You dont say…

22. Juni 2024

NYT publis­hed ano­t­her deep­di­ve on the the peace nego­tia­ti­ons in April of 2022.

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/06/15/world/europe/ukraine-russia-ceasefire-deal.html

The draft inclu­ded limits on the size of the Ukrai­ni­an armed for­ces and the num­ber of tanks, artil­le­ry bat­te­ries, war­s­hips and com­bat air­craft the coun­try could have in its arse­nal. The Ukrai­ni­ans were pre­pa­red to accept such caps, but sought much hig­her limits.

A for­mer seni­or U.S. offi­cial who was brie­fed on the nego­tia­ti­ons, noting how Rus­si­an for­ces were being repel­led across nort­hern Ukrai­ne, said Mr. Putin see­med to be “sali­vat­ing” at the deal.

Ame­ri­can offi­cials were alar­med at the terms. In mee­tings with their Ukrai­ni­an coun­ter­parts, the seni­or offi­cial recal­led, “We quiet­ly said, ‘You under­stand this is uni­la­te­ral dis­ar­ma­ment, right?’”

Lea­ders in Poland — ear­ly and strong sup­por­ters of Ukrai­ne — fea­red that Ger­ma­ny or Fran­ce might try to per­sua­de the Ukrai­ni­ans to accept Russia’s terms, accord­ing to a Euro­pean diplo­mat, and wan­ted to pre­vent that from happening.

To that end, when Poland’s pre­si­dent, Andrzej Duda, met with NATO lea­ders in Brussels on March 24, he held up the March 17 text, said the diplo­mat, who was present.

Which of you would sign it?” Mr. Duda asked his coun­ter­parts, the diplo­mat said.

None of the NATO lea­ders spo­ke up.

A Bre­akthrough in Istanbul?

A few days later, on March 29, Rus­sia and Ukraine’s repre­sen­ta­ti­ves met at an Istan­bul palace on the Bos­po­rus. To some, the talks felt like a bre­akthrough dri­ven by Russia’s battle­field struggles.

After each mili­ta­ry set­back, a mem­ber of Ukraine’s nego­tia­ting team said, Mr. Putin “redu­ced his demands.”

In Istan­bul, the Rus­si­ans see­med to endor­se Ukraine’s model of neu­tra­li­ty and secu­ri­ty gua­ran­tees and put less empha­sis on their ter­ri­to­ri­al deman­ds. After­ward, Mr. Medi­n­sky, Russia’s lead nego­tia­tor, said Ukraine’s offer of neu­tra­li­ty meant it was “rea­dy to ful­fill tho­se princi­pal deman­ds that Rus­sia insis­ted on for all the past years.”

Ukrai­ne sum­ma­ri­zed the pro­po­sed deal in a two-page docu­ment it cal­led the Istan­bul Com­mu­ni­qué, which it never publis­hed. The sta­tus of Cri­mea was to be deci­ded over a 10- or 15-year peri­od, with Ukrai­ne pro­mi­sing not to try to reta­ke the pen­in­su­la by for­ce; Mr. Zelen­sky and Mr. Putin would meet in per­son to fina­li­ze a peace trea­ty and strike a deal on how much Ukrai­ni­an ter­ri­to­ry Rus­sia would con­ti­nue to occupy.

The com­mu­ni­qué, pro­vi­ded to The Times by a Ukrai­ni­an nego­tia­tor, descri­bed a mecha­nism in which other coun­tries would inter­vene mili­ta­ri­ly if Ukrai­ne were atta­cked again — a con­cept that the Ukrai­ni­ans poin­ted­ly desi­gna­ted as Arti­cle 5, a refe­rence to the mutu­al defen­se agree­ment in Arti­cle 5 of the NATO treaty.

In ear­ly April, after Rus­sia with­drew from the out­skirts of Kyiv, images of mas­sa­c­red civi­li­ans in the sub­urb of Bucha, some with their hands tied with white cloth, sho­cked the world. For Ukrai­ni­ans, the idea that their coun­try could strike a com­pro­mi­se with Rus­sia see­med more remo­te than ever.

But Mr. Zelen­sky, visi­t­ing Bucha on April 4, said the talks would go on, even as Rus­sia dis­mis­sed the Bucha atro­ci­ties as a sta­ged “pro­vo­ca­ti­on.”

see also:

Qui­te quick­ly, but cer­tain­ly over the cour­se of the next weeks that fol­lo­wed, Selen­sky­js views evol­ved, part­ly under the influ­ence of his advisors

(as a second source)

Col­leagues, I spo­ke to RA,” Ukraine’s lead nego­tia­tor, Davyd Arak­ha­mia, wro­te on April 10 in a Whats­App mes­sa­ge to the Ukrai­ni­an team. “He spo­ke yes­ter­day for an hour and a half with his boss.”

RA” was Roman Abra­mo­vich, the Rus­si­an bil­lion­aire who play­ed a behind-the-scenes role in the talks. His “boss,” Mr. Putin, was urging the nego­tia­tors to con­cen­tra­te on the key issu­es and work through them quick­ly, Mr. Arak­ha­mia wro­te. (A mem­ber of the Whats­App group show­ed that mes­sa­ge and others to repor­ters for The Times.)

BUT THEN OH NO!

Mr. Putin’s invol­ve­ment and inten­ti­ons during the 2022 talks were sub­jects of deba­te in Kyiv and Washing­ton, Ukrai­ni­an and Ame­ri­can offi­cials said. Was he tru­ly inte­res­ted in a deal? Or was he merely try­ing to bog Ukrai­ne down while his tro­ops regrouped?

We didn’t know if Putin was serious,” said the for­mer seni­or U.S. offi­cial. “We couldn’t tell, on eit­her side of the fence, whe­ther the­se peop­le who were tal­king were empowered.”

One Ukrai­ni­an nego­tia­tor said he belie­ved the nego­tia­ti­ons were a bluff on Mr. Putin’s part, but two others descri­bed them as serious.

Much of the trea­ty would “not app­ly” to Cri­mea and ano­t­her to-be-determined swath of Ukrai­ne — mea­ning that Kyiv would accept Rus­si­an occup­a­ti­on of part of its ter­ri­to­ry without reco­gni­zing Rus­si­an sov­er­eig­n­ty over it.

But cru­cial sti­cking points remai­ned. Rus­sia wan­ted the firing ran­ge of Ukraine’s mis­si­les to be limi­ted to 25 miles, while Ukrai­ne wan­ted 174 miles — enough to hit tar­gets across Cri­mea. Rus­sia still wan­ted Ukrai­ne to repeal laws rela­ted to lan­guage and natio­nal iden­ti­ty, and to pull back Ukrai­ni­an tro­ops as part of a cease-fire.

The big­gest pro­blem, howe­ver, came in Arti­cle 5. It sta­ted that, in the event of ano­t­her armed attack on Ukrai­ne, the “gua­ran­tor sta­tes” that would sign the trea­ty — Gre­at Bri­tain, Chi­na, Rus­sia, the United Sta­tes and Fran­ce — would come to Ukraine’s defense.

To the Ukrai­ni­ans’ dis­may, the­re was a cru­cial depar­tu­re from what Ukrai­ni­an nego­tia­tors said was dis­cus­sed in Istan­bul. Rus­sia inser­ted a clau­se say­ing that all gua­ran­tor sta­tes, inclu­ding Rus­sia, had to appro­ve the respon­se if Ukrai­ne were atta­cked. In effect, Moscow could inva­de Ukrai­ne again and then veto any mili­ta­ry inter­ven­ti­on on Ukraine’s behalf — a see­min­gly absurd con­di­ti­on that Kyiv quick­ly iden­ti­fied as a dealbreaker.

Rus­sia tried to secu­re a veto on Ukraine’s secu­ri­ty gua­ran­tees by inser­ting a clau­se requi­ring unani­mous consent.

With that chan­ge, a mem­ber of the Ukrai­ni­an nego­tia­ting team said, “we had no inte­rest in con­ti­nuing the talks.”

And then ghosted.

The two quintessential lies

22. Juni 2024

So the argu­ment goes as follows:

- Rus­sia was going into Ukrai­ne to con­quer it ent­i­re­ly and then more

Addi­tio­nal infor­ma­ti­on: 190.000 to 220.000 tro­ops arent enough to con­quer OR hold any major city in the Ukrai­ne - much less the ent­i­re­ty of Ukrai­ne. See Mearsheimer/Kathie Hal­per video below. In which the first refe­ren­ces the fol­lowing para­graph from a Wall Street Jour­nal arti­cle, publis­hed on the 2nd of June 2024:

Of cour­se, Putin still wants Khar­kiv,” Oleh Syn­e­hu­bov, the head of the mili­ta­ry admi­nis­tra­ti­on for the region—which is also cal­led Kharkiv—said of Rus­si­an Pre­si­dent Vla­di­mir Putin. Syn­e­hu­bov noted that Rus­sia has deploy­ed only a frac­tion of the tro­ops nee­ded to storm the city, which he esti­ma­ted could requi­re up to half a mil­li­on soldiers.

src: click (Archiv)

(Khar­kiv, back befo­re the rus­si­an inva­si­on had about half the popu­la­ti­on of Kiev.)

So then the argu­ment extends:

- This isnt about “ter­ri­to­ry” (“con­que­ring all of it and more”) this is about kee­ping Ukrai­ne a sov­er­eign sta­te - see Pau­la Dobri­an­sky, For­mer Under Secreta­ry of Sta­te for Glo­bal Affairs; Seni­or Fel­low at Har­vard Ken­ne­dy School’s Bel­fer Cen­ter for Sci­ence and Inter­na­tio­nal Affairs; Vice Chair, Atlan­tic Coun­cil Scow­croft Cen­ter for Stra­te­gy & Secu­ri­ty -- in the fol­lowing Open to Deba­te (for­mer Intel­li­gence Squa­red) debate:

star­ting at 30:28 in

- The in depth argu­ment here goes as fol­lows. When Putin inva­ded Ukrai­ne - we saw leaf­lets being drop­ped in regi­ons east of Kiev that were tel­ling Ukrai­ni­an tro­ops to stand down, becau­se the government in Kiew (mili­ta­ry) would not exist any­mo­re - so any resis­tance to the inva­si­on “would be ent­i­re­ly futi­le, becau­se it alrea­dy “was over””, fur­ther­mo­re, the intent of the rus­si­an “attack on Kiev” would have been the same as with the take­over of Cri­mea 2014, name­ly to dis­rupt public life, make the stan­ding ukrai­ni­an government flee, or be kil­led (alle­ged­ly the US did take out several rus­si­an assas­si­na­ti­on units in Kiev wit­hin the first three days) - and then let the government be taken over, or revol­ted against by essen­ti­al­ly Ukrai­ni­an Krem­lin puppets.

Which leads to

- Rus­sia wasnt about to “con­quer Ukrai­ne” it was about to attempt a mili­ta­ry coup and take­over - using a shock and awe stra­te­gy, much like the one they used in Cri­mea befo­re. That eit­her would have cemen­ted a rus­sia friend­ly lea­ders­hip in Kiev, or wider advan­ces in the east amongst the resul­ting cha­os. (220.000 tro­ops (and only half of tho­se in the Kiev area) still being not near­ly enough to occu­py a Kiev (popu­la­ti­on of 3 mil­li­on) that was resis­ting its occupiers.)

Which then con­flicts with “thats impe­ri­al rus­sia wan­ting to con­quer several coun­tries, so Putin gets his rus­si­an empi­re back -- becau­se the­re posi­tively was no con­que­ring attempt (in the clas­si­cal sen­se) going on -- becau­se rus­sia had far to few tro­ops for that in its army at the time, and in the field -- see:

- The “addi­tio­nal coun­tries rus­sia wan­ted to take over” were Geor­gia and Mol­d­o­wa (land bridge to trans­nis­tria). Poland, Esto­nia, and Lit­hua­nia, were loo­sing their sh*t becau­se of Kali­nin­grad, but they all were Nato coun­tries you wouldnt inva­de with an army of 190.000 peop­le, which had about half of its tro­ops busy in the east of Ukrai­ne at that point.

That then let to the “things werent going remo­te­ly to plan” scenario --

whe­re two tracks of peace con­fe­ren­ces were put into place - whe­re rus­sia could be “pres­sed back down” to the fol­lowing demands:

- Neu­tral Ukraine
- Cri­mea thats not tal­ked about for many years
- secu­ri­ty gua­ran­ties by the west/troop size limits that would allow Ukrai­ne to defend its­elf in the future

Whe­re the point of con­ten­ti­on whe­re all of that bro­ke were the secu­ri­ty gua­ran­ties. Or as wes­tern Pro­pa­gan­da likes to put it “Putin deman­ded such a low troop count on the ukrai­ni­an mili­ta­ry, that on a sub­se­quent attack he would have been able to con­quer it any­how” - so “becau­se of that Ukrai­ne had to ghost rus­sia, and then drop the nego­tia­ti­ons”. In actual­li­ty by then Ukrai­ne was in the midd­le of their own offen­si­ve so.…..

As Davyd Arak­ha­mi­ia put it “the Ukrai­ne was using the nego­tia­ti­ons as a Smo­ke­s­creen to buy time to get more Wea­pons into Ukrai­ne” or, as Davyd Arak­ha­mi­ia did frame it in the same inter­view - Rus­sia tried to nego­tia­te a peace, whe­re upon a second attack Ukrai­ne would not exist anymore.

Tho­se two points he brought up in the inter­view with the ukrai­ni­an broad­cas­ter were never refu­t­ed by Davyd Arak­ha­mi­ia. He only tried to put “Let’s fight” - so his recal­ling of a Boris John­son state­ment into a slight­ly dif­fe­rent con­text after­wards (John­son would have said this to him in a mee­ting about “how to best get the rus­si­ans out of Ukraine”).

So, so far - we have two quin­te­sen­ti­al lies on part of wes­tern propaganda --

1. That Putin was out the­re to con­quer back his very own gre­at rus­sia. (Which is a lie, becau­se the attack was desi­gned as a Shock and awe quick topp­ling of the Ukrai­ni­an government - so was the take­over in Geor­gia (influ­ence ope­ra­ti­on) lea­ving only Mol­d­o­va for a mili­ta­ry take­over - IF Putin dindt want to chal­len­ge Nato with an army of 190.000 peop­le which then also would have had to hold Ukrai­ne against its will - a job that would requi­re rough­ly 400.000+ men, if you were an occu­p­y­ing force.

2. The Ukrai­ne needs its “natio­nal sov­er­eig­n­ty” to sur­vi­ve. So this is the Ukrai­ne cant beco­me a neu­tral coun­try argu­ment - becau­se the Ukrai­ne has to be able to deci­de the strength of its mili­ta­ry on its own - to be able to sur­vi­ve a second rus­si­an attack in the Future. That is a lie, becau­se this could also be sol­ved with secu­ri­ty gua­ran­ties -- which the Ukrai­ne has very bad expe­ri­en­ces with. (The Ukrai­ne essen­ti­al­ly gave up its nuclear wea­pons, as a pre­re­qui­si­te for beco­m­ing an inde­pen­dent sta­te, and got “secu­ri­ty gua­ran­ties” by the US, the UK and a few other coun­tries, in return - that were desi­gned not be worth all that much, becau­se of how they were phra­sed.) A neu­tral Ukrai­ne would be pos­si­ble - if we sol­ved the secu­ri­ty gua­ran­ties issue.

With the second remai­ning issue in that case being rus­si­an poli­ti­cal influ­ence that in a neu­tral Ukrai­ne would still remain active.

Around tho­se two lies, all of the wes­tern framing is build around. The “ukrai­ne has to deci­de on its own” framing, the “nato has an open door poli­cy, and every coun­try must be able to deci­de on its own, if it wants to enter nato” framing, the Putin wants to get back a grea­ter rus­sia framing, becau­se he thinks like a tsar (thats also framing), the Putin is cra­zy framing (the Ukrai­ni­ans are Nazis Nar­ra­ti­ve was acti­ve in Cri­mea, short­ly befo­re the take­over, becau­se it sho­cked popu­la­ti­ons into com­pla­cen­cy - that was the main aim of the rus­sia Pro­pa­gan­da push through its media out­lets in Cri­mea -- so as it was acti­ve back in 2014 - of cour­se that nar­ra­ti­ve was used for the full­sca­le attack on Ukrai­ne as well -- again, as about half of rus­si­as initi­al for­ces were acti­ve in the east. (So popu­la­ti­ons would have asked why - and the “Nazis” nar­ra­ti­ve was alrea­dy in place sin­ce 2014 (and pro­ved very use­ful back then).))

While intern­al­ly in the deci­ding bodies the argu­ment is actual­ly as follows:

At 35min in:

Ali­na Polya­ko­va (Pre­si­dent and CEO of the Cen­ter for Euro­pean Poli­cy Ana­ly­sis (CEPA): I think that signals to me that the­re is gro­wing agree­ment that the only way that we can mana­ge Rus­sia is by going back to the Cold War era stra­te­gy of con­tain­ment, that begins first, defea­ting Rus­sia in Ukrai­ne and second, ree­sta­b­li­shing deter­an­ce by deni­al in Euro­pe that means har­de­ning the Eas­tern flank first and fore­mo­st. Third har­de­ning the soft tar­gets of Rus­si­an influ­ence across the glo­be - uh influ­ence ope­ra­ti­ons in the infor­ma­ti­on space, cyber ope­ra­ti­ons that the Rus­si­ans have beco­me very sophisti­ca­ted at, pushing back against Russia’s use of PMC’s [pri­va­te mili­ta­ry con­trac­tors] to prop up aut­ho­ri­ta­ri­an governments across the glo­be and under­mi­ne demo­cra­tic lea­ders­hip - and fourth, under­mi­ning Rus­si­an domi­nan­ce in its for­mer empi­re, becau­se as long as we have so-called grey zone Sta­tes a hor­ri­ble term but, non-allied sta­tes that are not part of NATO that are not part of the EU in the Euro­pean con­ti­nent this is what pro­vi­des fod­der for Rus­si­an aggres­si­on so Mol­d­o­va is very much under thre­at as we speak, cer­tain­ly Bel­la­rus has alrea­dy beco­me a vassel sta­te of Rus­sia and then we have of cour­se Geor­gia and the other coun­tries of the Cau­ca­sus as well.

[…]

And Rus­sia will come back for NATO.

Han­no Pev­kur, Minis­ter of Defence of the Repu­blic of Esto­nia (30.05.2023):

What Rus­sia wants to achie­ve, the poli­ti­cal goals, let’s be honest - and they, the­se poli­ti­cal goals of Rus­sia have never chan­ged, they want to have a grey-zone bet­ween Rus­sia and NATO, they want to have a con­trol over this grey-zone and this is what they want to achie­ve. And they want to have some “secu­ri­ty gua­ran­tees” for them­sel­ves, sor­ry this is not the Free World and this is what Ukrai­ne is figh­t­ing for at the moment, that they are figh­t­ing for - the Free World and rule-based world and this is why we sup­port Ukrai­ne so this is obvious and then this is why we can never accept this approach of Rus­sia, loo­king at inter­na­tio­nal law.”

src:

(at 43:50 in)

or:

Pau­la Dobri­an­sky, For­mer Under Secreta­ry of Sta­te for Glo­bal Affairs; Seni­or Fel­low at Har­vard Ken­ne­dy School’s Bel­fer Cen­ter for Sci­ence and Inter­na­tio­nal Affairs; Vice Chair, Atlan­tic Coun­cil Scow­croft Cen­ter for Stra­te­gy & Security

But by the way that’s not - for­gi­ve me - that’s not the point. The point here is also not about sei­z­ing of ter­ri­to­ry too, I’d like to say that here it’s about a sov­er­eign country’s poli­ti­cal future, its own right to make its choices. Putin has out­right said that Ukrai­ne does­n’t exist as a coun­try - he has said that over and over and over so it’s not just about ter­ri­to­ry, it is also about sov­er­eign coun­try poli­ti­cal choices and an inva­si­on that actual­ly star­ted back in 2014 and right up to the present.

here at 32min in.

