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11. Februar 2023

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Selen­skyj appel­liert nach rus­si­schen Angrif­fen an Nato
Der ukrai­ni­sche Prä­si­dent hat nach den jüngs­ten Rake­ten­an­grif­fen Russ­lands die Nato um Hil­fe gebe­ten. “Das ist Ter­ror, den man stop­pen kann und muss”, sag­te Wolo­dym­yr Selen­skyj in einer Video­bot­schaft an das west­li­che Mili­tär­bünd­nis. Die Angrif­fe nann­te er eine “Her­aus­for­de­rung für die Nato”.

Er wie­der­hol­te die Dar­stel­lung von Ober­be­fehls­ha­ber Walerij Salu­schnyj, wonach rus­si­sche Rake­ten durch den Luft­raum Rumä­ni­ens geflo­gen sei­en. Rumä­ni­en demen­tier­te das. Die rus­si­schen Rake­ten sei­en in 35 Kilo­me­ter Ent­fer­nung von der rumä­ni­schen Gren­ze über das Gebiet des Nach­bar­lands Mol­dau geflo­gen, teil­te das rumä­ni­sche Ver­tei­di­gungs­mi­nis­te­ri­um mit. Das Land gehört sowohl der EU als auch der Nato an.

src: click

Was ist doch eine erneu­te Lüge um den Nato Bünd­nis­fall aus­zu­lö­sen unter Freun­den? Sowas igno­riert man doch in den scheiß Huren­wich­ser­drecks­me­di­en ein­fach weg.

Oh und für die die Nafta­li Ben­nett nicht gele­sen haben. Ihr müsst die Aus­sa­gen schon selbst lesen die scheiß HURENWICHSER DRECKSSCHWEINE von Medi­en irg­no­rie­ren die ein­fach weg.

Sterbt end­lich ihr ver­fick­ten, ver­dreck­ten, ver­hur­ten scheiß Wichserschweine.

You enter Putin’s palace, which is sur­re­al, he’s with peop­le… you know…

-Tell me what went on there.

It began befo­re that.

Befo­re the war, may­be two mon­ths, I met with Putin for the first time in Sochi.

The mee­ting was around five-six hours long. And he - we dis­cus­sed many topics, inclu­ding gene­ral topics such as mili­ta­ry histo­ry and the role of the USSR in World War II.

He likes the fact that I voice the truth, that the main for­ce that defea­ted the Nazis, make no mista­ke, was the USSR, the Red Army.

-Do you say that becau­se you know it will flat­ter him?

I say it becau­se it’s true historically.

-But did you know you’d say that?

I didn’t know enough about him, I read a book about him, etc…

I bought it at Bar­nes & Noble - In view of the meeting.


But I cer­tain­ly knew the mea­ning of World War II, they call it the Gre­at Patrio­tic War.

It’s at the core of the Rus­si­an ethos, espe­cial­ly for Putin.

Oder wie die ver­fick­ten scheiß huren Drecks­me­di­en mit Hin­weis auf unge­si­cher­te Quel­len berich­ten wür­den “Covid­iso­lier­ter Putin auf Zaren-Trip im Isolationskoller”.

He likes Jews very much.

He had Jewish neighbors

Who rai­sed him as a kid. 


-His tea­cher who lives in Israel.

And he did a very nice thing,

-He bought her an apartment…


The­re are two sides to him, I’m not deny­ing the other side. The racist side.

-Did he wear a sweatsuit?

At the end of the con­ver­sa­ti­on he said, “let’s walk along the shore.”

So we did, the esta­te in Sochi is huge. It’s a resort town. 

–Was this on Friday?

Yes. And we wal­ked along the shore.

-Just so the lis­teners know, this was befo­re the war.


-You’­re wal­king on the shore…

And he said, “I never invi­te peop­le to my pri­va­te home on the esta­te, but I’m invi­t­ing you.”

I can’t say for sure if that’s true or not.

He took me in the house, the­re was an ‘N’ shaped bar.

