Wie kann man die Gesellschaft eigentlich noch verarschen?

04. Juli 2023

Mit Pro­fes­so­ren, die einer Öffent­lich­keit erklä­ren wol­len, dass das Ost-/West-Gefälle der Ukrai­ne eigent­lich eine Erfin­dung ist, da es ja bei der Abstim­mung zum EU Asso­zi­ie­rungs­ab­kom­men auch eine Mehr­heit dafür im Osten gab.


Seht ihr, alles in Ord­nung! Leu­te die Ost-/West- Gefäl­le sagen sind ganz böse Putin-Versteher.

Da soll­ten wir bei uns im Sprach­ge­brauch bes­ser pro­ak­tiv maß­re­geln! Also min­des­tens auf social media!

Sagt die Pro­fes­so­rin! Und Phoe­nix fea­tured das in einem freund­li­chen Inter­view ohne Wider­spruch, ich mein war­um auch nicht?

Was sagt eigent­lich die OECD dazu?

Oh…

The pre­vious OECD Ter­ri­to­ri­al Review of Ukrai­ne (OECD, 2014b), com­ple­ted just befo­re the Euro­mai­dan events and the erup­ti­on of a sepa­ra­tist con­flict in the east of the coun­try, con­clu­ded that Ukrai­ne was both admi­nis­tra­tively and fis­cal­ly over-centralised. It argued that a more decen­tra­li­sed form of ter­ri­to­ri­al gover­nan­ce was essen­ti­al to making strength of the country’s size and diver­si­ty and to over­co­m­ing the much-discussed east-west divi­de, which was reflec­ted not only in its poli­tics but also in the struc­tu­re and per­for­mance of regio­nal eco­no­mies. This report updates and extends that ana­ly­sis. It argues that the geo­po­li­ti­cal and eco­no­mic shocks of recent years have had asym­metric impacts, both sec­to­ral­ly and geo­gra­phi­cal­ly. To a gre­at extent, they seem to have acce­le­ra­ted a num­ber of trends that emer­ged in the years fol­lowing the glo­bal finan­cial cri­sis of 2009. The struc­tu­ral shifts that began after the finan­cial cri­sis pre­sent new oppor­tu­nities for some regi­ons, espe­cial­ly in the west of the coun­try, but daun­ting new chal­len­ges for others, par­ti­cu­lar­ly in the east, whe­re the con­se­quen­ces of armed con­flict have exa­cer­ba­ted an alrea­dy dif­fi­cult struc­tu­ral adjus­t­ment. The asym­metric natu­re of the­se shocks across Ukraine’s regi­ons points to the need for a dif­fe­ren­tia­ted poli­cy respon­se and thus rein­for­ces the case for more decen­tra­li­sed gover­nan­ce. Howe­ver, it also unders­cores the impor­t­ance – and dif­fi­cul­ty – of get­ting decen­tra­li­sa­ti­on right, given the pro­ble­ma­tic insti­tu­tio­nal, poli­ti­cal and eco­no­mic envi­ron­ment in which it is being implemented.

src: click

Shit, Fuck.

Die­se Gesell­schaft ist und bleibt das abso­lut abar­tigst, gro­tesk Allerletzte.

Zusatz: Der “Bür­ger­krieg im Osten der Ukrai­ne”, war ein, aber nicht der bestim­men­de Fak­tor, der für den Invest­ment­stau ver­ant­wort­lich war - der Haupt­fak­tor sei, zu viel Zen­tra­li­sie­rung von Ent­schei­dungs­macht in Kiew. Sagt die OECD. Ach­ja, und die Welt­bank.

Aber die Pro­fes­so­rin weiß das natür­lich, das war ganz anders, weil eigent­lich exis­tier­te ja die homo­ge­ne Ukrai­ne, die wir heu­te natür­lich nur alle falsch und noch zu sehr in der Rück­an­sicht betrach­ten. Den East-West devi­de in der Ukrai­ne den gabs ja garnicht.

Wird wie­der mal Zeit für einen Karls­preis wür­de ich sagen. Pro­fes­so­ren kön­nen den eh pro­blem­los ent­ge­gen­neh­men, oder? Und für einen Jour­na­lis­mus Preis fürs rein gar­nicht Nach­ha­ken und fürs tol­le booking!

Wenn ich an Lücken und Leer­stel­len in der Ukraine­be­richt­erstat­tung den­ke lan­de ich ja auch sofort bei “es wird zu unrecht so getan, als sei der Osten der Ukrai­ne pro russisch”.

Erwähnt das The­ma nicht Selen­skyj jede Woche, weil er ja noch kurz den Osten befrei­en muss? Ja, schon, aber zu wenig, und nicht schnell genug! Wo die Pro­fes­so­rin wohl die Idee mit der Lücke in der Debat­te herhat…

Im Elfen­bein­turm auf dem Weg ins Bad den Kopf gestoßen?

Und da klin­gel­te zufäl­li­ger Wei­se auch schon das Tele­fon, und Phoe­nix war mit einer Inter­view­an­fra­ge zur Stelle?

Die­se Gesell­schaft ist das abso­lut gro­tesk, abar­tigst Allerletzte.

Die Ver­pflich­tung auf Lebens­zeit hat die Frau Pro­fes­sor aber schon, oder? Oder arbei­tet sie bei Phoe­nix grad flei­ßig dran? Ten­u­re Party!

Weil wozu was wis­sen, wenn ein­fach die Ideo­lo­gie passt?!

Fragt der Mode­ra­tor: Sehr geehr­te Frau Pro­fes­sor, hat sich viel­leicht in unse­rer west­li­chen Wahr­neh­mung etwas ver­än­dert, also seit Janukowitsch.

Ja, aber viel­leicht nicht genug, was ich damit sagen woll­te ist…”

Ja, dass du hast ein mora­li­sie­ren­des Stan­zerl drauf hast ver­mut­lich, von dem du nicht abwei­chen kannst und willst, und des­halb deflek­test du jetzt jede Fra­ge mit “ihr habt aber gesell­schaft­lich nicht genug getan, und wart außer­dem zu lang­sam!”, also selbst die Fra­gen, die du eigent­lich beant­wor­ten kön­nen soll­test. Also inhaltlich.

Jetzt ist die Dame aber nur Pro­fes­so­rin, also Poli­tik­wis­sen­schaft­le­rin (Prof. Gwen­d­o­lyn Sas­se) und ein neu­es Buch über die Ukrai­ne unter dem Titel “Der Krieg gegen die Ukrai­ne” hat sie auch drau­ßen. Was wir da wohl Inter­es­san­tes drin lesen werden…

Oh, dass wir alle noch immer den spie­geln­den kolo­nia­len Blick drauf hät­ten, als Gesellschaften. 

Na wenn das erst die OECD hört.…

Dan­ke Frau Professor!

Pro­pa­gan­da hat aber immer noch nie­mand ent­deckt, in die­ser ver­fick­ten, drecks, scheiss, Hurengesellschaft.

The best of the best

03. Juli 2023

Tref­fen sich ein Ver­tre­ter des Ger­man Mar­shall Funds of the United Sta­tes, drei (!?) von einer Soros Pri­vat­stif­tung unter­stütz­te pro ukrai­ni­sche NGOs und ein Board Mem­ber einer ukrai­ni­schen Stif­tung -- der aber gleich­zei­tig natür­lich auch Co-founder and Pre­si­dent der Ukrainian-Austrian Asso­cia­ti­on ist - vor einem wohl­wol­len­den Moderator -

nein - Moment der wohl­wol­len­de Mode­ra­tor ist ja auch der Co-founder and Pre­si­dent, Ukrainian-Austrian Asso­cia­ti­on selbst -- also alles ande­re wäre ja auch Freun­derl­wirt­schaft und so gar­nicht sexy/koscher…

Also tref­fen sich die in der diplo­ma­ti­schen Aka­de­mie Wien, um einen Hit nach dem ande­ren rauszuhauen.

Co-founder and Pre­si­dent, Ukrainian-Austrian Asso­cia­ti­on: “Thank you very much Yana may­be I should men­ti­on, that the ERSTE foun­da­ti­on is so clear­ly pro Ukrai­ne -- eehh ahhh, that, eh, you have done, uuuuh, qui­te a few important pro­jects in the past and I do hope that you will con­ti­nue that…” addres­sed at Yana Bari­no­va (Euro­pean Poli­ci­es and Ukrai­ni­an Rela­ti­ons, ERSTE Foun­da­ti­on; for­mer Kyiv City Coun­cil­lor for Culture)

Ideologie-Check BESTANDEN!

Was er uns dar­über hin­aus mit der Aus­sa­ge mit­tei­len woll­te? Ich hab kei­ne Ahnung.

Co-founder and Pre­si­dent, Ukrainian-Austrian Asso­cia­ti­on: “I may just tell you and the audi­ence, that the­re is a pro­ject, even in Aus­tria, in Vien­na - by the pre­si­den­ti­al office of Ukrai­ne, to show the exhi­bi­ti­on [of] Rus­si­an war cri­mes in Ukrai­ne, at the Uni­ver­si­ty of Vien­na. I [mys­elf] have [had (die Bes­ten der Bes­ten)] the pri­vi­le­ge to have inn­itia­ted such a pro­ject in aus­tria, but the pre­si­den­ti­al office [of Ukrai­ne] had to deci­de to prio­ri­ti­ze this exhi­bi­ti­on to go to New York, becau­se they are figh­t­ing for every vote at the gene­ral assem­bly of the United Nations.”

