Autorenarchiv

Kannst dir nicht ausdenken sowas…

15. Juni 2024

Bildschirmfoto 2024 06 15 um 23 04 08
src: click

Bür­gen­stock - Lis­te der Teil­neh­mer die EDA lis­tet Kapoor, Pavan als “Minis­te­ri­al Level” (Stri­cherl in der Mitte).

die NZZ nimmt das dann als Quel­le für ihren Datenjournalismus:

Bildschirmfoto 2024 06 15 um 22 56 14
src: click

Wider­spricht sich dann aber selbst zwei­mal im Text…

Meh­re­re euro­päi­sche Staats­chefs beto­nen auf dem Bür­gen­stock, es sei beson­ders wich­tig, sich nicht nur «in einer west­li­chen Echo­kam­mer» (Öster­reichs Bun­des­kanz­ler Karl Neham­mer) zu bewe­gen – umso zen­tra­ler sei etwa die Teil­nah­me von Indi­en oder Bra­si­li­en. Bei­de Län­der sind anwe­send, aller­dings nicht auf Ministerebene.

Genau hun­dert inter­na­tio­na­le Dele­ga­tio­nen kom­men auf den Bür­gen­stock. Mehr als die Hälf­te der Län­der schi­cken ihre Staats- oder Regie­rungs­chefs. Ande­re Län­der, wie etwa Indi­en (bei dem eine Teil­nah­me unsi­cher war), schi­cken einen Minister.

Alle wer­den ein­zeln vor­ge­stellt: Bun­des­prä­si­den­tin Amherd und der ukrai­ni­sche Prä­si­dent Wolo­di­mir Selen­ski mit dem indi­schen Ver­tre­ter Pavan Kapoor (Mit­te).

Deutsch­spra­chi­ger Jour­na­lis­mus, mei­ne Damen und Her­ren! Qua­li­tät wohin man schaut.

edit: Fun with data:

Non EU coun­tries that sent their head of state/head of gouvernment:

Bildschirmfoto 2024 06 16 um 00 23 24

Adds up to rough­ly 910 mil­li­on people.

EU sta­tes have rough­ly 450 mil­li­on people.

(I just bun­ched them tog­e­ther the few that didnt send their head of state/head of government arent worth buil­ding an extra cate­go­ry for at this time of the day.. 😉 .).

Non EU coun­tries that sent a minis­te­ri­al representative:

Bildschirmfoto 2024 06 16 um 09 06 01

Popu­la­ti­ons add up to rough­ly 2.2 Billion.

So repre­sen­ta­ti­ves of 3.5 bil­li­on peop­le in the world were “actively engaged”.

Cur­rent world population:

8.1 bil­li­on

Propaganda? Doch nicht bei Ukrinform!

15. Juni 2024

Glo­bal PEACE SUMMIT in Switz­er­land: how will Putin be FORCED to peace? | Spe­cial report

UATV, Ukrai­ni­an public broad­cas­ter, ope­ra­ted by Ukrin­form

src: click

The Natio­nal News Agen­cy of Ukrai­ne (Ukrai­ni­an: Українське національне інформаційне агентство), or Ukrin­form (Ukrai­ni­an: Укрінформ), is a sta­te infor­ma­ti­on and news agen­cy, and inter­na­tio­nal broad­cas­ter of Ukrai­ne. It was foun­ded in 1918 during the Ukrai­ni­an War of Independence[6] as the Bureau of Ukrai­ni­an Press (BUP). The first direc­tor of the agen­cy was Dmy­t­ro Dont­sov, when the agen­cy name was The Ukrai­ni­an Tele­graph Agency.[7]

[…]

Ukrin­form deli­vers news sto­ries in Ukrai­ni­an, Eng­lish, Ger­man, Spa­nish, French, Japa­ne­se, and Polish.[8]

Sie­he auch:

War­um ist die “ein (mög­li­cher) Weg zum Frie­den” For­mu­lie­rung heu­te eigent­lich so in…

edit: Oh btw. India only will be repre­sen­ted by an Ambassa­dor led diplo­ma­tic dele­ga­ti­on, even though gre­at and not all pro­pa­gan­distic news source Ukrin­form will inform you that Indi­as pre­si­dent is coming.

India has cho­sen to send Ambassa­dor Pawan Kapoor, the most seni­or care­er diplo­mat after Vinay Kwa­tra, to Switzerland.

src: click

The most seni­or care­er diplo­mat after the Vinay Kwa­tra (Cur­rent for­eign secreta­ry of india)?

I’m ama­zed!

Whats Ambassa­dor Pawan Kapoors cur­rent posi­ti­on in the indian diplo­ma­tic corps?

Pavan Kapoor (born 24 Decem­ber 1966) is an Indian diplo­mat and for­mer Indian Ambassa­dor to Rus­sia. He pre­vious­ly ser­ved as India’s High Com­mis­sio­ner to Mozam­bi­que and the King­dom of Swa­zi­land from Janu­a­ry 2014 to ear­ly 2016, Ambassa­dor to Isra­el from March 2016 to Sep­tem­ber 2019, and Ambassa­dor to the United Arab Emi­ra­tes from Octo­ber 2019 to Novem­ber 2021.[2]

Care­er
Pavan Kapoor joi­ned the Indian For­eign Ser­vice in 1990. In his diplo­ma­tic care­er, he has ser­ved in dif­fe­rent Indian Mis­si­ons abroad, the Minis­try of Exter­nal Affairs, and the Prime Minister’s Office in New Delhi. He also ser­ved as an inter­na­tio­nal civil ser­vant with the Com­mon­wealth Secre­ta­ri­at in London.[2]

src: click

Wait - India is sen­ding its for­mer rus­si­an ambassa­dor to the Ukrai­ni­an Glo­bal Peace sum­mit in Bür­gen­stock? You know, the one that joi­ned the Indian For­eign Ser­vice in 1990?

Wait - wait, when was indi­as second most seni­or care­er diplo­mat appoin­ted to his for­mer job - you know, as the indian ambassa­dor to russia?

Shri Pavan Kapoor (IFS: 1990), pre­sent­ly Ambassa­dor of India to United Arab Emi­ra­tes, has been appoin­ted as the next Ambassa­dor of India to the Rus­si­an Federation.

2. He is expec­ted to take up the assign­ment shortly.

New Delhi
Novem­ber 01, 2021

src: click

So the new indian ambassa­dor in Rus­sia is in office sin­ce when?

Pavan Kapoor 2021 - 2024
Vinay Kumar 2024 

src: click

Wait, wait, what was Pavan Kapoors Mis­si­on state­ment in the years 2021 - 2024?

