Wie kann man diese Gesellschaft noch verarschen?

29. August 2023

45. Draft Arti­cle 5(10) sti­pu­la­tes that “any pro­per­ty and assets of the occu­p­y­ing for­ces and occup­a­ti­on admi­nis­tra­ti­ons of the Rus­si­an Fede­ra­ti­on, inclu­ding of the Black Sea Fleet of the Rus­si­an Fede­ra­ti­on, loca­ted in the de-occupied ter­ri­to­ries (inclu­ding any pro­per­ty and assets crea­ted during the tem­pora­ry occup­a­ti­on) shall beco­me the pro­per­ty of Ukrai­ne.” This pro­vi­si­on risks to cau­se signi­fi­cant prac­ti­cal pro­blems as the resti­tu­ti­on of pro­per­ty issue in Albania32 and in Georgia33 demonstrate.

Hier der kom­plet­te Fließ­text: click, Ori­gi­nal­quel­le: click

Ist das Pro­vo­ka­ti­on? Neiii­in! Die Veni­ce Com­mis­si­on der EU über die Geset­zes­vor­la­ge die Selen­skyj per Prä­si­den­ti­al­de­kret vom 24. März 2021 bis zum 25. Jän­ner 2022 zu gül­ti­gem Recht in der Ukrai­ne wer­den hat las­sen, und prak­ti­scher Wei­se zur Umset­zung gleich dem Defen­se Coun­cil sei­nes Lan­des über­ant­wor­tet hat. Dh, die über fast ein Jahr in Kraft war und vom ukrai­ni­schen Mili­tär umge­setzt wer­den sollte.

Also, als Fort­set­zung von dem hier:

33. While it is to be com­men­ded that the draf­ters of the law thus try to con­tri­bu­te to its cla­ri­ty and to the effi­ci­en­cy in its app­li­ca­ti­on, it is pro­ble­ma­tic that the defi­ni­ti­ons are not always con­gru­ent with the respec­ti­ve terms used in public inter­na­tio­nal law. This is espe­cial­ly true for the cen­tral terms of “tran­si­tio­nal peri­od” and “tran­si­tio­nal justice”.

34. Tran­si­tio­nal peri­od is defi­ned as “the peri­od of time during which the Sta­te imple­ments its poli­cy to coun­ter the armed aggres­si­on of the Rus­si­an Fede­ra­ti­on against Ukrai­ne, res­to­re ter­ri­to­ri­al inte­gri­ty of Ukrai­ne wit­hin its inter­na­tio­nal­ly reco­gnis­ed bor­ders, and ensu­re the Sta­te sov­er­eig­n­ty of Ukrai­ne, res­to­re the ope­ra­ti­ons of cen­tral and local government aut­ho­ri­ties in the tem­pora­ri­ly occu­p­ied ter­ri­to­ries as well as eli­mi­na­te the con­se­quen­ces of the Rus­si­an aggres­si­on against Ukrai­ne, reinte­gra­te the tem­pora­ri­ly occu­p­ied (de-occupied) ter­ri­to­ries and their resi­dents, build sus­tainab­le peace, and pre­vent fur­ther occup­a­ti­on” (Arti­cle 1(1)(1)). The tran­si­tio­nal peri­od has two pha­ses – the con­flict peri­od, whe­re “mea­su­res are taken to reinte­gra­te the tem­pora­ri­ly occu­p­ied ter­ri­to­ries and their resi­dents, coun­ter the armed aggres­si­on of the Rus­si­an Fede­ra­ti­on against Ukrai­ne, res­to­re ter­ri­to­ri­al inte­gri­ty of Ukrai­ne, and ensu­re Ukraine’s Sta­te sov­er­eig­n­ty in the tem­pora­ri­ly occu­p­ied ter­ri­to­ries, build sus­tainab­le peace, and pre­vent fur­ther occup­a­ti­on” (Arti­cle 1(1)(2)) and the post-conflict peri­od, whe­re mea­su­res are taken to eli­mi­na­te the con­se­quen­ces of the­se events (Arti­cle 1(1)(3)).

