die das vor drei Monaten nicht verstehen wollte:
Die Bundesregierung müht sich, rasch unabhängiger von russischen Energien zu werden. Eine Strategie: der Kauf großer Mengen Flüssiggas. Dieses fehlt nun an anderer Stelle.
Auf Pakistans Ausschreibung hat dann niemand mehr reagiert.
Symbolbild:
Wir dürfen aber auf keinen Fall Nordstream 2 ans Netz gehen lassen, denn das würde die Versorgungssicherheit steigern, die Verknappung auf dem Weltmarkt entschärfen und den Gaspreis senken. Was bei Putin für weniger Einnahmen sorgt.
Russland habe bereits 2004 begonnen, mit der Energiesicherheit der Ukraine zu spielen (weniger Gaslieferungen durch die Ukraine), um -- Aussage US Expertin -- ein einen Keil zwischen die USA und Europa zu treiben, da die USA, also nicht die Regierungen, die Merkel den Rücken gestärkt haben, sondern Ted Cruz, dem die Energielieferungen der US so sehr am Herzen lagen, dass der faktisch Sanktionen, wenn Nordstream 2 in Betrieb geht, fordern musste!
Der Satz macht grammatikalisch keinen Sinn? Macht er im Original auch nicht. Und nicht nur grammatikalisch.
Das seien “diese typischen Spielchen, mit denen Russland das westliche Bündnis spalten wollte”!
DONTYOUSEE!!1?1!
Die Logik macht nur Sinn, wenn die US die Ukraine bereits seit 2004 als US Staatsgebiet betrachten.
Oder für die militärische Sicherheit (die ja die Nato gewährleistet) eine Russlandgas-versorgte Ukraine als dermaßen wichtig empfanden, dass sie eine potentielle Reduktion der Lieferungen (die Drohkulisse damals hielt ja nicht lange) als Spaltgrund europäischer Verteidigungsinfrastruktur/US definiert haben.
WTF?
Du sein Russe, du liefern Gas an Ukraine! Oder du gefährden westliche Einigkeit!
Und Deutschland und Europa haben damals nichts gemacht! Gut, Deutschland hat eine Fixmenge an russischem Gas definiert, die immer über die Ukraine bezogen werden müsse, und diese nicht kleiner angesetzt als die bisherige Liefermenge -- aber hey, wer will das der Bevölkerung heute schon sagen.
Russland hat damals (2004) durch die Reduktion der Gaslieferungsmenge in der Ukraine einen Keil zwischen Europa und US getrieben, weil es ihre Energiesicherheit gefährdet hat - DONTYOUSEE!11?!11! Cruz musste da Sanktionen fordern, wenn Nord Stream 2 in Betrieb geht! Auch wenn die US Administration Merkel offiziell den Rücken gestärkt hat!
(Die Ukraine die das Gas zu Teilen kostenlos, und zu Teilen unter dem Marktpreis bezogen hat, kommt da im Argument nicht mal mehr vor. Das war das Protektorat der US! Da fällt das unter “gutes Benehmen”, oder so…)
Expertenmeinung.
Aufbau der Expertenrude? US Thinktank. UK Thinktank. ein ehemaliger Brüssel-Korrespondent eines Radiosenders mimt den Europavertreter. Russlandredakteur bei der deutschen Welle.
Komisch, der Europavertreter ist der Einzige der nicht die komplette Sendung lang böser Putin, verschlagender Putin schreit, und auch mal Gegenpositionen hat, und einen Vertreter Deutschlands hat man erst garnicht geladen…
Wie Benjamin Franklin sagen würde… Totalverarsche. Propaganda für die Blöden. Diese Gesellschaft ist das Letzte.
edit: OHDASLÜGENERREICHTNEUESSPHÄREN!!
Selbe US “Expertin” - “wer “darbt” daran, dass jetzt die US Flüssiggas nach Europa liefern, die Inder (Energiepreis) und Südostasien (bisher primär Flüssiggasbezieher). Daher ist es auch wichtig, dass wir jetzt schauen, wie wir da die Phalanx gegenüber China aufrechterhalten.”
Die “Phalanx” gegenüber China ist Japan und die US mit Schlachtschiffen im Südpazifik. Also für diese Darbenden also zahlen wir jetzt mal locker die dreifachen Energiekosten (ohne Spekulation, nur Lieferung), investieren gleichzeitig in den Ausbau unseres Militärs durch US Rüstungsgüter, und schicken unsere Kinder in den Südpazifik, damit die US nicht so “darben”, die uns das Flüssiggas ja verkaufen. Während wir Energiewende machen! Nachdem Saudi Arabien beim Flüssiggas nicht so wollte, wie die US es wollten, da langfristige Struktursicherungsüberlegungen dort mehr Relevanz hatten.
Aber das ist nicht der eigentliche Punkt. Der Punkt ist, dass das Pivoting der Nato Richtung Südpazifik seit fünf Jahren in jedem German Marshall Fund Gespräch zu finden war -- nur jetzt muss auch Europa mitmachen, weil wir unseren Freunden im Südpazifik ja das Flüssiggas wegnehmen, für das wir den dreifachen Marktpreis zahlen müssen! Fucking Sau. Na das passt ja wieder wie Arsch auf Eimer.
edit: Anruferin: Ich fühle mich wie der personifizierte Ablasszettel, ich spare, in Spanien werden die Supermärkte klimatisiert (Anruferin ist ein bisschen so drauf, … kennt man von Deutschen die die “faulen Griechen” Narrative gefressen haben ja), aber Anruferin will auch dass alle Anderen auch mehr Sparen, damit sie als Vorreiterin gelten kann. (weil Persönlichkeitsstruktur, …)
Anstatt dessen “ich glaube es fehlt eine charismatische Politische Figur, die das benennt”, einmal so leben wie ein verfickter Boomerarsch der der Realität bereits mehr entrückt ist als es seinem Alter zusteht, und der das Wort “relative Wettbewerbsfähigkeit” nicht kennt.
Nächster Denkfehler, die Umstellung der Energieimport Infrastrukturen wird auf EU Ebene bereits langfristig in die bald bindende Gesetzgebung überführt, was erzählt der charismatische Politiker der Gesellschaft dann? Dass er die spanierfeindliche Anruferin ficken würde, weil er ihre Energiespartips so geil findet? Populismus ist was Tolles.
Kommentare unter dem Video sind leider deaktiviert.
