten, es wür­de eh nur unnö­tig die Bevöl­ke­rung verunsichern.

edit: Ups, klei­ner Feh­ler mei­ner­seits, Nabuc­co wäre durch Tur­key, Bul­ga­ria, Roma­nia, Hun­ga­ry and Aus­tria gegan­gen. Ita­li­en brauchts da nicht. Moment woher bekommt eigent­lich Ita­li­en sein Gas?

Ah:

Natu­ral gas in Ita­ly is main­ly impor­ted from Rus­sia (39%), Alge­ria (29%) (Algeria’s Balan­cing Act bet­ween His­to­ri­cal Part­ners­hip with Rus­sia and Inde­pen­dence Roo­ted in histo­ry, the rela­ti­ons­hip bet­ween Alge­ria and Rus­sia is expec­ted to con­ti­nue its robust and evol­ving coope­ra­ti­on. (ISPI)), Libya, The Nether­lands, and Qatar. src: click

ÖSTERREICH IST FREI!

edit: Kor­rek­tur, Ita­li­en hat 2023 remodelt: Bildschirmfoto 2024 11 16 um 10 45 57 src: click Für eine ein­fa­che Über­schlags­rech­nung in Pro­zent reicht es aus die Wer­te in der Gra­fik zu ver­dop­peln. Wobei für Aze­ri Gas fol­gen­des gilt:
Likely, any Aze­ri gas that does flow through Ukrai­ne after this year will be Aze­ri in name only, with the mole­cu­les ori­gi­na­ting in Russia.
src: click edit2: Für die die sich gedacht haben, da geht sich doch was nicht aus, stimmt - aber nur ne Detail­fra­ge:
We still get a lot of LNG from Rus­sia and why not replace it by Ame­ri­can LNG, which is che­a­per for us and brings down our ener­gy pri­ces,” said von der Ley­en. She said the EU approach to tra­de poli­ci­es imple­men­ted when Donald Trump takes power again as U.S. pre­si­dent in Janu­a­ry will be to enga­ge, look at com­mon inte­rests and nego­tia­te. The EU esti­ma­tes that about 4 bil­li­on to 6 bil­li­on cubic meters (141 bil­li­on to 212 bil­li­on cubic feet) of Rus­si­an LNG was ship­ped to third coun­tries via EU ports last year.
src: click 4-6 Bil­li­on cubic meters more LNG imports from the US (thats 8-12% more than the EU is impor­ting from the US cur­r­ent­ly).
Alge­ri­an sta­te hydro­car­bons firm Sona­trach said at the time it was rea­dy to incre­a­se gas sup­plies to Euro­pe, nota­b­ly via the Trans­med pipe­line lin­king Alge­ria to Ita­ly. Its CEO Tou­fik Hak­kar said Euro­pe is the “natu­ral mar­ket of choice” for Alge­ri­an gas, which accounts for about 11 per cent of Europe’s gas imports. The new deal bet­ween ENI and Sona­trach would add up to 9 bil­li­on cubic meters of gas from Alge­ria, just eclip­sing Russia’s cur­rent 29 bil­li­on cubic meters a year. The incre­a­sed flows will start in the fall, ENI said in a statement.
src: click Up to 9 bil­li­on cubic meters/year more from Alge­ria. 29 bil­li­on cubic meters from Russia/year was the cur­rent import rate in 2024 (see: click)
Under the cur­rent tran­sit con­tract, Russia’s Gaz­prom was obli­ged to pay Ukrai­ne for the tran­sit of 65 bil­li­on cubic metres (bcm) (~670 TWh) of gas in 2020, drop­ping to 40 bcm (~412 TWh) per year until 2024, whe­ther or not Gaz­prom actual­ly ship­ped the agreed amount. In fact, flows in 2024 have been around 44 mil­li­on cubic metres per day, which is equi­va­lent to 16 bcm/year – signi­fi­cant­ly below the 40 bcm/year con­trac­ted amount (Figu­re 2). Tran­sit fee reve­nues for Ukrai­ne amoun­ted to $1.2 bil­li­on in 2022 and $0.8 bil­li­on in 2023, or around 0.5 per­cent of Ukraine’s GDP 6.
src: click Minus 16 bil­li­on cubic meters/year via Ukrai­ne. Aus­tri­as year­ly gas con­sump­ti­on: 7 bil­li­on cubic meters/year. Ich finds ja gut, dass wir jetzt unser Gas aus Nor­we­gen beziehen.