35. Tran­si­tio­nal jus­ti­ce is defi­ned as “mea­su­res spe­ci­fied in this Law and other laws to eli­mi­na­te the con­se­quen­ces of vio­la­ti­ons of law, human and civil rights and free­doms cau­sed by the armed aggres­si­on of the Rus­si­an Fede­ra­ti­on against Ukrai­ne, inclu­ding mea­su­res to res­to­re the rights and free­doms, com­pen­sa­te for dama­ges, ensu­re jus­ti­ce and recon­ci­lia­ti­on, and pre­vent fur­ther occup­a­ti­on” (Arti­cle 1(1)(4)).

36. As has been com­men­ted by several of the natio­nal and inter­na­tio­nal sta­ke­hol­ders during the con­sul­ta­ti­on of the first ver­si­on of the draft law, the­se defi­ni­ti­ons are rather nar­row­ly con­cei­ved, and they take a one-sided approach to the tran­si­tio­nal peri­od. First, they redu­ce the thrust of the con­flict in Ukrai­ne to its inter-state dimen­si­on, i.e., to the invol­ve­ment of the Rus­si­an Fede­ra­ti­on. Second­ly, the mea­su­res of tran­si­tio­nal jus­ti­ce are desi­gned to over­co­me the con­se­quen­ces of human rights vio­la­ti­ons “cau­sed by the armed aggres­si­on of the Rus­si­an Fede­ra­ti­on against Ukrai­ne” (Arti­cle 1(1)(4)). The­re is a risk that this pro­vi­si­on be inter­pre­ted as refer­ring sole­ly to human rights vio­la­ti­ons com­mit­ted by cer­tain actors invol­ved in the armed conflict.

Offe­ne Pro­vo­ka­ti­on die einen rus­si­schen Trup­pen­auf­marsch nach sich gezo­gen hat?!

I wo.… gar­nicht. Hören sie doch ein­fach dem Kor­re­spon­den­ten der Zeit zu!

Wie kann man die Öffen­lich­keit eigent­lich noch verarschen?

Das hier eine Provokation?

44. Several pro­vi­si­ons of Arti­cle 5 deal with the vali­di­ty of legal acts car­ri­ed out during the con­flict peri­od by aut­ho­ri­ties not reco­gnis­ed by Ukrai­ne, such as the adop­ti­on of nor­ma­ti­ve instru­ments, the acqui­si­ti­on of citi­zenship, the issu­an­ce of iden­ti­ty docu­ments, the con­fis­ca­ti­on of pro­per­ty, etc. The draft law decla­res all the­se legal acts null and void. Arti­cle 13 fore­sees that cer­tain excep­ti­ons to this rule may be pre­scri­bed by law with respect to regis­tra­ti­on of civil sta­tus acts and for edu­ca­tio­nal docu­ments, but the­re is no simi­lar excep­ti­on fore­se­en for other legal acts and no pro­ce­du­re pre­scri­bed for indi­vi­du­als to be able, for instance, to obtain new iden­ti­ty docu­ments repla­cing tho­se issued by aut­ho­ri­ties not reco­gnis­ed by Ukrai­ne (Arti­cle 5(5)). In the view of the Veni­ce Com­mis­si­on, the pro­po­sed legis­la­ti­on is very far-reaching, espe­cial­ly taking into account that the rele­vant ter­ri­to­ries have alrea­dy been out­side the con­trol of the Ukrai­ni­an aut­ho­ri­ties sin­ce 2014 so that a “clean sla­te” – as if not­hing had hap­pen­ed over the years – is illu­so­ry. For the sake of safe­guar­ding the human rights of tho­se living in tho­se ter­ri­to­ries, a more dif­fe­ren­tia­ted approach is recommended.31

I wo… Über­haupt nicht, wo denn?

