Panel on Strengthening the Security Resilience of Ukraine: Military, Energy, Cyber
Highlight: Moderator asks, if Ukraine would be able to become a net energy exporter within the next five years to reduce economic dependance - expert follows up with a slide that reads:
Possible additional threats [to Ukraine] in 2022:
Physical attacks
- physical damage to infrastructure - gas pipelines, to force NS2 operation
- electricity network to prevent joining ENTSO-E (European association for the cooperation of transmission system operators (TSOs) for electricity)Cyber attacks on infrastructure
- gas pipelines to force NS2 operation
- electricity network to prevent joining ENTSO-EAttacks on coal mines/nuclear plants to create evironmental disasters, risk to people’s health
Informational attacks
- already happeningEconomic attacks
- Blockage of coal/gas supply
- Blockage of oil products supply
Followed up by a plea, to the US ministry of energy to help Ukraine with implementing a sustainable energy infrastructure, because
“The US has really, really great energy resilience systems, starting with trainings, communication, and building capacity of different stakeholders. It would be really good, if the US department of energy and the US government, would help the Ukraine ministry of energy and other stakeholders, to build this capacity here in the Ukraine. I believe this is a really great chance to enhance our cooperation, thank you very much.”
What a nice invitation - I might actually vacation there, next summer!
[First problem being Belarus is currently not supplying electricity to the Ukraine, with it being up in the air, if they will reconnect in the near future.] “The second problem is supply of oil products to Ukraine, because Russia and Belarus supply up to 70% of oil products to Ukraine now, and if they stop this supply, well, there will be a possibility to replace this fuel, but the time will matter. So Belarus can play some negative role, even destroying lets say energy security of Ukraine.”
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Starr Forum (MIT Center for International Studies)
Primarily sees “saber rattling”. Then followed up by a collection of all the US thinktank lead proposals dissected here in the last days. Eurasion economic union, Putin behavioral analysis and character centered motivation finding for the conflict, painting the Ukraine as an economic powerhouse, telling people its Putins fear of people power, pinning it on ego/status, … Everything except for creating a security infrastructure alongside russias borders that would sustain a coming demographic narrowing. First and fourth speakers at least touch upon it. Fourth speaker then also proposes something along those lines, detailed talks about a new security infrastructure as “the best possible solution, and the one thats currently being pursued”. All in all the best panel I’ve screened so far, watching it is recommended.
edit: Passend dazu der österreichische Falter: “Niemand hat wirklich ein Interesse an Kämpfen in der Ukraine. Warum trommeln dann trotzdem alle nach Krieg?”
edit2: Fifth speaker in the Starr Forum Panel goes into the threat from a military troops stationed at the border angle. Currently about 56.000 combat units and support units to fill up the 100.000 reported by other outlets before. Thats about 40% of russias current combat potential, now near the border (120-200 miles from the ukrainian border). About half the number are brigades, that are regularly stationed there. That includes most of the supporting ground troops. (Almost no additional support troops were added.) 15-20 SPTGs have moved primarily into Belarus, equaling 50% of the total eastern groups combat potential, that has now moved near the Ukraine. Positioning would make it possible to occupy the east or the south of Ukraine, or to encircle Kiev, probably not take Kiev “because that’s hard”. A total occupation is unlikely, but there is a possibility to use a limited military victory to attain political goals. Sustained partial occupation also seems unlikely according to the speaker.
edit3: Two new major takeaways. The panel agrees that russia has largely decoupled its ability to take military action from the public sentiment of its people, and also agrees, that the conflict is about larger concessions in the orientation of the security based order of the western alliance. Concessions that would exceed “preventing Ukraine from becoming a member of Nato”, because that wasnt very likely within the next years anyhow, according to the panelists.