And two inte­res­ting things hap­pen­ed at that bar.

Befo­re that, two days befo­re I left I got a call from this guy, Zelen­sky, the lea­der of Ukrai­ne, I heard he’s a Jew, a come­di­an, Hanoch Daum tur­ned prime minister…

Some­thing like that.

-God for­bid.

And he asked me nice­ly if I can ask Putin to talk to him, to meet with him.

I wai­ted with that, we’­ve been the­re some 5.5 hours, we’­re tal­king, and then I say, oh, Zelen­sky asked me to ask you if you can meet.

He was the nicest man up to then and his gaze tur­ned cold.

They’­re Nazis, they’­re war­mon­gers, I won’t meet him. “They’­re pro-Nazis.” 

Now, he has an ent­i­re theo­ry and nar­ra­ti­ve sur­roun­ding this issue. 
If we go back to World War II, Ukrai­ne defi­ni­te­ly was an accom­pli­ce at cer­tain times…

-Were you sho­cked by his answer?

I was sur­pri­sed when his deme­a­nor changed.

Second… he had liquor.

Now, I don’t like alco­hol, whis­key and the like.

Wine is the most I can drink.

But the wine isn’t kosher.

Oder wie die ver­fick­ten scheiß Huren­wich­ser­drecks­me­di­en mit Ver­weis auf unge­si­cher­te Quel­len berich­ten Wür­den - Hit­ler in der Vor­be­rei­tung des neu­en Neoimperialismus.

How do you expe­ri­ence him in pho­ne calls?

Very mat­ter of fact.

The­re are two very dif­fe­rent narratives.

He has one nar­ra­ti­ve and per­cep­ti­on, Zelen­sky and the West have another.

The West sees Putin as an impe­ria­list who wants to take over more places.

Once it’s Geor­gia, once here, once there. 

-Dont reward the thug.

And if we don’t stop him in Ukrai­ne he’ll go on to Poland and the Baltics.

Putin’s per­cep­ti­on was, as ear­ly as that mee­ting in Sochi, even more so here - wait - when the Wall came down, we reached an agree­ment with NATO that they would­n’t expand NATO and would not touch the belt coun­tries that enve­lop Russia.

-“Don’t bring me NATO, my enemy or rival and why are you intro­du­cing Ukrai­ne into NATO?” 


The sto­ry goes much deeper.

You know, the Ame­ri­cans, on a sideno­te, the Ame­ri­cans have a cen­tu­ries old doc­tri­ne cal­led the Mon­roe Doc­tri­ne wher­eby the hege­mo­ny over the Wes­tern Hemi­s­phe­re, North and South Ame­ri­ca, belongs to the USA.

As ear­ly as 200 years ago, they didn’t want Fran­ce and Bri­tain there.

-“Don’t come here.”

And to a degree that’s Putin’s per­cep­ti­on, “Don’t come here, this is my backyard.”

I don’t pre­su­me to judge the per­cep­ti­ons, what I care about is Israel’s natio­nal inte­rests and I wanted…

I knew that if I don’t take some other action I’ll be for­ced to sup­ply wea­pons and I’m end­an­ge­ring the Jews and…

So I cal­led the Ame­ri­cans, Blin­ken, Biden and Sul­li­van, the Nat’l Secu­ri­ty Advisor,and I said, “I have Putin’s ear, I can be a pipeline.”

Zelen­sky initia­ted the request to con­ta­ct Putin.

Zelen­sky cal­led me and asked me to con­ta­ct Putin.

I have the protocol.

-What for?

To help.

-As the war is ongoing.

Yes, and he was in distress.

Keep in mind, he knows that his days are num­be­red, that he’ll be killed.

It was­n’t hard to kill him.

It was­n’t hard to kill him.

The Rus­si­ans had deman­ds, one was den­azi­fi­ca­ti­on, mea­ning repla­ce­ment of the lea­der, and I assu­me the world unders­tood that this means kil­ling him.

The­re was a dis­ar­ma­ment - empty­ing Ukrai­ne out of wea­pons and army.