Das hier eine Pro­vo­ka­ti­on? Oder gar Nationalismus?

47. Arti­cle 7(1) refers to “indi­vi­du­als and citi­zens”. It is not qui­te clear from the text whe­ther all citi­zens of Ukrai­ne and other indi­vi­du­als shall be trea­ted equal­ly. Most of the rights men­tio­ned in this con­text (espe­cial­ly life, health, digni­ty, safe living con­di­ti­ons) do not allow to pri­vi­le­ge citi­zens. It should be made clear that the approach is unders­tood to be inclu­si­ve mea­ning all indi­vi­du­als living in the tem­pora­ri­ly occu­p­ied ter­ri­to­ries and not only Ukrai­ni­an citi­zens, as was con­fir­med by the aut­hors of the draft law. At the same time, the­re might be fric­tions with the rights of the intern­al­ly dis­pla­ced per­sons who might want to come back to the regi­on. It would be recom­mend­a­ble to find a for­mu­la of how to sol­ve fore­see­ab­le conflicts.

I wo, über­haupt nicht, die Ukrai­ne woll­te da doch nur gutes Augen­maß wal­ten lassen.

Das hier provokativ?!

48. In this con­text, atten­ti­on is also drawn to Arti­cle 31(2)(6), wher­eby wit­hin six mon­ths after deoc­cup­a­ti­on it shall be veri­fied whe­ther “natio­nals of the aggres­sor Sta­te and other for­eig­ners and stateless per­sons” are stay­ing legal­ly and “follow-up decisi­ons” shall be made pur­suant to the Law on the Legal Sta­tus of For­eig­ners and Stateless Per­sons. This pro­vi­si­on appears pro­ble­ma­tic with regard to Arti­cle 8 of the ECHR (right to respect for pri­va­te life) and the cor­re­spon­ding case-law of the Euro­pean Court of Human Rights34 and should be recon­si­de­red. Moreo­ver, care needs to be taken to ensu­re respect of Arti­cle 4 of Pro­to­col No. 4 to the ECHR (pro­hi­bi­ti­on of collec­ti­ve expul­si­ons of ali­ens). The aut­hors of the draft law indi­ca­ted that no such collec­ti­ve expul­si­on or repres­si­ve actions were intended.

Also collec­ti­ve expul­si­on of aliens?!

I wo… gleich gar­nicht, wie­so? Weil der ECHR das nicht mag? Na aber die Ukrai­ne, what gives.

Jetzt kom­men wir zum lus­ti­gen Teil:

B. Sec­tion II Cer­tain Aspects of Tran­si­tio­nal Justice

50. Sec­tion II focu­ses on several tools of tran­si­tio­nal jus­ti­ce. More spe­ci­fi­cal­ly, it fore­sees the use of cri­mi­nal pro­se­cu­ti­on, lustra­ti­on, gen­der jus­ti­ce, the right to truth, in/convalidation of tran­sac­tions and docu­ments, and Sta­te poli­cy for sus­tainab­le peace­buil­ding. When com­pa­red with the UN defi­ni­ti­on of tran­si­tio­nal jus­ti­ce, men­tio­ned abo­ve, the ran­ge of tools seems rela­tively limited.

51. It is espe­cial­ly sur­pri­sing that the vic­tims’ right to reme­dy and repa­ra­ti­on is not ela­bo­ra­ted upon in any detail eit­her in Sec­tion II or in Sec­tions IV-VI. While the intro­duc­tion of some gene­ral pro­vi­si­ons in Arti­cles 3 and 7 is alrea­dy a step ahead as com­pa­red to pre­vious ver­si­ons of the draft law, and while pre­cise regu­la­ti­ons on that mat­ter may be deve­lo­ped in sepa­ra­te legis­la­ti­on, at least some basic princi­ples should be inclu­ded in the draft law its­elf. In line with the requi­re­ments set by the UN stan­dards refer­red to above,35 it should be made clear that vic­tims of vio­la­ti­ons of inter­na­tio­nal human rights law and inter­na­tio­nal huma­ni­ta­ri­an law are gua­ran­te­ed equal and effec­ti­ve access to jus­ti­ce, ade­qua­te, effec­ti­ve, and prompt repa­ra­ti­on for any harm suf­fe­red and CDL-AD(2021)038 access to rele­vant infor­ma­ti­on con­cer­ning vio­la­ti­ons and repa­ra­ti­on. Repa­ra­ti­on should be ensu­red for any harm occur­red in con­nec­tion with the con­flict (not only that cau­sed by the Rus­si­an Fede­ra­ti­on), and the draft law should pro­vi­de for more details on the extent of the com­pen­sa­ti­on and the way in which it will be determined.

