On Wednesday, OMV said it had received an arbitral award of more than 230 million euros ($243.06 million) from the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) due to irregular gas supplies to its unit in Germany from Gazprom which ended in September 2022.
The Nordstream gas pipeline from Russia to Germany was ruptured at that time due to explosions and has never been repaired.
Dieser Russe schon wieder, nie liefert der pünktlich, hier sind 230 Millionen in an arbitral award as damage compensation. Go and stop russias gas deliveries to Austria with that. Dafür dass das Gas in Österreich immer fristgerecht angekommen ist.
Sure thing!
Wertewesten.
Ups, die 230 Mio haben wir auch nicht realisieren können. Naja…
edit: Dazu kurz auch Standard Logik:
Der OMV-Vertrag ist zwar nicht einsehbar. Aber eine Vermutung lautet: Der darin vereinbarte Abnahmepreis dürfte sich recht nah am Marktpreis fürs Gas bewegen. Als die Marktpreise 2022 anzogen, weil Russland seine Lieferungen an Deutschland oder Polen einstellte und Angst vor Knappheit einsetzte, zahlte das auch Österreich voll mit.
Russisches Gas ist wohl nicht wirklich billig
Dafür, dass Gas aus Russland nicht billig ist, gibt es noch andere Hinweise. Der Neos-Lab, der Thinktank der Oppositionspartei, hat immer wieder Außenhandelsdaten der Statistik Austria ausgewertet. Unternehmen müssen einmelden, zu welchem Preis sie wie viel Gas kaufen. Statistiker sagen, diese Daten seien verlässlich. Laut Zahlen des Labs kostet russisches Gas etwa so viel wie Gas, das über Deutschland oder Italien nach Österreich kommt. Die Überweisungen nach Russland sind 2022 mit dem Anstieg der Energiepreise explodiert. “Das mit dem billigen russischen Gas ist eine Mär”, sagte Energieexperte Walter Boltz deshalb einst.
[Das ist die alte Standard Lüge, die hier von der Presse konterkariert wurde:
„Wie erklärt sich dieser Österreich-Effekt beim Gaspreis? Immerhin haben OMV und Politik die langfristigen Lieferverträge mit Russland stets auch mit dem niedrigeren Preis beworben. Auch heuer importierte Österreich 58 Prozent seines Gases aus Russland. Billig ist es aber längst nicht mehr. Jeden Monat überwies die Republik 2023 rund 400 Millionen Euro an Moskau, rechnen die Neos vor. Der Umstand, dass Österreich so weiter den Krieg mitfinanziert, ist zwar politisch relevant, die hohen Preise erklärt das aber nicht.
Der Ursprung der österreichischen Teuerung dürfte vielmehr in der Krisenpolitik des Landes zu finden sein, sagen Experten. Österreichs Regierung hat verhältnismäßig rasch und umfassend auf die drohenden Energieengpässe reagiert. Mit Steuergeldern wurde eine strategische Gasreserve aufgebaut, auch die Versorger wurden angehalten, deutlich mehr Erdgas physisch in heimischen Speichern als in den Jahren zuvor zu lagern.“
Auf Basis von Marktanalysen erwarten Energieagentur und E-Control einen Anstieg der Preise um zehn bis 40 Prozent nach einem Lieferstopp. Aktuell zahlen Kunden am Markt etwa vier bis fünf Cent (ohne Steuern) für eine Kilowattstunde Gas. Nach einem Lieferstopp wären es um ein bis zwei Cent mehr.
Gut, was sind schon 2 cent mehr bei 4 cent Marktpreis.… Nachdem ein Zulieferer einer Energiegesellschaft wegbricht…
Das sind ja nur cents, das ist sicher nicht viel.
WHATTHEFUCK?
Standard, hier kaufen Boomer ihre Abos.
edit: Die OMV versteht sich vor allem selbst.
1000000 Haushalte in Österreich mit Gasheizung x 12.000kWh Durchschnittsverbrauch im Jahr x 0.02 Eur Preiserhöhung = 240 Mio im ersten Jahr.
Was macht die OMV da in Deutschland eigentlich für Geschäfte, dass sie dabei 230 Mio an Arbitration Strafzahlungen (Reingewinn) für den Zeitraum Februar-September 2022 zugesprochen bekommt?
“We still get a lot of LNG from Russia and why not replace it by American LNG, which is cheaper for us and brings down our energy prices,” said von der Leyen.
She said the EU approach to trade policies implemented when Donald Trump takes power again as U.S. president in January will be to engage, look at common interests and negotiate.
The EU estimates that about 4 billion to 6 billion cubic meters (141 billion to 212 billion cubic feet) of Russian LNG was shipped to third countries via EU ports last year.
4 bcm/y more LNG from the US = 8% increase year over year.
6 bcm/y more LNG from the US = 12% increase year over year.
Russian LNG exports, however, have remained relatively stable, hovering between 41 and 45 bcm/y between 2021 and 2023, with heavy maintenance at the Sakhalin-2 and Yamal LNG liquefaction plants last year.[viii] Around half of this LNG is exported to EU countries, a trend that has been increasing since 2021.
21 bcm/y more LNG from the US = 42% increase year over year.
UvdL math.
We still get a lot of LNG from Russia and why not replace it by American LNG, which is cheaper for us and brings down our energy prices
EULNG prices hit fresh year high as Asian equivalents stall
vor 1 Tag — The landing price for LNG delivered ex-ship to northwest Europe in December rose USD 0.79 to settle late on Thursday at USD 14.11/MMbtu
EU Natural Gas TTF on November 08th 2024 = 42 EUR/MWh EU Natural Gas TTF mean 2024 = 34 EUR/MWh
UvdL math.
The main alternative monetization option for Russian gas from YaNAO is LNG: even without tax allowances, the full cost of LNG from the Yamal peninsula in China is $6 to $7 per mmbtu, depending on the shipping route (the Northern Sea Route is cheaper).
Wie exzellent Österreich darauf vorbereitet ist, zeigt mir auch ein Blick in die Endabrechnung meines Wien Energie Vertrags vom 14.01.2020 bis 22.01.2021.
Mein Gas Verbrauchspreis damals als Endverbraucher lag bei 3,19 ct/kWh.
Dazu noch die allgemeine Inflation seit damals (minus 18,79% Kaufkraftentwicklung in Österreich, bei 5,6% Inflation p.a.) aufrechnen =
3,79 ct/kWh
Nun wie sah die TTF Preisentwicklung für Europäisches Gas seit dem 22.01.2021 aus?
Nun von 23,23 auf 45 Eur/MWh (aktueller Spike) das sind 94%.
Die geben wir natürlich an unseren Endkunden weiter.
7,35ct/kWh
Plus 16,67% USt.
8,58ct/kWh (6,97ct/kWh sollte ich die Endverbraucher Inflation doppelt eingerechnet haben)
Mein aktueller Gas Verbrauchspreis inklusive USt. und Verbraucherabgabe für 2025 bei Wienenergie:
6,57 ct/kWh
ÖSTERREICHWAREXZELLENTDARAUFVORBEREITET.
Gut die Netzgebühren werden so ein wenig steigen, jetzt wo wir unser Gas ja mehr so aus Italien und Deutschland beziehen wollen…
Naja, mich solls nicht stören, ich hab bei dem Tarif noch 8,5 Monate Vertragsbindung, ich heiz diesen Winter noch schön bis 20 Grad.
Was die Ukraine ab dem 1. Jänner 2025 so und so gemacht hätte.
Weils aber der Russe jetzt bereits gemacht hat, ist es ein “österreichischer Befreiungsschlag” so der Standard bereits gestern: click
Weils nur 90% des bisherigen Bezugs seit August diesen Jahres waren, ist die OMV auch “bestens darauf vorbereitet”, so der Standard heute.
Weil die EU ja bereits angekündigt hat, Europa wolle jetzt unter Trump viel mehr US Flüssiggas abnehmen.
Was Biden während seiner Amtszeit mit dem Verweis auf Umweltauflagen eingefroren hat (Menge), da Flüssiggaslieferungen ohne spezielle Tanker die die Evaporation mit Glocken abfangen aus den US vom Methanabdruck in CO2 Equivalent eh nur zwischen Steinkohle und Braunkohle liegen.
Weil Russland nicht weniger Gas liefern wird, sondern nur über andere Kanäle (Italien hat seine Lieferinfrastruktur nach Österreich bereits ausgebaut, Russland nimmt als Infrastrukturprojekte Pipelines in die Türkei in Angriff. Die Entfernung zwischen Türkei und Italien beträgt 1260 km. Das sind ja Welten.) Was Russland aber weniger Einnahmen aus den Gas Exporten beschert, da mehr Leute mitschneiden.
Wobei die OMV mit einer langfristigen Erhöhung des Gaspreises in dem Fall von bis zu 10% gerechnet hat, und er edit: in den letzten zwei Wochen eh nur um 20% gestiegen ist (spike, dh. das langfristige Preisniveau wird sich erst noch weisen.)
Versuch diese Information mal heute aus den Standardberichten rauszulesen: click Alleine wie der Standard den aktuellen Preisanstieg verschleiert. Zucker.
Hoffen wir, dass die OMV richtig projected hat, und wir in Österreich 10% mehr bezahlen, während Russland mehr als 10% Marge entgehen, und die EU das noch als Verhandlungsmasse gegen trumpsche US Zölle ins Treffen führen kann, während sich der Durchschnittsbürger erfreut zeigt, das mia uns vom Russen befreit haben.
TLDR, so lange schemen, bis man sowas in Handschlagqualität erst mal hinbringt. Wobei eh der Russe, oder? Schließlich hat der uns das Gas abgedreht. Dieser verdammte Russe schon wieder…
edit: Ups, ich hab noch den Industriegaspreis vergessen. Der ist in Deutschland doppelt so hoch wie vor dem Krieg, also wars im Oktober, vor dem aktuellen spike. Also nicht nur auf den TTF Preis schauen. Vgl. 1|2 Es gibt aber natürlich auch wieder gute Nachrichten, der Preis von LNG landed in NW Europe (also noch nicht Österreich) is eh noch darüber.… (oxford energy)
Gut, das muss in Österreich heute natürlich wieder kein Medium berichten, es würde eh nur unnötig die Bevölkerung verunsichern.
edit: Korrektur, Italien hat 2023 remodelt:
src: click
Für eine einfache Überschlagsrechnung in Prozent reicht es aus die Werte in der Grafik zu verdoppeln.
Wobei für Azeri Gas folgendes gilt:
Likely, any Azeri gas that does flow through Ukraine after this year will be Azeri in name only, with the molecules originating in Russia.
src: click
edit2: Für die die sich gedacht haben, da geht sich doch was nicht aus, stimmt - aber nur ne Detailfrage:
“We still get a lot of LNG from Russia and why not replace it by American LNG, which is cheaper for us and brings down our energy prices,” said von der Leyen.
She said the EU approach to trade policies implemented when Donald Trump takes power again as U.S. president in January will be to engage, look at common interests and negotiate.
The EU estimates that about 4 billion to 6 billion cubic meters (141 billion to 212 billion cubic feet) of Russian LNG was shipped to third countries via EU ports last year.
src: click
4-6 Billion cubic meters more LNG imports from the US (thats 8-12% more than the EU is importing from the US currently).
Algerian state hydrocarbons firm Sonatrach said at the time it was ready to increase gas supplies to Europe, notably via the Transmed pipeline linking Algeria to Italy.
Its CEO Toufik Hakkar said Europe is the “natural market of choice” for Algerian gas, which accounts for about 11 per cent of Europe’s gas imports.
The new deal between ENI and Sonatrach would add up to 9 billion cubic meters of gas from Algeria, just eclipsing Russia’s current 29 billion cubic meters a year.
The increased flows will start in the fall, ENI said in a statement.
src: click
Up to 9 billion cubic meters/year more from Algeria.
29 billion cubic meters from Russia/year was the current import rate in 2024 (see: click)
Under the current transit contract, Russia’s Gazprom was obliged to pay Ukraine for the transit of 65 billion cubic metres (bcm) (~670 TWh) of gas in 2020, dropping to 40 bcm (~412 TWh) per year until 2024, whether or not Gazprom actually shipped the agreed amount. In fact, flows in 2024 have been around 44 million cubic metres per day, which is equivalent to 16 bcm/year – significantly below the 40 bcm/year contracted amount (Figure 2). Transit fee revenues for Ukraine amounted to $1.2 billion in 2022 and $0.8 billion in 2023, or around 0.5 percent of Ukraine’s GDP 6.
src: click
Minus 16 billion cubic meters/year via Ukraine.
Austrias yearly gas consumption: 7 billion cubic meters/year.
Ich finds ja gut, dass wir jetzt unser Gas aus Norwegen beziehen.
1. It is hard to know why Putin did it now.
2. Everything was going so well in russias effort to “pacify” (influence operations) its other border regions.
3. But I know why russia did it now! It saw the western weakness, dont you see! Remember when that Putin/Xi talk was caught on tape, thats proof for the cause having been the want to destabilize the west!
Here is the throughline that argument is missing.
Russia was securing (influence operations) its border regions. Ukraine all the while was an active conflict zone. The US tipped the balance of that conflict zone in ukraines favor (Minsk 2 was there to give Ukraine time to arm up (Merkel), Javelins were in use in the Donbas, confirmed by Ukrainian Officials in interviews with US military journals, and the russian lead opposition didnt have anything to answer the Ukrainians rolling back the Donbas. This was in October 2021.), Europeans were largely not informed (https://harlekin.me/allgemein/just-checking-on-the-journalistic-performance-around-nordstream-because-of-an-interview/). Russia, seeing that the Donbas was about to be retaken by Ukraine, which would allow Ukraine access to irrigation gates that could cut of the water supply to Crimea entirely, moved their army to the borders, then partly withdrew, once the US/Russian talks on the European security structure were scheduled (partly withdrew means, blood conserves were still in the field, and support infrastructure was still built out, during that partial withdrawal (those parts still in preparation for the later invasion)).
Russias initial demands were overzealous (withdrawal of NATO to borders they hadnt to honor for more than a decade, security partnership, veto, …) but they were initial demands. Demands you go into negotiations with. The US in turn refused to even talk about its engagement in Ukraine as part of talks about the European Security arrangements, and ended talks on those principal terms (before details would have had to be discussed, where russias overzealous demands would have come into play (negotations mass)), then the US leaked the initial russian demands which were not principles that made discussion impossible a priori, but just demanded too much at first hand - than would have been possible for the US to agree to in a later phase of the talks, about a defense structure/restructuring in Europe.
The talks were canceled by the US, the russian troops were moved back to the ukrainian borders.
The moment of the declaration in the west, that russias “special operation” constituted a war of aggression was when unmarked russian vehicles entered the Donbas again.
The Nato debates on that they did, circled around “of course this is the beginning of a war, why shouldnt we say so, we have to call a spade a spade”, with the public refusal of UvdL to call it a war ending on day two of the invasion.
Before any rockets flew. Then Selenskyj provoked Russia, with the russian language message to russian citizens on Telegram, that russian people should tend to the streets (“Doctors, Lawyers, Artists, TikTokers, Mothers and also Fathers” to force the Russian government back to the discussion table), and then three hours later the first russian rockets were fired.
Why then, and not later? Putin stated multiple times after the invasion, that he regretted to not have done it earlier when Ukraine was less prepared. But the russian army itself still was ill prepared for the resistance. A miscalculation, we all know about that.
Point being, the Ukraine was about to be successful against russian supported “separatists” in the Donbas, and retake that region. With Ukraine regaining the Donbas, the way would have been open for Crimea being targeted to be freed next (cut off its water supply), and Sevastapol is the main Harbor russia uses for its colonial efforts in Africa, and the Harbor where 40% of Russias Exports were going through at the time. With the next best location russia could use being Murmansk near the Polar circle. Meaning, russia would have been forced to ship its armament-shipments for its colonies in Africa past 19 additional Nato outposts to reach Africa.
Meaning, Russia was on the verge of loosing its most important, year long ice free, harbor and its center of power projection into the black sea region, and into Africa, and the logistic center for 40% of its exports.
Not as a hypothetical, but as a “we know Ukraines plans for the reconquering of Crimea, and what would have been their policy for black sea harbors within Ukraine”. From (EU) Venice comission reports (on Minsk 2 implementation efforts):
“Why then” - Part 2 is russias demographic story.
So if they didnt manage to attain lasting control over their border region within the next 10 years, demographically - they wouldnt be able to do so militarily anymore. As in 20 years their military capacity would have halved. Simply because of the demographic factor.
That Germany was in the middle of a political transition, that the US had just withdrawn from Afghanistan in Chaos, that russia had reduced its attack surface for economic sanctions, were those “the reasons russia thought it could attack”, or just due diligence (US does those assesments all the time) combined with factors, that made an attack (resulting in a russian projected quick win) seem like a more promising stragety?
Point being -- was this an attack to topple the western rules based order? Or an attack out of russias own security/high importance economical interests?
And then we can look at how russia was treated in international fora for the past 20 years (gas station with a military, GDP comparable to brazil and on a downward spiral, …
Germany apparently “having forgotten to include russia in its economic planning over the european green deal trajectory they already were implementing”, …)
And even if you did mixed benefit/drawback calculations, taking into account the number of middle aged men in Russia that might die in such a conflict, instead of requesting state benefits in the years to come - and the uprising potential from russias economic developmental story not working out at all, during more and more uncertain times geopolitically, and macroeconomically --
everything trended towards, trying a quick invasion, and dealing with the fallout if it didnt go well later.
As it really was the only major gambit russia had left on its side. There was nothing else.
Once that failed and the west separated from russia economically -- the fallback strategy, and NOT necessarily the initial goal, was to intertwine its economy with the chinese one, which has a lower purchasing power adjusted GDP per capita.
So negative growth for the population in russia, which the russians again could use the war as a “unifying” force to push through, while tightening their security state. Under the pretenses of being engaged in a “war against the west”.
Because Russia thought of it that way from the beginning. And only engaged in it, because it knew (*triumphant hahaaaa!*) what hardship that would mean for the international values based order (*sad oh no!*), you know international law - as enforced by the UN --- which no one gives a fuck about anymore, at least if we look at Israels example, based on a security council that is in a deadlock because of the veto capabilities of its permanent members, and representing a structure not representative of the current world population, or macroeconomic developments anymore…
So how crazy was Putin, dear Fiona, when not thinking about Russias benefit in all of this at all -- but playing on the third level of the 3D Chess board to topple the western value based order, by making everyone understand, that Europe did mostly work because of the peace dividend, and the promise of US protection, that now has (relatively) vanished, because the isolationist camp in the US won the last election.
What level of 3D chess has the craaaaaazy Putin be capable of playing to “Manufacture a Crisis to Rewrite the Global order”, my dear Fiona?
Fiona, you that in the introductionary statement still mentioned, that is hard to know why Putin made this decision when he did.
I mean, whats the conspiracy theory here and whats the “russia didnt want to have Nato in the black see within a 15 years timeframe, while halfing their population of able man, capable of being drafted within the next 20 years”?
I mean, surely Fiona has something to show us, so we can all believe in this devilish russian master plan, to deligitimise the western order, right?
Well, its Putin who thought about it that way, because Fiona again knows how Putin thinks, and thats really all you should need argument wise, not to loose your jobs and get deplatformed in the Wertewesten, right?
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