Des ist jetzt aber kei­ne Pro­pa­gan­da, oder? Des ist jetzt ein­fach eine infor­ma­ti­ve Kunst­aus­stel­lung mit doku­men­ta­ri­schem Cha­rak­ter, die da auf Anlei­tung des pre­si­den­ti­al office of the Ukrai­ne mal ein­fach ganz schnell von Wien nach New York muss­te, oder?

Des ist ja fast so toll wie die Kunst­aus­stel­lun­gen die sonst nur die Vik­tor Pin­chuck Foun­da­ti­on zustan­de bringt!

Embed­ded Repor­ting == Front­li­ne Journalism

Yana Bari­no­va (Euro­pean Poli­ci­es and Ukrai­ni­an Rela­ti­ons, ERSTE Foun­da­ti­on; for­mer Kyiv City Coun­cil­lor for Cul­tu­re): “NGOs insi­de of them­sel­ves [sic!] they can shift their prio­ri­ties, if they can be fle­xi­ble, they can switch in bet­ween being a MEDIA [out­let], into [sic! to] lear­ning how to docu­ment war cri­mes.” [Very fle­xi­ble of tho­se NGOs, I might add, of cour­se all guar­ded and dri­ven around by the ukrai­ni­an patrol poli­ce, I recon.]

WAIT! NGOs can both be media out­lets and sta­te accredi­ted organs that docu­ment warcri­mes? Thats ama­zing! Just dont for­get to enter on you next job form, the usu­al ngo­jour­na­list­sta­tea­c­credi­ted­warcri­me­ex­per­tand­ana­lyst and if ever - someo­ne asks you what that means, just tell them you were flexible.

Co-founder and Pre­si­dent, Ukrainian-Austrian Asso­cia­ti­on: “The media are play­ing a pivo­tal role in coun­te­ring the rus­si­an nar­ra­ti­ve - which is ever­y­whe­re. And thats not only a ques­ti­on of money, which is plug­gend into the sys­tem sub­ver­si­ve­ly. This is the result of a stra­te­gy over may­be 10, 15, 20 years, when Putin came to power. So - some cri­ti­cism, Ukrai­ne in many aspects until some years ago was slee­ping and did not coun­ter the rus­si­an things, tal­king about cul­tu­re! [Wait for it, waaaaiiiit for it!] Yeah? That rus­sia is doing a cul­tu­ral initia­ti­ve, in order to spread the nar­ra­ti­ve, etc - so cul­tu­ral ambassa­dors of rus­sia, this was not coun­te­red by Ukrai­ne for many years, they were just silent, its not only a ques­ti­on of money. And only with the Ukrai­ni­an Insti­tu­te it star­ted (TELL ME MORE!1!). And that has been may­be five, six, seven years ago, befo­re that the­re was nothing.”

Not­hing? Well thats pro­bab­ly becau­se media is so important, but not near­ly as important as the Ukrai­ni­an Insti­tu­te, right? (*cough cough*)

Yana Bari­no­va (Euro­pean Poli­ci­es and Ukrai­ni­an Rela­ti­ons, ERSTE Foun­da­ti­on; for­mer Kyiv City Coun­cil­lor for Cul­tu­re): “Befo­re that (The Ukrai­ni­an Insti­tu­te I recon?) it was actual­ly more fashion­ab­le to be a Rus­si­an plu­ra­listic wri­ter, than actual­ly ack­now­ledge that you are com­ing from a vil­la­ge in the nort­hern part of Ukrai­ne. [WRONG NARRATIVE, WRONG NARRATIVE!]

Iry­na Kho­mi­ak Pro­gram­me Mana­ger, Ger­man Mar­shall Fund, Ber­lin): I obser­ved this uh also tal­king with col­leagues from other Euro­pean foun­da­ti­ons. First year it was the year of direct aid, urgent needs a direct aid on the bor­ders but now we see that I hope the war will end rather soo­ner than later, but still it con­ti­nues so what the stra­te­gy of Euro­pean phil­an­thro­py should be -- what uh what we can Under­ta­ke and I think that the main thing it’s not to do for Ukrai­ne but to do with Ukrai­ne becau­se defi­ni­te­ly we don’t want to be pas­si­ve reci­pi­ent of of funds we want to be co-creator of uh important impact­ful uh pro­grams so I iden­ti­fy a capa­ci­ty buil­ding initia­ti­ves as the top prio­ri­ty uh for the next several years - why becau­se we say restart Ukrai­ne rebuild Ukrai­ne brin­ging Ukrai­ne Euro­pean inte­gra­ti­on, but this is just words behind each of tho­se words the­re are peop­le and their capa­ci­ties and their know­ledge and their exper­ti­se what they can and well they can’t so I think the best thing what we can do to pre­pa­re peop­le for such enor­mous under­ta­king as rebuild Ukrai­ne to equip with know­ledge to equip with net­works to to equip with the best prac­ti­ces and this in a way means deco­lo­niz­a­ti­on of Euro­pean phil­an­thro­py what they mean it means that you help in order to lea­ve at a cer­tain point you help to grow the Ukrai­ni­an third sec­tor you help Ukrai­ni­an ngos to streng­t­hen its own capa­ci­ty, becau­se many big Inter­na­tio­nal foun­da­ti­ons mis­si­ons come to Ukrai­ne and what hap­pens they head hunt best minds of cour­se uh many peop­le choo­se working for inter­na­tio­nal orga­niz­a­ti­ons, it’s pres­ti­gious it’s it’s secu­ri­ty it’s good sala­ry and then when mis­si­on of this orga­niz­a­ti­on finis­hed and this orga­niz­a­ti­on lea­ve the Ukrai­ne it’s again tabu­la­ra­sa becau­se the­re is no inter­nal infra­st­ruc­tu­re that can con­ti­nue to work so uh I would call all tho­se part­ners who are open and keen to to help Ukrai­ne to to do with Ukrai­ne and to help to strengh­ten its own capa­ci­ty and for each pro­ject to find imple­men­ting part­ners in Ukrai­ne it’s abso­lute­ly ano­t­her tac­tic how you coope­ra­te with Ukrai­ne from other side it’s a big home­work for Ukrai­ni­an ngos becau­se you should be trans­pa­rent you should be accoun­ta­ble and you should know how to accom­pa­ny inter­na­tio­nal orga­niz­a­ti­on in their mis­si­on in Ukrai­ne becau­se to recei­ve the grant it’s one thing but to report on this grant to mea­su­re deli­ver­a­bles and then to build long-term sus­tainab­le stra­te­gy it’s also dif­fe­rent type of skill that requi­re stra­te­gic plan­ning visio­ning com­pli­an­ce with lots of inter­na­tio­nal pro­grams docu­ments stra­te­gies and agendas.

Wait, this is not a grass root move­ment at all? This is all astro­tur­fed by what “Inter­na­tio­nal foundations”?

Who do what “Phil­an­tro­py”?

Becau­se Phil­an­tro­py is so hard, becau­se - and I quo­te: “Becau­se to recei­ve the grant it’s one thing but to report on this grant to mea­su­re deli­ver­a­bles and then to build long-term sus­tainab­le stra­te­gy it’s also dif­fe­rent type of skill that requi­re stra­te­gic plan­ning visio­ning com­pli­an­ce with lots of inter­na­tio­nal pro­grams docu­ments stra­te­gies and agendas.”?

You know, for all the PHILANTROPY grants you recei­ved, right? [WRONG NARRATIVE, WRONG NARRATIVE!]

Iry­na Kho­mi­ak Pro­gram­me Mana­ger, Ger­man Mar­shall Fund, Ber­lin): “Fol­lowing the the needs of of the Civil Socie­ty on the ground we deci­ded to empha­si­ze and sort of rein­for­ce the sup­port um the um full-scale Inva­si­on um to a cer­tain extent um shifted the the Para­digm of uh of donor Civil Socie­ty rela­ti­ons so to say becau­se at some point the donors com­mu­ni­ty star­ted respon­ding to the needs of the Civil Socie­ty on the ground ins­tead of dic­ta­ting or shaping the Nar­ra­ti­ve per se, sin­ce the last late last March begin­ning of April last year we alrea­dy sup­por­ted around 200 pro­jects insi­de of the coun­try as I said on as local levels as pos­si­ble becau­se that’s whe­re the resi­li­en­ce is taking place that’s whe­re the reco­very is taking place I’m not under­mi­ning or neglec­ting the role of the sta­te level ngos and um and initia­ti­ves I’m just try­ing to focus on what I’ve been working with and also to sort of bring up this perspective.”

Oh, not­hing, I - Iry­na Kho­mi­ak Pro­gram­me Mana­ger, Ger­man Mar­shall Fund, Ber­lin, am just sta­ting that the inter­na­tio­nal donor com­mu­ni­ty is shaping the nar­ra­ti­ve of ukrai­ni­an sta­te level NGOs - which arent repre­sen­ta­ti­ve of the ukrai­ni­an peop­le - thats all.

