Wie kann man die Gesellschaft noch verarschen?

03. Dezember 2022

Die Qua­li­tät der Sophis­ten wird schlech­ter und schlech­ter. (Carl Bildt)

Ist wohl doch bes­ser Mear­s­hei­meer ein­fach zu deplatt­for­men, wie die Hoo­ver Insti­tu­ti­on sie­ben gegen nie­man­den am 06.03.2022.

Ich darf zusam­men­fas­sen. Die Ukrai­ne sehn­te sich nur in die EU, nicht in die Nato - dess­halb hat man die Nato Mit­glied­schaft in die Ver­fas­sung auf­ge­nom­men, aber EU Flag­gen zum Euro­mai­dan mit­ge­bracht. Russ­land fürch­te­te sich nur vor der öko­no­mi­schen Kraft einer Ukrai­ne, die der IMF ein­fach nicht und nicht kom­men sehen woll­te, nicht vor einer Auf­nah­me in die Nato. Putin hat mit einer Anne­xi­on der Krim reagiert - weil ihm sein Mili­tär­stütz­punkt egal war und er so nei­disch auf die bal­di­ge öko­no­mi­sche Stär­ke der Ukrai­ne war die zur EU wollte…!

Carl Bildt:

They are not mem­bers of ukrai­ne, and no one has… - of Nato [cor­rec­ting himself]”

Die erneu­te Bestär­kung des Com­mit­ments 2021 die Ukrai­ne in die Nato zu holen wird ein­fach ignoriert.

Debo­rah Hay­nes (Sky News)

So, there’s a cou­p­le of ques­ti­ons dealing with Rus­si­an acti­vi­ty in the Black Sea over the last few years and cur­r­ent­ly, and one per­son asks in par­ti­cu­lar what addi­tio­nal steps, do you see NATO taking to incre­a­se sta­bi­li­ty in the Black Sea, and also across the Balkans.

NATO Secreta­ry Gene­ral Jens Stoltenberg

While NATO has been and still is abso­lute­ly very much pre­sent in the Wes­tern Bal­kans, first of all we have new mem­bers from that regi­on, over the last few years, we have demons­tra­ted that NATO’s door is open with get­ting new mem­bers like North Mace­do­nia and Mon­te­ne­gro, that’s important, but we also work with part­ners in the regi­on, and we have still the KFOR mis­si­on in Koso­vo. So we are pre­sent, we have a histo­ry, and we have a respon­si­bi­li­ty to con­ti­nue to help sta­bi­li­ze the regi­on. In the Black Sea we have incre­a­sed our pre­sence. Three of the lit­to­ral sta­tes in the Black Sea are NATO mem­bers: Tur­key, Bul­ga­ria and Roma­nia. We have more air poli­cing and more naval pre­sence. We have more exer­ci­ses, and again the NATO 2030 agen­da is also about how can we invest more in deter­rence and defen­se acti­vi­ties, inclu­ding in the Black Sea region.
And then we have two very important part­ners, Geor­gia and Ukrai­ne. And we are step­ping up the coope­ra­ti­on with them, inclu­ding hel­ping Ukrai­ne with deve­lo­ping their naval capa­bi­li­ties. I visi­ted Odes­sa, some time ago when I saw how NATO trai­ners hel­ped to edu­ca­te Ukrai­ni­an cadets and naval per­son­nel, and we’­re also working with Geor­gia on Black Sea security.

Debo­rah Hay­nes (Sky News)

Actual­ly on Geor­gia there’s a ques­ti­on here, say­ing that we’­ve heard many times that NATO’s doors are open to Geor­gia. When exact­ly will the­se… will this door open, and can Geor­gia expect a road­map in the nea­rest future?

NATO Secreta­ry Gene­ral Jens Stoltenberg

I expect that NATO Allies today will recom­mit, con­firm the decisi­ons we have taken before.
Not least that at the Bucha­rest Sum­mit, whe­re we sta­ted clear­ly that Geor­gia will beco­me a mem­ber, but we did­n’t pro­vi­de any dates, and we will not pro­vi­de any dates today, either.
Our focus is on the reform, our focus is to con­ti­nue to sup­port Geor­gia in moder­ni­zing their defen­se and secu­ri­ty insti­tu­ti­ons, and the mes­sa­ge is that, of cour­se, NATO’s door is open, we have demons­tra­ted that over the last cou­p­le of years with Mon­te­ne­gro and North Mace­do­nia joi­ning. The other mes­sa­ge is that it’s only for the aspi­rant coun­try, Geor­gia, and the 30 allies to deci­de on enlar­ge­ment of our Alli­an­ce. Rus­sia has no right to inter­fe­re in that pro­cess. It’s a sov­er­eign right of any coun­try to deci­de his own path inclu­ding what kind of secu­ri­ty arran­ge­ments he is going to be part of.