Ey komm, also Ukrai­ni­sche Kriegs­ver­bre­chen braucht man doch nicht zu kom­pen­sie­ren wo kom­men wir da hin. Komm Ver­tei­di­gungs­rat der Ukrai­ne - UMSETZEN!

Pro­vo­ka­tiv? Geh, kein Stück.

Aber das war doch nur ein ver­se­hen. Naja, dann im nächs­ten Artikel:

54. Arti­cle 9 gives rise to con­cern. First, in the absence of the imple­men­ting legal act fore­se­en in Arti­cle 9(4), it is dif­fi­cult to assess the com­pa­ti­bi­li­ty of the who­le sys­tem of pro­se­cu­ti­on with inter­na­tio­nal legal stan­dards. Second­ly, it remains unclear why cri­mi­nal offen­ces com­mit­ted out­side the tem­pora­ri­ly occu­p­ied ter­ri­to­ries shall not be sub­ject to pro­se­cu­ti­on and whe­ther this rule shall app­ly to all cri­mi­nal offen­ces, inclu­ding com­mon cri­mes, or not. It also remains unclear why the impos­si­bi­li­ty to dischar­ge cer­tain per­sons from cri­mi­nal lia­bi­li­ty or to amnes­ty them for cri­mes lis­ted in Arti­cle 9(2) is limi­ted to cer­tain cate­go­ries of per­sons. The Veni­ce Com­mis­si­on recalls that in case of cri­mes under inter­na­tio­nal law or trea­ty cri­mes (i.e., cri­mes who­se per­pe­tra­tors Ukrai­ne has com­mit­ted to pro­se­cu­te under inter­na­tio­nal trea­ties), the­re is an obli­ga­ti­on to pro­se­cu­te under inter­na­tio­nal law that can­not be sus­pen­ded uni­la­te­ral­ly by a natio­nal legal act (such as amnes­ty law). Third­ly, the dif­fe­ren­tia­ted tre­at­ment of various cate­go­ries of per­pe­tra­tors of cri­mes is not ful­ly com­pre­hen­si­ble, is pro­ble­ma­tic with respect to the princi­ples of equa­li­ty befo­re the law and non­discri­mi­na­ti­on and will not be con­du­ci­ve to peace­buil­ding and recon­ci­lia­ti­on. Such a dif­fe­ren­tia­ti­on is not fore­se­en in the Minsk agree­ments either.37 Fourth­ly, several para­graphs of Arti­cle 9 refer to cri­mi­nal offen­ces com­mit­ted “in con­nec­tion with the tem­pora­ry occup­a­ti­on”. This con­cept is not defi­ned and lacks legal cla­ri­ty. Final­ly, the rela­ti­ons­hip bet­ween Arti­cle 9 and the pro­vi­si­ons of the Amnes­ty Law and the Cri­mi­nal Code is unclear. It is recom­men­ded to revi­se Arti­cle 9 to address the afo­re­men­tio­ned concerns.

Pro­vo­ka­ti­on? I wo - die ken­nen sich nur nicht aus…

Gut, als nächs­tes gleich mal ein “Recht auf Wahr­heit” umset­zen las­sen, nicht?