You know, becau­se like the Ers­te Foun­da­ti­on repre­sen­ta­ti­ve befo­re was say­ing, we dont have any ground level initia­ti­ves right now - at all, its all inter­na­tio­nal NGOs working in the Ukrai­ne, then lea­ving the coun­try and lea­ving back, what was it again?! Ah, yes - tabu­la­ra­sa. Not­hing. Abso­lute­ly not­hing at all.

Let me get this strai­ght, but when Jef­frey Sachs sta­tes the following:

It was a coup, of cour­se. It was an uncon­sti­tu­tio­nal sei­zu­re of power when very vio­lent groups, well armed, stor­med the government buil­dings in Febru­a­ry, 2014. [Pro­tes­ters, ange­red by Yanukovych’s rejec­tion of a tra­de agree­ment with the Euro­pean Uni­on, were kil­led by secu­ri­ty for­ces after try­ing to occu­py parts of Kyiv; after­ward, Yanu­ko­vych was iso­la­ted poli­ti­cal­ly and fled to Rus­sia with the assi­s­tance of the Krem­lin. I asked Sachs over e-mail for a source for his claim about the role play­ed by the U.S. He respon­ded, “It is public know­ledge that the Natio­nal Endow­ment for Demo­cra­cy and US NGOs spent hea­vi­ly in Ukrai­ne to sup­port the Mai­dan. I have first-hand know­ledge of that spen­ding.” The N.E.D. told The New Yor­ker that it pro­vi­des fun­ding to civil-society groups but “does not pro­vi­de fun­ding to sup­port protests.”]

src: click

Fol­lo­wed up by quo­te: “dont tell me that stuff!”.

He beco­mes per­so­na non gra­ta. Right? Right.

Its just the best demo­cra­tic socie­ties could mus­ter up, but not befo­re Sachs is actual­ly fired from Pro­ject Syn­di­ca­te of cour­se, whe­re he was the most publis­hed aut­hor befo­re the rus­si­an Inva­si­on of Ukrai­ne.

Right.

Kur­ze Mit­tei­lung an das Huren­wichs­er­schwein von mei­ner ehe­ma­li­gen Psy­cho­the­ra­peu­tin: Wenn ich vor etwas über einem Jahr irri­tiert bin, dass Soros in dem Umfeld gera­de wie­der drei Stif­tun­gen agie­ren hat und der Stan­dard außer­dem wie­der unkon­tex­tua­li­siert State­ments vom ECFR (its just a think tank) von Pro­ject Syn­di­ca­te als “so muss die öster­rei­chi­sche Poli­tik die Bevöl­ke­rung auf einen Lan­gen Krieg vor­be­rei­ten” abschreibt (Pro­ject Syn­di­ca­te has also recei­ved grants from Geor­ge Soros’s Open Socie­ty Foun­da­ti­ons, The Poli­ti­ken Foun­da­ti­on in Den­mark, Die Zeit, ZEIT-Stiftung, and the Bill & Melin­da Gates Foundation.[6]) und dass mich das dann irgend­wie ver­rückt macht - trotz bes­se­ren Wis­sens an der Stel­le nicht in die Ver­schwö­rungs­ecke weg­zu­kip­pen -- das nächs­te Mal viel­leicht was Bes­se­res aus­den­ken als “ja und Elon Musk?” - ok? Supi.

Und kur­ze Mit­tei­lung an das Arsch­loch­wichs­er­schwein von mei­ner ehe­ma­li­gen Psy­cho­the­ra­peu­tin, wenn ich ihr in Monat drei des Krie­ges erzäh­le, WIE der Ger­man Mar­shall­fund of the United Sta­tes, die deut­sche Hal­tung gegen­über dem Krieg kri­ti­siert, und der gleich­zei­tig die ein­zi­ge Quel­le ist, von der ich Hin­ter­grund­in­for­ma­tio­nen über die “Zei­ten­wen­de­re­de” bekom­me (so unwich­ti­ge Details wie, die Rän­ge wur­den voll besetzt, damit das Klat­schen bes­ser wirkt, und vor der Rede kann­ten den Inhalt weni­ger als ein dut­zend Per­so­nen), weil der ger­man Mar­shall Fund of the United Sta­tes dar­über debrieft wird, aber die euro­päi­sche Öffent­lich­keit halt nicht -- dann das nächs­te Mal viel­leicht mehr als ein­fach nur eine abwer­ten­de Hand­ges­te von sich geben.

Nur so ein Gedanke.

Ach­ja, und mir zuerst sagen, dass ich ihr erklä­ren sol­le wie öster­rei­chi­sche Aus­sen­po­li­tik läuft - wegen dem Moti­va­ti­ons­fak­tor - und mich dafür dann aus der Betreu­ung tre­ten, wenn ich es nicht mehr ertrage?

Ja, ja? Jederzeit!

Applau­se - for a job well done. Mögest du auch dei­ne ande­ren 120 Pati­en­ten so per­fekt betreu­en, wie mich.

Schei­ße, noch kein Dopa­min­push, weil man wie­der einem gehol­fen hat - und schon ein hal­bes Jahr vor­bei?! Na dann ab zum nächs­ten Kandidaten!

Die­se Gesell­schaft ist das abso­lut gro­tesk Allerletzte.

Pro­pa­gan­da, hat aber wie immer noch nie­mand entdeckt.

edit: Plea­se dou­bleck­eck, may­be I’ve mixed up Yana and Iry­na when attri­bu­ting the quo­tes abo­ve. The mode­ra­tor clear­ly cal­led one per­son Yana, but their online pho­tos look qui­te dif­fe­rent. I’ve kept the names the mode­ra­tor uses when refer­ring to them.

edit2: Hilf­rei­cher Kon­text via fefe:

[l] Angst vor der Soros Foun­da­ti­on? Weil die immer Revo­lu­tio­nen anzet­telt? Kei­ne Sor­ge!
Der alte Mann hat die Stif­tung sei­nem Sohn Alex über­ge­ben, und der will erst­mal 40% des Per­so­nals feu­ern. Außerdem:

>Alex­an­der Soros also said that under his lea­ders­hip, he plan­ned to focus the foun­da­ti­on more on US domestic politics.

Soviel dazu.

src: click

Getting fed ukrainian Propaganda

02. Juli 2023

How long will it take for every per­son on that panel to rea­li­ze, that all they’­ve been repro­du­cing over one and a half hours is ukrai­ni­an propaganda?

One life­time? Two lifetimes?

It’s such a bliss see­ing all tho­se over 60 year old diplo­mats redis­co­vering genui­nely ukrai­ni­an tal­king­points all by them­sel­ves (and a litt­le help from their ukrai­ni­an friends) and then mana­ging to con­vin­ce them­sel­ves, that thats actual­ly what they are thin­king as well, becau­se of a ratio­nal deli­be­ra­ti­on pro­ces­ses they’­ve enga­ged in.

Then of cour­se you also need an almost 60 year old “for­mer jour­na­list” to moti­va­te the audi­ence to clap, becau­se why not what else would they do? Pro­du­ce actu­al journalism?

Lets go through this, while we have the time to do so, why not?

Whats the rus­si­an win con­di­ti­on in a war of attrition? 

Kee­ping the ukrai­ni­an eco­no­my in a dys­func­tio­n­al sta­te for as long as pos­si­ble, so the ukrai­ni­ans who have fled don’t return for ano­t­her two to three years.

Child­ren get inte­gra­ted into the wes­tern edu­ca­tio­nal sys­tem, retur­ning to ukrai­ne seems like a worse and worse idea for the actu­al peop­le who have fled, over time, and the reuni­fi­ca­ti­on pro­cess the­re­fo­re rever­ses and more peop­le (the men) actual­ly flee the Ukrai­ne at the end of the pro­cess, rather than reimmigrate.

To coun­ter­act that, Ukrai­ne HAS TO start the rebuil­ding pro­cess while the war is still ongoing.

To attract inves­tors, they now have pro­po­sed, and star­ted to imple­ment a flat tax of sub 20%.

But to also attract half of the coun­try, and coin­ci­dent­al­ly the youn­ger more edu­ca­ted half, they now have to invest mas­si­ve­ly in new infra­st­ruc­tu­re pro­jects - and film PR spots of the kin­der­gar­dens they will con­struct, to have any messaging for the not so well off clas­ses at all.

The­re are still no new plans on how to diver­si­fy the ener­gy infra­st­ruc­tu­re, becau­se you cant at sca­le (if they invest in solar right now, it takes Rus­sia about 4 mon­ths to dele­te half that invest­ment - con­si­de­ring how long it took Rus­sia in the past to do so, in the Ukrai­ne, last year).

Pri­va­te invest­ment in theo­ry is pos­si­ble, becau­se Ukrai­ne opted to 10x their grain export busi­ness as a way of future­proofing their lan­dow­ners bank­rolls, as soon as it had open bor­ders to do so, so the invest­ment in most of their indus­tries still remai­ned outstanding.

