A masterclass in swapping cause and effect in rhetorics

15. November 2024

Here is the struc­tu­re of the argument.

1. It is hard to know why Putin did it now.
2. Ever­ything was going so well in rus­si­as effort to “paci­fy” (influ­ence ope­ra­ti­ons) its other bor­der regions.
3. But I know why rus­sia did it now! It saw the wes­tern weak­ness, dont you see! Remem­ber when that Putin/Xi talk was caught on tape, thats pro­of for the cau­se having been the want to desta­bi­li­ze the west!

Here is the through­li­ne that argu­ment is missing.

Rus­sia was secu­ring (influ­ence ope­ra­ti­ons) its bor­der regi­ons. Ukrai­ne all the while was an acti­ve con­flict zone. The US tip­ped the balan­ce of that con­flict zone in ukrai­nes favor (Minsk 2 was the­re to give Ukrai­ne time to arm up (Mer­kel), Jave­lins were in use in the Don­bas, con­fir­med by Ukrai­ni­an Offi­cials in inter­views with US mili­ta­ry jour­nals, and the rus­si­an lead oppo­si­ti­on didnt have anything to ans­wer the Ukrai­ni­ans rol­ling back the Don­bas. This was in Octo­ber 2021.), Euro­peans were lar­ge­ly not infor­med (https://harlekin.me/allgemein/just-checking-on-the-journalistic-performance-around-nordstream-because-of-an-interview/). Rus­sia, see­ing that the Don­bas was about to be reta­ken by Ukrai­ne, which would allow Ukrai­ne access to irri­ga­ti­on gates that could cut of the water sup­ply to Cri­mea ent­i­re­ly, moved their army to the bor­ders, then part­ly with­drew, once the US/Russian talks on the Euro­pean secu­ri­ty struc­tu­re were sche­du­led (part­ly with­drew means, blood con­ser­ves were still in the field, and sup­port infra­st­ruc­tu­re was still built out, during that par­ti­al with­dra­wal (tho­se parts still in pre­pa­ra­ti­on for the later invasion)).

Rus­si­as initi­al deman­ds were overze­a­l­ous (with­dra­wal of NATO to bor­ders they hadnt to honor for more than a deca­de, secu­ri­ty part­ners­hip, veto, …) but they were initi­al deman­ds. Deman­ds you go into nego­tia­ti­ons with. The US in turn refu­sed to even talk about its enga­ge­ment in Ukrai­ne as part of talks about the Euro­pean Secu­ri­ty arran­ge­ments, and ended talks on tho­se princi­pal terms (befo­re details would have had to be dis­cus­sed, whe­re rus­si­as overze­a­l­ous deman­ds would have come into play (nego­ta­ti­ons mass)), then the US lea­ked the initi­al rus­si­an deman­ds which were not princi­ples that made dis­cus­sion impos­si­ble a prio­ri, but just deman­ded too much at first hand - than would have been pos­si­ble for the US to agree to in a later pha­se of the talks, about a defen­se structure/restructuring in Europe.

The talks were can­ce­led by the US, the rus­si­an tro­ops were moved back to the ukrai­ni­an borders.

The moment of the decla­ra­ti­on in the west, that rus­si­as “spe­cial ope­ra­ti­on” con­sti­tu­ted a war of aggres­si­on was when unmar­ked rus­si­an vehi­cles ent­e­red the Don­bas again.

The Nato deba­tes on that they did, cir­cled around “of cour­se this is the begin­ning of a war, why shouldnt we say so, we have to call a spa­de a spa­de”, with the public refu­sal of UvdL to call it a war ending on day two of the invasion.

Befo­re any rockets flew. Then Selen­skyj pro­vo­ked Rus­sia, with the rus­si­an lan­guage mes­sa­ge to rus­si­an citi­zens on Tele­gram, that rus­si­an peop­le should tend to the streets (“Doc­tors, Lawy­ers, Artists, Tik­To­kers, Mothers and also Fathers” to for­ce the Rus­si­an government back to the dis­cus­sion table), and then three hours later the first rus­si­an rockets were fired.

Why then, and not later? Putin sta­ted mul­ti­ple times after the inva­si­on, that he reg­ret­ted to not have done it ear­lier when Ukrai­ne was less pre­pa­red. But the rus­si­an army its­elf still was ill pre­pa­red for the resis­tance. A mis­cal­cu­la­ti­on, we all know about that.

Point being, the Ukrai­ne was about to be suc­cess­ful against rus­si­an sup­por­ted “sepa­ra­tists” in the Don­bas, and reta­ke that regi­on. With Ukrai­ne regai­ning the Don­bas, the way would have been open for Cri­mea being tar­ge­ted to be freed next (cut off its water sup­ply), and Sevasta­pol is the main Har­bor rus­sia uses for its colo­ni­al efforts in Afri­ca, and the Har­bor whe­re 40% of Rus­si­as Exports were going through at the time. With the next best loca­ti­on rus­sia could use being Mur­mansk near the Polar cir­cle. Mea­ning, rus­sia would have been for­ced to ship its armament-shipments for its colo­nies in Afri­ca past 19 addi­tio­nal Nato out­posts to reach Africa.

Mea­ning, Rus­sia was on the ver­ge of loo­sing its most important, year long ice free, har­bor and its cen­ter of power pro­jec­tion into the black sea regi­on, and into Afri­ca, and the logistic cen­ter for 40% of its exports.

Not as a hypo­the­ti­cal, but as a “we know Ukrai­nes plans for the recon­que­ring of Cri­mea, and what would have been their poli­cy for black sea har­bors wit­hin Ukrai­ne”. From (EU) Veni­ce comis­si­on reports (on Minsk 2 imple­men­ta­ti­on efforts):

Wie kann man die­se Gesell­schaft noch verarschen?