A masterclass in swapping cause and effect in rhetorics

15. November 2024

Here is the struc­tu­re of the argument.

1. It is hard to know why Putin did it now.
2. Ever­ything was going so well in rus­si­as effort to “paci­fy” (influ­ence ope­ra­ti­ons) its other bor­der regions.
3. But I know why rus­sia did it now! It saw the wes­tern weak­ness, dont you see! Remem­ber when that Putin/Xi talk was caught on tape, thats pro­of for the cau­se having been the want to desta­bi­li­ze the west!

Here is the through­li­ne that argu­ment is missing.

Rus­sia was secu­ring (influ­ence ope­ra­ti­ons) its bor­der regi­ons. Ukrai­ne all the while was an acti­ve con­flict zone. The US tip­ped the balan­ce of that con­flict zone in ukrai­nes favor (Minsk 2 was the­re to give Ukrai­ne time to arm up (Mer­kel), Jave­lins were in use in the Don­bas, con­fir­med by Ukrai­ni­an Offi­cials in inter­views with US mili­ta­ry jour­nals, and the rus­si­an lead oppo­si­ti­on didnt have anything to ans­wer the Ukrai­ni­ans rol­ling back the Don­bas. This was in Octo­ber 2021.), Euro­peans were lar­ge­ly not infor­med (https://harlekin.me/allgemein/just-checking-on-the-journalistic-performance-around-nordstream-because-of-an-interview/). Rus­sia, see­ing that the Don­bas was about to be reta­ken by Ukrai­ne, which would allow Ukrai­ne access to irri­ga­ti­on gates that could cut of the water sup­ply to Cri­mea ent­i­re­ly, moved their army to the bor­ders, then part­ly with­drew, once the US/Russian talks on the Euro­pean secu­ri­ty struc­tu­re were sche­du­led (part­ly with­drew means, blood con­ser­ves were still in the field, and sup­port infra­st­ruc­tu­re was still built out, during that par­ti­al with­dra­wal (tho­se parts still in pre­pa­ra­ti­on for the later invasion)).

Rus­si­as initi­al deman­ds were overze­a­l­ous (with­dra­wal of NATO to bor­ders they hadnt to honor for more than a deca­de, secu­ri­ty part­ners­hip, veto, …) but they were initi­al deman­ds. Deman­ds you go into nego­tia­ti­ons with. The US in turn refu­sed to even talk about its enga­ge­ment in Ukrai­ne as part of talks about the Euro­pean Secu­ri­ty arran­ge­ments, and ended talks on tho­se princi­pal terms (befo­re details would have had to be dis­cus­sed, whe­re rus­si­as overze­a­l­ous deman­ds would have come into play (nego­ta­ti­ons mass)), then the US lea­ked the initi­al rus­si­an deman­ds which were not princi­ples that made dis­cus­sion impos­si­ble a prio­ri, but just deman­ded too much at first hand - than would have been pos­si­ble for the US to agree to in a later pha­se of the talks, about a defen­se structure/restructuring in Europe.

The talks were can­ce­led by the US, the rus­si­an tro­ops were moved back to the ukrai­ni­an borders.

The moment of the decla­ra­ti­on in the west, that rus­si­as “spe­cial ope­ra­ti­on” con­sti­tu­ted a war of aggres­si­on was when unmar­ked rus­si­an vehi­cles ent­e­red the Don­bas again.