… du als DW über sechs Monate nur “Einigkeit des Westens” Propaganda geschoben hast, zusammen mit die Ukraine will nur Frieden (luuustige Anekdote:
Die Ukraine sollte nach Angaben eines Beraters von Präsident Wolodymyr Selenskyj die Rückeroberung der Halbinsel Krim in die Liste ihrer Kriegsziele aufnehmen. Russland habe mit der Annexion der Krim 2014 einen Krieg gegen die Ukraine und die Welt begonnen, schrieb der Leiter des ukrainischen Präsidentenbüros, Mychajlo Podoljak, bei Twitter. “Es ist offensichtlich, dass dieser Krieg mit der Befreiung der Krim enden sollte.”
src: click
) und aktuell wieder ganz vorne mit dabei bist, wenns darum geht “die neue Phase des Krieges” auszurufen, also die in der Russland keine Gebietsgewinne mehr hat, obwohl es die hat? Etwa drei Monate nachdem dem Club Concordia in Österreich aufgefallen wäre “wir berichten einseitig”, was dort aber mit einem Lächeln abgetan wurde. Während du als Journalismus die Reden Selenskyjs die Stunden vor dem Einschlag der ersten Raketen einen Aufstand der Tiktoker, Ärzte, Anwälte, Mütter und Väter in Russland gefordert haben “da nur die Russen jetzt noch einen Krieg verhindern könnten” als “Selenskyj will Frieden” umschreibst, während du als Journalismus, die Aussagen - “wir lassen uns nicht an der Nase herumführen, das ist eine Invasion, eigentlich hatten wir die Ja bereits 2014, nennen wirs beim Namen”, einiger nordischer Natostaaten nicht bringst, nachdem russische Einheiten ohne Truppenabzeichen in den Donbas versetzt wurden, aber bevor die ersten Raketen flogen, und als UvdL das Wort Krieg auf CNN noch nicht aussprechen wollte, nachdem du als Journalismus die Militärischen Ehrungen von Befehlshabern des Asow Battalions bereits aus den ersten Reden schneidest, um die selben Reden in denen bereits das “wir wollen schnellen Friende, aber auch die Rückeroberung der Krim Narrativ angelegt ist (Friedensverhandlungen erst, wenn wir über die Krim reden können, die dann Putin in einem direkten Gespräch mit Selenskyj einfach übereignen werde)” - um sie als “Seleneskyj will Frieden” zu bringen, nachdem du als Journalismus über das Rammstein Format nicht berichtest, bei dem die US “Goschn halten, Hände falten” verordnet haben, was du dann direkt im Anschluss als “die Ukraine muss das selbst entscheiden” an die Öffentlichkeit weitergegeben hast - ohne es zu hinterfragen, ohne das Format überhaupt zu erwähnen, nachdem du “die Ukraine will jetzt schwere Waffen, wegen Butcha” bringst, obwohl das Atlantic Council diese Forderung als erstes formuliert, und ukrainische Regierungssprecher sie zwei Tage vor Butcha bereits kopiert haben, nachdem du aussparst dass Kuleba bei Times Radio den Journalisten erklärt hat, das spreche man wie “Butcher” aus, nicht “Bucca, oder Bucha”, also - als es keiner falsch ausgesprochen hat, nur mal so als “Flair” Element. Nachdem du als Journalismus nicht erwähnt hast, dass “schwere Waffen”, bereit zu dem Zeitpunkt an dem Deutschland “öffentlich nachgegeben hat”, in den Augen Kuleba bereits Mobile multiple Raketenabschusssyteme mit hoher Reichweite waren, und im deutschen Sprachraum geflissentlich die “braucht man solche Waffen zur Verteidigung” - Debatte aussparst, die in deutschen Regierung aber handlungsleitend ist, nachdem du als Journalismus den Wandel der Position der EU von “schnelles Kriegsende, aber nicht um Jeden Preis” zu “keine Verhandlungen über Sanktionen, solange Putin noch an der Macht ist” binnen 50 Tagen, komplett verschwiegen hast, nachdem du als Journalismus Horrorszenarion der Gasknappheit in Deutschland an die Wand gemalt hast, während Deutschland Frankreich gerade Gas in großen Mengen zur Verstromung geliefert hat, um deren Netzstabilität zu garantieren, während die hälfte ihres Atomstroms Wartungsbedingt ausgefallen ist, und jetzt trotz allem zwei Wochen früher bei einem Füllstand von 75% deiner Speicher bist als erhofft (zur Ehrenrettung, Putin hat mit einem Ende der Gaslieferungen im öffentlichen Messaging gespielt), nachdem du als Journalismus Botschafter Äußerungen nicht mehr bringst, wenn sie mit deinem öffentlichen Narrativ nicht mehr übereinstimmen (chinesischer, in den russischen Medien aber immerhin, kann man ja mal kontextualisiert bringen) - (“Die US haben den Krieg provoziert”, weil das ja alles Propaganda sei), während du als Journalismus bis Juli jetzt nicht genau gewusst haben willst, ob die Ukraine jetzt wieder in Verhandlungen gehen will (du hast aber sicherheitshalber schon mal für vier Monate behauptet, dass sie das will), nachdem Kuleba in Davos erklärt hatte “Friedeninitiativen von europäischen Partnern seien durchaus möglich, allerdings nur, wenn sie die vollständige territoriale Integrität der Ukraine als Grundbedingung anerkennen, und auf keinen Fall neue Kontaktlinien zeichnen, oder auch nur zur Debatte stellen”. Nachdem du als Journalismus Experten hofiert hast, die wie der Mangott, dann irgendwann mal Ende Mai draufkommen, dass das was Selenskyj in Reden sagt “widersprüchlich sei”, obwohl das nicht stimmt, da die Äußerung für Waffenstillstandsvereinbarungen, wieder zurück zu den Grenzen vor dem 24. Februar, und für Friedensverhandlungen aber mindestens die Krim zurück, seit dem ersten Monat in den Reden transportiert wurden, aber so - dass die Medien ersteres als die einzigen Vorbedingungen für Friedensverhandlungen verkauft haben, was dich dann als Mangott “verwirrt hat”, als du immer öfter auch den zweiten Teil gehört hast, wenn du als Journalismus “wir gemeinsam stark gegen Putin” Narrative verkaufst, während der Eurowechselkurs gegenüber dem Dollar um ein Drittel einbricht, und sich Energiepreise vervierfachen, was laut Minister Kocher vor zwei Wochen “noch viel zu wenig in Betrachtungen von relativer Wettbewerbsfähigkeit mit einfließt” - keine Angst, Vervierfachung noch nicht jetzt, erst im nächsten Jahr, währen du als Journalismus so lange nicht draufkommst, dass eine Welternähungskrise bevorsteht, bis Putin bereits durch Nordafrika tourt, und dann mit “russisches