So now the infra­st­ruc­tu­re recon­struc­tion push is cur­r­ent­ly put into place, whe­re they also nego­tia­ted mee­tings with pri­va­te inves­tors, who will short­ly visit the Ukrai­ne by train to con­si­der how they can help in rebuil­ding the (ener­gy) infrastructure.

So if you are rus­sia, you look at tho­se trains. You look at the four stops tho­se con­gre­ga­ti­ons make in the next two to three mon­ths, and then tho­se pro­jects beco­me your pri­ma­ry tar­gets for dis­il­lu­sio­ning the wes­tern inves­tor class.

Tho­se and the new steel­plants of cour­se that the Ukrai­ne plans to build in wes­tern regi­ons of the country.

And then you wait. And des­troy the ener­gy infrastructure.

And as long as you can keep up dis­rup­t­ing the new Ukrai­ni­an eco­no­my, wan­ting a sen­se of safe­ty will win out over the fear of being draf­ted, and the want to thri­ve in an eco­no­my, with half the peop­le, who now has imple­men­ted a flat tax, but oh so high growth poten­ti­al, if rus­si­an rockets dont hit.

And after about ten years, you have also lost the next genera­ti­on of expats, in an aging coun­try - with a flat tax, who­se ener­gy infra­st­ruc­tu­re once in a while might still be tar­ge­ted by rus­sia, and which still needs a vic­to­ry - becau­se, well neu­tra­li­ty was off the table after Butscha of course…

I mean what could go wrong? Ever­yo­ne on the panel is very optimistic!

Becau­se its the strength of the over 60 year old aus­tri­an diplo­mats on this panel to iden­ti­fy for them­sel­ves, that “thin­king that this all ends on day 0 when the war is over” is wrong argu­men­ta­tively, and it can all be over once busi­nes­ses just chan­ge their risk assess­ment pro­ce­du­res to see all the gre­at growth poten­ti­al of a coun­try at war, with a flat tax.

So far - thats 8 bil­li­on USD worth of pri­va­te sec­tor invest­ment after the Lon­don invest­ment con­fe­rence, right?

So whats the next spea­ker in Vien­na sel­ling, fol­lowing that uni­que stra­te­gic invest­ment plan?

A human cen­te­red rebuil­ding of their infra­st­ruc­tu­re. In a coun­try whe­re the medi­an age has now just incre­a­sed by four years, with a flat tax, and a PR push that they will be buil­ding more kin­der­gar­dens soon, so the popu­la­ti­on should not be afraid to get more child­ren, or even think about lea­ving the country…

Becau­se this all ends, as soon as we in the west invest, and Putin starts to rea­li­ze, that we will inte­gra­te the Ukrai­ne into the EU no mat­ter what it takes, and that Rus­sia has alrea­dy lost!

Ok, so what if Rus­sia mana­ges to des­troy the first for­eign invest­ment push and demons­tra­tively so?

Ano­t­her 50 bil­li­on for infra­st­ruc­tu­re rebuil­ding befo­re the second one?

This all ends when the war is fro­zen, and not one day earlier.

And if that takes too long, say good­bye to your next generation.

Or do you want to estab­lish that good “revi­sit ukrai­ne, to see your dad suf­fe­ring from PTSD cur­led up in the cor­ner of the room, we will have all that flat tax money to help him tough it out!” mas­sa­ging first? Pro­bab­ly not.

But thats not as posi­ti­ve, as panel II on Ukrai­ni­an State­hood made it sound… How come?

Becau­se I’m unde­re­sti­ma­ting the moti­va­tio­nal power of repeated pro­pa­gan­da messaging?

Now clap for the new ukrai­ni­an slo­gan: Plea­se dear popu­la­ti­on and inves­tors, return to a war­zo­ne. Our coun­try is so big, you will hard­ly noti­ce it.

Or was it - come to Ukrai­ne, as a coun­try at war, we have very low wages, and our medi­an pen­si­on is just 100 USD a mon­th. Dear Expats, plea­se return to our coun­try, for amp­le growth potential!

Also we would like to talk with your com­pa­nies risk assess­ment depart­ment, if you dont mind.

Sla­va.

This is get­ting bet­ter by the day.

edit: Es gibt aber natür­lich auch wie­der gute Nach­rich­ten: Schal­len­berg sieht in der Pres­se­stun­de “Ris­se im rus­si­schen Gebälk”
Na Gott sei Dank.

edit: Con­text:

[United Nati­ons Deve­lo­p­ment Pro­gram­me] Unco­vering the rea­li­ty of Ukraine’s deci­ma­ted ener­gy infrastructure

A new coun­try­wi­de ener­gy assess­ment con­firms dama­ges excee­ding $10 bil­li­on, with Ukraine’s capa­ci­ty to pro­du­ce electri­ci­ty redu­ced by 61 per­cent. But with no let-up on attacks on ener­gy net­works, whe­re does Ukrai­ne go from here?

src: click

edit2: More Context:

Live­li­hoods

The majo­ri­ty of house­holds repor­ted that the work of their house­hold mem­bers had been affec­ted sin­ce the start of the full-scale inva­si­on, pri­ma­ri­ly due to job loss, sala­ry cuts, and redu­ced working hours.
Most house­holds repor­ted a decre­a­se in inco­me, with IDPs and retur­nees being par­ti­cu­lar­ly vul­nerable in this respect. The­re has been a decre­a­se in access to paid work, as well as an incre­a­se in reli­an­ce upon huma­ni­ta­ri­an and government assi­s­tance, along­side sup­port from friends and rela­ti­ves (inclu­ding remit­tan­ces) as pri­ma­ry sources of inco­me. The majo­ri­ty of house­holds repor­ted enga­ging in eco­no­mi­c­al­ly dri­ven coping stra­te­gies to meet essen­ti­al needs, such as spen­ding savings, acqui­ring addi­tio­nal work, and redu­cing health expen­dit­u­re in order to meet other essen­ti­al needs. House­holds repor­ted that they could con­ti­nue enga­ging in taking on addi­tio­nal work, but could not con­ti­nue spen­ding savings, redu­cing essen­ti­al health expen­dit­ures, or taking on debt. Geo­gra­phi­cal­ly, the impact of the war on live­li­hoods has been felt most great­ly in the Sou­the­as­tern macro-region.

src: click

Approaching triple digits

01. Juli 2023

Why you bet­ter start a den­un­cia­ti­on cam­pai­gn against Mear­s­hei­mer star­ting in week two after the rus­si­an inva­si­on of Ukrai­ne in 2022 at the Hoo­ver Insti­tu­ti­on - and then get a more friend­ly voice to may­be invent a new ver­si­on of the rea­list school of for­eign rela­ti­ons, you know - like you do… May­be a fusi­on bet­ween geo­po­li­ti­cal rea­lism and idea­lism, right?

Lets not go to Mear­s­hei­mer to exp­lain it this time, lets go to one of his stu­dents, Sean Mirski.

Inno­cent enough, right?

Wright: Let me also tell peop­le a litt­le more about you are you - are still a visi­t­ing scho­l­ar at the Hoo­ver insti­tu­ti­on at Stan­ford University?

Mir­ski: I am, they keep exten­ding it so I’m not going to say no.

Wright: No don’t uh, and you pre­vious­ly ser­ved in the U.S. defen­se depart­ment under both Repu­bli­can and Demo­cra­tic admi­nis­tra­ti­ons - um and you would have a master’s degree from the Uni­ver­si­ty of Chi­ca­go in inter­na­tio­nal rela­ti­ons or some­thing, you went to Har­vard Law School - is that all true?

Mir­ski: That’s cor­rect, that’s all true.

Inno­cent enough, right - I mean what could go wrong?

Wright: So you think it was, it was a tac­ti­cal not stra­te­gic blun­der to sei­ze Cri­mea in terms of the moti­va­ti­on - it seems like the thre­at Rus­sia per­cei­ved was at least as direct as most of the thre­ats Ame­ri­ca is reac­ting to in your book, in the sen­se that you’­ve got a neigh­bor right on its bor­der and it has a very important naval base [Sewas­to­pol] in the neigh­bor, it’s tech­ni­cal­ly a long-term lea­se but it’s a lega­cy of the Soviet Uni­on and uh the­re is what loo­ks like from its point of view - a coup or - an event, a revo­lu­ti­on - depo­sing of a pre­si­dent who was kind of friend­ly uh and the­re is in some sen­se at least U.S. sup­port for what just hap­pen­ed - and the U.S. has pro­fes­sed the inten­ti­on to have that neigh­bor be part of NATO and so on - I mean that’s like, com­pa­red to most of the things the US has been reac­ting to uh by inter­vening in Latin Ame­ri­ca, that’s a much more direct thre­at right?