Pavan Kapoor hea­ded the Indian Embas­sy in Moscow on 22nd of Novem­ber, 2021. Pre­vious­ly, His Excel­len­cy was the Ambassa­dor of the Repu­blic of India to the United Arab Emi­ra­tes from Octo­ber 2019 to Novem­ber 2021. In a diplo­ma­tic care­er span­ning over three deca­des, Ambassa­dor Kapoor has ser­ved in dif­fe­rent capa­ci­ties in the Indian Mis­si­ons in Moscow, Lon­don, Gene­va, Tel Aviv apart from ser­ving in the Minis­try of Exter­nal Affairs and the Prime Minister’s Office in New Delhi.

Accord­ing to the Rus­si­an For­eign Minis­try, Pavan Kapoor recei­ved copies of his creden­ti­als from the Depu­ty Minis­ter of For­eign Affairs of the Rus­si­an Fede­ra­ti­on Igor Mor­gul­ov. Wit­hin the frame­work of the mee­ting, the sides dis­cus­sed an approach to fur­ther streng­t­he­ning of Russian-Indian rela­ti­ons, topi­cal glo­bal and regio­nal pro­blems, as well as a sche­du­le of upco­m­ing contacts.

src: click

Bes­test diplo­mat to attend the Glo­bal Ukrai­ni­an peace sum­mit ever!

Well at least he knows the territory…

Why Ambassa­dor Pawan Kapoor?

India has cho­sen to send Ambassa­dor Pawan Kapoor, the most seni­or care­er diplo­mat after Vinay Kwa­tra, to Switz­er­land. Kapoor cur­r­ent­ly ser­ves as Secreta­ry (West) in the Minis­try of Exter­nal Affairs. After spen­ding near­ly two and a half years in Moscow as the Indian Ambassa­dor to Rus­sia, Kapoor retur­ned to South Block in April 2024. His ten­u­re in Moscow coin­ci­ded with the Rus­si­an inva­si­on of Ukrai­ne in Febru­a­ry 2022.

src: click

Ah -- gre­at, now we know his job title…

Lets search the https://mea.gov.in/profiles.htm page (MEA = Minis­try of Exter­nal Affairs) for his pro­fi­le, why dont we? 

Exter­nal Affairs Minis­ter - no thats not him
Minis­ter of Sta­te for Exter­nal Affairs - no thats not him
For­eign Secreta­ry - no thats not him
Secreta­ry (Eco­no­mic Rela­ti­ons) - no thats not him
Secreta­ry (East) - ah, thats his eas­tern counterpart!
Secreta­ry (West) - THATS HIM, THATS Shri Pavan Kapoor!

So lets count.

Pre­si­dent? No.
Vice Pre­si­dent? No.
Prime Minis­ter? No.
Exter­nal Affairs Minis­ter? No.
Minis­ter of Sta­te for Exter­nal affairs? No.
For­eign Secreta­ry? No.
Secreta­ry (West)? Yes!

Second most seni­or diplo­mat incoming!

Government repre­sen­ta­ti­ve? Why should we send a government repre­sen­ta­ti­ve? Here, have a care­er diplomat.

Ukrin­form will tell you its Naren­dra Modi any­how. Dont look too close!

edit: Huch, was erlaubt sich eigent­lich SRF?

Und so tref­fen sich die 90 Staa­ten und Orga­ni­sa­tio­nen am Wochen­en­de ohne Russ­land auf dem Bür­gen­stock. Feh­len wird vor­aus­sicht­lich das Schlüs­sel­land Chi­na. Und das wich­ti­ge Indi­en dürf­te eine nie­der­ran­gi­ge Dele­ga­ti­on ent­sen­den – eben­so wie Bra­si­li­en, falls die­ses über­haupt teilnimmt.

src: click

Ganz infa­mes Kampagneen-Smearing!

Der Denkfehler

15. Juni 2024

Auslandsressort-Redakteur der NZZ Andre­as Rüesch gera­de eben in einem Kommentar.

Wenn die Ukrai­ne auf dem Bür­gen­stock nicht gestärkt wird, haben alle ver­lo­ren, auch die Schweiz

Auf dem Bür­gen­stock kön­ne es kei­nen Frie­den geben, weil Russ­land nicht mit am Tisch sit­ze, heisst es über­all. Die Aus­sa­ge ver­rät einen Denk­feh­ler. Sicher­heit in Euro­pa ent­steht nicht mit, son­dern gegen Russ­land.

src: click

Ach­so, ja - klar - dafür braucht man ja eine Frie­dens­kon­fe­renz in der neu­tra­len Schweiz. Latürnicht!

Bern und Kiew erkann­ten Anfang Jahr bei­de eine attrak­ti­ve Chan­ce für sich. Aber die bei­den zie­hen nicht am sel­ben Strick – und dadurch ver­wan­delt sich der Bür­gen­stock in ein Minenfeld.

Genau! Böse Schweiz! Eine Kriegs­kon­fe­renz hät­te sie ein­be­ru­fen sol­len, dann wäre der Neu­tra­li­tät der Schweiz genü­ge getan gewesen!

Den­noch ist das unter­lie­gen­de Argu­ment nicht falsch. Die Schweiz woll­te sich nach zuneh­men­dem poli­ti­schen Druck als Ver­mitt­ler gerie­ren. Die Ukrai­ne hat ange­nom­men um sich als “wir wol­len doch eh Frie­den” im inter­na­tio­na­len Kon­text zu pro­fi­lie­ren (Bür­gen­stock! 90 Län­der unter­zeich­nen den Selen­skyj 10 Punk­te Plan - in Tei­len! (Nuklea­re Sicher­heit, freie Schiff­fahrt, Rück­füh­rung der Kin­der und Gefangenenaustausch)).

Frie­den will jedoch nur die schwei­zer Regierung.

Damit kommt es zu einem Inter­es­sens­kon­flikt zwi­schen Bern und Kiew.

Der nur dadurch auf­lös­bar ist, dass die Schweiz end­lich Waf­fen lie­fert um Russ­land zu besiegen.

End­lich sprichts mal wer bei der NZZ aus…

Dumm halt, wenn der Redak­teur immer noch sein eige­nes Argu­ment nicht ver­steht (schwei­zer Verfassung…).

Hier noch der obli­ga­to­ri­sche “Die Schweiz tut zu wenig für die Kriegs- ich mei­ne Frie­dens­ord­nung” Arti­kel der der NZZ zur Unter­ma­lung am sel­ben Tag.

Dann haben wir Frie­dens­kon­fe­renz eigent­lich fer­tig… Bevor sie begon­nen hat.

edit: Ach­ja, und wie ord­nen wir jetzt das hier ein? 