Halt eins das nur bezüg­lich einer Kon­flikt­par­tei gilt…

63. Arti­cle 12 on ensu­ring the right to truth sti­pu­la­tes that “the Sta­te shall prompt­ly inform the public, pro­vi­ding reli­able, accu­ra­te, and com­ple­te infor­ma­ti­on about the cau­ses, evol­ve­ment, and con­se­quen­ces of the armed aggres­si­on of the Rus­si­an Fede­ra­ti­on against Ukrai­ne, except as other­wi­se estab­lis­hed by the Law of Ukrai­ne ‘On Access to Public Information’.”

64. Alt­hough the right to truth is not expli­ci­tly ensh­ri­ned in any human rights instru­ment, it is now gene­ral­ly reco­gnis­ed as part of cus­to­ma­ry inter­na­tio­nal law or, alter­na­tively, as a gene­ral princip­le of law.42 Accord­ing to a com­pre­hen­si­ve stu­dy pro­du­ced by the Office of the UN High Com­mis­si­on for Human Rights in 2006, the right app­lies to “all gross human rights vio­la­ti­ons and serious breaches of inter­na­tio­nal huma­ni­ta­ri­an law”.43 The use of the term “all” makes it clear that when imple­men­ting the right to truth, atten­ti­on has to be paid to estab­li­shing truth about all vio­la­ti­ons and not only tho­se com­mit­ted by cer­tain spe­ci­fic actors, as is howe­ver the case with Arti­cle 12 of the draft law which is limi­ted to the “armed aggres­si­on of the Rus­si­an Fede­ra­ti­on against Ukraine”.

65. The right to truth is victim-oriented, so the pri­ma­ry focus should lie on pro­vi­ding vic­tims with infor­ma­ti­on about “the cau­ses lea­ding to the person’s vic­ti­mi­sa­ti­on; the cau­ses and con­di­ti­ons per­tai­ning to the gross vio­la­ti­ons of inter­na­tio­nal human rights law and serious vio­la­ti­ons of inter­na­tio­nal huma­ni­ta­ri­an law; the pro­gress and results of the inves­ti­ga­ti­on; the cir­cum­s­tan­ces and rea­sons for the per­pe­tra­ti­on of cri­mes under inter­na­tio­nal law and gross human rights vio­la­ti­ons; the cir­cum­s­tan­ces in which vio­la­ti­ons took place; in the event of death, mis­sing or enfor­ced disap­pearan­ce, the fate and whe­rea­bouts of the vic­tims; and the iden­ti­ty of perpetrators”.44 Here, Arti­cle 12 falls short of the­se stan­dards as it only focus­ses on the armed aggres­si­on of the Rus­si­an Fede­ra­ti­on against Ukrai­ne and not on indi­vi­du­al victims.

66. The right to truth also has a socie­tal dimen­si­on. “Socie­ty has the right to know the truth about past events con­cer­ning the per­pe­tra­ti­on of hein­ous cri­mes, as well as the cir­cum­s­tan­ces and the rea­sons for which aberrant cri­mes came to be com­mit­ted, so that such events do not reoc­cur in the future”.45 The right to truth shall not ent­ail estab­li­shing one sin­gle nar­ra­ti­ve about the con­flict peri­od. Arti­cle 12 is pro­ble­ma­tic in this respect as it intro­du­ces an offi­cial nar­ra­ti­ve. In the view of the Veni­ce Com­mis­si­on, it is cru­cial that Arti­cle 12 be revi­sed in light of the pre­ce­ding paragraphs.

Und dass man damit kein sin­gu­lä­res Nar­ra­ti­ve kre­ieren soll, wur­de lei­der auch nicht im Gesetz fest­ge­legt. Na so ein Pech aber auch.


Geh wo - Pro­vo­ka­ti­on?! Wel­che? Ja wo denn?!

Ich mach dann mor­gen weiter.

Die­se Gesell­schaft ist das abso­lut gro­tesk und abar­tigst Allerletzte.

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