Catlady with a scarfs way to end the war in Ukraine

17. März 2023

More of the same! More of the same! And think about the sud­den mira­cle potential! 

So whe­re we are stan­ding right now - it’s star­ting to sink in that the ukrai­ni­an win con­di­ti­on cur­r­ent­ly is two fold.

1. Defeat rus­sia tho­rough­ly. As in the last rus­si­an sol­dier lea­ves the ter­ri­to­ry, Cri­mea gains self-government for 30 years, then auto­ma­ti­cal­ly beco­mes part of the ukrai­ni­an poli­ti­cal struc­tu­re again.

But then the­re is an addi­tio­nal con­di­ti­on, namely -

2. That rus­sia be fore­ver unab­le to mount an attack again - or at least for 30 years (as this is one of the US goals that beca­me public). This is a pret­ty invol­ved war aim, becau­se in more than one sen­se a pro­tra­c­ted con­flict is more than enough for rus­sia to dis­rupt ukrai­ni­an eco­no­mic deve­lo­p­ment enough to bleed the coun­try out over the long­term. So now the most via­ble opti­on seems to tie this all tog­e­ther into a regi­me­chan­ge opti­on, which a wes­tern for­ward can­di­da­te would have to win, which is only real­ly via­ble after a total ukrai­ni­an mili­ta­ry vic­to­ry. Or some­thing thats publicly per­cei­ved as very clo­se to that.

Enter cat­la­dy to mas­sa­ge the points.


Ukrai­ni­an offen­si­ve in the sum­mer is very sucess­full, and rus­si­an coun­ter offen­si­ve isnt, and rus­si­as mili­ta­ry posi­ti­on beco­mes despe­ra­te (lar­ge­ly over­laps with cri­mea get­ting cut off from sup­ply rou­tes btw), and then this pro­vo­kes a sud­den rethin­king pro­cess in the rus­si­an eli­te, and then the­re is open pro­test against a pro­longued dis­rup­ti­on stra­te­gy of ukrai­ne, and then the­re would be a regime chan­ge oppor­tu­ni­ty which then the west for­ward can­di­da­te would win, and then they could final­ly start paying repa­ra­ti­on pay­ments for the next 100 years, which the rus­si­an popu­la­ti­on might like!

I mean short term. Becau­se peop­le would be voting with short term inte­rests in mind.

To which the ans­wer nor­mal­ly is - you’d need at least many more dead bodies, befo­re the the public sen­ti­ment would start to flip in russia.

To which cat­la­dy would reply, but think of the sud­den mira­cle poten­ti­al, dont rule that out!

Becau­se cat­la­dys next argu­ment beco­mes - if the west would just deli­ver more and more effec­ti­ve wea­pons, at least the ukrai­ne could regain some ter­ri­to­ry - which the Rand cor­po­ra­ti­on by now has spe­ci­fied as ent­i­re­ly useless in terms of war pro­gres­si­on or via­ble war aims, becau­se the eco­no­mic bene­fit is small. (As long as ukrai­ne is hol­ding Odes­sa that is.)

To which the non “mira­cles could stack up” posi­ti­on is -- the likely out­co­me is a pro­tra­c­ted war, which will then turn into a fro­zen con­flict - to which cat­la­dy replies --

- well, but its too ear­ly to rule out mira­cle poten­ti­al, becau­se the ukrai­ni­an army could still defeat rus­sia signi­fi­cant­ly in their sum­mer offensive.

To which the respon­se then is - but that doesnt mean that the ent­i­re rus­si­an army will retract, and you still would need a total victory -

to which the cat­la­dy respon­se than is, yes, but cumu­la­ted mira­cles can hap­pen, its too ear­ly to rule that out.

To which the respon­se then is, but for that to hap­pen, you pri­ma­ri­ly need dead rus­si­an bodies (an actu­al war of attri­ti­on fought out will deli­ver them), not libe­ra­ti­on of ter­ri­to­ry. To which the respon­se then beco­mes, yes but mira­cles could hap­pen. And the psy­cho­lo­gi­cal effect of recap­tu­ring territory!