Der Stan­dard, gera­de eben:

Bildschirmfoto 2024 06 15 um 10 13 49
src: click

Am Freitag erhebt Putin überraschend neue, völlig inakzeptable Forderungen

15. Juni 2024

Für die Pro­pa­gan­da gibt es die Ukrai­ne nicht
Aller­dings haben Putin und sei­ne Apo­lo­ge­ten immer wie­der klar­ge­macht, dass es ihnen um die Ver­nich­tung alles Ukrai­ni­schen geht.

In einem Auf­tritt vor rus­si­schen Diplo­ma­ten am Frei­tag in Mos­kau wur­de er noch kon­kre­ter: Dem Start von Ver­hand­lun­gen müss­te Kiews mili­tä­ri­scher Rück­zug aus dem gesam­ten Ter­ri­to­ri­um der bereits annek­tier­ten, in der Ver­fas­sung als Teil Russ­lands fest­ge­schrie­be­nen Gebie­te im Don­bass und in der Süd­ost­ukrai­ne vor­an­ge­hen, eben­so der Ver­zicht auf den Nato-Beitritt. Dar­auf­hin wür­de Russ­land die Waf­fen schwei­gen las­sen. Die­se Bedin­gun­gen gehen weit über ein Ein­frie­ren der Front hin­aus und sind für die Ukrai­ne zwei­fel­los unerfüllbar.

Ein Zurück zu den Ver­hält­nis­sen vor dem 24. Febru­ar 2022 ist weder im Innern Russ­lands noch im Ver­hält­nis zum Wes­ten auf abseh­ba­re Zeit vor­stell­bar, selbst wenn die Kon­fe­renz auf dem Bür­gen­stock der Auf­takt für wei­te­re Gesprächs­run­den, auch unter Ein­be­zug Russ­lands, wäre.

src: click (NZZ)

Unglaub­lich! Unfass­bar! Infam!

Zwei­fel­los unerfüllbar!

Nur ein Putin-Apologet wür­de die­sen Vor­be­din­gun­gen für einen Waf­fen­still­stand zustimmen!

Hier die Posi­tio­nen des geein­ten Wer­te­wes­tens, die sie für die­se Aus­sa­ge über­se­hen müssen.

• Jedem Ukrai­ner ist es unter Stra­fe ver­bo­ten mit Putin zu ver­han­deln (Selen­skyj per Präsidentialdekret)

• Wir wer­den nicht ver­han­deln, bis der letz­te Rus­se die Ukrai­ne ver­las­sen hat (Teil der 10 Punk­te Selen­skyj Frie­dens­for­mel (ter­ri­to­ria­le Inte­gri­tät) im O-Ton ger­ne auch Andrii Yer­mak)

• Wir bestehen auf ter­ri­to­ria­ler Inte­gri­tät! (Every ukrai­ni­an spo­kes­per­son ever -- wur­de jetzt hin­ter “wir ver­han­deln eh erst mal nur drei ande­re Punk­te unse­rer Vor­be­din­gun­gen --- ter­ri­to­ria­le Inte­gri­tät, den voll­stän­di­gen Abzug aller Rus­sen und Repa­ra­ti­ons­zah­lun­gen ver­han­deln wir erst auf einem der nächs­ten Frie­dens­gip­fel” zurück­ge­stellt -- natür­lich erst­mal ohne Russ­land, das dem For­mat zuerst zustim­men muss, bevor wir mit Russ­land ver­han­deln. Sie­he obri­ge Quelle.)

• Daher auch: Russ­land muss zustim­men Repa­ra­ti­ons­zah­lun­gen leis­ten, bevor wir verhandeln.

• Wir ver­han­deln nur wenn Russ­land unser 10 Punk­te Selen­skyj Friedens-Formel Frame­work voll­stän­dig akzeptiert.

• Wir wol­len nicht ver­han­deln, wir haben schon genug ver­han­delt (O-Ton von Andrii Yer­mak, nach der geschei­ter­ten Som­mer­of­fen­si­ve, auf einem Kon­fe­renz Panel in dem er die 10 Punk­te Selen­skyj Frie­dens­for­mel vor­stellt…)

Wei­ters müs­sen sie fol­gen­des sehr über­zeu­gend finden:

• Einen Ver­zicht auf Nato Mit­glied­schaft zu for­dern ist inak­zep­ta­bel (Ok, Selen­skyj habe das über vier Mona­te lang erwogen, …

Qui­te quick­ly, but cer­tain­ly over the cour­se of the next weeks that fol­lo­wed, Selen­sky­js views evol­ved, part­ly under the influ­ence of his advisors

wäh­rend er Russ­land wäh­rend der Frie­dens­ge­sprä­che in der Tür­kei auch gar­nicht hin­ge­hal­ten hat (vom Vor­sit­zen­den der Selen­skyj Par­tei öffent­lich bestätigt)… 

Leis­tung!

(wäh­rend gera­de die Schwe­ren Waf­fen Lie­fe­run­gen vor­be­rei­tet wur­den)! Aber das zu for­dern sei min­des­tens, und im höchs­ten Maße inakzeptabel!)

• Das zu for­dern was das rus­si­sche Kriegs­ziel für die­ses Jahr dar­stellt sei eben­falls inak­zep­ta­bel! Gera­de­zu infam! (Russ­land glaubt den Don­bas in die­sem Jahr mili­tä­risch voll­stän­dig ein­neh­men zu können.)

• Man sieht also - Russ­land gehe es um die Zer­stö­rung der Ukrai­ne! Neu­tra­li­tät, und Gebiets­ge­win­ne die noch nicht mal facts on the ground sind! Nach all dem Good­will der zuvor von der Ukrai­ne kam! (Nicht aus­ge­spro­che­ne Ein­la­dung zu Bür­gen­stock, uni­la­te­ra­les Bestehen auf die Selen­skyj For­mel als ein­zig mög­li­ches Verhandlungsframework…)

Was nicht in der rus­si­schen Vor­be­din­gung zu fin­den ist: Das Behar­ren auf die Hal­bie­rung der ukrai­ni­schen Armee -- wie von west­li­chen Medi­en - ohne Quel­le - seit dem Zeit­punkt kol­por­tiert, seit dem man die von der Ukrai­ne geg­hos­te­ten und dann mit “für uns war das nur ein Smo­ke­s­creen” vom Lei­ter der Selen­skyj Par­tei kon­tex­tua­li­sier­ten Ver­hand­lun­gen in der Tür­kei nicht mehr als “da war nichts” weg­leug­nen konnte.