-The­re were 5-6 deman­ds at first. 

So Zelen­sky calls you.

Can you help me?”

At the time I was mee­ting with Scholz, the new chan­cellor of Ger­ma­ny who repla­ced Ange­la Merkel.

They’­re both excel­lent and very different.

Scholz is a man of few words.

Not that Ange­la was a big tal­ker, but he…

-You’­re mee­ting him in Germany? 
No, in Jerusalem. 

-Oh right.

So we have the first mee­ting and he’s very dis­tres­sed becau­se there’s the gas issue, he fears for Germany’s ener­gy and the ramifications.

I tell him about my dis­cus­sions with Putin and…

and Putin says, “we can reach a ceasefire.”

So I start talks back and forth, Putin-Zelensky, Zelensky-Putin. 
-On the phone.


What hap­pens in the­se pho­ne calls?

What hap­pens…

-What’s your suggestion?

What hap­pens is this, drafts are exch­an­ged, not only through us, direct­ly as well.

They’­re in Bela­rus, in a city cal­led Gomel.

The­re are two nego­tia­ti­on teams – Rus­sia and Ukrai­ne, that the world loo­ked down on, but I con­si­de­red it a good thing that they were tal­king and exchanging…

And I try to find solutions.

I’m very skil­led at nego­ta­ti­ons from my cor­po­ra­te life and poli­tics and I can pro­cu­re deals.

Moreo­ver, I rea­li­ze we’­re on bor­ro­wed time, I said that we’­re on the ver­ge of ano­t­her Kafr Kanna.

I’ll exp­lain what I mean to the listeners.

-An unplan­ned secu­ri­ty escalation. 
An extre­me situa­ti­on will occur wher­eby many civi­li­ans will be kil­led and then it will be very hard to reach a ceasefire.

It was very hard as it is. 

So I cal­led it the “Kafr Kan­na” affair.

I exp­lai­ned it to the Americans.

Ever­ything I did was ful­ly coor­di­na­ted with Biden, with Macron, with Boris John­son, with Scholz and obvious­ly with Zelensky.

But I want to… 
-Did they think you could succeed?

I have a deba­te about that with the Ame­ri­cans, I just…

I think the­re was a chan­ce and I’ll exp­lain, they say the­re was no chance.

But the­re are two questions: 
Was the­re a chan­ce and was it justifiable?

-May­be they didn’t want you to succeed.

-Talk about the com­pro­mi­se you thought you could achie­ve befo­re tal­king about the mee­ting itself.

The­re were a few issu­es, the major issues.

When I met with Putin he made two big con­ces­si­ons that are obvious now, they weren’t at the time. 
-During the first meeting.

No, at the meeting… 
-On Saturday.

I’ll go into that, but first, he renoun­ced the denazification.

-I.e., taking out Zelensky. 

-He said it in tho­se words?

That’s why it’s so - a leader’s life is inva­lu­able and I knew that Zelen­sky was under threat.

He was in a secret bun­ker, so 3-4 hours into the mee­ting, I’m get­ting to the mee­ting now, I asked, “what’s with - are you going to kill Zelensky?” 
He said, “I won’t kill Zelensky.”

Then I said, I have to under­stand that you’­re giving your word that you won’t kill Zelensky.”

I won’t kill Zelensky.”

After the mee­ting, in the car from the Krem­lin to the air­port, I con­ta­c­ted Zelen­sky by Whats­App or Telegram.

-Didn’t you fear the Rus­si­ans would see? 

He has no pro­blem becau­se I was - no, the pre­mi­se is… 
-They can see. So you call him.

I call Zelen­sky and say, “I came out of a mee­ting, he’s not going to kill you.” He asks, “are you sure?” “100%, he won’t kill you.”

Two hours later Zelen­sky went to his office and filmed hims­elf the­re on his pho­ne, “I’m not afraid…”

Any­ways, that was one con­ces­si­on. The other was that he renoun­ced dis­ar­ma­ment of Ukraine.