The Nato deba­tes on that they did, cir­cled around “of cour­se this is the begin­ning of a war, why shouldnt we say so, we have to call a spa­de a spa­de”, with the public refu­sal of UvdL to call it a war ending on day two of the invasion.

Befo­re any rockets flew. Then Selen­skyj pro­vo­ked Rus­sia, with the rus­si­an lan­guage mes­sa­ge to rus­si­an citi­zens on Tele­gram, that rus­si­an peop­le should tend to the streets (“Doc­tors, Lawy­ers, Artists, Tik­To­kers, Mothers and also Fathers” to for­ce the Rus­si­an government back to the dis­cus­sion table), and then three hours later the first rus­si­an rockets were fired.

Why then, and not later? Putin sta­ted mul­ti­ple times after the inva­si­on, that he reg­ret­ted to not have done it ear­lier when Ukrai­ne was less pre­pa­red. But the rus­si­an army its­elf still was ill pre­pa­red for the resis­tance. A mis­cal­cu­la­ti­on, we all know about that.

Point being, the Ukrai­ne was about to be suc­cess­ful against rus­si­an sup­por­ted “sepa­ra­tists” in the Don­bas, and reta­ke that regi­on. With Ukrai­ne regai­ning the Don­bas, the way would have been open for Cri­mea being tar­ge­ted to be freed next (cut off its water sup­ply), and Sevasta­pol is the main Har­bor rus­sia uses for its colo­ni­al efforts in Afri­ca, and the Har­bor whe­re 40% of Rus­si­as Exports were going through at the time. With the next best loca­ti­on rus­sia could use being Mur­mansk near the Polar cir­cle. Mea­ning, rus­sia would have been for­ced to ship its armament-shipments for its colo­nies in Afri­ca past 19 addi­tio­nal Nato out­posts to reach Africa.

Mea­ning, Rus­sia was on the ver­ge of loo­sing its most important, year long ice free, har­bor and its cen­ter of power pro­jec­tion into the black sea regi­on, and into Afri­ca, and the logistic cen­ter for 40% of its exports.

Not as a hypo­the­ti­cal, but as a “we know Ukrai­nes plans for the recon­que­ring of Cri­mea, and what would have been their poli­cy for black sea har­bors wit­hin Ukrai­ne”. From (EU) Veni­ce comis­si­on reports (on Minsk 2 imple­men­ta­ti­on efforts):

Wie kann man die­se Gesell­schaft noch verarschen?

So thats “why then” - Part 1.

Why then” - Part 2 is rus­si­as demo­gra­phic story. 

So if they didnt mana­ge to attain las­ting con­trol over their bor­der regi­on wit­hin the next 10 years, demo­gra­phi­cal­ly - they wouldnt be able to do so mili­ta­ri­ly any­mo­re. As in 20 years their mili­ta­ry capa­ci­ty would have hal­ved. Sim­ply becau­se of the demo­gra­phic factor.

That Ger­ma­ny was in the midd­le of a poli­ti­cal tran­si­ti­on, that the US had just with­drawn from Afgha­ni­stan in Cha­os, that rus­sia had redu­ced its attack sur­face for eco­no­mic sanc­tions, were tho­se “the rea­sons rus­sia thought it could attack”, or just due dili­gence (US does tho­se asses­ments all the time) com­bi­ned with fac­tors, that made an attack (resul­ting in a rus­si­an pro­jec­ted quick win) seem like a more pro­mi­sing stragety?

Point being -- was this an attack to topp­le the wes­tern rules based order? Or an attack out of rus­si­as own security/high impor­t­ance eco­no­mi­c­al interests?

