Was war eigentlich US und Nato Position im November 2021

21. April 2022

Also nach­dem die US der Ukrai­ne die impli­zi­te Erlaub­nis erteilt haben die rus­si­schen “Sepa­ra­tis­ten” mit Jave­lins aus dem Don­bas zu schie­ßen?

Atlan­tic Coun­cil - 23.11.2021:

The United Sta­tes would agree with Kyiv on red lines befo­re ent­e­ring the talks, such as no imple­men­ta­ti­on of the poli­ti­cal aspects of the Minsk Agree­ments without Rus­si­an com­pli­an­ce with its never-fulfilled mili­ta­ry obli­ga­ti­ons (per­ma­nent cease­fire, with­dra­wal of for­eign for­ces and hea­vy wea­pons, dis­band­ment of ille­gal mili­ti­as); no local elec­tions in the Don­bas with Rus­si­an and pro­xy for­ces still pre­sent; [Das kippt die “Steinmeier-Formel”] and spe­cial sta­tus for the Don­bas after elec­tions to be based on the Ukrai­ni­an law on decen­tra­liz­a­ti­on (sin­ce the Minsk Agree­ment does not sup­port Rus­si­an deman­ds for a Don­bas veto over Ukrai­ni­an for­eign policy).

On the con­ten­tious issue of when to res­to­re Ukrai­ni­an con­trol of the inter­na­tio­nal bor­der, which Rus­sia insists must come at the end of the pro­cess, the United Sta­tes and Ukrai­ne would offer as a com­pro­mi­se the inter­na­tio­na­liz­a­ti­on of the occu­p­ied ter­ri­to­ries as a tran­si­tio­nal mea­su­re. [== total retre­at, then total ter­ri­to­ri­al gain for Ukrai­ne] This would inclu­de a neu­tral peace­kee­ping for­ce to take the place of Russian-led for­ces and mili­ti­as insi­de Don­bas and an inte­rim inter­na­tio­nal civi­li­an admi­nis­tra­ti­on to replace the self-declared people’s repu­blics. The inter­na­tio­nal pre­sence would res­to­re nor­mal gover­nan­ce, estab­lish pro­fes­sio­nal local poli­ce for­ces, over­see the return of refu­gees, and orga­ni­ze local elec­tions in con­di­ti­ons con­sis­tent with OSCE standards.

Alt­hough Rus­sia may be slow to enga­ge on the initia­ti­ve, it would demons­tra­te US and Ukrai­ni­an rea­di­ness for a genui­ne com­pro­mi­se to end the war in eas­tern Ukrai­ne. It would be con­sis­tent with the Minsk frame­work but intro­du­ce imple­men­ta­ti­on mecha­nisms that are absent from the ori­gi­nal Minsk docu­ments. [You mean the frame­work is simi­lar, the imple­men­ta­ti­on is not?]

If Rus­sia agreed to end the Don­bas con­flict on this basis and imple­men­ted its side of the deal in good faith, the United Sta­tes and its allies would be able to sca­le back the pro­vi­si­on of let­hal wea­pons to Kyiv. Such an agree­ment would open the way to the lif­ting of Donbas-related sanc­tions and resump­ti­on of coope­ra­ti­on bet­ween Rus­sia and NATO that could help defu­se Rus­si­an anxie­ties about Ukraine’s rela­ti­ons­hip with NATO over the lon­ger term.

Gütig, oder? Und das wor­d­ing erst, wem kommt das noch bekannt vor?

Moreo­ver, bey­ond Putin’s pur­por­ted secu­ri­ty con­cerns, Ukrai­ne is a high­ly emo­tio­nal issue for him. His state­ments and pseudo-historical wri­tings make clear that he res­ents Ukraine’s inde­pen­dence, ques­ti­ons its legi­ti­ma­cy as a sov­er­eign sta­te, dis­pu­tes Ukrai­ni­ans’ exis­tence as a sepa­ra­te peop­le, and is outra­ged by Kyiv’s refu­sal to accept Rus­si­an hegemony.

Mei­ne Güte, der “ver­rück­te Putin” ist auch schon so alt?

src: click

NATO PK vom 01.12.2021:

We will call on the allies to join Ukrai­ne in put­ting tog­e­ther a deter­rence packa­ge,” Kule­ba told repor­ters as he arri­ved for the talks in Riga.

This should inclu­de pre­pa­ring eco­no­mic sanc­tions against Rus­sia, in case it “deci­des to choo­se the worst-case sce­n­a­rio”, Kule­ba said, adding that NATO should also boost mili­ta­ry and defence coope­ra­ti­on with Ukraine.