Mir­ski: Oh, yeah I mean cer­tain­ly, I think from Russia’s per­spec­ti­ve that’s pro­bab­ly the right way to think about it, I mean ame­ri­cans obvious­ly see it a litt­le bit dif­fer­ent­ly, becau­se at least - 

Wright: I’ve noti­ced that - I’ve noti­ced that… [*smirk*]

Mir­ski: Yeah [*smirk*], well and you know part of it is I think for most Ame­ri­cans you know the idea of NATO enlar­ge­ment it seems sort of I don’t want to say inno­cent [*cough, cough*], but it does­n’t seem or at least it has­n’t see­med tar­ge­ted at Rus­sia until very recent­ly, ehm but you know part of what makes Inter­na­tio­nal poli­tics dif­fi­cult is that one its very dif­fi­cult to com­mu­ni­ca­te inten­ti­ons in a sort of uh deli­be­ra­te way and num­ber two tho­se inten­ti­ons can just chan­ge over time. and so you know from Rus­si­as per­spec­ti­ve may­be NATO expan­ding in your know the 2000 odds and 2000 ear­ly 2010s was not aimed at Rus­sia but Rus­sia does­n’t have any way of gua­ran­te­eing that once NATO is up at Russia’s bor­der someo­ne does­n’t chan­ge their mind - and sud­den­ly NATO’s tur­ned into an anti-russia alli­an­ce again and so from Rus­si­as per­spec­ti­ve I think it’s under­stand­a­ble why they’­re con­cer­ned that you know coun­tries like Geor­gia and Ukrai­ne would be poten­ti­al­ly offe­red NATO admission.

Wright: Right and that leads to one kind of abs­tract ques­ti­on befo­re we get into the histo­ry, um you know you said it had no way of of being assu­red that NATO would­n’t ulti­mate­ly be a thre­at wha­te­ver the moti­va­ti­on behind expan­si­on and um this is a com­mon thing I mean there’s a term that does­n’t appe­ar in your book I think uh which is secu­ri­ty dilem­ma. I’m sure you’­re fami­li­ar with it you stu­di­ed uh under Mear­s­hei­mer at Chi­ca­go and that refers to the fact that um you know one nati­on uh it will it will read some­thing that ano­t­her nati­on does as eit­her offen­si­ve in intent or poten­ti­al­ly offen­si­ve uh and will react to it in a way that it sees as defen­si­ve but then the other, the other coun­try will - will see it as eit­her offen­si­ve in intent mis­rea­ding it or see it, the moti­va­ti­on, accu­rate­ly and but also see that poten­ti­al­ly this this new thing this new mili­ta­ry base some­whe­re could be put to offen­si­ve use and so they react and you get a spiral - […]

So of cour­se when you men­ti­on that (“What about in 30 years time? Rus­sia only cur­r­ent­ly has the demo­gra­phy to do some­thing against the per­cei­ved thre­at.”) in week two of the war towards you psy­cho­lo­gist, she snorts at you and strikes even the pos­si­bi­li­ty of that noti­on down. Just out­right. No rea­son. Becau­se having an edu­ca­ti­on is for pus­sies. And becau­se by then ever­yo­ne alrea­dy knew, that Putin was Hit­ler, and cra­zy, and that pro­pa­gan­da NEVER WORKS ON ANYONE ENDUCATED, right? 

RIGHT?

I mean you lear­ned at uni­ver­si­ty how it works, and that this is it. But who lis­tens to you, when you say, that Putin likely used Nazis as the “enemy image” to dehu­ma­ni­ze the oppo­nent in a war? And used several other Pro­pa­gan­da princi­ples in which he pro­bab­ly didnt belie­ve in per­so­nal­ly? Becau­se he might not actual­ly just be mad?

And that gets you ano­t­her snort and ano­t­her strike down for even having con­si­de­red the possibility.

Sor­ry - I thought I throw in some fla­vor text - just to ligh­ten the mood a bit. Befo­re we get to the more inte­res­ting stuff.

Wright: I had­n’t rea­li­zed that we had a ten­den­cy in the 19th cen­tu­ry, if I read you cor­rect­ly, to cha­rac­te­ri­ze part of the thre­at we faced uh from Euro­pe as ideo­lo­gi­cal in the sen­se that they were mon­ar­chists - right, like today we are framing our for­eign poli­cy appar­ent­ly lar­ge­ly as a glo­bal war bet­ween demo­cra­cy and auto­cra­cy, for bet­ter or worse, by the way the ans­wer is worse, but that’s the way we’­re framing it - um and uh - I was sur­pri­sed by the par­al­lel and uh and but but that’s kind of built in from the begin­ning, it sounds like.

Mir­ski: It is alt­hough it kind of fluc­tua­tes I think in how important it is, um cer­tain­ly when the United Sta­tes is for instance decla­ring the Mon­roe Doc­tri­ne in 1823 and things like that, the like you know dis­tinc­tion bet­ween mon­ar­chy and demo­cra­cy is real­ly at its height, uh and I think right­ly so - I mean I think the Euro­pean mon­ar­chies at that point were legi­ti­mate­ly con­cer­ned by the ideo­lo­gi­cal thre­at that was posed by the United Sta­tes and that’s true cer­tain­ly all the way through the Civil War.

Fran­ce uh during the U.S Civil War inva­des and occu­p­ies all of Mexi­co and installs an uh a Habs­burg Prince on the thro­ne of Mon­te­zu­ma uh and essen­ti­al­ly the the expli­cit rea­son to do this is to basi­cal­ly start making the hemi­s­phe­re safe for monarchy.

Emperor Napo­le­on III basi­cal­ly has this idea that once Mexi­co is remon­ar­chi­zed he’s going to just start moving south through the rest of the hemi­s­phe­re and tar­ge­ting all the­se Latin Ame­ri­can repu­blics making them back into mon­ar­chies - and so the­re is very much that sort of ideo­lo­gi­cal con­flict at that point. I do think it ame­lio­ra­tes a litt­le bit in the com­ing deca­des, you see you see fla­vors of it in the sen­se that obvious­ly in World War One there’s a lot of sort of rhe­to­ric about Prus­si­an auto­cra­cy and you know and cer­tain­ly of cour­se the phra­se to make the world safe for demo­cra­cy comes from Woo­d­row Wil­son at that time [see: Ber­nays] -- but um but it does­n’t it - ideo­lo­gi­cal fac­tors end up I think rece­ding a litt­le bit around the turn of the cen­tu­ry it’s less that and more kind of just pure secu­ri­ty kind of interests.

Wright: So in that case, uh so Fran­ce has this kind of uh Habs­burg pro­xy, I mean for a rea­son - I don’t know enough about histo­ry to under­stand why, it was­n’t just a french guy but he appar­ent­ly was­n’t right uh and and uh and then we in that case we basi­cal­ly sup­port a revo­lu­ti­on to get rid of him right?

Mir­ski: Yeah I mean so the the uh the then pre­si­dent of Mexi­co Beni­to Jua­rez um was essen­ti­al­ly alrea­dy you know figh­t­ing a civil war against uh Emperor Maxi­mi­li­an the the Habs­burg Prince - uh we end up most­ly just uh pro­vi­ding his for­ces with sup­port and sort of uh launch it you know uh I don’t want to say laun­ching a pro­xy war but it ends up being a pro­xy war but uh that was very much a con­flict that we did­n’t necessa­ri­ly ins­ti­ga­te so much as hel­ped uh as far as finish.

Wright: Okay and then what why don’t you may­be list several kinds of inter­ven­ti­ons, you know several inter­ven­ti­ons that repre­sent dif­fe­rent kinds of of inter­ven­ti­ons uh in say in bet­ween the Civil War uh and uh well you go all the way up to World War one if you want if it’ll help.

Mir­ski: Yeah well and so it starts out I think um you know up until like 1898 the Spanish-American War there’s not that much the­re are cer­tain­ly a few but there’s not as much in terms of direct sort of um the United Sta­tes is not as inte­res­ted in sort of meddling around with the inter­nal sov­er­eig­n­ty of other nati­ons, the one excep­ti­on is annex­a­ti­on which always ends up being sort of the last resort for the United Sta­tes in respon­se to secu­ri­ty thre­at and so in uh I have a chap­ter in the book about Hawaii whe­re a varie­ty of rea­sons we were very con­cer­ned about Hawaii uh get­ting anne­xed by Japan in respon­se essen­ti­al­ly we end up annex­ing Hawaii our­sel­ves um but star­ting in the Spanish-American War what ends up hap­pe­ning is we’­re left with uh we’­re occu­p­y­ing Cuba at the end of the war and on the one hand we’­ve pro­mi­sed to give Cuba its inde­pen­dence at the start of the war on the other hand we’­re very worried that if we just give Cuba its inde­pen­dence uh that uh it’s going to get sna­ped up by ano­t­her gre­at power like Ger­ma­ny uh uh basi­cal­ly under on the theo­ry that Cuba is unli­kely to stay sta­ble for long it’s going to descend into Civil War and once that hap­pens Ger­ma­ny is just going to come in and to scoop up the pie­ces and so what we end up doing is uh for­cing Cuba to uh install uh the Platt Amend­ment which is among other things - has pro­vi­si­on that gives the United Sta­tes the right to inter­vene in Cuban Affairs if things get bad enough essen­ti­al­ly that was not - 

Wright: That was nice of them I thought. Just send tro­ops whenever we want!