Zelen­sky made a big con­ces­si­on that Satur­day too.

I think this was the second Satur­day after the war bro­ke out.

The war bro­ke out on a Thurs­day, the next Saturday 
I was in Moscow, Zelen­sky relin­quis­hed joi­ning NATO.

He said, “I’m renoun­cing that.”

The­se are huge steps on each side.

Huge con­ces­si­ons.

The war bro­ke out becau­se of the demand to join NATO and Zelen­sky said, “I’m renoun­cing that.”

Then what’s left… a lot.

The­re was - the most com­plex issue, is the ter­ri­to­ri­al issue.

Don­bas, the Cri­me­an Pen­in­su­la, Cri­mea, and the cor­ri­dor that was forming bet­ween the two.

-In Mariu­pol.

And the second issue was - how will Ukrai­ne pro­tect its­elf and guarantees.

Ukrai­ne deman­ded of Rus­sia that it be able to get secu­ri­ty gua­ran­tees from Ame­ri­ca, Fran­ce, all the big ones.

And the­re was an argu­ment, becau­se to Rus­sia a gua­ran­tee is a pact, it’s no dif­fe­rent than NATO.

This is whe­re I brought my expe­ri­ence, I gave it a lot of thought and said, the nego­tia­ti­on is unre­a­son­ab­le becau­se they’­re nego­tia­ting over some­thing they don’t have.

There’s the joke about a guy try­ing to sell the Brook­lyn Bridge to passersby.

This guy did exist.

100 years ago he sold…

-They don’t have the Broo­kyln Bridge.

I said that because… 
Ame­ri­ca will give you guarantees?

It will com­mit that in seven years, if Rus­sia vio­la­tes some­thing, it will send sol­di­ers after lea­ving Afgha­ni­stan and all that?

I said, “Volo­dym­yr, it won’t hap­pen, you won’t get gua­ran­tees, why are you negotiating?”

Then I sug­gested what I cal­led the “Israe­li model.”

We don’t have guarantees.

I said, “I’m the prime minis­ter of Isra­el, “we don’t have gua­ran­tees from anyo­ne, if someo­ne inva­des us tomor­row, nobo­dy has assu­red us and no one will come to save us. What we do have is a strong, inde­pen­dent army that can pro­tect its­elf, so let’s for­get about the­se gua­ran­tee and dis­cuss the para­me­ters for buil­ding mili­ta­ry for­ce, what kind of wea­pons, what pla­nes, how many offi­cers, soldiers…”

Becau­se Rus­sia doesn’t want Ukraine…

So this was a cogni­ti­ve bre­akthrough that they both accepted.

Again, it took time and then you’­re dis­cus­sing which mis­si­les, the­se are ass­ault mis­si­les, what do you need that for…

The ter­ri­to­ri­al issue is 

-And this is pre Kafr Kan­na, pre Bucha. 


The Bucha mas­sa­c­re - once that hap­pen­ed I said, it’s over. 

I saw solu­ti­ons in that regard too, I’d rather not go into that.

They’­re pri­ma­ri­ly rela­ted to post­po­ning the argu­ment by 99 years.

All kinds of solu­ti­ons in the middle.

Like David Avi­dan said, “ever­ything takes time, time takes everything.” 

To affix…


I knew from our rounds ver­sus Gaza, ver­sus Hiz­bol­lah, it’s very hard to reach a ceasefire.

Why is that?

As usu­al, becau­se of the inter­nal poli­tics of each side.

Neit­her side can seem to be giving up, to be losing, to be weak.

So after Zelen­sky went to war - he didn’t go to war, after…

-Sus­tai­ning a blow. 
Sus­tai­ning this war, now he’ll back down?

-Does Putin say anything to you that you deem pragmatic?

He was very prag­ma­tic, so was Zelensky. 
-He wasn’t messianic.

No, no.

-Give me an examp­le of pragmatism.

An examp­le of pragmatism.

I won’t dis­c­lo­se things I should­n’t, but he total­ly unders­tood Zelensky’s poli­ti­cal constraints.

