Gute Nachrichten, ZDF Heute hat wieder einen neuen unbedarften Moderator - und natürlich wieder den Chef-Propagandisten der Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz, Nico Lange im Angebot:
“Die Ukrainer könnten ja bei GPS Signalen “Frequency hopping” machen um den russischen Störsignalen zu entgehen.”
BWAHHAAHAHHAHHHAHA. Ah… Aha.
“Oder Softwareupdates!”
Ahhh…
Also -
Die Satellitensignale der globalen Satellitennavigationssysteme (GNSS) in den Frequenzbereichen 1164 - 1215 MHz, 1215 - 1300 MHz und 1559 - 1610 MHz, wie z. B. NAVSTAR-GPS, GALILEO, GLONASS […]
src: click (bundesnetzagentur.de)
Meine Güte, ob die Russen das schaffen werden eine Frequenzbreite von drei mal beinahe 100Mhz zu stören?! Ehm. Ja.
Und Frequency hoppen will er!
Also - GPS sendet Uhrzeit. Flugkörper trianguliert im Millisekundenbereich. Rakete hoppt Frequenz. Spoofing schickt Uhrzeit als Signal mit 2 Sekunden Verzögerung als stärkeres Signal auf der bekannten Frequenz - Flugkörper korrigiert nach rechts und jetzt?
Moment, Moment ich habs!
GPS sendet Uhrzeit. Flugkörper trianguliert im Millisekundenbereich. Störsender stört Transmission. Rakete hoppt Frequenz. Bekommt keine Uhrzeit. Flugkörper kann nicht korrigieren und fliegt gerade aus.
Bestechend genial. Und gefixt wird natürlich per Software Update! Und nach so einem Software Update kann so ein GPS Empfänger - die selben Frequenzen empfangen wie vorher. Weil Hardwarelimitation. GPS Signale sind keine Zwei-Wege-Kommunikation, nicht verschlüsselt, und emitieren auf bekannten Frequenzen.
Jetzt aber - also richtig genial - die Raketen hüpfen aus dem bekannten Frequenzspektrum heraus und erhalten dann GPS Uhrzeit Signale - über ein anderes Frequenzspektrum, für das wir repeater über die 300km zum Ziel aufgestellt haben? Oder mit Internet Satelliten Uplink Latenz? Nein, jetzt hab ichs aber, über Wifi! Mit 50Meter Genauigkeit im Stadtbereich! Oder über 5G mit Packet loss! Über Triangulation von Mobilfunksendemasten!
Der hats einfach drauf der Sicherheitsexperte der Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz.
Das ZDF darf wie immer von Profis lernen.
Aber wie macht das eigentlich die US Armee?
In response to these vulnerabilities, the Space Force is hardening what it calls the “GPS enterprise” that includes three segments: satellites in space, the ground control system and user equipment. “We are looking at how we will continue to evolve this architecture into one that is more robust and resilient than it is today,” said Col. Ryan Colburn, director of the spectrum warfare division at the Space and Missile Systems Center.
DoD uses a number of PNT [Position Navigation Timing] technologies to complement GPS or to serve as backup when GPS is degraded or unavailable.
Some military platforms use onboard sensors to track their position and keep time without the use of an external signal. Other PNT technologies use external sources of information other than GPS to determine the position of a platform. Military combat aircraft use GPS paired with inertial navigation systems so if GPS goes out the pilot can still complete the mission. [Yeah, and how do you know when to kick in the inertia based system, when the signal is spoofed…] Inertial sensors and clocks allow a platform to identify its position and keep track of time without an external signal like GPS. Other technologies rely on celestial and magnetic navigation to determine position. [Marschflugkörper, schau auf die Sterne, schau auf die Sterne und schau auf den Mond, dein Leben, ist ein Streben, in die Ferne die keiner bewohnt…] There’s also a growing number of satellites in low Earth orbit that transmit PNT information. [Ah, there is Nico Langes “Softwareupdate”. 😉 ]
None of these alternative PNT technologies, however, has reduced the U.S. military’s dependence on GPS, said the Government Accountability Office in a May report.
“Alternative PNT does not appear to be a particularly high priority for DoD,” said Karen Howard, GAO’s director of science, technology assessment and analytics.
src: click
Ich find ja gut, dass ZDF heute immer Experten interviewt, und nie Propagandisten. 🙂
edit:
COUNTERMEASURES TO MAINTAIN GPS AND PNT INTEGRITY
The U.S. government has undertaken several significant initiatives to improve the resilience and reliability of its GPS-based systems. The foundational step of these efforts is the GPS modernization program, an ongoing, multibillion-dollar effort to upgrade the system’s features and performance. Along with new satellites, the program includes the deployment of new ground stations. The upgraded infrastructure will add navigation signals for both civilian and military users and will enhance the system’s accuracy and availability.
The system employs M-code, a new military signal in the L1 and L2 GPS bands [L1, at 1575.42 MHz, and L2, at 1227.6 MHz] that is intended to improve resistance to spoofing and jamming. In addition to a wide-angle antenna for broad distribution of the signal, the new satellites can deliver M-code to specific locations via spot beam transmissions. By using high-gain directional antennas to aim the signal at a specific region, the satellites can create a much more powerful signal that resists jamming. The M-Code signals also are encrypted using the Modernized Navstar Security Algorithm, which enables military GPS receivers to detect and reject false signals.
The encryption of military GPS signals prevents spoofing. Many GPS receivers still utilize the Selective Availability
Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) technology to address jamming and spoofing.
As the GPS III constellation is launched, U.S. forces will purchase equipment compatible with M-Code signals. But while M-Code provides an effective defense against spoofing, it is still vulnerable to jamming attacks. Other possible measures to protect GPS-based PNT capabilities include Interference Detection and Mitigation solutions. These solutions isolate an anomalous signal that is jamming GPS and replaces it. They use different tools to augment the GPS signal or implement another PNT solution.
Another option is to outfit GPS-enabled systems with anti-jam antennas. [MOUNT THE DIRECTIONAL ANTENNA ARRAY TO THE CRUISE MISSILE!] These antennas block RF signals coming from near the horizon, where jamming signals typically originate. Instead the antenna’s beam is focused at the zenith, where GPS satellites are located.
Controlled Reception Pattern antennas, or “smart” antennas, can be electrically steered to focus narrow beams directly at GPS satellites, mitigating the denial of GPS signals. Further, smart antennas can track GPS satellites as they move across the sky. While these antennas provide effective defense against jamming, they are larger and more expensive that standard GPS antennas.
Other technologies available today include in-line protection systems. “These don’t require us to physically change our antenna or the GNSS receiver that’s downstream,” Hohman says. “This could be very powerful for applications where it costs a lot of money to update an antenna or to update a GPS receiver. Instead, you could just stick a device in between the antenna and the existing receiver and provide some level of additional protection. [signal decryption, cant use normal GPS for that] That could be a very attractive capability for platforms that aren’t looking to do full renovations on their system.”
Alternative navigation signals offer another option to address jamming and spoofing attacks. The Satellite Time and Location service, which was launched in 2016, uses Iridium satellites in low-earth orbit to provide an encrypted signal for positioning and timing. The signal is 1,000 times stronger than GPS, making it more resistant to jamming and spoofing, and is accurate to 30-50 meters. This compares to an accuracy for GPS of 30 centimeters. [Ah, the power of latency… 🙂 ] Although it doesn’t offer the same precision as the Air Force satellites, this service can provide a reference that enables the detection of GPS spoofing. Further, it can be employed in combination with other measurements to provide navigation capabilities when GPS is denied.
src: click (safranfederalsystems.com)