And now to the good news, cat­la­dys posi­ti­on repres­ents the wes­tern publics posi­ti­on at large.


Well, may­be not the publics posi­ti­on (“ukrai­ne should take up nego­tia­ti­ons, even if they’d loo­se cri­mea”) but the poli­ti­cal estab­lish­ments posi­ti­on, which has to be uni­form, becau­se - ehm - unity gre­at. West strong.

Uh, and never men­ti­on to them game theo­ry. And non zero sum games. They cant pro­cess. I mean cat­la­dys deli­be­ra­ti­on poten­ti­al is tap­ped out at fin­ding the right scarf.

Oh and by the way, we have to do this, becau­se think of the inter­na­tio­nal pre­ce­dent this would crea­te otherwise!

And btw. I even agree with cat­la­dys posi­ti­on for may­be ano­t­her year or two, to real­ly have the eco­no­mic cost for having star­ted this sink in for rus­sia - but that doesnt necessa­ri­ly harm their lea­ders­hip classes.

And then we wait ano­t­her year and try it again, and then we wait ano­t­her year and try it again, and then cat­la­dy has three new cats, one of which would be named Hero, or Heroic probably.

To which the default posi­ti­on then still is this is loo­king like its beco­m­ing a pro­tra­c­ted war of attri­ti­on, that might later turn into a fro­zen conflict.

To which the respon­se of the cur­rent US admi­nis­tra­ti­on would be - gre­at, becau­se that leads to more dead bodies, and the regime chan­ge poten­ti­al would rise.

To which cat­la­dy would respond - yes, and may­be they could even libe­ra­te ano­t­her ter­ri­to­ry or two!

To which the ans­wer cur­r­ent­ly is, the effort for ukrai­ne to libe­ra­te the ent­i­re coun­try, inclu­ding cri­mea through mili­ta­ry means, by some, is seen as may­be 20 fold of what they have achie­ved so far.

Becau­se Char­kiew was low rus­si­an infan­try num­bers, low trai­ned units (natio­nal guard), no second line they could fall back to, becau­se tho­se tro­ops got moved to Cher­son, and a working ukrai­ni­an pro­pa­gan­da initia­ti­ve, that gave the rus­si­ans the impres­si­on, that they were alrea­dy in their back.

But it could hap­pen again, and then it would only need to stack a few times, and then… I mean then - the rus­si­an public sen­ti­ment could turn on a whim!

Even if both nati­ons see this as a war for their survival - .

Oh, but never get back to non zero sum thin­king, it would be too dangerous.

Cant trust Putin!

Now renewing the grain export deal for ano­t­her 60 days.

And still no issu­es to manu­fac­tu­re most wea­pons domesti­cal­ly for one of the invol­ved par­ties in that war.

edit: For­mer goth lady now chips in - cat­la­dy total­ly right. (More or less.)

Min­na Ålan­der is a rese­arch fel­low in the Euro­pean Uni­on rese­arch pro­gram­me at the Fin­nish Insti­tu­te of Inter­na­tio­nal Affairs (FIIA) whe­re her rese­arch focus is on Ger­man for­eign and secu­ri­ty poli­cy. She is also part of the rese­arch pro­ject ana­ly­zing Finland’s evol­ving role in Euro-Atlantic secu­ri­ty, led by Mat­ti Pesu, whe­re she par­ti­cu­lar­ly focu­ses on Fin­nish secu­ri­ty and defence poli­cy, Nort­hern Euro­pean secu­ri­ty and Nor­dic defence coope­ra­ti­on. Pre­vious­ly, Ålan­der worked at the Ger­man Insti­tu­te for Inter­na­tio­nal and Secu­ri­ty Affairs (SWP) in Berlin.

src: click

SWP? Stif­tung Wis­sen­schaft und Poli­tik, inven­tors of the “lear­ning cur­ve”.

No one has yet seen any pro­pa­gan­da though.

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