And Zelen­sky was prag­ma­tic too.

It doesn’t start at once, you have to peel the onion.

In every nego­tia­ti­on each side is all bravado -

-“I’ll rip ‘em apart,” 
“I’ll rip ‘em apart.”

I’ll do this and that…” 
Fine, okay.

It’s a pha­se you can’t skip.

But once you say, “I under­stand” and you under­stand the per­ple­xi­ties, then you can gra­du­al­ly get to the crux of the matter… 


-Let’s try to resu­me a chro­no­lo­gi­cal description.

-You lea­ve on Saturday. 
-I must say this is very indi­ca­ti­ve of your per­so­na­li­ty, stri­ving to get there.

-I mean, it’s so farfetched…

-Why do you even go there?

-That’s who you are… 
I under­stand at that point that there’s no one else to mediate. 

–The­re isn’t.

-It posi­ti­ons you at a high level of glo­bal endeavoring.

-Sud­den­ly you’­re a man that the world is tal­king about. 


-With this his­to­ric role and you say to yourself, later we’ll gau­ge if it’s true and why it did­n’t work out, but you say, we have a win­dow of oppor­tu­ni­ty, we’­re pre­ven­ting what we see now, mil­li­ons of refu­gees, casu­al­ties, a coun­try being des­troy­ed and I can do some­thing about it.

I’m cau­tious.

-What odds did you give it?


–Was the­re 50%? 
I think so.

-And all this right after a call with Putin.

-Putin says to you, “come?”

Yes, he says “come.”

It was sche­du­led for a Satur­day, we tried to chan­ge that, but…

I didn’t hesitate. 
It was pre­ser­ving life on a glo­bal scope and… Keep in mind, all my endea­vors are pro­tec­ting Isra­el from pres­su­re that can harm us. 

–Ins­tead of being on one side or ano­t­her, you’­re the media­tor, so… 
-You are not part of…

Right, the third path. 
-Did it cross your mind? 

Yes, yes.

-That’s thin­king out­side the box. 

I’m not on eit­her side, 
I’m the mediator. 


If I take sides, I can’t be a fair mediator.

-Why didn’t it work out? 
Hold on.

Then we tra­vel in com­ple­te secrecy on this decrepit pla­ne from Isra­el - through the Kazakh regi­on, the Stans becau­se we could­n’t fly over the Black Sea, a very long rou­te. We pray and reci­te the Sab­bath blessings.

It was very moving.

It was very cram­ped too, becau­se the pla­ne wasn’t - it was a pri­va­te pla­ne that we leased.

-Did Mos­sad arran­ge the trip?

Mos­sad and Hul­a­ta and poor things, all the - my guys are sit­ting on - it was­n’t comfy, we were extre­me­ly cramped.

We land at the Moscow air­port, several offi­cials wel­co­me us and we go to the Kremlin.

By the way, it was my first time in Russia.

Bes­i­des Sochi, first time in Moscow.

It was a cold day, I think it was raining,

I see the Kremlin.

We get to this huge wai­t­ing area and I pre­pa­re my stra­te­gy in my mind.

I for­got to say that mean­while I stu­di­ed ever­ything in depth.

The histo­ry, I read a book on the histo­ry of Ukrai­ne and Rus­sia to under­stand, I con­sul­ted with for­mer lea­ders who dealt with this.

I con­sult a lot, I get Rus­si­an experts, nego­tia­ti­ons experts, becau­se when you get into some­thing, and I knew the name of each vil­la­ge, Don­bas and the histo­ry, what hap­pen­ed in 2014, in 2009, what hap­pen­ed all tho­se years, becau­se you can’t come in the midd­le of the story.

It’s also important in terms of your relia­bi­li­ty vis a vis the lea­ders, they have to under­stand that you under­stand them.

You’­re not agre­eing with them, you understand.

Then we wai­ted outside…

The­re were bowls with cho­co­la­tes and cakes - yes, I defi­ni­te­ly enjoy­ed tho­se cakes.