And then we can look at how rus­sia was trea­ted in inter­na­tio­nal fora for the past 20 years (gas sta­ti­on with a mili­ta­ry, GDP com­pa­ra­ble to bra­zil and on a down­ward spiral, …

Ger­ma­ny appar­ent­ly “having for­got­ten to inclu­de rus­sia in its eco­no­mic plan­ning over the euro­pean green deal tra­jec­to­ry they alrea­dy were implementing”, …)

And even if you did mixed benefit/drawback cal­cu­la­ti­ons, taking into account the num­ber of midd­le aged men in Rus­sia that might die in such a con­flict, ins­tead of reques­ting sta­te bene­fits in the years to come - and the upri­sing poten­ti­al from rus­si­as eco­no­mic deve­lo­p­men­tal sto­ry not working out at all, during more and more uncer­tain times geo­po­li­ti­cal­ly, and macroeconomically --

ever­ything tren­ded towards, try­ing a quick inva­si­on, and dealing with the fall­out if it didnt go well later.

As it real­ly was the only major gam­bit rus­sia had left on its side. The­re was not­hing else.

Once that fai­led and the west sepa­ra­ted from rus­sia eco­no­mi­c­al­ly -- the fall­back stra­te­gy, and NOT necessa­ri­ly the initi­al goal, was to intert­wi­ne its eco­no­my with the chi­ne­se one, which has a lower purcha­sing power adjus­ted GDP per capita.

So nega­ti­ve growth for the popu­la­ti­on in rus­sia, which the rus­si­ans again could use the war as a “uni­fy­ing” for­ce to push through, while tigh­tening their secu­ri­ty sta­te. Under the pre­ten­ses of being enga­ged in a “war against the west”.

But Mrs. “we have to tell moti­va­tio­nal sto­ries all the time, so rus­si­as sto­ries dont get trac­tion”, Fio­na Hill now wants to argue, that “Rus­si­as war against the wes­tern world” IS real.

Becau­se Rus­sia thought of it that way from the begin­ning. And only enga­ged in it, becau­se it knew (*tri­um­phant hahaaaa!*) what hardship that would mean for the inter­na­tio­nal values based order (*sad oh no!*), you know inter­na­tio­nal law - as enfor­ced by the UN --- which no one gives a fuck about any­mo­re, at least if we look at Isra­els examp­le, based on a secu­ri­ty coun­cil that is in a dead­lock becau­se of the veto capa­bi­li­ties of its per­ma­nent mem­bers, and repre­sen­ting a struc­tu­re not repre­sen­ta­ti­ve of the cur­rent world popu­la­ti­on, or macroeco­no­mic deve­lo­p­ments anymore…

So how cra­zy was Putin, dear Fio­na, when not thin­king about Rus­si­as bene­fit in all of this at all -- but play­ing on the third level of the 3D Chess board to topp­le the wes­tern value based order, by making ever­yo­ne under­stand, that Euro­pe did most­ly work becau­se of the peace divi­dend, and the pro­mi­se of US pro­tec­tion, that now has (rela­tively) vanis­hed, becau­se the iso­la­tio­nist camp in the US won the last election.

What level of 3D chess has the craaaaaa­zy Putin be capa­ble of play­ing to “Manu­fac­tu­re a Cri­sis to Rewri­te the Glo­bal order”, my dear Fiona?

Fio­na, you that in the intro­duc­tion­a­ry state­ment still men­tio­ned, that is hard to know why Putin made this decisi­on when he did.

I mean, whats the con­spi­ra­cy theo­ry here and whats the “rus­sia didnt want to have Nato in the black see wit­hin a 15 years time­frame, while hal­fing their popu­la­ti­on of able man, capa­ble of being draf­ted wit­hin the next 20 years”?

I mean, surely Fio­na has some­thing to show us, so we can all belie­ve in this devi­lish rus­si­an mas­ter plan, to deli­gi­ti­mi­se the wes­tern order, right?

Well, its Putin who thought about it that way, becau­se Fio­na again knows how Putin thinks, and thats real­ly all you should need argu­ment wise, not to loo­se your jobs and get deplat­for­med in the Wer­te­wes­ten, right?