So thats “why then” - Part 1.

Why then” - Part 2 is rus­si­as demo­gra­phic story. 

So if they didnt mana­ge to attain las­ting con­trol over their bor­der regi­on wit­hin the next 10 years, demo­gra­phi­cal­ly - they wouldnt be able to do so mili­ta­ri­ly any­mo­re. As in 20 years their mili­ta­ry capa­ci­ty would have hal­ved. Sim­ply becau­se of the demo­gra­phic factor.

That Ger­ma­ny was in the midd­le of a poli­ti­cal tran­si­ti­on, that the US had just with­drawn from Afgha­ni­stan in Cha­os, that rus­sia had redu­ced its attack sur­face for eco­no­mic sanc­tions, were tho­se “the rea­sons rus­sia thought it could attack”, or just due dili­gence (US does tho­se asses­ments all the time) com­bi­ned with fac­tors, that made an attack (resul­ting in a rus­si­an pro­jec­ted quick win) seem like a more pro­mi­sing stragety?

Point being -- was this an attack to topp­le the wes­tern rules based order? Or an attack out of rus­si­as own security/high impor­t­ance eco­no­mi­c­al interests?

And then we can look at how rus­sia was trea­ted in inter­na­tio­nal fora for the past 20 years (gas sta­ti­on with a mili­ta­ry, GDP com­pa­ra­ble to bra­zil and on a down­ward spiral, …

Ger­ma­ny appar­ent­ly “having for­got­ten to inclu­de rus­sia in its eco­no­mic plan­ning over the euro­pean green deal tra­jec­to­ry they alrea­dy were implementing”, …)

And even if you did mixed benefit/drawback cal­cu­la­ti­ons, taking into account the num­ber of midd­le aged men in Rus­sia that might die in such a con­flict, ins­tead of reques­ting sta­te bene­fits in the years to come - and the upri­sing poten­ti­al from rus­si­as eco­no­mic deve­lo­p­men­tal sto­ry not working out at all, during more and more uncer­tain times geo­po­li­ti­cal­ly, and macroeconomically --

ever­ything tren­ded towards, try­ing a quick inva­si­on, and dealing with the fall­out if it didnt go well later.

As it real­ly was the only major gam­bit rus­sia had left on its side. The­re was not­hing else.

Once that fai­led and the west sepa­ra­ted from rus­sia eco­no­mi­c­al­ly -- the fall­back stra­te­gy, and NOT necessa­ri­ly the initi­al goal, was to intert­wi­ne its eco­no­my with the chi­ne­se one, which has a lower purcha­sing power adjus­ted GDP per capita.

So nega­ti­ve growth for the popu­la­ti­on in rus­sia, which the rus­si­ans again could use the war as a “uni­fy­ing” for­ce to push through, while tigh­tening their secu­ri­ty sta­te. Under the pre­ten­ses of being enga­ged in a “war against the west”.

But Mrs. “we have to tell moti­va­tio­nal sto­ries all the time, so rus­si­as sto­ries dont get trac­tion”, Fio­na Hill now wants to argue, that “Rus­si­as war against the wes­tern world” IS real.

Becau­se Rus­sia thought of it that way from the begin­ning. And only enga­ged in it, becau­se it knew (*tri­um­phant hahaaaa!*) what hardship that would mean for the inter­na­tio­nal values based order (*sad oh no!*), you know inter­na­tio­nal law - as enfor­ced by the UN --- which no one gives a fuck about any­mo­re, at least if we look at Isra­els examp­le, based on a secu­ri­ty coun­cil that is in a dead­lock becau­se of the veto capa­bi­li­ties of its per­ma­nent mem­bers, and repre­sen­ting a struc­tu­re not repre­sen­ta­ti­ve of the cur­rent world popu­la­ti­on, or macroeco­no­mic deve­lo­p­ments anymore…

So how cra­zy was Putin, dear Fio­na, when not thin­king about Rus­si­as bene­fit in all of this at all -- but play­ing on the third level of the 3D Chess board to topp­le the wes­tern value based order, by making ever­yo­ne under­stand, that Euro­pe did most­ly work becau­se of the peace divi­dend, and the pro­mi­se of US pro­tec­tion, that now has (rela­tively) vanis­hed, becau­se the iso­la­tio­nist camp in the US won the last election.

What level of 3D chess has the craaaaaa­zy Putin be capa­ble of play­ing to “Manu­fac­tu­re a Cri­sis to Rewri­te the Glo­bal order”, my dear Fiona?

Fio­na, you that in the intro­duc­tion­a­ry state­ment still men­tio­ned, that is hard to know why Putin made this decisi­on when he did.

I mean, whats the con­spi­ra­cy theo­ry here and whats the “rus­sia didnt want to have Nato in the black see wit­hin a 15 years time­frame, while hal­fing their popu­la­ti­on of able man, capa­ble of being draf­ted wit­hin the next 20 years”?

I mean, surely Fio­na has some­thing to show us, so we can all belie­ve in this devi­lish rus­si­an mas­ter plan, to deli­gi­ti­mi­se the wes­tern order, right?

Well, its Putin who thought about it that way, becau­se Fio­na again knows how Putin thinks, and thats real­ly all you should need argu­ment wise, not to loo­se your jobs and get deplat­for­med in the Wer­te­wes­ten, right?

PS: The Hel­sin­ki Com­mis­si­on is not­hing to be in awe from, its the US “staf­fed by some sena­tors” tal­king club whe­re the ent­i­re Ukrai­ni­an PR dele­ga­ti­ons get invi­ted to, artists and all, to sing a US Sena­tor the US natio­nal anthem, befo­re asking for more wea­pons. Its not an inde­pen­dent non-partisan body at all. Just FYI.









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