We are con­fi­dent that if we join efforts if we act in a coor­di­na­ted fashion, we will be able to deter Pre­si­dent Putin and to demo­ti­va­te him from choo­sing the worst-case sce­n­a­rio, which is a mili­ta­ry ope­ra­ti­on,” Kule­ba said.

Ja sag mal, die Posi­ti­on kenn ich ja auch…

Rus­sia has no veto. Rus­sia has no say. And Rus­sia has no right to estab­lish a sphe­re of influ­ence, try­ing to con­trol their neigh­bours,” Stol­ten­berg told repor­ters, poun­ding his podium.

The argu­ments are not new in essence and do not pre­su­me a rea­di­ness for NATO to enlar­ge. Most NATO mem­bers see risks rather than advan­ta­ges in enlar­ging the alli­an­ce in what Moscow sees as its backyard.

Just the ques­ti­on is reflec­ting some­thing, which I think we should be very much awa­re of, that is not accep­ta­ble – and that is that Rus­sia has a sphe­re of influ­ence,” the NATO chief retorted.

They try to re-establish some kind of accep­t­ance that Rus­sia has the right to con­trol what neigh­bours do, or not do,” Stol­ten­berg said.

I think that tells more about Rus­sia than about NATO,” he added.

The argu­ment that Rus­sia has no right to have a sphe­re of influ­ence is likely to infu­ria­te Moscow. Seni­or US pun­dits have argued in the recent past that “Rus­sia needs its buffers”.

This idea that NATO’s sup­port to a sov­er­eign nati­on is the pro­vo­ca­ti­on, is just wrong. It’s to respect the sov­er­eig­n­ty and the will of the Ukrai­ni­an peop­le,” he said, adding that Ukrai­ne is an inde­pen­dent sta­te, its bor­ders must be safe and its neigh­bours must not vio­la­te them.

We do not want to go back to the world in which sta­tes were limi­ted by sphe­res of influ­ence of super­powers”, he empha­sis­ed, ans­we­ring the ques­ti­on about Russia’s reac­tion to the pos­si­ble acces­si­on of Ukraine.

[…]

For his part, Stol­ten­berg repeated his warning on Wed­nes­day that any future Rus­si­an aggres­si­on against Ukrai­ne would come at a ‘high pri­ce’ and have serious poli­ti­cal and eco­no­mic con­se­quen­ces for Moscow.

The 30 NATO allies tog­e­ther repre­sent more than 50% of the glo­bal economy.

We have a wide ran­ge of opti­ons to make sure that Rus­sia will be con­fron­ted with serious con­se­quen­ces if they once again use for­ce against an inde­pen­dent sov­er­eign nati­on, Ukrai­ne,” Stol­ten­berg told repor­ters in Riga.

Ever­ything from eco­no­mic sanc­tions, finan­cial sanc­tions, poli­ti­cal restric­tions, but also, as we saw after 2014 when they ille­gal­ly anne­xed Cri­mea … that actual­ly trig­ge­red the big­gest rein­for­ce­ment of our collec­ti­ve defence sin­ce the end of the Cold War,” Stol­ten­berg said.

We don’t know whe­ther Pre­si­dent Putin has made the decisi­on to inva­de” Ukrai­ne, US Secreta­ry of Sta­te Antho­ny Blin­ken said, but added that “if Rus­sia inva­des Ukrai­ne… we will be pre­pa­red to act” with high-level eco­no­mic sanc­tions and other measures.

It’s important that Rus­sia under­stands this, Blin­ken stres­sed, adding that the US will make sure Ukrai­ne has the means to defend itself.

We’ve seen this play­book befo­re in 2014 when Rus­sia last inva­ded Ukrai­ne, then as now they signi­fi­cant­ly incre­a­sed com­bat for­ces near the bor­der,” Blin­ken said.

Then as now, they inten­si­fied dis­in­for­ma­ti­on that Ukrai­ne is the aggres­sor to jus­ti­fied pre-planned mili­ta­ry action,” he added.

Blin­ken will meet with Rus­si­an For­eign Minis­ter Ser­gey Lav­rov in Stock­holm on Thursday.

src: click

Ja ver­flixt und zuge­näht, wie kom­men die­se Posi­tio­nen jetzt plötz­lich in all die Exper­ten die sie mir begon­nen haben öffent­lich ab dem 24. Febru­ar 2022 als Inter­pre­ta­ti­ons­vor­la­gen anzureichen?

Die wer­den doch nicht alle die sel­be Quel­le gele­sen haben?









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