Unglaub­lich!

Was erlau­be Russ­land! Die Neu­tra­li­tät der Ukrai­ne und die besetz­ten Gebie­te inklu­si­ve der Abgel­tung der mili­tä­ri­schen Zie­len für die­ses Jahr als Vor­be­din­gung für Ver­hand­lun­gen zu fordern!

Das sieht doch jeder, dass das nicht annehm­bar ist! So kom­men wir auf dem Ver­hand­lungs­weg nie wie­der zu den “Ver­hält­nis­sen vor dem 24. Febru­ar 2022” zurück!

Auf der ande­ren Sei­te sieht man, dass --

Russ­land muss anneh­men was in der 10 Punk­te Selen­skyj For­mel steht (with­dra­wal of Rus­si­an for­ces from Ukrai­ne, the res­to­ra­ti­on of Ukraine’s ter­ri­to­ri­al inte­gri­ty, repa­ra­ti­on pay­ments), und mit Putin ver­han­deln wir über­haupt nicht mehr -- damit wir wie­der zu einem Sta­tus quo “Ver­hält­nis­se vor dem 24. Febru­ar 2022” zurück­keh­ren kön­nen, wäre doch wohl das Min­des­te! Das sind die guten und wich­ti­gen Vor­be­din­gun­gen für einen gerech­ten Verhandlungs-Frieden! Und davor gibts auch kei­nen Waf­fen­still­stand. (Die Ukrai­ne ist aktu­ell mei­len­weit davon ent­fernt die Gebie­te zurück­zu­er­obern die seit dem 24. Febru­ar 2022 von Russ­land besetzt wor­den sind, was im ers­ten Jahr ein­mal als Vor­be­din­gun­gen für einen Waf­fen­still­stand kol­por­tiert wur­de - und seit dem nie wieder.)

Ach­ja, und Putin gehe es auch gar­nicht dar­um, dass er die Ukrai­ne aus der Nato raus­hält. Er for­dert das nur die gan­ze Zeit (vor der Inva­si­on, bei den ers­ten Vor­ver­hand­lun­gen in der Tür­kei, jetzt als Vorbedingung…).

Der Wes­ten hat mal wie­der fertigargumentiert.

Nur ein Putin-Apologet, wür­de hier noch sehen, dass die For­de­run­gen des Wes­tens einen Ver­hand­lungs­frie­den hinauszögern!

Eines scheint mitt­ler­wei­le aber fest­stell­bar - auch Russ­land ist aktu­ell nicht an Ver­hand­lun­gen interessiert.

edit: Es gibt aber auch wie­der gute Nach­rich­ten - in den Stan­dard­kom­men­ta­ren wer­den wie­der Vide­os mit ukrai­ni­scher Pro­pa­gan­da verbreitet:

Gleich bei 1:30 in: 

Ich habe es an X ver­schie­de­nen Stel­len gele­sen, dass Putin Waf­fen­still­stand nennt man - muss sich halt anschau­en was er for­dert. Er for­dert einen ukrai­ni­schen Rück­zug aus den Gebie­ten die er annek­tiert hat, danach kön­nen Ver­hand­lun­gen begin­nen. Danach, das heißt er for­dert von der Ukrai­ne dass sie sich aus aus den vier frisch annek­tier­ten Oblas­ten zurück­zieht, die er in -- wovon er kei­nen voll­stän­dig kon­trol­liert und dabei -- er bes­ten­falls die Hälf­te mehr oder weni­ger -- zumin­dest von Sapo­rischsch­ja und von von Don­jetzk kontrolliert --

Russian Annexation Claims December 10 2023

(hab die Gra­fik vom ISW eigen­stän­dig mit einem simp­len over­lay des aktu­el­len Front­ver­lau­fes nach ISW auf den heu­ti­gen Stand gebracht, ursprüng­li­che Quel­le: click)

- und die­se drei Oblas­ten haben die Beson­der­heit dass zwei von ihnen schwe­re Befes­ti­gun­gen haben, die die Rus­sen gera­de sehr sehr lan­ge auf­hal­ten und ihren Vor­marsch der statt­fin­det sehr sehr ver­lang­sa­men, wäh­rend die drit­te - Ron - ist es so, dass die nicht besetz­te Sei­te auf der ande­ren Sei­te des Nipro ist der ein gro­ßes Natur­hin­der­nis, ist für die rus­si­schen Trup­pen die gleich­zei­tig damit davon abge­hal­ten wer­den den Süd­wes­ten der Ukrai­ne zu bedrän­gen zu erobern wo die letz­ten See­hä­fen der Ukrai­ne sind - und wo die gro­ße Stadt Odes­sa ist - die eben aktu­ell noch nicht besetzt ist - wenn er also das bekommt was er will wür­de die Ukrai­ne all ihre Befes­ti­gungs­li­ni­en auf­ge­ben müs­sen denn sie hat kei­ne Befes­ti­gungs­li­ni­en 400 km im rück­wär­ti­gen Raum die Befes­ti­gun­gen die halb­wegs den Namen wert sind sind alle in die­sen drei Pro­vin­zen was den Süden und den Süd­wes­ten angeht bzw das ist der Fluss die wür­den sie auf­ge­ben - danach kön­nen Ver­hand­lun­gen begin­nen und wenn er in die­sen Ver­hand­lun­gen dann Din­ge for­dert die nicht akzep­ta­bel sind, geht der Krieg natür­lich weiter.

Viel­leicht noch mal kurz die Goog­le Suche zu Odes­sa, which oblast -- Oh Odessa!

Bildschirmfoto 2024 06 15 um 09 50 35

Wir hal­ten fest, die Waf­fen­still­stands­be­din­gun­gen sind als sol­che heu­te nicht trag­bar [d’ac­cord], denn 

- DA MÜSSTEN DIE URKAINER JA NEUE VERTEIDIGUNGSLINIEN GRABEN

und

- und wenn Russ­land die Ver­hand­lun­gen danach sabo­tiert, dann hät­ten die Ukrai­ner die natür­li­che Befes­ti­gungs­an­la­ge im Süden, den Dni­per nicht mehr, und täten sich also auch da sehr viel schwe­rer Odes­sa zu verteidigen.

Und hier die Kol­por­tier­ten Waf­fen­still­stands Vor­be­din­gungnen der Ukraine:

Russ­land gibt das gesam­te seit dem 24.02.2022 beset­ze Gebiet auf. Spä­ter erwei­tert auf der letz­te Rus­se ver­lässt das gesam­te ter­ri­to­ria­le Staats­ge­biet der Ukrai­ne. Sie­he im O-Ton ger­ne auch Andrii Yer­mak beim Erklä­ren der 10 Punk­te Selen­skyj For­mel Ende Sep­tem­ber 2023, spä­ter erwei­tert auf die GESAMTE 10 Punk­te Selen­skyj Friedensformel.)