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69. We rei­tera­te the decisi­on made at the 2008 Bucha­rest Sum­mit that Ukrai­ne will beco­me a mem­ber of the Alli­an­ce with the Mem­bers­hip Action Plan (MAP) as an inte­gral part of the pro­cess; we reaf­firm all ele­ments of that decisi­on, as well as sub­se­quent decisi­ons, inclu­ding that each part­ner will be jud­ged on its own merits. We stand firm in our sup­port for Ukraine’s right to deci­de its own future and for­eign poli­cy cour­se free from out­side inter­fe­rence. The Annu­al Natio­nal Pro­gram­mes under the NATO-Ukraine Com­mis­si­on (NUC) remain the mecha­nism by which Ukrai­ne takes for­ward the reforms per­tai­ning to its aspi­ra­ti­on for NATO mem­bers­hip. Ukrai­ne should make full use of all instru­ments avail­ab­le under the NUC to reach its objec­ti­ve of imple­men­ting NATO princi­ples and stan­dards. The suc­cess of wide-ranging, sus­tainab­le, and irrever­si­ble reforms, inclu­ding com­ba­ting cor­rup­ti­on, pro­mo­ting an inclu­si­ve poli­ti­cal pro­cess, and decen­tra­li­sa­ti­on reform, based on demo­cra­tic values, respect for human rights, mino­ri­ties, and the rule of law, will be cru­cial in lay­ing the ground­work for a pro­spe­rous and peace­ful Ukrai­ne. Fur­ther reforms in the secu­ri­ty sec­tor, inclu­ding the reform of the Secu­ri­ty Ser­vices of Ukrai­ne, are par­ti­cu­lar­ly important. We wel­co­me signi­fi­cant reforms alrea­dy made by Ukrai­ne and stron­gly encou­ra­ge fur­ther pro­gress in line with Ukraine’s inter­na­tio­nal obli­ga­ti­ons and com­mit­ments. We will con­ti­nue to pro­vi­de prac­ti­cal sup­port to reform in the secu­ri­ty and defence sec­tor, inclu­ding through the Com­pre­hen­si­ve Assi­s­tance Packa­ge. We will also con­ti­nue to sup­port Ukraine’s efforts to streng­t­hen its resi­li­en­ce against hybrid thre­ats, inclu­ding through inten­si­fy­ing acti­vi­ties under the NATO-Ukraine Plat­form on Coun­te­ring Hybrid War­fa­re. We wel­co­me the coope­ra­ti­on bet­ween NATO and Ukrai­ne with regard to secu­ri­ty in the Black Sea regi­on. The Enhan­ced Oppor­tu­nities Part­ner sta­tus gran­ted last year pro­vi­des fur­ther impe­tus to our alrea­dy ambi­tious coope­ra­ti­on and will pro­mo­te grea­ter inter­ope­ra­bi­li­ty, with the opti­on of more joint exer­ci­ses, trai­ning, and enhan­ced situa­tio­nal awa­reness. Mili­ta­ry coope­ra­ti­on and capa­ci­ty buil­ding initia­ti­ves bet­ween Allies and Ukrai­ne, inclu­ding the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Bri­ga­de, fur­ther rein­for­ce this effort. We high­ly value Ukraine’s signi­fi­cant con­tri­bu­ti­ons to Allied ope­ra­ti­ons, the NATO Respon­se For­ce, and NATO exercises.

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We stand in soli­da­ri­ty with our valued part­ners Ukrai­ne and Georgia.
And we will con­ti­nue to sup­port their reforms, brin­ging them clo­ser to NATO.
Sixth, we will sub­stan­ti­al­ly step up trai­ning and capacity-building for part­ners. From Ukrai­ne and Geor­gia to Iraq and Jordan.

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NATO Spo­kes­per­son Oana Lungescu:
Ok we’ll go to Inter­fax Ukrai­ne. Second row here.

Interfax-Ukraine (Iry­na Somer):
Thank you, Oana. Secreta­ry Gene­ral, Ukrai­ni­an lea­ders­hip has qui­te high expec­ta­ti­on, regar­ding mem­bers­hip action plan. But as far as I see from the Sum­mit com­mu­ni­qué here, we are not the­re yet. After this sum­mit, what will be your main mes­sa­ge for Ukrai­ni­an lea­ders, and for Ukrai­ni­an peop­le? Thank you.

NATO Secreta­ry Gene­ral Jens Stoltenberg:
My main mes­sa­ge is that NATO stands in soli­da­ri­ty with Ukrai­ne. We pro­vi­de a strong poli­ti­cal sup­port to the ter­ri­to­ri­al inte­gri­ty and sov­er­eig­n­ty of Ukrai­ne. And we pro­vi­de prac­ti­cal sup­port, and we are step­ping up our prac­ti­cal sup­port, both wit­hin the NATO con­text but also bila­te­ral­ly, from dif­fe­rent NATO Allies. I had a bila­te­ral mee­ting for instance with [Prime Minis­ter] Jus­tin Tru­deau of Cana­da and of cour­se, Cana­da is one of many Allies who are pro­vi­ding bila­te­ral sup­port to Ukrai­ne. And in the com­mu­ni­qué, in the decisi­ons we have taken today we have rei­tera­ted our decisi­ons on, that NATO’s door is open on the decisi­on we made back in the, at the Bucha­rest Sum­mit in 2008. And also that we will step up, and we will do more to help Ukrai­ne, and also Geor­gia, as ano­t­her aspi­rant coun­try to focus on reforms that will move them clo­ser to NATO and Euro-Atlantic integration.

NATO Spo­kes­per­son Oana Lungescu:
Ok, we’­re going to CBC. Fourth row. Thanks.

CBC News (Mur­ray Brewster):
Secreta­ry Gene­ral, Mur­ray Brews­ter with CBC. Thank you for taking the ques­ti­on. Fol­lowing on what was asked about Ukrai­ne and the Mem­bers­hip Action Plan, do you actual­ly ever fore­see any cir­cum­s­tan­ces under which Rus­sia would allow Ukrai­ne to join NATO uncon­tes­ted? And sepa­r­ate­ly, I wan­ted to ask whe­ther or not the­re was unani­mi­ty among Allies that Chi­na its­elf is a secu­ri­ty threat?

NATO Secreta­ry Gene­ral Jens Stoltenberg:
I think it’s extre­me­ly important to under­line that every nati­on has the right to choo­se its own path. And that inclu­des also what kind of secu­ri­ty arran­ge­ments it wants to be part of, inclu­ding whe­ther it wants to be part of, a mem­ber of NATO or not. So the mes­sa­ge is that it is for Ukrai­ne, and the 30 Allies, to deci­de when Ukrai­ne can beco­me a NATO mem­ber. Rus­sia, of cour­se, has no say. Becau­se they can­not veto what neigh­bours can do. We will not return to an age whe­re we had sphe­res of influ­ence, whe­re big powers deci­ded what small neigh­bours could do. And I very often use my own coun­try Nor­way as an examp­le. Nor­way is a small coun­try bor­de­ring Rus­sia. Of cour­se, Rus­sia -- or the Soviet Union-- dis­lik­ed that we joi­ned NATO back in 49, 1949. But, sin­ce Allies at that time were so stron­gly in favour of accep­t­ing also small neigh­bours of Rus­sia into the Alli­an­ce, of cour­se, Nor­way was accep­ted. As the Bal­tic coun­tries or as Mon­te­ne­gro and North Mace­do­nia, recent­ly. So, this is about fun­da­men­tal princi­ples of accep­t­ing the right of every nati­on to deci­de, it’s for the 30 Allies, and Ukrai­ne to deci­de when Ukrai­ne is rea­dy for membership.

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NATO Spo­kes­per­son Oana Lungescu:
Thank you. We’ll now go to Iry­na Somer from Inter­fax Ukraine.

Iry­na Somer (Interfax-Ukraine):
Thank you, Oana. Secreta­ry Gene­ral, can you plea­se tell us a litt­le bit more than you alrea­dy said, what can we expect from the upco­m­ing Sum­mit for part­ners coun­try par­ti­cu­lar­ly for aspi­rant coun­tries, Ukrai­ne and Geor­gia. Thank you.