I think it show­ed, huh?

-The­re was a time… 
Then I went in to see Putin.

Remem­ber, this is at the height of COVID


We sat at both ends of the table.

-He was sca­red of COVID, right?

I don’t know. 
He stay­ed 20 meters away.

The­re was a distance and the­re was a mic and spea­ker next to me.

Elkin loo­ked like he had COVID.

The­re was the Rus­si­an inter­pre­ter and Elkin, they sat fair­ly far away from the table and trans­la­ted and we star­ted talking.

I unders­tood the basic needs of each side, again, the­re were the initi­al pha­ses at first and obvious­ly I can’t go into detail, I’m just tel­ling you what I can.

By the way, I think this is the first time I’m tel­ling all this. And when you peel away… 
I was under the impres­si­on that both sides very much want a ceasefire.

And as I said, at that mee­ting, Putin made two big con­ces­si­ons after the ori­gi­nal deman­ds, he renoun­ced dis­ar­ma­ment and den­azi­fi­ca­ti­on and I say to mys­elf, wow, this is a huge shift.

-So he’s not gung ho to fight at all costs.


He has goals to achieve.

That’s the impres­si­on I got. 

You have to be cau­tious, someo­ne can always put on an act, I’m describ­ing how I saw it.

I left very opti­mistic becau­se he renoun­ced joi­ning NATO, which was the rea­son for the invasion.

Putin said, “tell me you’­re not joi­ning NATO, I won’t invade.”

He renoun­ced his demands.

Then begins the - then I update ever­yo­ne one after the other.

- You go to Ger­ma­ny, right? 
From the­re I go to Ger­ma­ny, my first time in Germany.

I made a point of never set­ting foot in Germany.

Becau­se of the Holocaust.

Obvious­ly I don’t bla­me today’s Ger­man people.

I arri­ve at… 

Scholz’ office.

I’m the­re with Shim­rit, the poli­ti­cal advisor.

She did a gre­at job through and through.

I must say, both she and Eyal Hul­a­ta were skeptical.

What are you doing? Wait, take it slow…”

They’­re young people.

-The three of you.

-Not that young, but…

They’­re in their 40s. 
-They’­re not 70 with a poli­ti­cal back­ground, mil­li­ons of conflicts…

But they’­re very intel­li­gent, poli­te, and they think I’m going too fast.

And I disagree.

I say we’­re going for it.

-Why was it important to go to Germany?

Becau­se Ger­ma­ny is the player…

Ger­ma­ny and Fran­ce are the major play­ers in Europe.

And in order to pro­cu­re an agreement,everyone has to do something.

The­re are so many things to do.

So I had din­ner with him, I got kos­her food, we sat with his nat’l secu­ri­ty advisor.

We were taken from the air­port by heli­co­p­ter, it was weird fly­ing over Ber­lin in a heli­co­p­ter, but in all the trips, I went over…

I wro­te down what hap­pen­ed becau­se I could­n’t in real time.

I wro­te a pro­to­col of what we dis­cus­sed and what the next steps would be.

What the dis­agree­ments are in the nego­tia­ti­ons and what ever­yo­ne has to do.

From the­re, I think that tog­e­ther, I’m not sure, we updated the Ame­ri­cans and Macron.

-“The Ame­ri­cans?”

-Biden hims­elf or…

No, usual­ly it was Jake Sul­li­van, the nat’l secu­ri­ty advi­sor, some­ti­mes Biden, some­ti­mes Blinken.

-They’­re very tight there. 

And Boris Johnson. 
You know… each lea­der has their way. 
Boris was… we can divi­de the spec­trum of lea­ders, who’s ten­ding more towards “now we have to fight Putin.”

-Becau­se we mus­tn’t reward the bad guys. 


And who says, “for­get war, ever­yo­ne loses.”


Boris John­son adop­ted the aggres­si­ve line.

Macron and Scholz were more prag­ma­tic and Biden was both.

And… that’s it.

Then I return to Isra­el and a nego­tia­ti­ons mara­thon of drafts begins.