Hmm… Wel­che Bedin­gun­gen sind da illusorischer…

Reden wir drüber…

Drei ganz normale Tage im Leben Selenskyjs

14. Juni 2024

TAG 1:

They are after me! What proof?

Bildschirmfoto 2024 06 14 um 09 11 50
src: click

TAG 2:

Quick, lets some­bo­dy scat­ter, that voi­cing their opi­ni­on, and poin­ting at other coun­tries that see that the same way is “a sub­t­le boy­kott”. Not just voi­cing their opi­ni­on and poin­ting at other coun­tries that see it the same way.

In Gesprä­chen mit Ent­wick­lungs­län­dern hat Chi­na den Diplo­ma­ten zufol­ge die Kon­fe­renz nicht offen kri­ti­siert oder die Län­der dazu auf­ge­for­dert, ihr fern­zu­blei­ben. Ein Insi­der sag­te aber, Chi­na habe erklärt, das Tref­fen wür­de den Krieg ver­län­gern. Zwei ande­ren Diplo­ma­ten zufol­ge hat Chi­na west­li­chen Natio­nen gesagt, vie­le Ent­wick­lungs­län­der teil­ten Pekings Ansich­ten zur Kon­fe­renz. Vom chi­ne­si­schen Außen­mi­nis­te­ri­um war zunächst kei­ne Stel­lung­nah­me erhältlich.

Bildschirmfoto 2024 06 14 um 09 14 23
src: click

TAG 3:

My bes­test friends!

Bildschirmfoto 2024 06 14 um 09 20 10
src: click

*pssst* Noo­ne tell Selen­skyj, that they never sold rus­sia wea­pons in the past (during Rus­si­as war on Ukrai­ne), only parts… He’ll find out soon enough.

Ah, Ukrai­ne…

Sla­va.

Stupid, stupid, stupid

13. Juni 2024

Guys! Guys! I’ve got it! - Here is how we plan the peace con­fe­rence track!

- So first we take Selen­sky­js hate tira­de, which is still coi­ned “Selen­sky­js Peace for­mu­la” to this day. Tho­se are five points. You know the one with “the enemy has to be bea­ten, and be punis­hed, and pay, and lea­ve” at its heart.
- Then we silent­ly remo­ve the parts that are so stu­pid it hurts (we need a world wide action for­ce against all wars guys! Whos with me? Selen­skyj thinks its a gre­at idea!)”
- Then of cour­se we pam­per it up with the utter­most fluff, that “ever­yo­ne will find easy to agree to”. Then we’e got 10 points. (Ok, some of the fil­ler is real­ly thought­ful and easy to agree on.)
- Then we open­ly sta­te - guys, guys, this is the trick - we talk about this, and then when we all agree, we might invi­te rus­sia - but only if it honors our plan!
- Then we coin that “the peace sum­mit”
- Then we start to put out the­re the “Rus­sia is try­ing to sabo­ta­ge the peace”, “Chi­na is try­ing to sabo­ta­ge the peace” pro­pa­gan­da - if anyo­ne else in the world in terms of power bro­kers does anything about it
- Then we tell our part­ners (ger­ma­ny), that hey guys - we do this, so final­ly we dont have to react to other peace con­fe­rence “offers” any­mo­re - becau­se look guys -- we have our own!
- Then we let slip into the open that “qua­li­ty of part­ner­sta­tes” was far less important than “quan­ti­ty”
- Then we rebrand it as the “FIRST PEACE SUMMIT”, event though its the fifth mee­ting, becau­se we real­ly, real­ly nee­ded a restart con­cep­tual­ly - yet we still hold on to the initi­al points of the Selen­skyj for­mu­la
- Then we let our ambassa­dor slip, that we pre­ven­ted rus­sia to come, to get more coun­tries to attend, becau­se we real­ly just wan­ted the public per­cep­ti­on mojo
- Then we sell to the ger­man dele­ga­ti­on, that no - no, lis­ten to us, this is just an open frame­work, so wha­te­ver coun­tries will agree on, we’ll then use to pres­su­re rus­sia into peace talks
- By making sure, this frame­work is the ONLY one thats used in peace talks - ever, so noi­sy chi­ne­se - and bra­si­li­ans, and -- just stop, becau­se we’­ve got a gre­at plan here
- Which alrea­dy mir­rors EXACTLY the same pro­pa­gan­da BS that Kule­ba put out the­re on one of the first press con­fe­ren­ces on the side­li­nes of Davos in the first year, which is “guys - you can mount peace dis­cus­sion efforts, if you fol­low the rules, guys!” With the rules back then being “con­ta­ct lines cant be moved” and “the ter­ri­to­ri­al inte­gri­ty of Ukrai­ne must be preserved”

Excu­ses are get­ting dum­ber by the day

- which every media out­let in ger­ma­ny ate up like effin cake, becau­se “Selen­skyj still loo­king for peace!”
- then you visit the east asi­an coun­tries in a US friend­ly venue and get all sorts of “what the eff you you want us to do here” qus­ti­ons from every repor­ter
- then as Selen­skyj you tell them - guys, guys, this is real­ly only about three very important fluff points, like nuclear safe­ty, and food secu­ri­ty (by now fluff, becau­se exports are flowing, future pro­jec­tion not inclu­ded in that thought), and huma­ni­ta­ri­an things, mucho import­an­to -- its just about that, so come and sup­port us plea­se!
- then you let slip, that you only talk about fluff, becau­se thats the first con­fe­rence after the restart, and you real­ly want quan­ti­ty, not qua­li­ty - so you get “brand reco­gni­ti­on”, and this isnt the Selensnkyj for­mu­al any­mo­re
- then you con­tra­dict this by sel­ling to the public that this is the next new and bet­ter second com­ing of what was pre­vious­ly the UN char­ta which “doesnt work”
- then con­gre­ga­ti­ons around the world are star­ting to act like you’­re insa­ne (about time, plus minus)
- then somehow, you tell to the ger­man dele­ga­ti­on, no - no, thats fine, becau­se even though we insist, that this frame­work (and no other frame­work) is used for all future peace talks, but look --- its real­ly “open ended” in terms of out­co­mes, becau­se we will deba­te the points that sound to ever­yo­ne like “rus­si­an capi­tu­la­ti­on” in the last two ses­si­ons, or may­be never, when we dont have inter­na­tio­nal agree­ment, or the war inter­fe­res.
- And then when we have an inter­na­tio­nal agree­ment amongst part­ners, and rus­sia must accept it, we final­ly can have peace!