Getreide aus Odessa, dieses Jahr noch, nächstes dann nicht mehr (in nennenswerten Mengen)” Feelgood Nebeninitiativen aufmachst, da das der EU (im Sinne von reagieren) bis dahin komplett egal war, da das ja auch nie in einem Forderungskatalog der Urkaine aufgetaucht ist - also bis es darum ging Bahnstrecken für den Güterverkehr über Transnistrien zu bauen, um der Ukraine in der Zukunft irgendeine Form von Handel zu ermöglichen, auch bei fünffach höheren Transportkosten, nachdem du es als Journalismus nicht geschafft hast zu erwähnen, dass das öffentliche Narrativ, acht Tage nach Kriegsbeginn von der Hoover Institution gezimmert wurde (Kotkin), die auch gleich ne neue Serie - warum Kissinger, und Mearsheimer, und der Papst nicht recht haben können (da das “eine Einzelerklärung sei”, und der Ukraine Krieg ein “multifaktorielles Problem”) aus dem Boden gestampft haben, mit komplett unbekannten und jungen Gesichtern die im wesentlichen gefordert haben, “wir wissen das besser, denn wir sind die den besseren US Netzwerken vernetzt, deshalb haben wir die Deutungshoheit gepachtet” - also nachdem du als Journalismus das übersehen und nicht gebracht hast, während die chinesische Regierung von Tag eins geostrategische Logik als Kriegsgrund anerkannt hat, was du der Bevölkerung aber nicht erklärt hast, was aber auch nicht stimmen durfte (eh nur Kissinger, Mearsheimer und der Papst und China…), da Putin, während du als Journalismus die Geschichtswissenschaftler gefeiert hast die “Putin ist verrückt und ein Opfer seiner eigenen Propaganda” postuliert haben, aber ohne den Begriff Propaganda in den Mund zu nehmen, denn Putin meine ja alles in seinen Reden an die Russische Bevölkerung so ernst, wie Franz Joseph den Tot von Kronprinz Rudolph, während du als Journalismus den toten Otto von Habsburg ausgegraben hast, der ja immer schon gewusst hat, dass der Russe aggressiv ist (Wiener Zeitung), während du als Journalismus (1, 2) Snyder als Hauptnarrativ empfiehlst der von Neokolonialismus als Kriegsrund spricht, während die deutsche Regierung von “Revanchismus” spricht, sowie Fiona Hill, die über vier bis fünf Steinstatuen, ehemalige Zaren, doppelte Vornamen und die Geschichtsversessenheit Putins (natürlich verrückte Pseudogeschichte), den Kriegsgrund darin erkannt hat, dass Putin der Realität entrückt wäre, sie aber nicht, sie sei nur die richtige Geschichtsphilosophin am richtigen Ort, also angeblich handlungsleitend in den US Gesprächsinitiativen mit Russland, nachdem du als Journalismus verschweigst, dass es selbst im CFR Stimmen gibt, die öffentlich stark bezweifeln, dass so wie die Debatten (die die US für Europa geführt haben, EU Vertreter waren leider nicht dabei) im Vorfeld gelaufen sind, auch nur irgendjemand daran gearbeitet habe einen Krieg noch zu verhindern (die Forderungen Russlands waren überbordend, an Wahnsinn grenzend, und nicht annehmbar, also die veröffentlichen Maximalforderungen), nachdem du als Journalismus verschwiegen hast, dass ein typisches Business Frühstück der Victor Pinchuk Foundation in Davos so aussieht, dass dort folgendes abläuft -
The pillar of independent journalism, payed to act in a moderating role for a private funds breakfast meeting, Fareed Zakaria (CNN): “And I want to call on this extraordinary ukrainian born entrepreneur, who now runs a billion dollar silicon valley startup Olec Runinsky (sic?) to tell us a story about how technology has really played a role in a kind of a surprising, optimistic way!”
Olec Runinsky (sic?): “Absolutely! And ah… Cutting edge technology is definitely playing a major role here - ahhh. This is probably the first open source war, that is happening right now, and in this war, its really easy to take the sides of good, vs. bad. And great people step up in the toughest times! [Open source ethos. 🙂 ] Ahm. In the beginning of the conflict, probably about 48 hours before, I got a call from minister Federovs team, asking a very simple question. Ah… do you know Elon? And so - I didn’t but through a few connections with investors, one of my investors was in the room with him. They passed the phone. And after a short conversation, it was really interesting, his response was, of course we should help a nation state stay connected. Thats how we ended up getting 12.000 or so starlink sattelite dishes into the country. To distribute connectivity. Because the russian plan was to cut the cord.”
- bei einem Medien-Frühstück bei dem Selenskyj dann auch noch über Videoschalte live “vorbeischaut”, und Snyder - also wortgleich - das selbe Spiel und Statement abgibt, mit dem er sich bereits drei Monate zuvor überhaupt empfohlen hat, dann aber mit Klitchko im Publikum, erste Reihe fußfrei, also nachdem du als Journalismus auch vergessen hast das zu erwähnen, und es im Krieg immer noch nicht so richtig toll läuft, trotz von den US seit drei Monaten (also von gut informierten Pundits, innerhalb der US, nicht aus Regierungskreisen) beworbener “decapitation of command and control” Strategie (mobile multiple Raketensysteme mit hoher Reichweite und Präzision, wir erinnern uns) -- was du den Leute natürlich auch nicht erklärst - das ist ja immer noch die Ukraine die für sich alleine entscheidet. Also nachdem aus dem US Verteidigungsministerium Leaks rausdiffundieren, dass die die US die Versenkung der Moskwa maßgeblich geplant hätten - da das bereits einem Kriegseintritt gleichkommt (aber nur einem Völkerrecht nach, das die US noch nie gekümmert hat) - und als Ukraine Waffen in Schulen und Krankenhäusern lagerst - sorry Amnesty International Report was du als Journalismus als “die haben das bestimmt nicht so gemeint” bringst.
Also nachdem du als Journalismus das alles geschafft hast, was machst du eigentlich dann?
Ganz klar. Du besinnst dich auf das was der Club Concordia nach der “ok, wir berichten einseitig” Einsicht noch als Nebensatz gebracht hat “- aber wir werden das in einem Jahr oder so aufarbeiten”.
Journalismus der sich auch vor seiner Verantwortung nicht drückt!