-Your office deals with this?

-Not the for­eign minis­try or… 
The NSC.

And I do ever­ything vis a vis… the NSC and… with Shimrit.

I update…

-Do you hold the NSC in high regard?

-It’s what you make of it.

Yes, the short ans­wer is yes. To Netanyahu’s credit, he built the NSC in a very good way.

It’s an excel­lent enti­ty that sup­ports the prime minis­ter and has to report to the prime minister…it’s an excel­lent entity.

The NSC is the Nat’l Secu­ri­ty Council.

-What do I want from the NSC
Two things:

I want it to tell me what should be on my radar.

What things I must pay atten­ti­on to becau­se the world is very… and do the admi­nis­tra­ti­ve work.

-You want to do something? 
The­re are always con­se­quen­ces. You can’t be impul­si­ve. And whoever con­ce­des then this coun­try… and the other one caves.

The Jor­da­ni­ans asked me…to appro­ve intro­du­cing the Quran at the Temp­le Mount.

-I don’t have a clue. 
-Is that good? Bad? What’s the history?

So I never say yes on the spot.

I’ll stu­dy it and get back to you with an answer.”

I think ever­yo­ne should do that, not give ans­wers on the spot, even though you want to plea­se and… 

If you could you’d say “sure thing.” 


-Then you get back, it was a good visit, he walks you to the car.

Yes, so I’m very cautious.

Take a breath,


-By the way, Bibi is cau­tious too. 


Very cau­tious.

By the way, I noti­ced that throughout the Russia-Ukraine cri­sis Bibi did­n’t attack me. 

I think he rea­li­zed we con­duc­ted a very intel­li­gent poli­cy. It went back and forth and then… I’ll say this in the broad sen­se, I think the­re was a legi­ti­ma­te decisi­on by the West to keep striking Putin and not…

-“Strike Putin?”

-Putin was striking Ukraine.

Hold on, yes, but given… I mean the more aggres­si­ve approach. 
I’ll tell you something.

I can’t say if they were wrong.

-May­be other thugs in the world would see it.

My posi­ti­on at the time… in this regard, it’s not a natio­nal Israe­li interest.

Unli­ke the con­su­la­te or Iran, when I’m con­cer­ned about Isra­el, I stand firm. 


Here, I don’t have a say.

I’m just the media­tor, but I turn to Ame­ri­ca in this regard, I don’t do as I please.

Anything I did was coor­di­na­ted down to the last detail with the US, Ger­ma­ny and France.

-So they blo­cked it? 
Basi­cal­ly, yes.

They blo­cked it and I thought they’­re wrong.

In retro­spect, it’s too soon to know.

The advan­ta­ges and dis­ad­van­ta­ges: The down­si­de of the war going on is the casu­al­ties in Ukrai­ne and Rus­sia, it’s a very har­sh blow to Ukraine[…]

Oder wie die SCHEISSHURENWICHSERMEDIEN berich­ten Wür­den Putin auf einem Impe­ria­lis­mus­tripp zwingt Selen­skyj durch unhalt­ba­re For­de­run­gen die Ver­hand­lun­gen abzubrechen.

Die Nato Ost­erwei­te­rung war natür­lich nur ein Vor­wand. Dass Putin zu die­sem Zeit­punkt voll­kom­men ver­rückt ent­rückt und nicht bereit zu ver­han­deln ist, wis­sen wir ja aus der Medienberichterstattung.


edit: An der Stel­le ist es viel­leicht noch­mal gut sich die US PR von Beginn des Krie­ges anzusehen.

Wenn Putin Kiew nimmt, wird es mit der Diplo­ma­tie schwie­rig.” wur­de zu “Sobald sich Russ­land von Kiew zurück­ge­zo­gen hat, wur­de Diplo­ma­tie unmög­lich” weil sich vier Tage vor Butscha die ukrai­ni­sche Posi­ti­on gedreht hat, nach­dem der rus­si­sche Ver­hand­lungs­füh­rer den Rück­zug als Zuge­ständ­nis an eine Ver­hand­lungs­lö­sung ver­kauft hatte.