Also -- this is the “Peace for­mu­la”, which pre­vents all other peace talks, until we can achie­ve agree­ment under our peace frame­work, amongst 100 sta­tes internationally.

So of cour­se this is a “peace summit”.

- Then you chan­ge the public PR to “this should lead to a peace sum­mit” 15 days befo­re the start.

And this ladies, and gen­tle­men is how you achie­ve just peace.

The ger­man dele­ga­ti­on has bought it - no quar­rels about it.

- Oh, and what this does to the wider public -- well, thats what media is for, right?

--

Second issue with that DGAP meeting --

Ukrai­ne not at all cor­rupt guys, you should real­ly visit it, then it doesnt feel like, just ano­t­her coun­try at war, it feels like a coun­try thats almost wes­tern and so full of hope!

Yeah gre­at, guys - what about the drop outs from lea­ding posi­ti­ons in the recon­struc­tion con­fe­rence frame­work, right befo­re the con­fe­rence? Whe­re the second per­son lea­ving, made it sound like - may­be cor­rup­ti­on still being an inte­gral part of the rebuil­ding effort, at the sta­te level… (Not my asses­ment, Fran­ce 24 (Video here).)

Also you still know that the­re is eco­no­mic data out the­re from befo­re the war, right? Or that the main asset the Ukrai­ne is for­ced to give out again cur­r­ent­ly as a secu­ri­ty for loans is agri­cul­tu­ral land. Or that the coun­try is at war, or… I guess its not­hing but poten­ti­al, becau­se you’­ve got the NGO peop­le talk to the sta­ke­hol­ders for the first time at the recent recon­struc­tion con­fe­rence in ger­ma­ny, right? Keep the spi­rit up! This is final­ly moving! (In terms of non ener­gy inten­si­ve invest­ments in the very west, I guess? Gre­at ear­ning oppor­tu­ni­ty! Rus­sia will likely never get the­re. Redu­ce your risks! Make REAL money, invest in war recon­struc­tion, during the war!)

The­re also was a third point, which I seem to have for­got­ten, but it was less important…

edit: Pas­send dazu hat sich die NZZ heu­te zu einem “Erklärt” durchgerungen:

Bildschirmfoto 2024 06 13 um 19 22 54
src: click (Archiv)

edit: Had the wrong arti­cle refe­ren­ced in here for the Kule­ba press event. Fixed.

edit2: Die NZZ schreibt sich um die­se Bege­ben­hei­ten her­um noch drei Sze­na­ri­os von denen eines dann doch noch Erfolg ist. Muss man gele­sen haben. (click)

So apparently the “denazification” narrative was active in societies

13. Juni 2024

in cri­mea as well - pre rus­si­an capture.

Its from an audi­ence ques­ti­on by a per­son that cant remem­ber the book tit­le of the book she has read, so I have not much to work with here -- but the experts on sta­ge dont nega­te it. It being, that peop­le were out­right afraid, that the “nazis” might come and harm them, short­ly befo­re the rus­si­an invasion.

If that was the case -- isnt it the first thing that comes to mind, that this must be cra­zy rus­si­an Put­ler, or that his aim must be regime chan­ge, becau­se think of the term den­azi­fi­ca­ti­on? May­be not?

The logic, that this is used, so the poli­ti­cal lea­ders­hip of a regi­on can be exch­an­ged - might be a desi­red side effect, but its not the main goal of that pro­pa­gan­da narrative.

The main goal being (assu­med) the one you have the most desi­red effect on. So the main goal of that nar­ra­ti­ve was to put popu­la­ti­ons under fear, to move them towards inaction?

Why am I hea­ring this for the first time today?

Also if it was acti­ve in cri­mea, short­ly befo­re the rus­si­an inva­si­on, of cour­se you pick it as the main nar­ra­ti­ve pre wider inva­si­on -- so it can have its effect on the popu­la­ti­on in the east.

Oh yeah - right, …

Pro­pa­gan­da hat wie­der nie­mand entdeckt.

Am Aller­we­nigs­ten in “war­um wir in den Krieg gehen” Reden…

Victoria Amelina!

13. Juni 2024

Dan­ke Robert Bosch Stiftung!

I remem­ber!

--

I have to won­der though which of her books Timo­thy Sny­der Remem­bers most favourably…

1. The Fall Syn­dro­me, or Homo Compatiens

Syn­op­sis:

Kost­ya is an ordi­na­ry Ukrai­ni­an, a pro­duct of our time. Poli­tics and Mai­dan pro­tests are of litt­le inte­rest to him. But the sub­tit­le of the novel “Homo Com­pa­ti­ens” - the man who sym­pa­thi­zes sug­gests: the main cha­rac­ter will not be able to stay in his com­fort zone.

2. Someo­ne or a Water Heart

Syn­op­sis:

The prot­ago­nist of this book is Someo­ne. And to find out who he real­ly is, he will have to try: learn to read, find a team of like-minded peop­le and rea­li­ze dreams tog­e­ther. A fun and very beau­ti­ful sto­ry for the litt­le ones about the pro­blem that they them­sel­ves will soon have to sol­ve: who am I and what is my dream? And this sto­ry hap­pen­ed in a big aqua­ri­um, big and round, like our planet.

3. Dom’s Dream Kingdom

Syn­op­sis:

A fun­ny pood­le named Dom tells us the sto­ry of a fami­ly - an old colo­nel and several genera­ti­ons of women. The dog and the peop­le feel awk­ward in the small Lviv apart­ment whe­re he lived befo­re… What dif­fe­rence does it make? The stones will not tell. Or they will tell you if you have a dog’s sen­se. Are the­re any sto­ries that will help a colo­nel from the east of Ukrai­ne or his dog final­ly feel at home in Lviv in the 90s?

It seems that you will never find a key to someo­ne else’s chest. Never let go of the fighter’s helm again. Neit­her the dog nor the walls will ever accept new owners. But some­ti­mes someo­ne else’s secret turns out to be yours too. And may­be the heroes of this sto­ry will mana­ge to find a home.

or

4. Sto­ries of Eka the Excavator

Syn­op­sis:

Eka is a small exca­va­tor. But his adven­tures are big, some­ti­mes even on a glo­bal sca­le! Eka, like a real super­he­ro, has the power to save the world… may­be. Eka likes to talk about his ama­zing adven­tures: on how he scoo­ped up half the sea with a bucket, or how he plu­cked a star from the sky… or even of when he almost sto­le an ice­berg in Ant­arc­ti­ca. Eka real­ly wants to be important! Perhaps he can help St. Nicho­las, or bring a dino­saur ske­le­ton to a muse­um, or sim­ply save his beloved park from dest­ruc­tion… May­be, just may­be, like the famous Baron Mun­chau­sen, Eka exa­g­ge­ra­tes a litt­le in his storie-e-es? The­re is only a way to find out!