Und wie schaut diese Aufarbeitung dann aus?
Deutsche Welle, “Global Media Forum” -
Media coverage in times of crises: Lessons from the past and ideas for tomorrow with Timothy Snyder!
Alles klar!!11!?
Jetzt haben wir ja schon ein halbes Jahr hinter uns, warum die Aufarbeitung also Leuten überlassen die sich nicht in die Business Breakfasts der Victor Pinchuk Foundation einladen lassen? Das bringt doch nur Probleme…
Diese Gesellschaft ist das Allerletzte.
Hab den Teil jetzt noch rausgelassen, als die US die Ukraine bewogen haben die Neutralitätsüberlegungen aufzugeben, und dann den verfickten Johannes Kopf am 28. April in die Österreichisch Amerikanische Gesellschaft zu einer Gesprächsrunde über “Future Jobs” zu laden damit dem dann am 6. Mai auffällt, er müsse jetzt dringend bei einer Bürgerinitiative zur Abschaffung der Neutralität Österreichs mitmachen. Weil Neutralität ja nur was für Gestrige ist, schau, sogar die Schweiz hat sie diesmal abgelegt!
Also nachdem die Wiener Zeitung als letztes österreichisches Medium umgefallen ist und im April im Leitartikel veröffentlicht hat “Gewinnen müssen, weil Verlieren verboten ist” also nachdem die Wiener Zeitung im April Medienpartner der Österreichische Amerikanischen Gesellschaft für selbige Gesprächsrunde wurde, und der Selbe Chefredakteeur dort als Moderator bezahlt wurde, der den Leitartikel geschrieben hat - Verlieren verboten übrigens jetzt neu, mit der ganzen Krim. Für die die auch das zeitlich einordnen wollen, das war zu dem Zeitpunkt, als die EU die Peace Facility (außerhalb des normalen Budgets stehender Fond) für Waffenkäufe in der Ukraine geöffnet hat.
Das muss etwas vor dem Zeitpunkt gewesen sein, als der Gauk dem Lanz Orwell erklärt - und die deutsche Bevölkerung einmal komplett mit Mythen der Aufklärung total verarscht hat -
aber keine Angst, laut Monitor, dem Kontrollorgan der deutschen Medienlandschaft, muss dass jetzt so sein, denn für die die das noch nicht mitbekommen haben, wir befinden uns jetzt in einem Kulturkrieg: click (Gegen den russischen Neokolonialismus der laut der deutschen Bundesregierung Revanchismus ist?)
In dem die Ukraine sich jetzt aber selbst entscheiden muss, sich die Krim zurückzuholen.
Ich lieg eh schon am Boden und brech trotzdem noch zusammen.
“We are at the edge of war with Russia and China on issues which we partly created, without any concept of how this is going to end or what it’s supposed to lead to.”
So they still act like they cant wrap their heads around what happened here.
Diese Gesellschaft ist das Allerletzte.
Moneyquote:
What is absolutely remarkable is, that at the end of march, negotiations were advancing, for a neutral Ukraine, and for an end of the war. And then Ukraine walked away from the negotiating table, at the end of march, and the reason is, that the UK and the US pressed them. “You can win on the battlefield. You dont have to negotiate non-enlargement of NATO.” This was a big mistake. My point is simply, that we need this war to end, with russia leaving Ukraine and NATO saying, we are not going to fill in the void, Ukraine is going to be neutral. And this is how we could also save the world economy, as well as saving Ukraine, its very straight forward. Russia needs to leave. But the United States doesnt need to fill in afterwards. Thats the basic point. We need a buffer.
Hintergrund ist folgender. Stand 02.02.2022
Russia’s most recent demands-to exclude the possibility of Ukraine becoming a member of NATO -met with a firm refusal by NATO and its members, many of them also EU Member States, as the demands undermine nations’ rights to self-determination and free choice of alliances, both for NATO countries and aspiring states. However, while NATO’s 2008 Bucharest summit declaration stated that both Ukraine and Georgia will become NATO members, their NATO membership has not materialised, as NATO was reluctant to trigger further Russian aggression and has not granted them the Membership Action Plan, the next step on the membership path for the two countries.
The Council of the European Union discussed the European security situation on 24 January 2022 and approved conclusions which emphasised the indivisibility of European security: ‘Any challenge to the European security order affects the security of the EU and its Member States’. The Council rejected notions of ’spheres of influence’, condemned Russia’s continued aggressive actions and threats against Ukraine and called on Russia to de-escalate, abide by international law and engage constructively in dialogue.The Council reiterated the European Council conclusions of 16 December 2021, stating ‘that any further military aggression by Russia against Ukraine will have massive consequences and severe costs’.
[…]
Diplomatie actions
The above-mentioned actions were followed by a series of diplomatic exchanges around New Year.
On 17 December 2021, Russia demanded binding guarantees that Ukraine and Georgia will not become NATO members, as well as limitations on NATO’s military presence in eastern and central European countries which already belong to the Alliance. The Russian and American presidents talked by phone on 30 December 2021, and agreed on a set of meetings which took place during the second week of 2022. These included: the US-Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue (SSD) in Geneva on 10 January 2022, a continuation of a security dialogue created in June 2021 to address arms-control and risk-reduction measures; the NATO-Russia Council in Brussels on 12 January and the OSCE’s Permanent Council meeting in Vienna on 13 January. During these meetings, Russia’s initial requests, equating to Putin’s red lines, were rejected by the Western countries. The NATO allies proposed a dialogue on arms control, military transparency, and preventing military incidents; this was assessed by Russia as not sufficient, addressing only topics of secondary interest to the country.
During bilateral talks with Russia, the United States coordinated its position with Ukraine and European allies and excluded discussing European security without European allies and partners, as stated by the US Deputy Secretary of State, Wendy Sherman. This was preceded by EU High Representative Josep Borrell’s statement, which underlined the need to involve the EU in the talks-an aim in clear contrast to Vladimir Putin’s willingness to return to Cold War bi-polar logic, in which only Russia and the US would be granted a place in negotiations. HR/VP Borrell visited Ukraine from 4 to 6 January. In eastern Ukraine, he reaffirmed the EU’s ‘full support to Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity’, adding that the main purpose is to de-escalate through both negotiations and ’strong stands and firm positons on supporting Ukraine’. He also declared that ‘there is no security in Europe without the security of Ukraine’. The ‘Gymnich’ format, informal meetings of EU foreign ministers, took place on 13and 14 January 2022, and reconfirmed this policy based on two courses of action: a strong determination to introduce ‘large-scale sanctions in the event of any violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity’; and continuation of diplomatic talks with Russia, including in the ‘Normandy format’.