So that Ukrai­ne has to remain a sov­er­eign coun­try (to deci­de on its own mili­ta­ry strenght, to never be poli­ti­cal­ly influ­en­ced by rus­sia ever again (only by credi­tors.. 😉 ) then also extents to whats hap­pe­ning right now -

here are the chan­ges from the draft of the Bür­gen­stock con­fe­rence that Switz­er­land pro­vi­ded to all invi­ted sta­tes on the 28th of May com­pa­red to the final draft --

https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/06/13/7187968/

Here is what Sit­z­er­land had put in the­re initi­al­ly and what the Ukrai­ne has lob­bied to replace it with:

2. Ter­ri­to­ri­al Inte­gri­ty and the UN Charter

– Old wor­d­ing: the pre­vious sum­mit decisi­on ver­si­on crea­ted a legal win­dow to inclu­de Ukrai­ne aban­do­ning part of its ter­ri­to­ry in the con­di­ti­ons of “sus­tainab­le peace with Rus­sia”, if necessary.

– New wor­d­ing: the new draft decisi­on clear­ly sta­tes that the basis for sus­tainab­le peace will be only “a solu­ti­on based on the princip­le of respect for the ter­ri­to­ri­al inte­gri­ty and sov­er­eig­n­ty of all states”.

src: click

also

3. Alter­na­ti­ve Peace Formulas

– Old wor­d­ing: the pre­vious draft blur­red the mea­ning of the Peace For­mu­la and ope­ned up space for inter­na­tio­nal dis­cus­sion of all alter­na­ti­ve visi­ons of peace, such as the Chinese-Brazilian one, which envi­sa­ges a halt to the streng­t­he­ning of Ukraine’s Armed For­ces and a ces­sa­ti­on of hostilities.

– New wor­d­ing: the new wor­d­ing sta­tes that only peace pro­po­sals that com­ply with inter­na­tio­nal law (i.e. an uncon­di­tio­nal return of the 1991 bor­ders, unless revi­sed by Ukrai­ne its­elf) and the UN Char­ter (in par­ti­cu­lar, Ukraine’s uncon­di­tio­nal right to con­ti­nue repel­ling Rus­si­an aggres­si­on and libe­ra­ting the occu­p­ied ter­ri­to­ries) will be taken into account.

src: click

Tho­se are now points that are acti­ve in the final com­mu­ni­que that 78 coun­tries signed at Bür­gen­stock - and accord­ing to Ser­giy Sydo­ren­ko (Ukrai­ni­an Jour­na­list, spon­so­red by USAID), same source arti­cle, also the main rea­son, that 15 coun­tries refu­sed to sign, and more than two dozen of coun­tries down­gra­ded their par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on from Presidential/Ministerial level to minis­ters or even their deputies.

With he final gag being the following:

Vik­to­ria Kir­ner vor 14 Stunden

Ukrai­ne: Ein Land des glo­ba­len Südens könn­te zwei­ten Frie­dens­gip­fel ausrichten
Die Ukrai­ne ist der Ansicht, dass ein zwei­tes Gip­fel­tref­fen, bei dem Kiews Vor­schlä­ge für einen Frie­den mit Russ­land erör­tert wer­den sol­len, von einem Land des glo­ba­len Südens aus­ge­rich­tet wer­den könn­te, wie ein hoch­ran­gi­ger Beam­ter der Nach­rich­ten­agen­tur Interfax-Ukraine am Frei­tag sag­te. Das berich­tet die Nach­rich­ten­agen­tur Reuters.

Mehr als 90 Län­der nah­men letz­te Woche am ers­ten Gip­fel in der Schweiz teil, da die Ukrai­ne eine brei­te Unter­stüt­zung für ihren Plan zur Been­di­gung des Krie­ges sucht.

Mos­kau, das nicht ein­ge­la­den war, bezeich­ne­te das Ergeb­nis des Gip­fels - ein Kom­mu­ni­qué, das von den meis­ten Teil­neh­mern unter­zeich­net, aber ins­be­son­de­re von Indi­en, Bra­si­li­en und Saudi-Arabien abge­lehnt wur­de - als “nahe­zu null”.

Wir haben meh­re­re Län­der [die sich als Gast­ge­ber anbie­ten], und ich kann mit hoher Wahr­schein­lich­keit sagen, dass ein sol­cher Gip­fel in einem der Län­der des glo­ba­len Südens statt­fin­den könn­te”, wur­de der Prä­si­den­ten­be­ra­ter Ihor Zhovk­va von Interfax-Ukraine zitiert.

Die Ukrai­ne wol­le, dass der nächs­te Gip­fel vor Ende des Jah­res ein­be­ru­fen wer­de, sag­te er und füg­te hin­zu, dass Russ­land ein­ge­la­den wer­den kön­ne, wenn es bereit sei, den von der Ukrai­ne vor­ge­leg­ten Fahr­plan zu berück­sich­ti­gen und kei­ne Ulti­ma­ten zu stellen.

src: click

The­re are now ongo­ing “Peace con­fe­ren­ces” - twice a year - with chan­ging host sta­tes. Whe­re the Ukrai­ne will always invi­te their “guar­di­an sta­tes”, based on the Bür­gen­stock Com­mu­ni­quee (and Selen­sky­js 10 point peace for­mu­la), whe­re the Ukrai­ne - cur­r­ent­ly sta­tes, at this very minu­te, it will only ever invi­te Rus­sia, if rus­sia agrees to the “Peace for­mu­la frame­work” estab­lis­hed at Bür­gen­stock -- which in its­elf alrea­dy inclu­des that it has to be based on “the princip­le of respect for the ter­ri­to­ri­al inte­gri­ty” and “sov­er­eig­n­ty of all states”. 

With the first one being the stand in for “the Ukrai­ne needs Cri­mea and the Don­bas back, befo­re we can invi­te Rus­sia to our peace for­mu­la con­fe­rence”, and the second part “sov­er­eig­n­ty of all sta­tes” being the stand in for:

3. Alter­na­ti­ve Peace Formulas

– Old wor­d­ing: the pre­vious draft blur­red the mea­ning of the Peace For­mu­la and ope­ned up space for inter­na­tio­nal dis­cus­sion of all alter­na­ti­ve visi­ons of peace, such as the Chinese-Brazilian one, which envi­sa­ges a halt to the streng­t­he­ning of Ukraine’s Armed For­ces and a ces­sa­ti­on of hos­ti­li­ties.