NATO Secreta­ry Gene­ral Jens Stoltenberg:
Ukrai­ne and Geor­gia are two high­ly valued part­ners. We pro­vi­de both poli­ti­cal sup­port, and prac­ti­cal sup­port, to Ukrai­ne and Geor­gia. I think it is important that we con­ti­nue to streng­t­hen the part­ners­hip with the­se two high­ly valued part­ners. And this is important, not least becau­se the­se part­ners have been sub­ject to Rus­si­an aggres­si­ve actions. Geor­gia, in 2008, and still they occu­py part of Geor­gi­an ter­ri­to­ry, and we see the same in Ukrai­ne with the ille­gal annex­a­ti­on of Cri­mea and, and con­ti­nued desta­bi­liz­a­ti­on of Eas­tern Ukraine.

I spo­ke yes­ter­day with Pre­si­dent Zelens­kiy, and that was a very good con­ver­sa­ti­on. I rei­tera­ted NATO’s strong sup­port to [Ukraine’s] ter­ri­to­ri­al inte­gri­ty and sov­er­eig­n­ty. And also, that I expect NATO lea­ders to reaf­firm the decisi­on on the NATO poli­cy on Open Door, which has been a major suc­cess, hel­ping to spread demo­cra­cy and free­dom across Euro­pe. And the Sum­mit will demons­tra­te NATO’s endu­ring sup­port to Geor­gia and Ukrai­ne, and their Euro-Atlantic aspi­ra­ti­ons. The focus is on reform, and we will con­ti­nue to help and sup­port them in imple­men­ting the­se reforms.

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Das White­pa­per bezüg­lich der stra­te­gi­schen Bezie­hun­gen der US zur Ukrai­ne im Novem­ber 2021 in dem unzwei­deu­tig klar­ge­stellt wur­de, dass es das Ziel der US sei die Ukrai­ne zur Nato zu holen wird voll­stän­dig ignoriert.

Gui­ded by the April 3, 2008 Bucha­rest Sum­mit Decla­ra­ti­on of the NATO North Atlan­tic Coun­cil and as reaf­fir­med in the June 14, 2021 Brussels Sum­mit Com­mu­ni­que of the NATO North Atlan­tic Coun­cil, the United Sta­tes sup­ports Ukraine’s right to deci­de its own future for­eign poli­cy cour­se free from out­side inter­fe­rence, inclu­ding with respect to Ukraine’s aspi­ra­ti­ons to join NATO.

1. The United Sta­tes and Ukrai­ne intend to con­ti­nue a ran­ge of sub­stan­ti­ve mea­su­res to pre­vent exter­nal direct and hybrid aggres­si­on against Ukrai­ne and hold Rus­sia accoun­ta­ble for such aggres­si­on and vio­la­ti­ons of inter­na­tio­nal law, inclu­ding the sei­zu­re and attemp­ted annex­a­ti­on of Cri­mea and the Russia-led armed con­flict in parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regi­ons of Ukrai­ne, as well as its con­ti­nuing malign beha­vi­or. The United Sta­tes intends to sup­port Ukraine’s efforts to coun­ter armed aggres­si­on, eco­no­mic and ener­gy dis­rup­ti­ons, and mali­cious cyber acti­vi­ty by Rus­sia, inclu­ding by main­tai­ning sanc­tions against or rela­ted to Rus­sia and app­ly­ing other rele­vant mea­su­res until res­to­ra­ti­on of the ter­ri­to­ri­al inte­gri­ty of Ukrai­ne wit­hin its inter­na­tio­nal­ly reco­gni­zed borders.

2. The United Sta­tes does not and will never reco­gni­ze Russia’s attemp­ted annex­a­ti­on of Cri­mea and reaf­firms its full sup­port for inter­na­tio­nal efforts, inclu­ding in the Nor­man­dy For­mat, aimed at nego­tia­ting a diplo­ma­tic reso­lu­ti­on to the Russia-led armed con­flict in the Donetsk and Luhansk regi­ons of Ukrai­ne on the basis of respect for inter­na­tio­nal law, inclu­ding the UN Char­ter. The United Sta­tes sup­ports Ukraine’s efforts to use the Cri­mea Plat­form to coor­di­na­te inter­na­tio­nal efforts to address the huma­ni­ta­ri­an and secu­ri­ty cos­ts of Russia’s occup­a­ti­on of Cri­mea, con­sis­tent with the Platform’s Joint Declaration.