The diplomatic process continued with German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock’s visit to Moscow on 18 January and the meeting between US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Geneva on 21 January 2022. Further diplomatic exchanges are expected, and the OSCE’s Polish presidency is planning to visit Washington, Kiev and Moscow to continue talks during February, an initiative welcomed by Russia.
NATO reaction
Following the NATO-Russia Council on 12 January 2022, NATO’s Secretary-General reaffirmed NATO’s open door policy, as each nation has the right to choose its security arrangements. NATO called on Russia to de-escalate immediately and to refrain from aggressive and malign behaviour. On 30 November 2021, NATO’s Secretary-General and foreign ministers reiterated NATO’s support for Ukraine’s path towards membership and further Euro-Atlantic integration. On top of the practical support Ukraine has received, including trust funds, equipment and training, the Secretary-General stated that ‘any future Russian aggression against Ukraine would come at a high price’. In a subsequent meeting of NATO’s foreign ministers with the representatives of Ukraine and Georgia on 1 December, the ministers dismissed the concept of Russia’s sphere of influence over independent sovereign states, such as Ukraine, which they deemed to be unacceptable.
[…]
US reactions
During a phone conversation on 2 January 2022 between the US and Ukrainian presidents, President Biden declared that the US and its allies ‘will respond decisively if Russia further invades Ukraine’. Already during his candidacy, Joe Biden was outspoken about Ukraine’s role in US foreign policy and acknowledged the possibility of providing security assistance and weapons. President Zelenskyy visited Washington in September 2021 and met President Biden. The Joint Statement on the US-Ukraine Strategic Partnership reaffirmed US support for ‘Ukraine’s right to decide its own future foreign policy course free from outside interference, including with respect to Ukraine’s aspirations to join NATO’. Moreover, President Biden announced a US$60 million security assistance package, including additional Javelin anti-armour systems and forthcoming joint hardware production through Ukroboronprom. Washington recognises Ukraine as ‘central to the global struggle between democracy and autocracy’. In late December 2021, defensive military aid worth US$200 million was approved, with deliveries already arriving. In January 2022, the US approved the sending of American-made anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles to Ukraine by the Baltic States.
Aber dank der Intervention der Hoover institution, die acht Tage nach Kriegsbeginn das Epistem gezimmert hat, das DAS garantiert nicht der Grund für ein Einmarsch Russlands war - oder die fucking Stinger und Javelins die seit Oktober im Donbas im Einsatz waren, wissen wir dass der Papst nur ein verrückter Spinner ist, wenn er davon spricht, dass ihn Staatsoberhäupter vorgewarnt hätten, dass Russland provoziert werden sollte.
Fucking scheiß Gesellschaft.
Was für ein verdammtes distraction play. “Wir lassen den Einfluss in unserer geopolitischen Sphäre nicht zu.” Seit den FUCKING Neunzigern - das selbe Argument. Der selbe Selenskyj der sich mal für mal zurücknehmen musste, da der nächste Schritt im Nato Aufnahmeverfahren EXPLIZIT “um keinen Konflikt zu provozieren” nicht angeboten wurde. Dann Regierungswechsel in den USA - UNDPLÖTZLICH - “we reject the notion, that Russia has any right to a geopolitical sphere of influence”. Weil freie Demokratien frei entscheiden können, müssen, sollen, dürfen. Wegen Werten. Niemals in der verfickten Geschichte von Geostrategie hat irgendetwas auch nur ähnliches, auch nur annähernd eine Rolle gespielt. Aber nein, ganz klar, das ist jetzt das dominante Narrativ, daran muss man schon glauben.
Ich bin in einer Welt aufgewacht, in der mit Soap Logik Tagespolitik gemacht wird. Weil sichs die Hoover Institution und das Atlantic Council für die Medien ausgedacht haben, und die das seit dem verbreiten wie eine Eins.
Diese Gesellschaft ist das Allerletzte.
Atlantic Council - 2006:
The Interagency System:
Domestic reforms are of key importance to the EU-Ukraine and NATO-Ukraine action plans. Successful policymaking requires integration of foreign and domestic policy, as well as economic and social policy with security and defense issues. Implementing the EU-Ukraine and NATO-Ukraine plans, and potentially NATO member agreements and/or the EU acquis communitaire in the future, will be a complex process. It will require consensus between the president and prime minister, as well as support from a working majority in the Rada. Moreover, there must be skilled coordination across the Ukrainian government. This requires a strong, accepted, and empowered interagency coordinating mechanism.
Goals of an Interagency System
A successful interagency process - be it in Ukraine, the United States, or a Western European country - needs to accomplish several tasks. In particular, it should:
• Delineate clear lines of responsibility. Ministries and agencies should have an unambiguous idea as to which part of the interagency system is the venue for addressing a particular issue.
• Give each ministry and agency that has an equity in a particular question an opportunity to present its policy view. Involving bureaucratic players in an inclusive process increases the prospects of securing bureaucratic “buy-in” to policy decisions, even if a ministry or agency’s desired option ultimately is not chosen.
• Present policymakers with the range of viable policy options in an even and balanced manner, without unduly skewing the field in favor of one recommendation or another. This helps to ensure that policymakers are able to make fully informed decisions.
• Be capable of monitoring implementation of policy decisions once taken. This provides for necessary follow-up and, if implementation lags, ensures that the senior leadership is made aware.
• Encourage resolution of interagency policy disputes at lower levels, preserving the time of senior leaders for resolving those issues that defy resolution. This also allows time for senior leaders to review major policy decisions that are agreed at lower levels but, because of their importance, require senior-level validation.
In the United States, interagency coordination is managed by the National Security Council staff. The NSC staff is headed by the national security advisor and is a part of the Executive Office of the President. (The structure of the U.S. interagency coordinating system is described below in Chart #1.) When the U.S. interagency system works properly, it accomplishes the five tasks described above.
• The structure, including regional and functional interagency groups, or policy coordinating committees (PCCs), is established and well known; when an issue arises, it is almost always clear at the outset which PCC has responsibility.
• The membership of most interagency groups is inclusive, so that all departments or agencies with an interest in a particular national security issue generally participate in the relevant PCC. They thus have an opportunity to weigh in with their view.
• When agencies differ, a range of options is forwarded to policymakers at the next higher level with a description of the pros and cons of each.
• Interagency groups, usually at the PCC level, are used to monitor implementation of presidential policy.
• The system tends to work issues first at lower levels, either in a PCC or sub-PCC. If agreement cannot be reached there, the issue is moved up the chain to the Deputies Committee and, if necessary, the Principals Committee. Sub-PCCs and PCCs often can reach interagency agreement, which preserves the time of more senior officials for tougher issues.
Ukraine’s Interagency System for Euro-Atlantic Issues
The executive branch mechanisms in Ukraine responsible for coordinating Euro-Atlantic integration have evolved since Yushchenko became president. However, they will have to evolve further to accommodate the constitutional changes approved in December 2004, which are being implemented in the first part of 2006. Those changes - described in greater detail on page 10 of this paper - will give the prime minister greater independence from the president and substantially expanded authority. Euro-Atlantic integration, to be pursued effectively, will then require a consensus between the president and prime minister.
The National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) is, according to the Ukrainian constitution, the premier coordinating body for Ukrainian national security and defense issues. Article 107 of the constitution provides that the NSDC, under the chairmanship of the president, “coordinates and controls [monitors]” executive branch agencies in the area of national security and defense. Article 107 does not charge the NSDC with primary responsibility for coordinating foreign policy; the Foreign Ministry has that responsibility. The NSDC includes the prime minister; the ministers of defense, internal affairs, and foreign affairs; the head of the Security Service of Ukraine; and additional members appointed by the president. In December 2005, Yushchenko appointed Prosecutor General Oleksander Medvedko, Presidential Secretariat head Oleg Rybachuk, and Health Minister Yuriy Polyachenko to the NSDC.
The NSDC reports to the president but is separate from the presidential secretariat. The secretariat includes advisors to the president on both foreign policy and defense issues; they serve as the president’s personal staff on these issues, performing analytical work, making policy proposals, and assisting with coordination on foreign affairs, defense, and national security issues. For comparison, the primary functions of the U.S. NSC staff - coordinating interagency policy, ensuring implementation of presidential policy, and staffing the president - are performed in Ukraine by both the NSDC and the presidential secretariat.
The NSDC’s portfolio in reality extends well beyond traditional national security and defense issues. In April 2005, a senior NSDC official estimated that the Council’s staff spent about 50 percent of its time on national security, defense, and foreign policy issues, and 50 percent on domestic issues. The latter included administrative reform, the state budget, and reform of the energy sector. While this may have reflected in part the preferences of Petro Poroshenko, who was NSDC secretary from February-September 2005, the NSDC has in the past regularly involved itself on domestic matters, and will likely continue to do so under Anatoliy Kinakh, its current secretary and a former prime minister.
Beyond the NSDC, the Government Committee on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration is specifically tasked with coordinating Euro-Atlantic integration policy. This body was created to ensure that all parts of the executive branch were engaged on Euro-Atlantic integration, for example, by making sure that each ministry and agency’s budget request reflected Euro-Atlantic issues. The Government Committee comes under the Cabinet of Ministers and is charged with defining and implementing policies according to the strategy delineated by the Cabinet. The foreign minister chairs this committee, which also includes the ministers of defense, economy, internal affairs, finance, and justice plus the head of the State Customs Service.
As of January 2006, the Cabinet of Ministers was considering proposing to the president the establishment of an Interagency Commission of National Coordinators for Euro-Atlantic Integration. This would be chaired by a deputy foreign minister, which would mean it would rank lower in the bureaucratic hierarchy than the Government Committee on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration. This body would focus on NATO-Ukraine issues; a series of interagency working groups, organized around key NATO questions and chaired by deputy ministers, would be subordinate to the Commission. However, it is not clear that the Interagency Commission would be directly subordinate to the Government Committee. In a November 2005 discussion, a senior Ministry of Defense official suggested that, while the Government Committee reports to the Cabinet of Ministers, the Interagency Commission might report to the president (presumably through the NSDC). Other Ukrainian officials have suggested the Commission would report directly to the Cabinet of Ministers, but not necessarily through the Government Committee.
The structure for coordinating Euro-Atlantic integration policy thus is not clear at this time. Adding to the mix, Yushchenko has signed decrees assigning the Foreign Ministry prime responsibilities for coordinating (as well as implementing) foreign policy. For example, a November 2005 decree gave the Foreign Ministry responsibility for coordinating measures taken by executive branch organs related to Euro-Atlantic integration. In addition, the legal basis for foreign policy-making is dated, as the underlying law is a 1993 Rada resolution “On the Basic Directions of Ukrainian Foreign Policy.”
There has been some consolidation in the executive branch structure. Yushchenko eliminated the position of deputy prime minister for European integration that he had created in February 2005. Originally held by Rybachuk (currently the head of the presidential secretariat), the deputy prime minister position had responsibility for overseeing government-wide efforts to draw closer to the European Union, while the Foreign Ministry under Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk had the lead on issues related to NATO. The division was not clear-cut; the Foreign Ministry maintained important responsibilities for coordinating questions regarding the European Union.
The secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers’ Department for European Integration reported to then-Deputy Prime Minister Rybachuk in February-September 2005. With the abolition of the deputy prime minister’s position, the secretariat now comes under the Cabinet of Ministers, though its long-term status is unclear. In another consolidating move, Yushchenko in November 2005 issued a decree abolishing the State Council on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine. The council had reported directly to the president, in parallel to rather than through the NSDC.
Although it goes beyond the scope of this paper, which focuses on executive branch mechanisms, the Rada, in particular its Foreign Affairs and European Integration Committees, also plays an important role on Euro-Atlantic integration policy. The executive branch will have to ensure good links to the Rada to facilitate Rada support and passage of legislation to advance Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic course.
Weaknesses of the Current System
A comparison to the five tasks identified as necessary for an effective interagency coordinating system reveals a number of weaknesses in the Ukrainian system.
First, the Ukrainian structure does not clearly delineate lines of responsibility, creating confusion about which body is the appropriate venue for handling a particular problem. It appears that there will be a choice, at least between the Government Committee on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration and the Interagency Commission of National Coordinators for Euro-Atlantic Integration. And while the latter body, headed by a deputy foreign minister, appears to be junior to the former, headed by the foreign minister, it is not clear that the Commission would in fact be directly subordinate to the Committee. This raises the possibility of parallel, competing structures. Furthermore, it is not obvious how the work of these interagency bodies will relate to the Foreign Ministry’s assigned coordination efforts. Unclear division of and/or overlapping responsibilities create possibilities for wasted time, policy disconnects, and even contradictory decisions.
Second, the current structure may also give the Foreign Ministry too much responsibility for interagency coordination. There is no question that the Foreign Ministry should lead on managing the implementation of foreign policy. Moreover, the apparent shift in relative weight for developing foreign policy from the presidential secretariat to the Foreign Ministry that took place during Yushchenko’s first months in office is a prudent move for sensible policymaking. But it may be wiser for an overarching body such as the NSDC - rather than the Foreign Ministry, which is also an implementing agency - to have the broader responsibility for coordination among all ministries and agencies. It can be more difficult for a ministry, which is advocating its own preferred policy view, to ensure that all options are conveyed to senior leaders in a fair and balanced way.
Third, it is not clear whether the current structure provides all ministries and agencies that have an equity in a particular question the opportunity to present their views on that question. The Government Committee certainly includes key ministry and agency heads: the ministers of defense, economy, internal affairs, finance, and justice; the head of the customs agency; and the foreign minister. But will the Committee coordinate the Euro-Atlantic integration efforts of other ministries as well? These include such ministries as Agrarian Policy (a major issue for EU-Ukraine relations will be how Ukraine’s agricultural sector relates to the European Union and its Common Agricultural Policy); Fuel and Energy (another major subject, highlighted by the recent Ukrainian-Russian gas dispute and its potential impact on gas flows to Western Europe); and Labor and Social Policy (given the growing harmonization of EU labor and social practices). These and other ministries need to be engaged as a normal part of the interagency coordination process, lest there be critical gaps in Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration effort.
Fourth, there are questions as to whether the current Ukrainian structure is able to ensure that, when there is an interagency dispute, senior policymakers receive the full range of viable policy options presented in a balanced manner. The president will be the ultimate judge of the options that he receives and whether he is well-served. Much will depend on the NSDC secretary and his approach: will he treat all options evenly, or will his presentations prejudice the choice in favor of his own preference? During Poroshenko’s tenure as NSDC secretary, the NSDC and Cabinet appeared to regard one another as competitors rather than collaborators in shaping government policy, reflecting the in-fighting between Poroshenko and Tymoshenko. The NSDC launched some initiatives with little coordination. For example, during spring 2005, the NSDC conceived and launched a new initiative to address the long-simmering Transnistria dispute in neighboring Moldova with little apparent input from the Foreign Ministry.
Finally, the Ukrainian system does not encourage the resolution of interagency policy disputes at lower levels of the bureaucracy, as the lowest-ranking mechanism operates at the deputy minister level. Senior Foreign Ministry officials have tried to devolve authority down to the level of department heads, but other ministries insisted that coordination take place at the level of deputy ministers. As a result, the Ukrainian system appears to have no equivalent to the PCC and sub-PCC structure in the U.S. model that would allow discussion of issues and preparation of policy options at levels below that of deputy minister and minister. This creates a situation in which deputy ministers (and their bosses) end up doing coordination work that could be accomplished at lower levels, preserving their time for other issues.
The Forthcoming Constitutional Changes
The Ukrainian interagency coordinating system will be further challenged by the constitutional changes that began to come into effect on January 1, 2006. These will significantly alter the balance of power between the president and the Rada, and the balance of executive power between the president and the prime minister. In both cases, the president’s authority will be diminished.
This move away from the kind of super-presidency model that developed during the Kuchma years will introduce greater checks and balances into the Ukrainian government and political system. This could very well be a positive development for Euro-Atlantic integration, as evidenced by the experience of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that have recently joined NATO and the European Union after implementing major democratic and economic reforms. In most cases, parliament was the primary branch of government, as opposed to the super-presidency model more common in the former Soviet space.
Prior to the 2006 constitutional reforms, the Ukrainian president nominated the prime minister, who then had to be approved by the Rada, and the president appointed all ministers. When the constitutional changes take full effect with the March Rada elections, the Rada will choose the prime minister. In addition to acquiring independence from the president, the prime minister will have greater authority; he or she will appoint all ministers and senior agency heads except for the foreign and defense ministers, heads of the security service and National Bank of Ukraine, prosecutor general, and NSDC secretary. Thus, most ministers will be named by, and presumably be more beholden to, the prime minister.
This form of co-habitation between the president and prime minister will add a new layer of complexity to interagency coordination in Ukraine. For example, the constitution requires that many presidential decrees be countersigned by the prime minister and relevant minister. This presented little problem when the prime minister and ministers served at the pleasure of the president. And it presumably will present little problem if the new prime minister comes from Yushchenko’s political party, Our Ukraine. That by no means is a given. Once the changes are in place, and if the Rada chooses someone other than a member of Our Ukraine to be prime minister, Yushchenko will need to find ways to secure the prime minister’s support for his policy course and consent to presidential decrees. Absent a meeting of the minds on a Euro-Atlantic integration course between Yushchenko and the prime minister, this new power arrangement could prove a formula for stalemate that no coordination mechanism could overcome.
Thus, a clear understanding on Euro-Atlantic integration issues between the president and prime minister will be even more important for a coherent policy course toward the European Union and NATO. One key element to implementing such an understanding is to have an effective structure in place for coordination between the president and prime minister, as well as among all the various ministries and agencies.
Recommendations
The weaknesses of the Ukrainian policy coordination system could well complicate Ukraine’s ability to develop and implement a coherent approach to Euro-Atlantic institutions. The Ukrainian system will be further challenged once the prime minister gains greater independence and authority. Ukrainian officials should begin to consider now, even before the constitutional reforms are fully implemented and the Rada elections take place, how to reconfigure their structure to facilitate effective policy coordination on Euro-Atlantic issues. In particular, they should consider the following changes to the current policy coordination structure:
• The National Security and Defense Council should be the senior policy-coordinating body for Euro-Atlantic questions. It provides the logical mechanism for coordination between the president and the prime minister, as the NSDC is chaired by the president with the prime minister as a key member. When the NSDC considers Euro-Atlantic issues, membership on the body should be expanded to include all ministers who are involved in or affected by policies designed to draw Ukraine closer to the European Union and NATO. In terms familiar to Americans, an NSDC session would be the equivalent of a full National Security Council meeting chaired by the president.
• The Government Committee on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration should be retained, but the Ukrainians should consider two principal changes. First, the Committee should be made subordinate to the NSDC rather than the Cabinet of Ministers, as the Committee will have to prepare policy options and recommendations not just for the prime minister, but for the president as well (since he will still retain lead responsibilities in the foreign and security policy areas). Second, the Committee should be chaired by the NSDC secretary. Participation by ministries should be at the ministerial level. In U.S. terms, the Committee would then become the equivalent of the Principals Committee.
• The Interagency Commission of National Coordinators for Euro-Atlantic Integration should be made directly subordinate to the Government Committee on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration. It should be chaired by the senior deputy secretary of the NSDC. Ministries should participate at the deputy minister level. In U.S. terms, this would be the counterpart to the Deputies Committee.
• To work issues at lower levels of the bureaucracy, the Ukrainians should regularize a set of interagency working groups subordinate to the Interagency Commission. These should include groups addressing foreign policy issues; defense and security issues; economic, financial, and trade issues; justice, rule of law, and law enforcement issues; and health and social issues. Each group would be chaired by an NSDC official, with appropriate ministries represented by department heads or deputy heads (not all ministries would need to participate in all working groups; participation would be determined by subject matter). Most interagency coordination issues related to Euro-Atlantic integration should first be engaged at this level. These working groups could do preliminary coordination and preparation of policy options and thereby take some of the burden off of busy ministers and deputy ministers; in some cases, the working groups might resolve disputes and produce consensus. These would be the equivalent of the U.S. Policy Coordinating Committees.
With this structure, the advisors in the presidential secretariat for foreign policy and defense issues would continue to support the president on Euro-Atlantic integration policy, but they would shed responsibilities for coordinating interagency policy. They would stay in close contact with the NSDC secretariat as policy questions were developed, so that they could keep the president informed on major issues and ensure that presidential views were fed into the process.
Likewise, the Cabinet of Ministers’ Department for European Integration would be a parallel group supporting the prime minister on foreign policy and defense issues. It would have no responsibilities for coordinating interagency policy, but would maintain close contact with the NSDC secretariat, keeping the prime minister informed and making sure that his or her views were fed into the policy process.
The structure outlined above for coordinating Euro-Atlantic integration (see Chart #2 on page 15) offers several advantages:
• It would eliminate the ambiguity and possible overlaps in the current Ukrainian system. Instead, it offers a clear hierarchy, in which policy issues move through a single, well-defined channel from one level to the next.
• By regularizing a series of working groups, this structure would allow issues to be worked at levels below ministers and deputy ministers. Indeed, this is where most interagency coordination should take place, reserving the time of deputy ministers and ministers for major policy issues or those issues on which consensus cannot be achieved at the working level.
• This structure would provide a clear mechanism for coordinating policy between the president and the prime minister. Each would have his or her advisors to monitor the development of policy as it moved up from the working group level toward the NSDC. All relevant ministries would be involved at each level of the structure. And, for those issues that go all the way to a full NSDC meeting, both the president and prime minister would be taking part.
Some may see this structure as a diminution of the power of the Cabinet of Ministers, as the NSDC - viewed as “the president’s body” - would be the primary coordinating entity. Use of the NSDC makes sense, however, as the NSDC involves both the president and the prime minister, while the Cabinet will be responsible to the prime minister. All ministries, moreover, would be involved at all levels of the proposed coordination structure. The president as chair of the NSDC might appear to have a stronger position than the prime minister, who is only a member of the NSDC. However, the constitutional requirement that the prime minister and relevant minister countersign presidential decrees and the prime minister’s authority over most ministers provide a de facto check on presidential power.
For this structure to work, it will be important that the NSDC secretary be committed to presenting policy options in a fair and balanced way. He or she must be, and must be seen to be, playing the role of “honest broker.” It will also be important to ensure that the NSDC’s secretariat, as well as the Euro-Atlantic offices of the various ministries, are staffed with people who understand what a Euro-Atlantic course requires of Ukraine. It is not enough to aspire to be “European.” One must grasp the principles, values, and processes that that entails. There is a small but growing cadre of such experts in Ukraine; they need to be empowered.
Moreover, making the working groups effective will require a substantial change in Ukrainian government culture, which currently is run “top down.” There will need to be a conscious effort to encourage initiative, innovation, and decision-making at lower levels. Some senior officials will likely resist this, fearing loss of their own authority, but it is essential if Ukraine wishes to have a more efficient and effective process.
Conclusion
“Joining Europe” will require that the president and prime minister have a common vision on Euro-Atlantic integration issues. It also will require that there be in the new Rada a supportive coalition that shares this vision and can command a regular majority to approve necessary legislation. And “joining Europe” will require support from a growing segment of the Ukrainian public; neither the European Union nor NATO will consider ultimately taking Ukraine in without evidence that membership has the support of a sizeable segment of the Ukrainian people. The experience of the Central and Eastern European states serves as an important reminder in this regard. All of them enjoyed a parliamentary and national consensus on the strategic objectives of joining NATO and the European Union, a consensus that has yet to coalesce in Ukraine. [Aber gut dass da schon wer dran denkt. Danach kann man immer noch demokratische Mehrheiten finden.]
Forging a common vision on Euro-Atlantic integration, ensuring that that vision is translated into the myriad policy decisions that must be taken, and then following up on the implementation of those decisions requires a defined, robust, and empowered interagency coordinating structure. The structure suggested in this paper would help to implement a viable interagency coordination process in Ukraine on Euro-Atlantic issues. The Ukrainian government should consider these recommendations, ideally before the Rada elections, as the country after the ballot will be (rightly) focused on government formation. Without such a structure, even if the president and prime minister see eye-to-eye on Euro-Atlantic integration following the March elections, “joining Europe” will prove for Ukraine a slower, more cumbersome and painful process than should be the case.
src: The Atlantic Council Bulletin Februar 2006, via ETH Zürich
Ist erstaunlich wie sehr sich die Gesellschaften dafür selbst entscheiden, nicht?
Nein, also und warum Putin nur mit den US verhandeln möchte, kann ich ja überhaupt nicht verstehen.
edit: Bist du gscheid, must du als Journalist heute verblödet sein.
Es geht um den globalen Kulturkampf gegen Schwulenhasser! Welche Verbindungen gibt es in weltweiten Netzwerken? Auch zu evangelikalen ultrareligiösen Christen, und welche Rolle spielen Rechtsextremisten in diesen Netzwerken?
Ich darf zusammenfassen, jeder der nicht das Kulturkampf-Narrativ frisst, ist Hitler.
liefen unerwartet sehr super für die Ukraine, auch dank der neuen schweren westlichen Waffen.
Die BBC hat das mal veranschaulicht und die Gesamtkarte gleich mal an fünfter Stelle im Artikel versteckt. Früher konnte man die ja noch an erster Stelle bringen…
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