Mir­ski: Yeah, well and it’s it’s fun­ny becau­se uh one of the deba­tes among his­to­ri­ans is what was the kind of ori­gi­nal inten­ti­on of the Platt Amend­ment uh and I think you know my view is that if you look at the the aut­hor of it the pri­ma­ry aut­hor of it uh Secreta­ry of Sta­te or Secreta­ry of War Eli­hu Root, he you know I think he genui­nely thought it would be a last resort - and he also genui­nely thought it would never be used becau­se part of the thought was well if we pro­mi­se if we tell the Cub­ans that we’­re going to inter­vene in their poli­tics if they ever have a civil war the Cub­ans don’t want us in their poli­tics and so they’ll never have a civil war and is this sort of what ends up being incredi­b­ly nai­ve, thin­king that uh ends up lea­ding the US to take a grea­ter and grea­ter role in the regi­on but that at least was the initi­al thin­king - um but that’s sort of like the you know and that is not a minor impo­si­ti­on on Cuban sov­er­eig­n­ty but that ends up being sort of the the ligh­ter edge of inter­ven­ti­ons as the kind of 1900, yeah 19 odds and the 1910s go on the inter­ven­ti­ons start to beco­me much more hard-hitting and so in 1905 uh one other examp­le of an inter­ven­ti­on is some­thing cal­led cus­toms recei­ver­s­hips so the United Sta­tes will come in and basi­cal­ly admi­nis­ter the cus­tom houses of our neigh­bors which is a litt­le bit like the Chi­ne­se com­ing in to admi­nis­ter the IRS uh and the rea­son that ana­lo­gy works is becau­se at the time Latin Ame­ri­can sta­tes essen­ti­al­ly drew all of their reve­nues from taxing tra­de - through the cus­tom houses and so if you con­trol the cus­tom houses you con­trol­led all inter­nal reve­nue for the sta­te of the Domi­ni­can Repu­blic or Hai­ti or whe­re­ver, and so the US starts com­ing in and is essen­ti­al­ly taking over the­se cus­tom houses and initi­al­ly it’s like con­sen­su­al might not be com­ple­te­ly the right word - but at least it’s at the invi­ta­ti­on of the Domi­ni­can government over time this beco­mes much less con­sen­su­al and we start taking over more cus­tom houses. At first we’­re just admi­nis­te­ring them, we’­re giving Reve­nue to the uh to the cen­tral governments over time we end up star­ting to use that finan­cial leash to do other things and so if we don’t like the government or we don’t like what the government’s doing we won’t hand over the reve­nue and we start star­ving it of reve­nue um we end up obvious­ly uh regime chan­ge uh first time the United Sta­tes ever open­ly over­throws now the government is in 1909 with Nica­ra­gua this starts to beco­me a bit of a pat­tern over the next deca­de and so we’ll send gunships and basi­cal­ly uh for­ce pre­si­dent uh pre­si­dents and dic­ta­tors off their uh out of their pre­si­den­ti­al chairs uh and final­ly this all just cul­mi­na­tes in occup­a­ti­ons - uh inclu­ding I think the occup­a­ti­on of Hai­ti which lasts for almost two deca­des from 1915 to I belie­ve 1934. and so that ends up being sort of the spec­trum of U.S. inter­ven­ti­on during this time and it comes in a lot of fla­vors, but I think one of the points that I make in the book is that the­se sort of ear­ly “inter­ven­ti­on light” end up sort of lea­ding to the hea­vier inter­ven­ti­ons in part becau­se they don’t actual­ly fix the pro­blem that the United Sta­tes is try­ing to solve.

Wright: The uh on the on the con­trol­ling the cus­toms uh what is the cus­toms house is the term or --?

Mir­ski: Cus­toms recei­ver­s­hips yeah with the cus­tom houses yep.

Wright: Um so yeah I mean we use that as a means of con­trol we also fear that Euro­pean powers will use it as a means of con­trol right and yes and it’s inte­res­ting the extent to which uh both the per­cep­ti­on of thre­at we have and the per­cep­ti­on of thre­at that leads - well whe­ther you want to call it per­cep­ti­on of thre­at but but the moti­va­ti­on that leads some Euro­pean powers to want to exert con­trol over uh here - is about uh is about finan­cial mat­ters and fear that the other one will con­trol the com­mer­ce right? I mean this was an actu­al Euro­pean fear was that the U.S uh government was going to basi­cal­ly con­trol imports and exports for the who­le hemi­s­phe­re and I guess one ques­ti­on is I mean how big a part of the moti­va­tions espe­cial­ly on the U.S. side but but on both sides were the­se kind of pure­ly eco­no­mic things um and did did the natu­re of inter­na­tio­nal eco­no­mics sub­se­quent­ly chan­ge so that that kind of even­tual­ly cea­sed to be much of a fac­tor per se or what?

Mir­ski: Uh yeah so that’s actual­ly a gre­at ques­ti­on uh one point to make at the start is uh Euro­peans were as you men­tio­ned the Euro­pean -- the con­cern among Ame­ri­can poli­cy makers was that Euro­pean nati­ons would essen­ti­al­ly come in and con­trol the­se cus­tom houses if the United Sta­tes did not and the rea­son why was becau­se Euro­pe basi­cal­ly was owed a lot of money by the­se coun­tries um but the thing that that state­ment kind of uh obscu­res a litt­le bit is that the money that was owed was not real­ly so much debt on con­tracts alt­hough that was part of it it was more that under the inter­na­tio­nal law of the time and a les­ser extent today -- um you know if you’­re a Euro­pean coun­try and one of your citi­zens gets inju­red in a civil war or you know his pro­per­ty gets sto­len you as the Euro­pean Sta­te can essen­ti­al­ly Cham­pion their claims against the government in ques­ti­on and as I men­tio­ned a lot of the­se coun­tries are incredi­b­ly poli­ti­cal­ly unsta­ble we’­re tal­king you know a new pre­si­dent every year some­ti­mes mul­ti­ple times a year and so in the con­text of all the­se Civil Wars and revo­lu­ti­ons the­se Euro­pean sta­tes do kind of rank up enor­mous claims, dealing uh - that stem from the kind of mistre­at­ment of their citi­zens and pro­per­ty and I think that ends up being actual­ly much more important for Euro­pean powers than the sort of oh my Ban­kers went in they signed a con­tract and now you know the government’s try­ing to kind of welch on that um it’s just you know that that does play into it to some extent but it ends up being I think a sort of a secon­da­ry fac­tor - um and so so you’­re right so the Ame­ri­can poli­cy makers were a litt­le bit worried that essen­ti­al­ly to kind of make uh the­se coun­tries behave bet­ter that the Euro­pean nati­ons would sort of come in and and start taking over the cus­tom houses -- the the nice thing is that this the situa­ti­on has impro­ved in that respect in the inter­vening Cen­tu­ry in two ways, one there’s been an important deve­lo­p­ment in inter­na­tio­nal law in part uh - I think ori­gi­nal­ly sort of pro­po­sed by Latin Ame­ri­can sta­tes them­sel­ves for sort of obvious rea­sons but uh even­tual­ly cham­pio­ned by the United Sta­tes to essen­ti­al­ly make it unlaw­ful for uh powers to inter­vene on behalf of for instance like con­tract debts and things like that and then kind of bey­ond that initi­al deve­lo­p­ment there’s been obvious­ly just more of a norm that you don’t get to use mili­ta­ry for­ce against ano­t­her Nati­on just becau­se you might have you know eco­no­mic claims against them so that’s been a huge kind of deve­lo­p­ment and one that the United Sta­tes I think was very very in favor of becau­se it sort of eli­mi­na­ted part of the risk that the United Sta­tes saw the other aspect of this though that I think has been hel­pful is that the sort of sys­tem of um inter­na­tio­nal arbi­tra­ti­on uh par­ti­cu­lar­ly inves­tor Sta­te arbi­tra­ti­on that’s been set up in espe­cial­ly you know the last half cen­tu­ry or so, has kind of ame­lio­ra­ted the con­cerns that a lot of the­se powers in gene­ral have about not not get­ting fair tre­at­ment - becau­se it turns out that the record of essen­ti­al­ly suing a sta­te becau­se they expro­pria­ted your pro­per­ty or wha­te­ver most of the­se clai­mants actual­ly win and ended up collec­ting on kind of the wha­te­ver money they’­re owed and so becau­se there’s now a mecha­nism that does­n’t invol­ve using for­ce and that mecha­nism Works rea­son­ab­ly well I think it’s actual­ly kind of ame­lio­ra­ted some of the pres­su­res you saw um the U.S respon­ding to.

Wright: Yeah it would be nice to ame­lio­ra­te all the pres­su­res that lead to uh to war and and inter­ven­ti­on uh force­ful inter­ven­ti­on and the­re were attempts I mean, uh you know like uh here’s a James Blai­ne the Secreta­ry of Sta­te who uh wants to set up a sys­tem this is in the late 19th cen­tu­ry whe­re the way you’­re going to main­tain order in Latin Ame­ri­ca is you know uh a lot of inter­na­tio­nal com­mer­ce reci­pro­cal tra­de rela­ti­ons and the U.S. is going to faci­li­ta­te arbi­tra­ti­on of dis­pu­tes so it’s kind of like a hemi­s­phe­ric court or some­thing is the idea and you know I even say broad­ly spea­king this is a direc­tion in which you’d like to see the world evol­ve right you just have ways of sol­ving dis­pu­tes um but the­se things seem never to work out uh well enough to pre­vent ano­t­her round of inter­ven­ti­on right?