3. The United Sta­tes and Ukrai­ne endor­se the 2021 Stra­te­gic Defen­se Frame­work as the foun­da­ti­on of enhan­ced Ukraine-U.S. defen­se and secu­ri­ty coope­ra­ti­on and intend to work to advan­ce shared prio­ri­ties, inclu­ding imple­men­ting defen­se and defen­se indus­try reforms, deepe­ning coope­ra­ti­on in are­as such as Black Sea secu­ri­ty, cyber defen­se, and intel­li­gence sharing, and coun­te­ring Russia’s aggression.

4. The United Sta­tes and Ukrai­ne are key part­ners in the broa­der Black Sea regi­on and will seek to deepen coope­ra­ti­on with Black Sea Allies and part­ners to ensu­re free­dom of navi­ga­ti­on and effec­tively coun­ter exter­nal thre­ats and chal­len­ges in all domains.

5. The United Sta­tes remains com­mit­ted to assis­ting Ukrai­ne with ongo­ing defen­se and secu­ri­ty reforms and to con­ti­nuing its robust trai­ning and exer­ci­ses. The United Sta­tes sup­ports Ukraine’s efforts to maxi­mi­ze its sta­tus as a NATO Enhan­ced Oppor­tu­nities Part­ner to pro­mo­te interoperability.


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West­li­che Bünd­nis­se hät­ten sich nicht in den Osten aus­ge­dehnt, nein, die Zivil­ge­sell­schaf­ten des Ostens hät­ten sich viel mehr zum Wes­ten ori­en­tiert. (NATO OSTERWEITERUNG, EU OSTERWEITERUNG, …) Das muss man schon aner­ken­nen, des­halb muss die Wil­ly Brandt Stif­tung ges­tern auch fest­stel­len, die Ost­po­li­tik Deutsch­lands sei dar­an geschei­tert, dass es ost­eu­ro­päi­sche NGOs nicht stark genug in sei­ne Außen­po­li­tik ein­be­zo­gen habe.

Die US hät­te doch kei­ne Zeit gehabt mit Polen über die geo­po­li­ti­sche Stra­te­gie in Euro­pa zu spre­chen, nach­dem Afgha­ni­stan been­det war - obwohl Zei­han bestä­tigt die Polen hät­ten es als Chan­ce gese­hen end­lich wie­der wesent­li­che Geo­po­li­tik in Euro­pa vor­an­zu­trei­ben und hät­ten den US die Türen ein­ge­rannt.

War­um haben die US das ukrai­ni­sche Mili­tär über Jah­re trai­niert und mit Waf­fen ver­sorgt, wie sie einem zukünf­ti­gen Nato Staat zustan­den. Noch­mal - die Ukrai­ne war seit 2014 in einem “Bür­ger­krieg” - sie­he Jave­lins.

Die Rus­sen hät­ten sich doch für die “abseh­ba­re Zukunft” kei­ne Gedan­ken um eine Nato Ost­erwei­te­rung machen müssen!?

Ja kor­rekt, es wur­de immer an Putin kom­mu­ni­ziert, dass man ihm ger­ne noch 30 Jah­re gebe - und erst dann wenn die Demo­gra­phie in Russ­land noch schlech­ter wäre (Risi­ko einer mili­tä­ri­schen Akti­on Russ­lands gerin­ger) kei­ne ver­bind­li­chen Zusa­gen mehr mache. Nur über eine sta­bi­le Frie­dens­ord­nung woll­te man mit Russ­land nie sprechen.

Da habe Russ­land immer “über­bor­den­de For­de­run­gen gestellt, die von kei­nem akzep­tier­bar waren” - nur dass die Euro­pä­er die nie gehört haben, bis Russ­land die von den US abge­bro­che­nen Gesprä­che im Dezem­ber in Tei­len gele­akt hat -

das sel­be Argu­ment wie heu­te bei Times Radio -

Nur dass bei Times Radio noch expli­zit dazu­ge­sagt wer­den muss - mit Putin kön­ne man ja kei­ne sta­bi­len Ver­trä­ge schlie­ßen, der lüge immer. Dan­ke für den emo­tio­na­len Impuls wie der Hörer das ein­zu­ord­nen habe…

War­um hat die ver­fick­te Hoo­ver Insti­tu­ti­on Mear­s­hei­mer wohl am 06.03.2022 zur Per­so­na non Gra­ta erklärt. War­um wohl?

