Our transatlantic friends are spitballing

08. Februar 2022

… future sce­n­a­ri­os of Nato deve­lo­p­ment in Euro­pe - report released today. Rough­cut, how to get Euro­pe more res­il­li­ant under war/proxy war conditions.

With it also being para­mount that Nato will grow and chan­ge in the com­ing years. With Euro­pe poten­ti­al­ly being under war.


And so sen­si­ti­ve in regards to the situa­ti­on cur­r­ent­ly evolving.


Now on Ukrai­ne, whe­re the rules based order is under direct ass­ault, we sug­gest a more proac­ti­ve, stra­te­gy dri­ven approach to NATO part­ners­hips, inclu­ding the Ukrai­ne deter­rence initia­ti­ve. That would make it a stra­te­gic prio­ri­ty for the alli­an­ce, to do ever­ything pos­si­ble, short of an arti­cle five gua­ran­tee, to help Ukrai­ne and other part­ners, that are threa­tened by Mos­kow, to defend them­sel­ves and deter aggres­si­on. This Ukrai­ne deter­rence initia­ti­ve could be an exten­si­on of the enhan­ced oppor­tu­nities part­ners pro­gram, at a time when NATO mem­bers­hip of the Ukrai­ne is real­ly not on the agenda.”

Ah, a NATO build-up without a NATO mem­bers­hip. Excellent.

As Juli­an out­lined in his over­view - we argue, that the new stra­te­gic con­cept must com­mit the alli­an­ce to a step chan­ge in the balan­ce of respon­si­bi­li­ty bet­ween the United Sta­tes and the euro­pean mem­bers of the alli­an­ce, to inclu­de Cana­da as well. This is no lon­ger just a mat­ter of over­co­m­ing long stan­ding dis­pu­tes over bur­den sharing in defen­se spen­ding, bet­ween the United Sta­tes and Euro­pe - its now a stra­te­gic neces­si­ty, becau­se the rise of chi­na as a stra­te­gic com­pe­ti­tor crea­tes US need to shift its stra­te­gic focus to the indo­pa­ci­fic regi­on. And under the­se cir­cum­s­tan­ces, Nato can no lon­ger afford it exces­si­ve reli­an­ce on the United sta­tes, eit­her for collec­ti­ve defen­se, or for cri­sis manage­ment and coope­ra­ti­ve secu­ri­ty mis­si­ons bey­ond euro­pes bor­ders. Clear­ly - in an arti­cle five con­tin­gen­cy bet­ween rus­sia in the bal­tic or black sea regi­ons, the United Sta­tes may not always be able to deploy ade­qua­te rein­for­ce­ments to Euro­pe, becau­se of com­pe­ting deman­ds on its for­ces in the indo-pacific. So euro­pean allies will need to be able to pick up most of the slack. Now simi­lar­ly resour­ce cons­traints and shif­ting prio­ri­ties may also lead the US to limit its invol­ve­ment in the midd­le east, afri­ca, and south asia. Or at least to be more selec­ti­ve in when and whe­re it enga­ges. That means, that the United Sta­tes will incre­a­singly look to the euro­pean allies and the euro­pean uni­on to shoul­der more of the bur­den for cri­sis manage­ment and part­ner capa­ci­ty buil­ding in their own neighborhood.”

Same stance - as announ­ced by Peter Zei­han and men­tio­ned in this blog, one year ago.

This is some­what important, as the (trans­at­lan­tic) think­tank cir­cuit is cur­r­ent­ly try­ing to estab­lish that Putin (hims­elf pro­bab­ly) is try­ing to dri­ve a wedge into the US/European coali­ti­on, while in rea­li­ty the stra­te­gic focus of the US has shifted to the indo-pacific and will do more so in the future regard­less of what hap­pens in the­se parts of the world. An expan­sio­nist Chi­na is too much of a stra­te­gic thre­at to the US - while Euro­pe doesnt hold the same value any­mo­re (not mili­ta­ri­ly, not regar­ding ener­gy secu­ri­ty, not in terms of tra­de (US deve­lo­ping Mexi­co and India to be con­su­mer eco­no­mies), not in terms of inno­va­ti­on eit­her (has more to do with the fact that ener­gy secu­ri­ty in the US in the com­ing three deca­des is not rely­ing on anything that Euro­pe pro­du­ces. They’­ve beco­me net exporters.)

Why is the first thing that comes to mind “Fare well a**holes? And thanks for all the hell rai­sing in the past days!”?

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