Mir­ski: Yeah, I mean this actual­ly, so Blai­ne defi­ni­te­ly sort of pioneers uh this approach alt­hough he’s not that suc­cess­ful at imple­men­ting it but um Eli­hu Root who I men­tio­ned ear­lier is the aut­hor of The Platt Amend­ment by the time he he ends up being uh Theo­do­re Roosevelt’s uh Secreta­ry of Sta­te for essen­ti­al­ly the second half of the Roo­se­velt admi­nis­tra­ti­on and he is uh he ends up win­ning I think a Nobel Peace Pri­ze for his efforts uh in favor of inter­na­tio­nal arbi­tra­ti­on um and one of his big deve­lo­p­ments is he sets up this uh Cen­tral Ame­ri­can court of jus­ti­ce this court that is meant to arbi­tra­te all the dis­pu­tes among the five Cen­tral Ame­ri­can nati­ons who are always at each other’s throats always inva­ding each other and sort of causing pro­blems and he sees this expli­ci­tly as a way of fixing some of the dis­or­der and kind of the the power vacu­ums that he’s afraid are going to lead to Euro­pean expan­si­on uh the court though ends up being a bit of a fail­u­re part of that I think is that sub­se­quent admi­nis­tra­ti­ons just don’t take it serious­ly and Woo­d­row Wil­son even­tual­ly just ends up kil­ling it becau­se it gives a ruling on an issue that he does­n’t like and so he essen­ti­al­ly uh kind of chucks it out the window.

Wright: Um which pre­si­dent was that I mis­sed it.

Mir­ski: Woo­d­row Wil­son. Um uh I did­n’t get as much into this in the book, uh for a varie­ty of rea­sons, but uh the Cen­tral Ame­ri­can Court essen­ti­al­ly con­clu­des that some that Wilson’s attempt to cor­ner the mar­ket on the the Trans-Isthmian canal by uh taking canal rights to Nica­ra­gua is a vio­la­ti­on of the uh rights of its neigh­bors and the United Sta­tes does­n’t like that and so it essen­ti­al­ly pulls the plug on the court.

NO!? We have defi­ni­te­ly not seen that being repeated in the last four mon­ths any­whe­re, right?

Das IWM­Vi­en­na gibt noch mal bekannt wo es ideo­lo­gisch steht

RIGHT?

And our rule-based legal order! Dont for­get about our rule-based legal order!

Mir­ski: I think the book sort of one of the the­mes of the book is that the­re is this sort of under­stan­ding among Ame­ri­can poli­cy makers that what hap­pens in Latin Ame­ri­ca is real­ly what mat­ters most and so a lar­ge part of the kind of efforts that we uh you know Pioneer at the glo­bal level like the League of Nati­ons, or the United Nati­ons, or the IMF, the World Bank - all of the­se have roots in Latin Ame­ri­ca and of cour­se that makes sen­se that’s the regi­on whe­re we’­ve been most invol­ved that’s the regi­on whe­re you know uh wha­te­ver -- it’s not always fair to descri­be our atti­tu­de towards Euro­pe as iso­la­tio­nist, but uh at least there’s an argu­ment the­re when it comes to the wes­tern hemi­s­phe­re - there’s just no argu­ment we’­ve always been super invol­ved and so so much of I think Ame­ri­can for­eign poli­cy uh in you know the kind of post World War II era and post even World War One era real­ly did grow out of what we are doing in our regi­on befo­re­hand both good and bad I should say.

Wright: So did you at any point add up all the inter­ven­ti­ons all the kind of I don’t know what the term would be - extra legal inter­ven­ti­on - or or you know in some sen­se kind of dubio­us inter­ven­ti­ons um, how many rough­ly in in like let’s say uh I don’t know bet­ween the the annun­cia­ti­on of the Mon­roe Doc­tri­ne, even though the­re was­n’t much enfor­ce­ment of it for the for the first cou­p­le of deca­des - uh say through World War One?

Mir­ski: It’s tri­cky to give an exact num­ber par­ti­al­ly becau­se it’s a ques­ti­on of defi­ning terms uh so one of the kind of pre­vai­ling prac­ti­ces of the time was that if there’s like a civil war hap­pe­ning in a coun­try, you can land your for­ces to pro­tect your citi­zens but they essen­ti­al­ly just you know stay around wha­te­ver part of the city or citi­zens are in and don’t real­ly inter­vene in the rest of the con­flict, um if you inclu­de stuff like that - as qua­li­fy­ing as a use of for­ce or you know use or thre­at of for­ce, uh I don’t know what the exact num­ber is but uh it’s going to be some­thing uh I don’t know if it’s trip­le digits but it’s going to be approa­ching trip­le digits.

Wright: Wow.

Mir­ski: I can say from 1898 to 1918 we were using For­ce against one of our neigh­bors an average of almost twice a year um and again some of tho­se are rela­tively more minor uses of for­ce to the extent that’s a you know way that you can descri­be this - others you know it’s occup­a­ti­on of ent­i­re nati­ons and so it real­ly sort of spans the spec­trum and depends depends on what you kind of defi­ne as uh and as an extra legal intervention

Wright: Mhm - wha--

Mir­ski: And of cours -- oh go ahead!

Wright: No go ahead, go ahead!

Mir­ski: Well I was gon­na say there’s also the dif­fi­cul­ty of what counts as extra legal, so yeah you know under the Platt Amend­ment we had the right to inter­vene in Cuba as a legal mat­ter, I mean one thing that [Eli­hu] Root was very very con­cer­ned about, as a one of the best lawy­ers of his genera­ti­on was having a legal basis for doing ever­ything the United Sta­tes did. That was actual­ly in lar­ge part why the Platt Amend­ment was framed the way it was.

Um and you know the Platt Amend­ment its­elf I would - I think it’s fair to count it as a inter­ven­ti­on in the sen­se that the U.S. told the Cub­ans look you can eit­her let us con­ti­nue occu­p­y­ing you or even annex you or you can gain your free­dom with the­se con­di­ti­ons and the Cub­ans cho­se the lat­ter not exact­ly a fair choice from the Cuban perspective.

Wright: And we got a pret­ty sweet deal with the Pana­ma Canal 3D [?] too, I would say or wha­te­ver it’s cal­led now. Is it the case I under­stand it that okay so we signed that trea­ty but then the per­son who signed it on the other side was­n’t even an actu­al Pana­ma­ni­an is that right? Well, he was, he was this like French entre­pre­neur or some­thing, who can make money if we signed it - so okay, you sign it.

Mir­ski: Yeah, the Pana­ma Canal sto­ry is just one of the I mean just stran­ger than fic­tion I think, through and through the­re was this gen­tle­man uh by the name of […]

[…]

Bunau-Varilla, I was right okay so he um so he’s this French­man who’s invol­ved in - so the French would try to build the Pana­ma Canal deca­des befo­re the United Sta­tes did, they fail it goes bankrupt. Bunau-Varilla is this French­man who was invol­ved in the effort and he’s pri­ma­ri­ly an engi­neer but for a varie­ty of rea­sons he beco­mes dedi­ca­ted to having this canal finis­hed under any means uh kind of any way pos­si­ble and he con­clu­des that the only way to do that is to have the United Sta­tes build the canal. 

The pro­blem is that Colom­bia essen­ti­al­ly does­n’t like the terms that uh it’s repre­sen­ta­ti­ve in the United Sta­tes Repre­sen­ta­ti­ve nego­tia­ted for the Pana­ma canal and so Colom­bia rejects it -

Wright: And Pana­ma is it I don’t know if you said this and I mis­sed it or Pana­ma is it that - or what we call Pana­ma, was part of Colom­bia at that point.

Mir­ski: Yeah sor­ry I should have men­tio­ned that so Pana­ma is still part of Colom­bia at this point and uh Colom­bia rejects the trea­ty and Roo­se­velt is furious - Ame­ri­cans in gene­ral are annoy­ed and Bunau-Varilla basi­cal­ly deci­des uh that the only way to get the Ame­ri­cans to build the canal is for Pana­ma to decla­re its inde­pen­dence and then to sign a canal trea­ty with the Ame­ri­cans. And the Pana­ma­ni­ans are essen­ti­al­ly on board with this, becau­se from their per­spec­ti­ve having a canal through their sta­te is going to be a mas­si­ve eco­no­mic boon it’s going to make their sta­te kind of important for a varie­ty of rea­sons and so uh you know, skip­ping some of the sort of details the pana­ma­ni­ans do even­tual­ly launch this revo­lu­ti­on - uh Bunau-Varilla is hea­vi­ly invol­ved - he finan­ces a lar­ge part of it um it’s always hard to know how serious­ly to take him becau­se his book is one of the most, I mean his auto­bio­gra­phy is just one of the most like puf­fed up pie­ces of sort of self agg­ran­dis­ment you can ima­gi­ne, but it actual­ly as far as his­to­ri­ans can tell, is likely most­ly accu­ra­te - um but pana­ma­ni­ans decla­re inde­pen­dence and the United Sta­tes essen­ti­al­ly sends eight uh war­s­hips down to pre­vent the Colom­bi­ans from reta­king the pro­vin­ce, and so the United Sta­tes hel­ps Pana­ma uh decla­re inde­pen­dence at this point - howe­ver uh you know the US basi­cal­ly turns to the pana­ma­ni­ans and says okay let’s nego­tia­te this trea­ty and Bunau-Varilla in exchan­ge for his help made the Pana­ma­ni­an uh uh seces­sio­nists pro­mi­se to make him their first repre­sen­ta­ti­ve of the pana­mana­ni­an sta­te in Washing­ton - and they know that this is a bad idea so they immedia­te­ly send some actu­al pana­ma­ni­ans up to Washing­ton to do the actu­al nego­tia­ti­ons but Bunau-Varilla does­n’t real­ly care very much about Pana­ma does not real­ly care at all about Pana­ma get­ting a good deal in this trea­ty or anything like that and so he immedia­te­ly turns around to Secreta­ry of Sta­te John Mil­ton Hay and says lis­ten I’ll sign on wha­te­ver terms you want the stron­ger you can make them for the United Sta­tes the bet­ter becau­se we have to get this through the U.S. Sena­te and Pana­ma is not in a posi­ti­on to object, becau­se the only rea­son it’s inde­pen­dent is becau­se the U.S. war­s­hips are off its Coast and so uh Bunau-Varilla and Hay sign this trea­ty, that is just enor­mous­ly favor­able to the United Sta­tes. When it goes befo­re Con­gress, one of its oppon­ents - basi­cal­ly says I’ve never seen a trea­ty that is this favor­able to the United Sta­tes um and you know the U.S. Sena­te uh pas­ses it and by the time the Pana­ma­ni­ans arri­ve it’s just too late it’s alrea­dy been signed.

So stran­ge, that we cant hold tho­se kind of deba­tes in Euro­pe right now, right? I mean, we all know this is a con­flict based on con­flic­ting value sys­tems right?

Right?

Drei mei­ner ehe­ma­li­gen Psy­cho­lo­gen wür­den sagen, beschäf­ti­gen sie sich doch nicht mehr so damit.

Mei­ne Psych­ia­te­rin wür­de sagen, sie nei­gen zu Über­in­ter­pre­ta­ti­on -- und ich wür­de ein­fach nur Ursu­la Werther-Pietsch, Mit­un­ter­zeich­ne­rin der alp­bach­na­hen Initia­ti­ve “Unse­re Sicher­heit” (Die sich gegen die öster­rei­chi­sche Neu­tra­li­tät aus­spricht, und bis­her zwei offe­ne Brie­fe ver­fasst hat, die dann spä­ter Johan­nes Kopf (selbst eben­falls Teil der Initia­ti­ve) bewor­ben hat, und das bereits eine Woche nach­dem er zu einem Panel in der Öster­rei­chisch Ame­ri­ka­ni­schen Gesell­schaft gela­den wur­de) zitieren:

Die Grün­dung einer neu­en Schu­le des Mul­ti­la­te­ra­lis­mus, die rea­lis­ti­sche und idea­lis­ti­sche Außen- und Sicher­heits­po­li­tik ver­eint, wird zur Dis­kus­si­on gestellt.

Geo­po­li­tik nicht als Leit­mo­tiv sehen

Inter­na­tio­na­le Bezie­hun­gen sol­len nichts ande­res als den täg­li­chen Bedürf­nis­sen im poli­ti­schen Leben die­nen; ihr innen­po­li­ti­scher Bezug ist daher evi­dent. Aller­dings nicht aus der übli­chen Per­spek­ti­ve, näm­lich dem “Lip­pen­ab­le­sen”, um “poli­tisch zu punk­ten” unter dem Deck­män­tel­chen des Bür­gers als Sou­ve­rän. Nein, umge­kehrt soll Geo­po­li­tik, also das Spiel von Macht­in­ter­es­sen auf glo­ba­ler Ebe­ne, als inte­gra­ler Teil von mensch­li­cher Sicher­heit gese­hen wer­den, als eine gewich­ti­ge Dimen­si­on, nicht aber als Leit­mo­tiv oder gar über­ge­ord­ne­tes Axiom.

src: click

Weil rea­lis­ti­sche Schu­le in For­eign Rela­ti­ons Theo­ry das geht ja nicht mehr, das ist ja Mear­s­hei­mer, und wir haben ja gera­de gese­hen was da selbst bei einem sei­ner Stu­den­ten dabei herauskommt.

Nein, also da doch bit­te Mear­s­hei­mer ab Woche zwei des Krie­ges von der Hoo­ver Insti­tu­ti­on denun­zie­ren las­sen. Ist bes­ser so. Er sagt ja auch zu wenig “Wer­te” und inter­na­tio­na­les Recht.

Ich muss abschlie­ßend noch kurz wie so oft zusam­men­fas­sen: Die­se Gesell­schaft ist das abso­lut gro­tesk, abar­tigst Allerletzte.

Aber auch nur, weil bei uns eine der­ar­ti­ge Dis­kus­si­on in den nächs­ten 20 Jah­ren nicht mehr öffent­lich statt­fin­den kann.

Die Wiener Zeitung kommt heute ihren ehelichen Pflichten als Medienpartnerin der Österreichisch Amerikanischen Gesellschaft nach

28. Juni 2023

Bildschirmfoto 2023 06 28 um 20 13 02

Inter­view in der US-Botschaft in Wien-Alsergrund: Ken­ne­dy (l.), Sel­mayr (M.) und Skoll (r.).

Sel­mayr: In jeder Kri­se steckt auch eine Chan­ce. Und es ist bemer­kens­wert, wie eng die west­li­chen Mäch­te seit dem Beginn des Krie­ges zusammenarbeiten.

Ken­ne­dy: Ich möch­te einen wich­ti­gen Punkt, das Pro­blem der rus­si­schen Des­in­for­ma­ti­on, anspre­chen. Eine der wich­tigs­ten Zei­tun­gen der USA, die “Washing­ton Post”, druckt den Slo­gan “Demo­cra­cy Dies in Darkness” gleich neben dem Zei­tungs­ti­tel ab - und die­sen Slo­gan fin­den Sie natür­lich auch im Internet.

Skoll: Der Krieg in der Ukrai­ne ist eine exis­ten­zi­el­le Fra­ge. Und zwar nicht nur für die Ukrai­ne, son­dern auch für den Rest der Welt.

src: click

Mnja - um den Sel­mayr Duk­tus zu bedie­nen - damit brau­chen wir uns jetzt über die Aus­ge­wo­gen­heit der Bericht­erstat­tung natür­lich kei­ne Sor­gen mehr zu machen.

Ich hab den Ver­tre­ter der Wie­ner Zei­tung mal im Bild mar­kiert - für die die ihn nicht kennen.

Ich hof­fe es hat wenigs­tens Spass gemacht.

edit: Wor­um ging es bei dem Gespräch?

Letz­ter Paragraph:

Skoll: Öster­reich hat sich jahr­zehn­te­lang der Brü­cken­funk­ti­on zwi­schen Ost und West gerühmt, dafür brauch­te man gute Bezie­hun­gen zu Mos­kau. Aber: Wir leben im Jahr 2023. Nun gibt es Krieg in Euro­pa, und wir kön­nen nicht mehr zurück zum Sta­tus quo ante. Das erfor­dert ein schmerz­haf­tes intel­lek­tu­el­les, emo­tio­na­les und auch öko­no­mi­sches Umden­ken. Und da erlau­be ich mir noch ein­mal, einen Appell für Qua­li­täts­jour­na­lis­mus in die Run­de zu wer­fen. Dar­über muss debat­tiert wer­den. Und dafür müs­sen die Bür­ge­rin­nen und Bür­ger Zugang zu guten Infor­ma­ti­on haben, was vor sich geht und wie die Welt sich ändert. Ohne erst­klas­si­ge Infor­ma­ti­ons­quel­len, ohne Qua­li­täts­jour­na­lis­mus ist das nicht möglich.

Groß­bri­tan­ni­ens Bot­schaf­te­rin in Öster­reich, Lind­say Skoll muss es ent­gan­gen sein, dass in Öster­reich kei­ne Qua­li­täts­zei­tung mehr exis­tiert die in ihrer Blatt­li­nie nicht auf “die Ukrai­ne muss gewin­nen, da ver­lie­ren kei­ne Opti­on ist” ein­ge­schwenkt ist. Die Wie­ner Zei­tung war die letzte. 

Hier der dama­li­ge Leit­ar­ti­kel in der Wie­ner Zei­tung: click

In der Woche nach dem sie mit der Öster­rei­chisch Ame­ri­ka­ni­schen Gesell­schaft eine Medi­en­part­ner­schaft ein­ge­gan­gen ist.

edit: Kon­text

edit2: Der Stan­dard ein paar Tage später:
Das neu­tra­le Öster­reich drif­tet ins Abseits

Er soll­te dann aber dazu­sa­gen, was das bedeu­tet. Ein EU-Land, das nicht bereit ist, mit den Part­nern für Frie­den und Frei­heit zu kämp­fen, gehört nicht zum inne­ren Kern einer Gemeinschaft.

Wie kann man die Bevöl­ke­rung eigent­lich noch verarschen?