War­um hat das Robert Schuh­mann Cent­re das am 18. 06. noch­mal ver­stärkt (zumin­dest Tei­le des Publikums)?

War­um wohl?

War­um darf die­se Per­son öffent­lich nicht existieren?

Sterbt ihr ver­fick­ten Wichserschweine.

edit: Dann gibt es noch einen Moment bei dem Bildt zur Schau stellt, dass er nicht weiß, dass die Jave­lins im Don­bas im Ein­satz waren (Ori­gi­nal­quel­le, Arti­kel­se­rie des Redak­teurs aus jün­ge­rer Zeit, hier sein Twit­ter Account, er wur­de ges­tern noch zum B-21 Reve­al ein­ge­la­den.) - und einen Moment bei dem Bildt zur Schau stellt, dass er mit der emo­tio­na­len Geschich­te von Putin muss­te den Aus­lands­ge­heim­dienst­chef run­ter­ma­chen weil er ihm die fal­sche Ant­wort gege­ben hat agiert, ohne zu wis­sen dass PBS am sel­ben Tag sowohl gemel­det hat, dass das Signa­ling an den Wes­ten gewe­sen sei, dass der Ein­fluss des Lei­ters des Aus­lands­ge­heim­diens­tes inner­halb der rus­si­schen Füh­rungs­eli­te nicht mehr bestand (die für die gesam­ten Bestechungs­ak­tio­nen in Kiew ver­ant­wort­lich sein hät­te sol­len die Putin einen schnel­len Sieg besche­ren hät­ten sol­len), als auch gemel­det hat, dass das ein Beleg für den wahn­sin­ni­gen Putin gewe­sen sein soll der iso­liert und im Wahn han­delt. Bildt nimmt die zwei­te Inter­pre­ta­ti­on und über­zeugt das Publikum.

Sterbt ihr Wichserschweine.


Jef­frey Sachs 02.06.2022:

[…] then after 9/11, of cour­se, Bush pushed the enlar­ge­ment of NATO to I think, seven coun­tries under his watch. An extra­or­di­na­ry incre­a­se of the num­ber of coun­tries, the Bal­tic Sta­tes to begin with the Roma­nia, Bul­ga­ria, Slo­va­kia, Slo­ve­nia, if I remem­ber cor­rect­ly, all during Bush’s watch.

And then to the shock of the Euro­peans in NATO in 2008, he said, Ukrai­ne and Geor­gia will beco­me mem­bers of NATO. And just take a look at a map. And I encou­ra­ge ever­y­bo­dy to take a look at the map of the Black Sea. What was NATO’s idea? What was the US stra­te­gic idea? The US stra­te­gic idea was basi­cal­ly to own the black sea for NATO, becau­se you’d have Tur­key, Roma­nia, Bul­ga­ria, Ukrai­ne, and where’s Geor­gia all the way over on the Eas­tern side of the Black Sea, sud­den­ly is going to be a NATO coun­try, whe­re­as NATO was ori­gi­nal­ly to defend against an inva­si­on by a now defunct non-existent coun­try in Wes­tern Europe.

So sud­den­ly, it is an expan­sio­na­ry for­ce moving strai­ght across the Black Sea. It reminds me a lot of the Cri­me­an War of the 19th cen­tu­ry. Who con­trols the Black Sea? And well, one thing has led to ano­t­her and we have the war in Ukrai­ne. And if in our media you say, the United Sta­tes play­ed a pro­vo­ca­ti­ve war. You’re immedia­te­ly tar­ge­ted. Oh, you’re just pur­vey­ing Putin’s pro­pa­gan­da. Well, this is real­ly non­sen­se. We need a serious dis­cus­sion, some con­text, some histo­ry, and we should not have pushed NATO right up against Russia’s edge and right around the encir­cle­ment of the Black Sea. But we did so, and now we’re also paying con­se­quen­ces for this, but espe­cial­ly Ukrai­ne is paying con­se­quen­ces for this.

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Pro­jects Syn­di­ca­tes meist­pu­bli­zier­ter Autor darf halt lei­der nicht mehr auf Pro­ject Syn­di­ca­te publi­zie­ren, was willst du machen…

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