New wor­d­ing: the new wor­d­ing sta­tes that only peace pro­po­sals that com­ply with inter­na­tio­nal law (i.e. an uncon­di­tio­nal return of the 1991 bor­ders, unless revi­sed by Ukrai­ne its­elf) and the UN Char­ter (in par­ti­cu­lar, Ukraine’s uncon­di­tio­nal right to con­ti­nue repel­ling Rus­si­an aggres­si­on and libe­ra­ting the occu­p­ied ter­ri­to­ries) will be taken into account.

We need to be allo­wed to deci­de how lar­ge our army is, and what its aim/goal is in the future.”

And only if rus­sia agrees to that frame­work, it can be invi­ted to the next “peace conference”.

Die Ukrai­ne wol­le, dass der nächs­te Gip­fel vor Ende des Jah­res ein­be­ru­fen wer­de, sag­te er und füg­te hin­zu, dass Russ­land ein­ge­la­den wer­den kön­ne, wenn es bereit sei, den von der Ukrai­ne vor­ge­leg­ten Fahr­plan zu berück­sich­ti­gen und kei­ne Ulti­ma­ten zu stellen.

To ensu­re this, the Ukrai­ne insis­ted on remo­ving the fol­lowing pas­sa­ge from the ori­gi­nal draft of the final com­mu­ni­quee Switz­er­land sent out to all atten­ding sta­tes on the 28th of May - entirely:

4. Invol­ve­ment of Russia
– Old wor­d­ing: the ear­lier ver­si­on tur­ned Rus­sia from an aggres­sor into a par­ti­ci­pant in peace talks, requi­ring only vague “confidence-building mea­su­res” on nuclear and food security.

– New wor­d­ing: this sec­tion has been rewrit­ten from scratch. The Swiss agreed not to men­ti­on Rus­sia at all in the pro­vi­si­on on peace talks, ins­tead refer­ring to “all par­ties”. The­re is no lon­ger a wea­ke­ned requi­re­ment for “confidence-building mea­su­res”, but ins­tead “spe­ci­fic actions” are requi­red. And most import­ant­ly, the refe­ren­ces to a “second peace sum­mit” that hin­ted at a com­mit­ment to invi­te Rus­sia to par­ti­ci­pa­te have been removed.

src: click

So why crea­te tho­se “peace sum­mits” at all?

(If only 78 coun­tries out of 193 UN coun­tries signed and the tal­ked about points at tho­se con­fe­ren­ces still remain points from Selen­sky­js 10 Point peace for­mu­la, which now only beco­me more con­tro­ver­si­al (inter­na­ti­nal tri­bu­nals reques­ted, repe­ra­ti­on pay­ments reques­ted, cri­mea and don­bas back alrea­dy part of the “glo­bal peace sum­mit frame­work” (ter­ri­to­ri­al inte­gri­ty), we deci­de how big our mili­ta­ry is alrea­dy part of the “glo­bal peace sum­mit” frame­work, the last rus­si­an sol­dier has to lea­ve Ukrai­ne -- all having to be agreed on by Rus­sia -- BEFORE Rus­sia can be invited.…)

see also:

Ukrai­ni­an ambassa­dor to esto­nia in the fol­lowing Pod­cast on the 12th of June, nine hours after Andrij Jer­mak sta­ted “we want to invi­te rus­sia to the second peace for­mu­la con­fe­rence” for the first time: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_782Vs76ask at 16:20 min. in - 

So Rus­sia may be invi­ted for the next - for the second peace sum­mit, but — befo­re we should agree on the frame­work of this nego­tia­ti­on pro­cess and on joint inter­na­tio­nal plan for peace in Ukrai­ne. ONLY at this sta­ge, rus­sia can be invi­ted, and can be part of this process.“

-- if you need a second source…

Well thats easy…

As the wes­tern two quint­essen­ti­al pro­pa­gan­da lies

1. The tsar Putin is hell­bent on con­que­ring back gre­at rus­sia (Putin has sta­ted about five times in the past two weeks, that he would not attack Nato, and that he would be rea­dy for a sei­ze fire after he has the four Ukrai­ni­an oblasts rus­sia “offi­cial­ly anne­xed” under his con­trol (see also this Reu­ters exclu­si­ve), and that he is rea­dy to talk with the US about the euro­pean secu­ri­ty struc­tu­re, if tho­se talks also would inclu­de Ukrai­ne, … )

and

2. Ukrai­ne NEEDS to stay poli­ti­cal­ly sov­er­eign - which in the final Bür­gen­stock com­mu­ni­quee - as a phra­se - was a stand in for “Ukrai­ne needs to be able to deci­de what size of mili­ta­ry it has, and for what purpose”

Beco­me more and more obvious over time (becau­se Rus­sia will not able to con­quer other euro­pean sta­tes anymore) ---

more and more of the public will demand peace talks.

And for that we alrea­dy have the “glo­bal peace for­mu­la frame­work” in which rus­sia has to agree to “ter­ri­to­ri­al inte­gri­ty and Ukraine’s uncon­di­tio­nal right to con­ti­nue repel­ling Rus­si­an aggres­si­on and libe­ra­ting the occu­p­ied ter­ri­to­ries (sov­er­eig­n­ty) has been writ­ten in, which rus­sia HAS TO AGREE TO, to even be invited.

And so the two quint­essen­ti­al wes­tern pro­pa­gan­da lies can con­ti­nue for ano­t­her two years.

Peace con­fe­ren­ces” being held with chan­ged out host coun­tries, twice a year. Until rus­sia suc­cumbs to the wes­tern - sor­ry “Glo­bal Peace For­mu­la Frame­work” demands.

Wer­te­ge­sell­schaft. Ken­nen sie sich aus.

But the public will be strung along by the sin­gle out thats left - and that is, that if you dont do it exact­ly that way --

RUSSIA WILL COME FOR NATO COUNTRIES.

Which is and always was thre­at infla­ti­on, and the­re­fo­re wes­tern pro­pa­gan­da. Why is it less likely that “rus­sia will do it again” - well, this is a war of attri­ti­on which loses rus­sia peop­le at the rate of 800 per day on a good day (thats over the ent­i­re bor­der). And second -- have you che­cked the demo­gra­phic charts for rus­sia recent­ly? In five years time only 8% of their male popu­la­ti­on is capa­ble of being draf­ted anymore.

They cur­r­ent­ly had a popu­la­ti­on spike at 37-38 years old, and alrea­dy are a coun­try in ter­mi­nal demo­gra­phic decli­ne, which is why Kras­t­ev even sug­gested that the attack on Ukrai­ne was moun­ted to get more young peop­le back into rus­si­as fold, when the war started.

Thats the army thats batt­ling NATO in 2030?

8% only coun­ting males is 11 mil­li­on peop­le, 2/3 (thats the ger­ma­ny in WW2 rate, which had 13 mil­li­on sol­di­ers with a stan­ding popu­la­ti­on of 40 mil­li­on males) of which you need to keep the eco­no­my going - that lea­ves you with 3.7 mil­li­on poten­ti­al soldiers.

Against Poland with a popu­la­ti­on of 37 mil­li­on (2.4 mio males in the same draf­ting bra­cket) with Nato allies? Strai­ght into WW3?

Oh yeah - I for­got - this is becau­se of the wes­tern rule of law that has to be uphold, for about 3-4 more years, then the cur­rent rate of attri­ti­on will make sure rus­sia will be unab­le to mount an addi­tio­nal attack over the next 10 years… (Not becau­se of peop­le, but becau­se of the cur­rent attri­ti­on rate on mili­ta­ry equip­ment (cur­rent pro­duc­tion rates alrea­dy accoun­ted for).)

And on top of this - Chi­na loo­ks at all this and then tells rus­sia, yes - sure, go ahead and attack our second lar­gest export mar­ket, so our first lar­gest export mar­ket gets drawn into a war as well.

Statistical uptick of russians “about to attack”, and russian airplanes “about to fire” very likely in the upcoming days…

21. Juni 2024

Ukrai­ne may fire US-provided mis­si­les into Rus­sia whe­re­ver it is com­ing under attack, Pen­ta­gon says

src: click (ABC)

This is not about geo­gra­phy. It’s about com­mon sen­se,” said spo­kes­man Army Maj. Char­lie Dietz. “If Rus­sia is attacking or about to attack from its ter­ri­to­ry into Ukrai­ne, it only makes sen­se to allow Ukrai­ne to hit back [on the attacking par­ty that was only “about to attack them” so - I think we call that first stri­ke­ab­le, right?] against the for­ces that are hit­ting it from across the border.”

Addi­tio­nal­ly, they can use air defen­se sys­tems sup­plied by the United Sta­tes to take Rus­si­an pla­nes out of the sky, even if tho­se Rus­si­an pla­nes are in Rus­si­an air­space, if they’re about to fire into Ukrai­ni­an air­space,” Dietz said in a statement.

I’m tel­ling you, that rus­si­an was about to fire! Good thing I saw him, befo­re he did!

So - ukrai­ni­an attacks on rus­sia are now limi­ted by “wait a minu­te, do you think we might need tho­se rockets to attack sup­ply rou­tes in Crimea”?

Ah, good were the days - when a Car­lo Masa­la would tell ger­man audi­en­ces, that the batt­le over Lyman was “very” important, becau­se from the­re - Ukrai­nes liter­al­ly could reach all train hubs, they alrea­dy could attack befo­re, becau­se they alrea­dy were wit­hin ran­ge before…

Now new in the port­fo­lio of “This by no means is sala­mi sli­ce tac­tics, this is a “Lear­ning Cur­ve”” regar­ding what Ger­ma­ny needs to green­light for the Ukrai­ni­ans to use at any given moment: They can now use ever­ything, to fire at anything - if they think - it was about to fire at Ukraine.

Eska­la­ti­ons­spi­ra­le? I wo -- “Lern­kur­ve”, hat uns Clau­dia Major von der Stif­tung Wis­sen­schaft und Poli­tik doch bei­gebracht!

edit: Wait -- lets not for­get the “This is not about geo­gra­phy. It’s about com­mon sen­se,…” part! So -- what was the pro­vo­ca­ti­on that lead to the US esca­la­ting in that fashion? You know, from only allowing mis­si­les to attack rus­si­an for­ces in rus­sia, near Char­kiev? Oh, right… The­re was none. The esca­la­ti­on real­ly was just “about com­mon sen­se” and did not need any “geo­gra­phic restric­tions” becau­se they were soooo two weeks ago.

edit: Es gibt aber auch wie­der gute Nach­rich­ten. Der Stan­dard wider­spricht gera­de Forbes…

Don’t Fear Russia’s 3.3-Ton Glide-Bomb. It’s Mas­si­ve Over­kill When A 1.1-Ton Glide-Bomb Will Kill You Just Fine. (For­bes)

Russ­land setz­te neue ton­nen­schwe­re Bom­be im Krieg ein (Der Standard)

Auch des­we­gen hat Kiew neben einer ver­stärk­ten Flug­ab­wehr auch immer wie­der gefor­dert, mit west­li­chen Waf­fen auch mili­tä­ri­sche Zie­le über rus­si­schem Gebiet angrei­fen zu können.

Aso - wegen der Bom­be die eh kei­nen Unter­schied macht.

Klar, war­um bin ich nicht drauf gekommen…

But as a glide-bomb, the FAB-3000 also would be unwie­l­dy and likely lacking in ran­ge [30km]. Don’t worry about the 3.3-ton FAB-3000. Ins­tead, worry about the Rus­si­an glide-bombs that aren’t imp­rac­ti­cal for ever­y­day use: the FAB-500, FAB-1000 and FAB-1500.

src: click

Food security now also includes metals

19. Juni 2024

Gre­at news from good friends at Euro­pean Prav­da! They actual­ly mana­ged to influ­ence Switz­er­land to rephra­se their final Bür­gen­stock com­mu­ni­quee in 5 vital points:

Ukrai­ne Peace Sum­mit turns hard on Rus­sia. How lea­ders amen­ded the final decisi­on under criticism

THURSDAY, 13 JUNE 2024 — SERGIY SYDORENKO, EUROPEAN PRAVDA

Har­sh cri­ti­cism of the agreed draft reso­lu­ti­on of the Peace Sum­mit, voi­ced both in Ukrai­ne and by Ukraine’s allies, for­ced the orga­nisers to make con­ces­si­ons. Switz­er­land, which is orga­ni­sing the Glo­bal Peace Sum­mit, sent a radi­cal­ly revi­sed docu­ment to all capi­tals of the par­ti­ci­pa­ting coun­tries, cor­rec­ting key issu­es high­ligh­ted by Euro­pean Pravda.

The updated draft is ent­i­re­ly accep­ta­ble for Ukrai­ne. It expli­ci­tly calls the war “Rus­si­an aggres­si­on.” Loo­p­ho­les that could have paved the way for ter­ri­to­ri­al con­ces­si­ons from Ukrai­ne were remo­ved from the text. Several sta­tes that had plan­ned to attend the Peace Sum­mit in Switz­er­land have deci­ded not to go the­re after the draft decisi­on was chan­ged in favour of Ukraine.

Euro­pean Prav­da has lear­ned the details of the nego­tia­ti­ons and the decisi­on that will be adop­ted this weekend.

Behind the sce­nes of the Peace Summit
The time­li­ne of the­se events is cru­cial: it shows how urgent the chan­ges that occur­red over the past week were.

The idea to hold the Peace Sum­mit in Switz­er­land was agreed upon at the begin­ning of the year. On 10 April, Switz­er­land announ­ced the agreed date and loca­ti­on for the sum­mit. Lea­ders of about 160 coun­tries, four inter­na­tio­nal orga­ni­sa­ti­ons (UN, EU, Coun­cil of Euro­pe, OSCE), the Pope and the Ecu­me­ni­cal Patri­arch were invi­ted to the Bür­gen­stock Alpi­ne Spa. It was pre­de­ter­mi­ned that Rus­sia would not be pre­sent at the first Peace Sum­mit, which Ukrai­ne deman­ded in the first place.

Both Kyiv and Bern aimed to adopt a decisi­on fol­lowing the sum­mit. Howe­ver, the wor­d­ing nee­ded to be agreed upon by all participants.

Pre­pa­ra­ti­on for this docu­ment star­ted more than two mon­ths ago. Euro­pean Prav­da has the April draft of the joint com­mu­ni­qué, whe­re the sum­mit dates were still ten­ta­ti­ve. That docu­ment was pre­pa­red in Kyiv and was ent­i­re­ly accep­ta­ble for Ukrai­ne, adhe­ring to the important red lines for Ukrai­ni­an society.

Howe­ver, Switz­er­land per­sua­ded Ukrai­ne to sof­ten it as much as pos­si­ble, con­si­de­ring the wis­hes of all par­ti­ci­pants. On 28 May, a com­pro­mi­se ver­si­on was sent from Bern to all capi­tals, and initi­al­ly, Kyiv had to agree to it.

Ever­ything chan­ged when the public lear­ned that this draft was dan­ge­rous for Ukraine.

The dis­cus­sion began with an arti­cle by Euro­pean Prav­da, publis­hed on 5 June. The next day, on 6 June, Kyiv was for­ced to make public state­ments asser­ting that “Ukrai­ne will not retre­at from the Peace For­mu­la.” This fue­led dis­cus­sions in the capi­tals of Ukraine’s allies, which were also not thril­led with the wor­d­ing of the Swiss docu­ment. At least a few of them con­ta­c­ted Bern with a pro­po­sal to revi­se the joint statement.

On 9 June, Switz­er­land had sent a com­ple­te­ly new draft to all coun­tries. Amen­ding the com­mu­ni­qué took mere days, not mon­ths as before.

What has changed
The summit’s decisi­on remains unch­an­ged in for­mat and struc­tu­re. This is a two-page docu­ment dedi­ca­ted to three issu­es: nuclear secu­ri­ty, food secu­ri­ty and the pri­so­ners of war. Key issu­es that lay out­side the­se points have been addres­sed though.

Rus­si­an Aggression
– Old wor­d­ing: The May draft decisi­on of the Peace Sum­mit did not men­ti­on the word “aggres­si­on,” mea­ning the inter­na­tio­nal crime whe­re Rus­sia is the per­pe­tra­tor and Ukrai­ne the victim.

– New wor­d­ing: This has been amen­ded. The joint com­mu­ni­qué now refers to “the aggres­si­on of the Rus­si­an Fede­ra­ti­on against Ukraine”.

Ter­ri­to­ri­al Inte­gri­ty and the UN Charter
– Old wor­d­ing: the pre­vious sum­mit decisi­on ver­si­on crea­ted a legal win­dow to inclu­de Ukrai­ne aban­do­ning part of its ter­ri­to­ry in the con­di­ti­ons of “sus­tainab­le peace with Rus­sia”, if necessary.

– New wor­d­ing: the new draft decisi­on clear­ly sta­tes that the basis for sus­tainab­le peace will be only “a solu­ti­on based on the princip­le of respect for the ter­ri­to­ri­al inte­gri­ty and sov­er­eig­n­ty of all sta­tes”. [Cri­mea back to Ukrai­ne, and no neu­tra­li­ty that inclu­des “limi­ta­ti­on on mili­ta­ry forces”]

Alter­na­ti­ve Peace Formulas
– Old wor­d­ing: the pre­vious draft blur­red the mea­ning of the Peace For­mu­la and ope­ned up space for inter­na­tio­nal dis­cus­sion of all alter­na­ti­ve visi­ons of peace, such as the Chinese-Brazilian one, which envi­sa­ges a halt to the streng­t­he­ning of Ukraine’s Armed For­ces and a ces­sa­ti­on of hostilities.

– New wor­d­ing: the new wor­d­ing sta­tes that only peace pro­po­sals that com­ply with inter­na­tio­nal law (i.e. an uncon­di­tio­nal return of the 1991 bor­ders, unless revi­sed by Ukrai­ne its­elf) and the UN Char­ter (in par­ti­cu­lar, Ukraine’s uncon­di­tio­nal [no for­ce limi­ta­ti­on] right to con­ti­nue repel­ling Rus­si­an aggres­si­on and libe­ra­ting the occu­p­ied ter­ri­to­ries) will be taken into account.

Invol­ve­ment of Russia
– Old wor­d­ing: the ear­lier ver­si­on tur­ned Rus­sia from an aggres­sor into a par­ti­ci­pant in peace talks, requi­ring only vague “confidence-building mea­su­res” on nuclear and food security.

– New wor­d­ing: this sec­tion has been rewrit­ten from scratch. The Swiss agreed not to men­ti­on Rus­sia at all in the pro­vi­si­on on peace talks, ins­tead refer­ring to “all par­ties”. The­re is no lon­ger a wea­ke­ned requi­re­ment for “confidence-building mea­su­res”, but ins­tead “spe­ci­fic actions” are requi­red. And most import­ant­ly, the refe­ren­ces to a “second peace sum­mit” that hin­ted at a com­mit­ment to invi­te Rus­sia to par­ti­ci­pa­te have been removed.

Food Secu­ri­ty
– New addi­ti­on: The updated docu­ment inclu­des the state­ment that “attacks on mer­chant ships in ports and along the ent­i­re rou­te, as well as against civi­li­an ports and civi­li­an port infra­st­ruc­tu­re, are unac­cep­ta­ble”. This falls under the glo­bal food secu­ri­ty sec­tion but app­lies to all civi­li­an ves­sels, inclu­ding con­tai­ner ships or tho­se expor­ting Ukrai­ni­an metals. Con­ti­nued attacks would block Russia’s par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on in peace initiatives.

The­se signi­fi­cant chan­ges ensu­re that the new draft of the sum­mit decisi­on is more accep­ta­ble to Ukrai­ne, rein­for­cing its ter­ri­to­ri­al inte­gri­ty, addres­sing Rus­si­an aggres­si­on accu­rate­ly and main­tai­ning strin­gent con­di­ti­ons on peace nego­tia­ti­ons invol­ving Russia.

The docu­ment is accep­ta­ble for Ukraine
The Joint Com­mu­ni­qué on a Peace Frame­work in its new ver­si­on aligns with Ukraine’s inte­rests. Alt­hough the­re are still minor remarks, the main dan­gers have been addres­sed. Cur­r­ent­ly, the draft is not yet final: the­re is still a pos­si­bi­li­ty of point chan­ges on 13-14 June. Howe­ver, Euro­pean Pravda’s sources are incli­ned to belie­ve that the updated con­tent of the decisi­on will remain.

Rea­listic expec­ta­ti­ons are necessa­ry. This sum­mit will not lead to a bre­akthrough or end the war. Ukrai­ne is merely taking one of the first steps on a long path. Howe­ver, it is cru­cial that this step is in the right direc­tion and does not crea­te new problems.

The hig­her ambi­ti­on of the docu­ment came at a cost:

several coun­tries have decli­ned to par­ti­ci­pa­te in the sum­mit. As of 5 June, Switz­er­land offi­cial­ly announ­ced that it had “recei­ved more than 80 con­fir­ma­ti­ons of atten­dance at the level of heads of sta­tes and governments”, and the total num­ber of con­fir­med atten­de­es, as repor­ted by offi­cials, excee­ded 100. Howe­ver, in the fol­lowing days, this phra­se had to be remo­ved from the event’s web­site, and now it reads that “around 90 sta­tes have con­fir­med their par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on in the Sum­mit on Peace in Ukrai­ne, most of them at head of sta­te or government level”.

Sources of Euro­pean Prav­da repor­ted that, in rea­li­ty, about 15 coun­tries have “pau­sed” their atten­dance. In addi­ti­on, the num­ber of tho­se who have signal­led a demo­ti­on from the pre­si­den­ti­al or prime minis­te­ri­al level to the level of minis­ters or even their depu­ties is in the dozens.

Alt­hough it is obvious that due to the recent chan­ges, the sum­mit will be atten­ded by fewer sta­tes than initi­al­ly anti­ci­pa­ted by Ban­ko­va Street [whe­re the Ukrai­ni­an President’s Office is loca­ted] eight days ago, it is bet­ter to have a sum­mit of like-minded peop­le than to make con­ces­si­ons on issu­es that are cri­ti­cal for the state.

Ser­giy Sydorenko

Euro­pean Prav­da, Editor

src: click

Final­ly!

Bildschirmfoto 2024 06 19 um 07 54 42
src: click

Da kann der Krieg ja end­lich weitergehen.

edit: Fun­ding for good friends at Euro­pean Prav­da pro­vi­ded by:

Inter­na­tio­nal donors sup­port the pro­ject finan­cial­ly, on the pro­vi­so that they do not inter­fe­re in edi­to­ri­al poli­cy. Finan­cial sup­port was pro­vi­ded by the Euro­pean Endow­ment for Demo­cra­cy, Inter­na­tio­nal Renais­sance Foun­da­ti­on, Coun­cil of Euro­pe, and NATO Public Diplo­ma­cy Divi­si­on (PDD).

Sin­ce June 2016, Euro­pean Prav­da has been co-financed by the Euro­pean Uni­on. Par­ti­al co-financing is pro­vi­ded from the NATO PDD and from adver­ti­sing reve­nues. From 2018, the main co-donor of the pro­ject is the Natio­nal Endow­ment for Demo­cra­cy (NED), fun­ded from the US Con­gress budget.[3]

Accord­ing to the edi­tor, Ser­hii Sido­ren­ko, “EP” is a non-profit orga­niz­a­ti­on, as of Febru­a­ry 2021.[8]

src: click

Great success!

18. Juni 2024

Eine Absa­ge aus Pro­test, zwei Rück­zie­her und ein ver­schwun­de­ner Prinz: Auf dem Bür­gen­stock rum­pel­te es hin­ter den Kulissen

src: click (NZZ)

Zeit für Medienintervention!

DIE ANDEREN WAREN SCHULD! SIE SIND DIE BÖSEN! DIE ANDEREN SIND DIE BÖSEN!

Am Ukraine-Gipfel zer­schell­ten diplo­ma­ti­sche Hoff­nun­gen an den geo­po­li­ti­schen Rea­li­tä­ten. Was beweg­te wich­ti­ge Schwel­len­län­der, Sand ins Getrie­be des Frie­dens­pro­zes­ses zu streuen?

Zum Abschluss des Gip­fel­tref­fens auf dem Bür­gen­stock bemüh­ten sich die Schwei­zer Gast­ge­ber, das Bild eines rund­um geglück­ten Gross­an­las­ses zu zeich­nen. Doch bei einem genaue­ren Blick zeigt die­ses Bild kla­re Ris­se. Berns Hoff­nung auf eine brei­te Ein­heits­front für den Frie­den zer­schell­te an den geo­po­li­ti­schen Rea­li­tä­ten. Sym­pto­me dafür gab es auf dem Bür­gen­stock und in den Tagen davor zuhauf: Ein Staats­prä­si­dent sag­te unter wüten­dem Pro­test sei­ne Teil­nah­me kurz­fris­tig ab, zwei Län­der des­avou­ier­ten die Schweiz mit ihrem Nein zur Schluss­erklä­rung, nach­dem die Gast­ge­ber sie bereits zum zustim­men­den Lager gezählt hatten.

Zuletzt ver­wei­ger­ten ins­ge­samt 15 von 93 teil­neh­men­den Staa­ten ihre Unter­schrift unter die Bürgenstock-Deklaration. Das ist ein unüb­lich hoher Anteil. Denn bei sol­chen Gip­fel­tref­fen wird nor­ma­ler­wei­se im Vor­aus ein Kon­sens gesucht, oder man einigt sich not­falls in letz­ter Minu­te auf eine ver­wäs­ser­te Variante.

Also gre­at suc­cess! Accord­ing, to the aus­tri­an News­pa­per “Der Stan­dard” - die NZZ titelt der­weil bereits 

Mos­kaus sieht sich bestä­tigt - Kiew zieht zwie­späl­ti­ge Bilanz”

Gre­at suc­cess, much hope, very! For next ses­si­on of Selen­skyj peace for­mu­la sum­mit! Why in Sau­di Ara­bia - AGAIN (Copen­ha­gen, Jed­dah (KSA), Mal­ta and Davos)? Becau­se coun­try very neu­tral, and gre­at democracy!

Much!