PS: The Hel­sin­ki Com­mis­si­on is not­hing to be in awe from, its the US “staf­fed by some sena­tors” tal­king club whe­re the ent­i­re Ukrai­ni­an PR dele­ga­ti­ons get invi­ted to, artists and all, to sing a US Sena­tor the US natio­nal anthem, befo­re asking for more wea­pons. Its not an inde­pen­dent non-partisan body at all. Just FYI.

Europes Media narrative is fucked

14. November 2024

Kaum koor­di­niert die US nicht mehr das Ukrai­ne Nar­ra­tiv, lau­fen alle Mei­nun­gen in alle denk­ba­ren unter­schied­li­chen Rich­tun­gen davon. Wirk­lich ein­drucks­voll das in der From vor­ge­führt zu bekommen.

Also nie­mand deckt sich ana­ly­tisch mehr mit irgendjemandem.

Das ZDF hat wie­der einen neu­en 18 Jäh­ri­gen Trot­tel gefun­den, der im Stu­di­um mehr gelernt hat Detail­fra­gen zu deflec­ten und inhalts­lee­re Plat­ti­tü­den zu dre­schen, behaup­tet aber erneut das sei ein Exper­te -- im kei­ne und fal­sche Ant­wor­ten geben, selbst auf User­fra­gen, die Nar­ra­ti­ve auf­grei­fen die das ZDF in der Sen­dung zuvor selbst gestreut hat -- wer die­se User­fra­ge wohl wie­der gepickt hat…

Wobei das Bürsch­chen wirk­lich ein aufs ande­re Mal gezielt voll ins Fett­näpf­chen tritt, und ein­fach gar­nichts mehr mit dem über­ein­stimmt was der Reis­ner ges­tern erzählt:

Wäh­rend France24 unter dem schlech­tes­ten Mode­ra­tor den die haben (den bes­ten haben sie in die US geschickt um dort Lokal­re­por­ta­gen zu machen, typisch - wenns mal wie­der zu ent­schei­den­den Pha­sen kommt, ist der intel­li­gen­te Mode­ra­tor lei­der nicht da, was willst du machen), aber sich im Tenor bereits weit von der Poli­tik der Biden Admi­nis­tra­ti­on ver­ab­schie­det, und die mög­li­chen Aus­wir­kun­gen auf die Ukrai­ne durch­spielt, was sich momen­tan noch kein deut­sches Medi­um traut…

Am geils­ten wird das dann in den Abschnit­ten, in denen Reis­ner die wahr­schein­li­chen Todes- und Ver­wun­de­ten­zah­len nennt, aber im ZDF natür­lich nie­mand einer eine Ahnung hat, und der Mode­ra­tor dann beginnt den FUCKING Kor­re­spon­den­ten in der Ukrai­ne danach zu fra­gen, der sich dann aus “die Ukrai­ne nennt kei­ne offi­zi­el­len Zah­len”, man könn­te aber die Grä­ber zäh­len, sei­nen eige­nen Pleo­nas­mus zusammenstöpselt…

Ach­ja, und die fuck­ing enorm wich­ti­ge Kursk Offen­si­ve Russ­lands ist in Frank­reich gleich mal gar kein The­ma weil man die Aus­wir­kun­gen der US Wah­len mehr struk­tu­rell betrachtet…

Bis dann wie­der beim ZDF das Büschen auf­taucht und meint, naja was ich vor zwei Mona­ten geschrie­ben hab, hat sich zwar ins Gegen­teil ver­kehrt, aber das macht ja nichts, denn ich hab ja immer noch mas­sig Tal­king points von ande­ren und nen Ruck­sack vol­ler Platitüden…

Läuft toll so… Wenn die US nicht mehr das PR Nar­ra­tiv schreiben…

Still good, I have to admit

14. November 2024

Stratfor chairman on the virtues of american isolationism

14. November 2024

Christ­ma­sy. You can smell the nutmeg.

Dazu viel­leicht noch ein Streichquartett: