The two quintessential lies

22. Juni 2024

So the argu­ment goes as follows:

- Rus­sia was going into Ukrai­ne to con­quer it ent­i­re­ly and then more

Addi­tio­nal infor­ma­ti­on: 190.000 to 220.000 tro­ops arent enough to con­quer OR hold any major city in the Ukrai­ne - much less the ent­i­re­ty of Ukrai­ne. See Mearsheimer/Kathie Hal­per video below. In which the first refe­ren­ces the fol­lowing para­graph from a Wall Street Jour­nal arti­cle, publis­hed on the 2nd of June 2024:

Of cour­se, Putin still wants Khar­kiv,” Oleh Syn­e­hu­bov, the head of the mili­ta­ry admi­nis­tra­ti­on for the region—which is also cal­led Kharkiv—said of Rus­si­an Pre­si­dent Vla­di­mir Putin. Syn­e­hu­bov noted that Rus­sia has deploy­ed only a frac­tion of the tro­ops nee­ded to storm the city, which he esti­ma­ted could requi­re up to half a mil­li­on soldiers.

src: click (Archiv)

(Khar­kiv, back befo­re the rus­si­an inva­si­on had about half the popu­la­ti­on of Kiev.)

So then the argu­ment extends:

- This isnt about “ter­ri­to­ry” (“con­que­ring all of it and more”) this is about kee­ping Ukrai­ne a sov­er­eign sta­te - see Pau­la Dobri­an­sky, For­mer Under Secreta­ry of Sta­te for Glo­bal Affairs; Seni­or Fel­low at Har­vard Ken­ne­dy School’s Bel­fer Cen­ter for Sci­ence and Inter­na­tio­nal Affairs; Vice Chair, Atlan­tic Coun­cil Scow­croft Cen­ter for Stra­te­gy & Secu­ri­ty -- in the fol­lowing Open to Deba­te (for­mer Intel­li­gence Squa­red) debate:

star­ting at 30:28 in

- The in depth argu­ment here goes as fol­lows. When Putin inva­ded Ukrai­ne - we saw leaf­lets being drop­ped in regi­ons east of Kiev that were tel­ling Ukrai­ni­an tro­ops to stand down, becau­se the government in Kiew (mili­ta­ry) would not exist any­mo­re - so any resis­tance to the inva­si­on “would be ent­i­re­ly futi­le, becau­se it alrea­dy “was over””, fur­ther­mo­re, the intent of the rus­si­an “attack on Kiev” would have been the same as with the take­over of Cri­mea 2014, name­ly to dis­rupt public life, make the stan­ding ukrai­ni­an government flee, or be kil­led (alle­ged­ly the US did take out several rus­si­an assas­si­na­ti­on units in Kiev wit­hin the first three days) - and then let the government be taken over, or revol­ted against by essen­ti­al­ly Ukrai­ni­an Krem­lin puppets.

Which leads to

- Rus­sia wasnt about to “con­quer Ukrai­ne” it was about to attempt a mili­ta­ry coup and take­over - using a shock and awe stra­te­gy, much like the one they used in Cri­mea befo­re. That eit­her would have cemen­ted a rus­sia friend­ly lea­ders­hip in Kiev, or wider advan­ces in the east amongst the resul­ting cha­os. (220.000 tro­ops (and only half of tho­se in the Kiev area) still being not near­ly enough to occu­py a Kiev (popu­la­ti­on of 3 mil­li­on) that was resis­ting its occupiers.)

Which then con­flicts with “thats impe­ri­al rus­sia wan­ting to con­quer several coun­tries, so Putin gets his rus­si­an empi­re back -- becau­se the­re posi­tively was no con­que­ring attempt (in the clas­si­cal sen­se) going on -- becau­se rus­sia had far to few tro­ops for that in its army at the time, and in the field -- see:

- The “addi­tio­nal coun­tries rus­sia wan­ted to take over” were Geor­gia and Mol­d­o­wa (land bridge to trans­nis­tria). Poland, Esto­nia, and Lit­hua­nia, were loo­sing their sh*t becau­se of Kali­nin­grad, but they all were Nato coun­tries you wouldnt inva­de with an army of 190.000 peop­le, which had about half of its tro­ops busy in the east of Ukrai­ne at that point.

That then let to the “things werent going remo­te­ly to plan” scenario --

whe­re two tracks of peace con­fe­ren­ces were put into place - whe­re rus­sia could be “pres­sed back down” to the fol­lowing demands:

- Neu­tral Ukraine
- Cri­mea thats not tal­ked about for many years
- secu­ri­ty gua­ran­ties by the west/troop size limits that would allow Ukrai­ne to defend its­elf in the future

Whe­re the point of con­ten­ti­on whe­re all of that bro­ke were the secu­ri­ty gua­ran­ties. Or as wes­tern Pro­pa­gan­da likes to put it “Putin deman­ded such a low troop count on the ukrai­ni­an mili­ta­ry, that on a sub­se­quent attack he would have been able to con­quer it any­how” - so “becau­se of that Ukrai­ne had to ghost rus­sia, and then drop the nego­tia­ti­ons”. In actual­li­ty by then Ukrai­ne was in the midd­le of their own offen­si­ve so.…..

As Davyd Arak­ha­mi­ia put it “the Ukrai­ne was using the nego­tia­ti­ons as a Smo­ke­s­creen to buy time to get more Wea­pons into Ukrai­ne” or, as Davyd Arak­ha­mi­ia did frame it in the same inter­view - Rus­sia tried to nego­tia­te a peace, whe­re upon a second attack Ukrai­ne would not exist anymore.

Tho­se two points he brought up in the inter­view with the ukrai­ni­an broad­cas­ter were never refu­t­ed by Davyd Arak­ha­mi­ia. He only tried to put “Let’s fight” - so his recal­ling of a Boris John­son state­ment into a slight­ly dif­fe­rent con­text after­wards (John­son would have said this to him in a mee­ting about “how to best get the rus­si­ans out of Ukraine”).

So, so far - we have two quin­te­sen­ti­al lies on part of wes­tern propaganda --

1. That Putin was out the­re to con­quer back his very own gre­at rus­sia. (Which is a lie, becau­se the attack was desi­gned as a Shock and awe quick topp­ling of the Ukrai­ni­an government - so was the take­over in Geor­gia (influ­ence ope­ra­ti­on) lea­ving only Mol­d­o­va for a mili­ta­ry take­over - IF Putin dindt want to chal­len­ge Nato with an army of 190.000 peop­le which then also would have had to hold Ukrai­ne against its will - a job that would requi­re rough­ly 400.000+ men, if you were an occu­p­y­ing force.

2. The Ukrai­ne needs its “natio­nal sov­er­eig­n­ty” to sur­vi­ve. So this is the Ukrai­ne cant beco­me a neu­tral coun­try argu­ment - becau­se the Ukrai­ne has to be able to deci­de the strength of its mili­ta­ry on its own - to be able to sur­vi­ve a second rus­si­an attack in the Future. That is a lie, becau­se this could also be sol­ved with secu­ri­ty gua­ran­ties -- which the Ukrai­ne has very bad expe­ri­en­ces with. (The Ukrai­ne essen­ti­al­ly gave up its nuclear wea­pons, as a pre­re­qui­si­te for beco­m­ing an inde­pen­dent sta­te, and got “secu­ri­ty gua­ran­ties” by the US, the UK and a few other coun­tries, in return - that were desi­gned not be worth all that much, becau­se of how they were phra­sed.) A neu­tral Ukrai­ne would be pos­si­ble - if we sol­ved the secu­ri­ty gua­ran­ties issue.

With the second remai­ning issue in that case being rus­si­an poli­ti­cal influ­ence that in a neu­tral Ukrai­ne would still remain active.

Around tho­se two lies, all of the wes­tern framing is build around. The “ukrai­ne has to deci­de on its own” framing, the “nato has an open door poli­cy, and every coun­try must be able to deci­de on its own, if it wants to enter nato” framing, the Putin wants to get back a grea­ter rus­sia framing, becau­se he thinks like a tsar (thats also framing), the Putin is cra­zy framing (the Ukrai­ni­ans are Nazis Nar­ra­ti­ve was acti­ve in Cri­mea, short­ly befo­re the take­over, becau­se it sho­cked popu­la­ti­ons into com­pla­cen­cy - that was the main aim of the rus­sia Pro­pa­gan­da push through its media out­lets in Cri­mea -- so as it was acti­ve back in 2014 - of cour­se that nar­ra­ti­ve was used for the full­sca­le attack on Ukrai­ne as well -- again, as about half of rus­si­as initi­al for­ces were acti­ve in the east. (So popu­la­ti­ons would have asked why - and the “Nazis” nar­ra­ti­ve was alrea­dy in place sin­ce 2014 (and pro­ved very use­ful back then).))

While intern­al­ly in the deci­ding bodies the argu­ment is actual­ly as follows:

At 35min in:

Ali­na Polya­ko­va (Pre­si­dent and CEO of the Cen­ter for Euro­pean Poli­cy Ana­ly­sis (CEPA): I think that signals to me that the­re is gro­wing agree­ment that the only way that we can mana­ge Rus­sia is by going back to the Cold War era stra­te­gy of con­tain­ment, that begins first, defea­ting Rus­sia in Ukrai­ne and second, ree­sta­b­li­shing deter­an­ce by deni­al in Euro­pe that means har­de­ning the Eas­tern flank first and fore­mo­st. Third har­de­ning the soft tar­gets of Rus­si­an influ­ence across the glo­be - uh influ­ence ope­ra­ti­ons in the infor­ma­ti­on space, cyber ope­ra­ti­ons that the Rus­si­ans have beco­me very sophisti­ca­ted at, pushing back against Russia’s use of PMC’s [pri­va­te mili­ta­ry con­trac­tors] to prop up aut­ho­ri­ta­ri­an governments across the glo­be and under­mi­ne demo­cra­tic lea­ders­hip - and fourth, under­mi­ning Rus­si­an domi­nan­ce in its for­mer empi­re, becau­se as long as we have so-called grey zone Sta­tes a hor­ri­ble term but, non-allied sta­tes that are not part of NATO that are not part of the EU in the Euro­pean con­ti­nent this is what pro­vi­des fod­der for Rus­si­an aggres­si­on so Mol­d­o­va is very much under thre­at as we speak, cer­tain­ly Bel­la­rus has alrea­dy beco­me a vassel sta­te of Rus­sia and then we have of cour­se Geor­gia and the other coun­tries of the Cau­ca­sus as well.

[…]

And Rus­sia will come back for NATO.

Han­no Pev­kur, Minis­ter of Defence of the Repu­blic of Esto­nia (30.05.2023):

What Rus­sia wants to achie­ve, the poli­ti­cal goals, let’s be honest - and they, the­se poli­ti­cal goals of Rus­sia have never chan­ged, they want to have a grey-zone bet­ween Rus­sia and NATO, they want to have a con­trol over this grey-zone and this is what they want to achie­ve. And they want to have some “secu­ri­ty gua­ran­tees” for them­sel­ves, sor­ry this is not the Free World and this is what Ukrai­ne is figh­t­ing for at the moment, that they are figh­t­ing for - the Free World and rule-based world and this is why we sup­port Ukrai­ne so this is obvious and then this is why we can never accept this approach of Rus­sia, loo­king at inter­na­tio­nal law.”

src:

(at 43:50 in)

or:

Pau­la Dobri­an­sky, For­mer Under Secreta­ry of Sta­te for Glo­bal Affairs; Seni­or Fel­low at Har­vard Ken­ne­dy School’s Bel­fer Cen­ter for Sci­ence and Inter­na­tio­nal Affairs; Vice Chair, Atlan­tic Coun­cil Scow­croft Cen­ter for Stra­te­gy & Security

But by the way that’s not - for­gi­ve me - that’s not the point. The point here is also not about sei­z­ing of ter­ri­to­ry too, I’d like to say that here it’s about a sov­er­eign country’s poli­ti­cal future, its own right to make its choices. Putin has out­right said that Ukrai­ne does­n’t exist as a coun­try - he has said that over and over and over so it’s not just about ter­ri­to­ry, it is also about sov­er­eign coun­try poli­ti­cal choices and an inva­si­on that actual­ly star­ted back in 2014 and right up to the present.

here at 32min in.

So that Ukrai­ne has to remain a sov­er­eign coun­try (to deci­de on its own mili­ta­ry strenght, to never be poli­ti­cal­ly influ­en­ced by rus­sia ever again (only by credi­tors.. 😉 ) then also extents to whats hap­pe­ning right now -

here are the chan­ges from the draft of the Bür­gen­stock con­fe­rence that Switz­er­land pro­vi­ded to all invi­ted sta­tes on the 28th of May com­pa­red to the final draft --

https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/06/13/7187968/

Here is what Sit­z­er­land had put in the­re initi­al­ly and what the Ukrai­ne has lob­bied to replace it with:

2. Ter­ri­to­ri­al Inte­gri­ty and the UN Charter

– Old wor­d­ing: the pre­vious sum­mit decisi­on ver­si­on crea­ted a legal win­dow to inclu­de Ukrai­ne aban­do­ning part of its ter­ri­to­ry in the con­di­ti­ons of “sus­tainab­le peace with Rus­sia”, if necessary.

– New wor­d­ing: the new draft decisi­on clear­ly sta­tes that the basis for sus­tainab­le peace will be only “a solu­ti­on based on the princip­le of respect for the ter­ri­to­ri­al inte­gri­ty and sov­er­eig­n­ty of all states”.

src: click

also

3. Alter­na­ti­ve Peace Formulas

– Old wor­d­ing: the pre­vious draft blur­red the mea­ning of the Peace For­mu­la and ope­ned up space for inter­na­tio­nal dis­cus­sion of all alter­na­ti­ve visi­ons of peace, such as the Chinese-Brazilian one, which envi­sa­ges a halt to the streng­t­he­ning of Ukraine’s Armed For­ces and a ces­sa­ti­on of hostilities.

– New wor­d­ing: the new wor­d­ing sta­tes that only peace pro­po­sals that com­ply with inter­na­tio­nal law (i.e. an uncon­di­tio­nal return of the 1991 bor­ders, unless revi­sed by Ukrai­ne its­elf) and the UN Char­ter (in par­ti­cu­lar, Ukraine’s uncon­di­tio­nal right to con­ti­nue repel­ling Rus­si­an aggres­si­on and libe­ra­ting the occu­p­ied ter­ri­to­ries) will be taken into account.

src: click

Tho­se are now points that are acti­ve in the final com­mu­ni­que that 78 coun­tries signed at Bür­gen­stock - and accord­ing to Ser­giy Sydo­ren­ko (Ukrai­ni­an Jour­na­list, spon­so­red by USAID), same source arti­cle, also the main rea­son, that 15 coun­tries refu­sed to sign, and more than two dozen of coun­tries down­gra­ded their par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on from Presidential/Ministerial level to minis­ters or even their deputies.

With he final gag being the following:

Vik­to­ria Kir­ner vor 14 Stunden

Ukrai­ne: Ein Land des glo­ba­len Südens könn­te zwei­ten Frie­dens­gip­fel ausrichten
Die Ukrai­ne ist der Ansicht, dass ein zwei­tes Gip­fel­tref­fen, bei dem Kiews Vor­schlä­ge für einen Frie­den mit Russ­land erör­tert wer­den sol­len, von einem Land des glo­ba­len Südens aus­ge­rich­tet wer­den könn­te, wie ein hoch­ran­gi­ger Beam­ter der Nach­rich­ten­agen­tur Interfax-Ukraine am Frei­tag sag­te. Das berich­tet die Nach­rich­ten­agen­tur Reuters.

Mehr als 90 Län­der nah­men letz­te Woche am ers­ten Gip­fel in der Schweiz teil, da die Ukrai­ne eine brei­te Unter­stüt­zung für ihren Plan zur Been­di­gung des Krie­ges sucht.

Mos­kau, das nicht ein­ge­la­den war, bezeich­ne­te das Ergeb­nis des Gip­fels - ein Kom­mu­ni­qué, das von den meis­ten Teil­neh­mern unter­zeich­net, aber ins­be­son­de­re von Indi­en, Bra­si­li­en und Saudi-Arabien abge­lehnt wur­de - als “nahe­zu null”.

Wir haben meh­re­re Län­der [die sich als Gast­ge­ber anbie­ten], und ich kann mit hoher Wahr­schein­lich­keit sagen, dass ein sol­cher Gip­fel in einem der Län­der des glo­ba­len Südens statt­fin­den könn­te”, wur­de der Prä­si­den­ten­be­ra­ter Ihor Zhovk­va von Interfax-Ukraine zitiert.

Die Ukrai­ne wol­le, dass der nächs­te Gip­fel vor Ende des Jah­res ein­be­ru­fen wer­de, sag­te er und füg­te hin­zu, dass Russ­land ein­ge­la­den wer­den kön­ne, wenn es bereit sei, den von der Ukrai­ne vor­ge­leg­ten Fahr­plan zu berück­sich­ti­gen und kei­ne Ulti­ma­ten zu stellen.

src: click

The­re are now ongo­ing “Peace con­fe­ren­ces” - twice a year - with chan­ging host sta­tes. Whe­re the Ukrai­ne will always invi­te their “guar­di­an sta­tes”, based on the Bür­gen­stock Com­mu­ni­quee (and Selen­sky­js 10 point peace for­mu­la), whe­re the Ukrai­ne - cur­r­ent­ly sta­tes, at this very minu­te, it will only ever invi­te Rus­sia, if rus­sia agrees to the “Peace for­mu­la frame­work” estab­lis­hed at Bür­gen­stock -- which in its­elf alrea­dy inclu­des that it has to be based on “the princip­le of respect for the ter­ri­to­ri­al inte­gri­ty” and “sov­er­eig­n­ty of all states”. 

With the first one being the stand in for “the Ukrai­ne needs Cri­mea and the Don­bas back, befo­re we can invi­te Rus­sia to our peace for­mu­la con­fe­rence”, and the second part “sov­er­eig­n­ty of all sta­tes” being the stand in for:

3. Alter­na­ti­ve Peace Formulas

– Old wor­d­ing: the pre­vious draft blur­red the mea­ning of the Peace For­mu­la and ope­ned up space for inter­na­tio­nal dis­cus­sion of all alter­na­ti­ve visi­ons of peace, such as the Chinese-Brazilian one, which envi­sa­ges a halt to the streng­t­he­ning of Ukraine’s Armed For­ces and a ces­sa­ti­on of hos­ti­li­ties.

New wor­d­ing: the new wor­d­ing sta­tes that only peace pro­po­sals that com­ply with inter­na­tio­nal law (i.e. an uncon­di­tio­nal return of the 1991 bor­ders, unless revi­sed by Ukrai­ne its­elf) and the UN Char­ter (in par­ti­cu­lar, Ukraine’s uncon­di­tio­nal right to con­ti­nue repel­ling Rus­si­an aggres­si­on and libe­ra­ting the occu­p­ied ter­ri­to­ries) will be taken into account.

We need to be allo­wed to deci­de how lar­ge our army is, and what its aim/goal is in the future.”

And only if rus­sia agrees to that frame­work, it can be invi­ted to the next “peace conference”.

Die Ukrai­ne wol­le, dass der nächs­te Gip­fel vor Ende des Jah­res ein­be­ru­fen wer­de, sag­te er und füg­te hin­zu, dass Russ­land ein­ge­la­den wer­den kön­ne, wenn es bereit sei, den von der Ukrai­ne vor­ge­leg­ten Fahr­plan zu berück­sich­ti­gen und kei­ne Ulti­ma­ten zu stellen.

To ensu­re this, the Ukrai­ne insis­ted on remo­ving the fol­lowing pas­sa­ge from the ori­gi­nal draft of the final com­mu­ni­quee Switz­er­land sent out to all atten­ding sta­tes on the 28th of May - entirely:

4. Invol­ve­ment of Russia
– Old wor­d­ing: the ear­lier ver­si­on tur­ned Rus­sia from an aggres­sor into a par­ti­ci­pant in peace talks, requi­ring only vague “confidence-building mea­su­res” on nuclear and food security.

– New wor­d­ing: this sec­tion has been rewrit­ten from scratch. The Swiss agreed not to men­ti­on Rus­sia at all in the pro­vi­si­on on peace talks, ins­tead refer­ring to “all par­ties”. The­re is no lon­ger a wea­ke­ned requi­re­ment for “confidence-building mea­su­res”, but ins­tead “spe­ci­fic actions” are requi­red. And most import­ant­ly, the refe­ren­ces to a “second peace sum­mit” that hin­ted at a com­mit­ment to invi­te Rus­sia to par­ti­ci­pa­te have been removed.

src: click

So why crea­te tho­se “peace sum­mits” at all?

(If only 78 coun­tries out of 193 UN coun­tries signed and the tal­ked about points at tho­se con­fe­ren­ces still remain points from Selen­sky­js 10 Point peace for­mu­la, which now only beco­me more con­tro­ver­si­al (inter­na­ti­nal tri­bu­nals reques­ted, repe­ra­ti­on pay­ments reques­ted, cri­mea and don­bas back alrea­dy part of the “glo­bal peace sum­mit frame­work” (ter­ri­to­ri­al inte­gri­ty), we deci­de how big our mili­ta­ry is alrea­dy part of the “glo­bal peace sum­mit” frame­work, the last rus­si­an sol­dier has to lea­ve Ukrai­ne -- all having to be agreed on by Rus­sia -- BEFORE Rus­sia can be invited.…)

see also:

Ukrai­ni­an ambassa­dor to esto­nia in the fol­lowing Pod­cast on the 12th of June, nine hours after Andrij Jer­mak sta­ted “we want to invi­te rus­sia to the second peace for­mu­la con­fe­rence” for the first time: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_782Vs76ask at 16:20 min. in - 

So Rus­sia may be invi­ted for the next - for the second peace sum­mit, but — befo­re we should agree on the frame­work of this nego­tia­ti­on pro­cess and on joint inter­na­tio­nal plan for peace in Ukrai­ne. ONLY at this sta­ge, rus­sia can be invi­ted, and can be part of this process.“

-- if you need a second source…

Well thats easy…

As the wes­tern two quint­essen­ti­al pro­pa­gan­da lies

1. The tsar Putin is hell­bent on con­que­ring back gre­at rus­sia (Putin has sta­ted about five times in the past two weeks, that he would not attack Nato, and that he would be rea­dy for a sei­ze fire after he has the four Ukrai­ni­an oblasts rus­sia “offi­cial­ly anne­xed” under his con­trol (see also this Reu­ters exclu­si­ve), and that he is rea­dy to talk with the US about the euro­pean secu­ri­ty struc­tu­re, if tho­se talks also would inclu­de Ukrai­ne, … )

and

2. Ukrai­ne NEEDS to stay poli­ti­cal­ly sov­er­eign - which in the final Bür­gen­stock com­mu­ni­quee - as a phra­se - was a stand in for “Ukrai­ne needs to be able to deci­de what size of mili­ta­ry it has, and for what purpose”

Beco­me more and more obvious over time (becau­se Rus­sia will not able to con­quer other euro­pean sta­tes anymore) ---

more and more of the public will demand peace talks.

And for that we alrea­dy have the “glo­bal peace for­mu­la frame­work” in which rus­sia has to agree to “ter­ri­to­ri­al inte­gri­ty and Ukraine’s uncon­di­tio­nal right to con­ti­nue repel­ling Rus­si­an aggres­si­on and libe­ra­ting the occu­p­ied ter­ri­to­ries (sov­er­eig­n­ty) has been writ­ten in, which rus­sia HAS TO AGREE TO, to even be invited.

And so the two quint­essen­ti­al wes­tern pro­pa­gan­da lies can con­ti­nue for ano­t­her two years.

Peace con­fe­ren­ces” being held with chan­ged out host coun­tries, twice a year. Until rus­sia suc­cumbs to the wes­tern - sor­ry “Glo­bal Peace For­mu­la Frame­work” demands.

Wer­te­ge­sell­schaft. Ken­nen sie sich aus.

But the public will be strung along by the sin­gle out thats left - and that is, that if you dont do it exact­ly that way --

RUSSIA WILL COME FOR NATO COUNTRIES.

Which is and always was thre­at infla­ti­on, and the­re­fo­re wes­tern pro­pa­gan­da. Why is it less likely that “rus­sia will do it again” - well, this is a war of attri­ti­on which loses rus­sia peop­le at the rate of 800 per day on a good day (thats over the ent­i­re bor­der). And second -- have you che­cked the demo­gra­phic charts for rus­sia recent­ly? In five years time only 8% of their male popu­la­ti­on is capa­ble of being draf­ted anymore.

They cur­r­ent­ly had a popu­la­ti­on spike at 37-38 years old, and alrea­dy are a coun­try in ter­mi­nal demo­gra­phic decli­ne, which is why Kras­t­ev even sug­gested that the attack on Ukrai­ne was moun­ted to get more young peop­le back into rus­si­as fold, when the war started.

Thats the army thats batt­ling NATO in 2030?

8% only coun­ting males is 11 mil­li­on peop­le, 2/3 (thats the ger­ma­ny in WW2 rate, which had 13 mil­li­on sol­di­ers with a stan­ding popu­la­ti­on of 40 mil­li­on males) of which you need to keep the eco­no­my going - that lea­ves you with 3.7 mil­li­on poten­ti­al soldiers.

Against Poland with a popu­la­ti­on of 37 mil­li­on (2.4 mio males in the same draf­ting bra­cket) with Nato allies? Strai­ght into WW3?

Oh yeah - I for­got - this is becau­se of the wes­tern rule of law that has to be uphold, for about 3-4 more years, then the cur­rent rate of attri­ti­on will make sure rus­sia will be unab­le to mount an addi­tio­nal attack over the next 10 years… (Not becau­se of peop­le, but becau­se of the cur­rent attri­ti­on rate on mili­ta­ry equip­ment (cur­rent pro­duc­tion rates alrea­dy accoun­ted for).)

And on top of this - Chi­na loo­ks at all this and then tells rus­sia, yes - sure, go ahead and attack our second lar­gest export mar­ket, so our first lar­gest export mar­ket gets drawn into a war as well.









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