Putin hat­te Angst vor einer öko­no­misch erfolg­rei­chen Ukrai­ne” wur­de als Argu­ment aus der “beim Euro­mai­dan ging es nur um den EU Bei­tritt” Logik ent­wi­ckelt, die Mear­s­hei­mer als “three prong” Logik anders gewich­tet sieht. Der sprin­gen­de Punkt hier­bei sind Ver­trags­be­stand­tei­le inner­halb des Bei­tritts­ab­kom­mens der Euro­päi­schen Uni­on nach Arti­kel 42 Absatz 7 des EU Ver­tra­ges, die eine Bei­stands­pflicht von Nato­staa­ten garan­tiert - der Bei­tritt in die Euro­päi­sche Uni­on hat seit 2009 immer auch eine Bei­stands­pflicht durch Nato­mit­glie­der zu Folge.

Die öko­no­mi­schen Pro­gno­sen für die Ukrai­ne wäh­rend der ver­blei­ben­den Lebens­zeit von Putin waren laut IMF schlecht.

Kurz­fas­sung: US Inter­es­sen haben zu Beginn des Krie­ges ange­deu­tet, dass eine Erobe­rung Kiews eine diplo­ma­ti­sche Lösung erschwe­ren wür­de. Defak­to war das Gegen­teil der Fall. 

US Inter­es­sen haben zu Beginn des Krie­ges das Motiv “die Ukrai­ne woll­te in die EU und nicht in die Nato” ent­wor­fen, wäh­rend die Hoo­ver Insti­tu­ti­on Mear­s­hei­mer zum sel­ben Zeit­punkt 7 zu 0 in eigens ent­wor­fe­nen Talk For­ma­ten dis­kre­di­tiert haben, um die Rol­le der Nato Ost­erwei­te­rung als pri­mä­ren Stand­punkt der Gegen­sei­te zu dis­kre­di­tie­ren. Meas­hei­mer durf­te noch ein­mal im Eco­no­mist publi­zie­ren und war dann Per­so­na non Grata.

De-Nazifizierung war die innen­po­li­ti­sche Begrün­dung für “Regime Chan­ge” von Russ­land (war­um man in Kiew einen Regime­wech­sel ein­ge­lei­tet hät­te) - nicht der pri­mä­re Kriegsgrund.

Putin war auch nicht ver­rückt - man hat der Öffent­lich­keit ein­fach die Rus­si­sche Pro­pa­gan­da für Russ­land intern falsch erklärt. (Novorus­sia, De-Nazifizierung, …)

Putin hielt sich auch nicht für einen Zaren, son­dern hat­te Sor­gen bezüg­lich des “Backy­ards” Russ­lands, sowie einer lan­gen Land­gren­ze zur Nato, bei einem stän­dig schwe­len­den Kon­flikt. Das in “fürch­te­te sich vor einer posi­ti­ven öko­no­mi­schen Ent­wick­lung der Ukrai­ne” umzu­for­men ist sinn­ver­zer­rend. Zum Einen da sie nicht pro­gnos­ti­ziert war, zum ande­ren, da “backy­ard” auch ande­re Aspek­te berührt. Sie­he Bidens Inter­pre­ta­ti­on von “front­y­ard”.

Selen­skyj hat in spä­te­rer Fol­ge “De-Nazifizierung” wie­der­holt als Grund benannt, war­um die Ukrai­ne und er per­sön­lich nicht mit Putin ver­han­deln könn­ten. Die­se Begrün­dung war zu die­sem Zeit­punkt bereits vor­ge­scho­bem, da der Ukrai­ne bekannt war, dass von der rus­si­schen Sei­te auf die­se For­de­rung bereits ver­zich­tet wurde.

Din­ge zu denen ein Armin Wolf nur ein­mal schlu­cken muss, und schon sind sie gesell­schaft­lich nicht mehr von Bedeu­tung.

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