Storie-e-es of Eka the Exca­va­tor is a collec­tion of the fun­nies sto­ries from the most tal­ka­ti­ve exca­va­tor in the world!

War­ti­me work

After the Rus­si­an inva­si­on of Ukrai­ne star­ted, she worked as a war cri­mes rese­ar­cher for Truth Hounds, a Ukrai­ni­an organization.[18][19][17] She used her trai­ning as a nove­list to inter­view witnesses.[17]

In Sep­tem­ber 2022, while doing rese­arch in the Izi­um regi­on, she unco­ve­r­ed the war dia­ry of fel­low Ukrai­ni­an wri­ter Volo­dym­yr Vaku­len­ko, who had been kil­led by the occu­p­y­ing for­ces in March 2022.[17][20] In May 2023, Vaku­len­ko recei­ved a post­hu­mous award from the Inter­na­tio­nal Publis­hers Asso­cia­ti­on, which Ame­li­na accep­ted on his behalf.[17]

Ame­li­na also hos­ted intern­al­ly dis­pla­ced Ukrai­ni­ans and hel­ped to deli­ver huma­ni­ta­ri­an aid in Lviv.[17]

Per­so­nal life and death
Ame­li­na had a son in the ear­ly 2010s.

As of 2022, Ame­li­na lived in Kyiv.[18] In June 2023, after recei­ving a resi­den­cy in Paris, Ame­li­na con­si­de­red moving the­re with her 12-year-old son.[17]

On 27 June 2023, she was inju­red during the Rus­si­an attack on Kra­ma­tor­sk while she was dining at RIA Piz­za tog­e­ther with Héc­tor Abad, Ser­gio Jara­mil­lo and Cata­li­na Gómez. The restau­rant was hit by an Iskan­der missile.[21][22] Ame­li­na died due to her inju­ries on 1 July at the Mech­ni­kov Hos­pi­tal in Dnipro at the age of 37.[23][24] She was buried in Lviv.[17]

In 2023, a tri­bu­te to Ame­li­na, Not­hing Bad Has Ever Hap­pen­ed, was publis­hed by Arrows­mith Press. It inclu­ded inter­na­tio­nal con­tri­bu­ti­ons and pre­vious­ly publis­hed work by Ame­li­na in Eng­lish translation.[25]

src: click

NTV bucht jetzt freie ukrainische Journalisten als Ukraine Experten

12. Juni 2024

Viel­leicht auch eine Idee für zdf heute?

edit:

One degree of sepa­ra­ti­on to: Robert Bosch Stiftung:
Bildschirmfoto 2024 06 13 um 11 34 00

Die inter­na­tio­na­le För­de­rung der Robert Bosch Stif­tung ent­wi­ckel­te sich unter dem Ein­druck der bei­den Welt­krie­ge und hat­te zunächst zum Ziel, zur Aus­söh­nung Deutsch­lands mit sei­nen Nach­barn bei­zu­tra­gen. Daher stand in den ers­ten Jah­ren die Ver­bes­se­rung der deutsch-französischen und deutsch-polnischen Bezie­hun­gen im Fokus.[6] So för­der­te die Stif­tung über vie­le Jah­re den Aus­tausch von Schü­lern, Leh­rern und Wis­sen­schaft­lern aus Deutsch­land und Polen. Von 1982 bis 2000 gab sie gemein­sam mit dem Deut­schen Polen-Institut (DPI) die 50-bändige Pol­ni­sche Biblio­thek heraus.[25] Eben­falls gemein­sam mit dem DPI ver­gab sie von 2003 bis 2019 den Karl-Dedecius-Preis.[26] Ab den 1980er Jah­ren enga­gier­te sich die Stif­tung für die Stär­kung der trans­at­lan­ti­schen Bezie­hun­gen. So ermög­lich­te sie seit 1984 mit dem Robert Bosch Foun­da­ti­on Fel­low­ship Pro­gram rund 600 ame­ri­ka­ni­schen Nach­wuchs­füh­rungs­kräf­ten einen Arbeits­auf­ent­halt in Deutschland.[27] Nach Ende des Kal­ten Krie­ges rück­ten auch die Län­der Mittel- und Ost­eu­ro­pas, spä­ter Län­der der Öst­li­chen Part­ner­schaft in den Blick: Die Stif­tung ist unter ande­rem Gesell­schaf­te­rin und Mit­grün­de­rin der 2006 ins Leben geru­fe­nen Stif­tung Deutsch-Russischer Jugendaustausch.[28] Ab der Jahr­tau­send­wen­de wei­te­te die Stif­tung ihre Tätig­keit auf Asi­en und Afri­ka aus. Bila­te­ra­le For­ma­te wur­den schritt­wei­se durch mul­ti­la­te­ra­le und the­ma­tisch fokus­sier­te Pro­gram­me ersetzt. Ab 2010 för­der­te die Stif­tung zudem Pro­jek­te aus dem Bereich Frie­den. 2014 grün­de­te sie die Robert Bosch Aca­de­my in Ber­lin, an der Exper­ten aus aller Welt zu glo­ba­len gesell­schaft­li­chen Her­aus­for­de­run­gen arbeiten.[29]

src: click

Polen, Ame­ri­ka, Russ­land und Frie­den! Ja ist denn heut schon Weihnachten.

Robert Bosch Stif­tung, für die die sich nicht kennen:

Vic­to­ria Amelina!

One degree of sepa­ra­ti­on to: Amerikahaus:
Bildschirmfoto 2024 06 13 um 11 33 45

Wo den NTV wohl ken­nen­ge­lernt hat…

Just a normal wednesday conversation

12. Juni 2024

Mode­ra­tor: “Then there’s going to be next week in Switz­er­land this what’s cal­led a peace sum­mit. Russia’s not invi­ted. China’s not atten­ding. Is it, what how would you label it?”

Ana­sta­si­ya Shapoch­ki­na (Lec­tu­rer in geo­po­li­tics at Sci­ence Po and Pre­si­dent of Eas­tern Cir­cles): “First of all, this thing that’s - I think the peace sum­mit is desi­gned by the - as far as I under­stand - by the Ukrai­ni­an diplo­ma­tic estab­lish­ment as a, as as a way to regroup as many nati­ons as pos­si­ble behind the peace plan of Pre­si­dent Selen­skyj and it’s a way to also test the diplo­ma­tic effort of the last two and a half years, to see if Ukrai­ne can actual­ly gather as a sign of sup­port, inter­na­tio­nal sup­port, not just wes­tern part­ners but also as many as pos­si­ble part­ners from the glo­bal south and thus showing and making peop­le show --”

Mode­ra­tor: “As we’­re spea­king the Ukrai­ni­an pre­si­dent has taken a quick trip away from Euro­pe to Sau­di Ara­bia, he’s met with the Crown Prince there.” 

Ana­sta­si­ya Shapoch­ki­na: “Not very logi­cal, but exact­ly see, like in terms of geo­gra­phy - very logi­cal in terms of the peace pro­cess, exact­ly - becau­se of cour­se Sau­di Ara­bia as a cru­cial Regio­nal actor anti-iran actor, while Iran being ali­gned with Rus­sia, Sau­di Ara­bia is tra­di­tio­nal­ly ali­gned eit­her with the US or against against Iran, at least more recent­ly, and this is a cru­cial play­er who can influ­ence other coun­tries in the regi­on, becau­se what Ukrai­ne is aiming at at the peace Sum­mit is not just qua­li­ty but also quan­ti­ty and aiming to kind of make it as an alter­na­ti­ve to the UN Gene­ral Assem­bly Gathe­rings and votings whe­re Rus­sia is very hea­vi­ly pre­sent and influ­en­cing as an alter­na­ti­ve kind of gathe­ring - to show how, much sup­port it can actual­ly gar­ner and this is going to be a real test, I think - to Ukrai­ni­an diplo­ma­cy, real­ly just to show for it -- howe­ver of cour­se whe­ther about peace we’­re going to see any bre­akthroughs, I do not expect to see any actu­al bre­akthroughs about peace. It’s not about peace nego­tia­ti­ons it’s about the sup­port for Ukrai­ne, diplo­ma­tic sup­port and then behind diplo­ma­tic sup­port, coun­tries like Sau­di Ara­bia of cour­se can play a much grea­ter role about which I expect them to be more circumspect.”

Mode­ra­tor: “Eliza­beth Braw, uh Selen­skyj very bad­ly wan­ted Joe Biden to attend, it’s not going to hap­pen - ins­tead he’s going to send his vice pre­si­dent Kami­la Har­ris - why, why does he, why has Ukraine’s pre­si­dent inves­ted so much poli­ti­cal capi­tal in this uh sum­mit next week in Switzerland?”

Eliza­beth Braw: “Well as as was just said it’s it’s an effort to show that the coun­tries sup­por­ting Ukrai­ne in this war are not just Wes­tern coun­tries and and uh from my own expe­ri­ence for examp­le -- when I when I talk to Indian audi­en­ces I always hear, well you know the West should­n’t tell us what posi­ti­on to tell about, to to take on Ukrai­ne and we deci­de for our­sel­ves -- so it’s important for for Selen­skyj to be able to show that sup­port for Ukrai­ne is not just a wes­tern thing, it’s not just a wes­tern dic­ta­ted thing - and that real­ly mat­ters bey­ond diplo­ma­tic ges­tu­res, becau­se a num­ber of non-western coun­tries uh have essen­ti­al­ly remai­ned on the side­li­nes and while being on the side­li­nes, have also uh direct­ly or indi­rect­ly been sup­por­ting uh the Rus­si­an eco­no­my, by con­ti­nuing to to tra­de with Rus­sia -- becau­se they haven’t impo­sed sanc­tions they essen­ti­al­ly uh not only con­ti­nue to tra­de with Rus­sia but under­mi­ne Wes­tern sanc­tions and and they would say well it’s up to us whom we tra­de with but that uh essen­ti­al­ly, well it strength- streng­t­hens Rus­sia wea­kens Ukrai­ne even as their diplo­ma­tic pos­tu­re is that they are neu­tral, so that as many of the­se coun­tries as Selin­skyj can, can con­vin­ce to publicly side with Ukrai­ne in some fashion uh - the bet­ter it is for for for for Ukrai­ne in this war regard­less of the out­co­me of of any talks at at this peace sum­mit or any­whe­re else.”

Mode­ra­tor: “Gul­li­ver Gragg, Selen­skyj -- how’s it being felt whe­re you are, the the fact that he’s he’s gone off on you know for all the­se for all the­se sum­mi­try uh the uh..

Gul­li­ver Gragg: “The­re have been some oppo­si­ti­on voices cri­ti­ci­zing him for being away from the coun­try for such a long time, he was in Sin­g­a­po­re the Phil­ip­pi­nes and he came back for one day, then he went to Swe­den then of cour­se Fran­ce, Ger­ma­ny now the­se but the­se are all real­ly very important mee­tings, and I think that you know there’s a broad under­stan­ding um of what the idea of this so-called peace sum­mit um in Switz­er­land is, and I think even Ukrai­ni­ans who are cri­ti­cal of Selen­skyj and his team on a num­ber of issu­es, aren’t real­ly um sug­ges­ting that this isn’t fun­da­ment­al­ly a good idea - becau­se, clear­ly - the idea of brea­king the Rus­si­an Nar­ra­ti­ve of Rus­sia and the rest ver­sus uh the west - by showing that Ukraine’s got a lot of coun­tries from the rest of the world on its side as well - is, is not a bad idea in its­elf, but um the way things are going with the pre­pa­ra­ti­ons of it um it does­n’t look that good - I mean ear­lier ukrai­ni­ans were say­ing that if they had a hund­red coun­tries taking part they’d call it a suc­cess, and they were expec­ting at least Joe Biden to be the­re, they were expec­ting the Chi­ne­se to be repre­sen­ted albeit at a lower level -- the chi­ne­se aren’t com­ing they’­re, put­ting for­ward a dif­fe­rent pro­po­sal, Joe Biden’s not com­ing and it loo­ks like fal­ling well short of the um tar­get of 100 coun­tries so um - you know, we’ll see what hap­pen hap­pens in Switz­er­land um -- we’ll see whe­ther or not the­re is a final decla­ra­ti­on at the uh at the end of this sum­mit, I mean I think that if the­re is - the ukrai­ni­ans will feel that they’­ve got some­thing to work with going for­ward - if the­re isn’t, then some peop­le in Ukrai­ne may be say­ing that the Selen­skyj team mana­ged it bad­ly, and um flop­ped it.”

Mode­ra­tor “Selen­skyj has had the Midas touch sin­ce uh, at least on the world sta­ge uh sin­ce Febru­a­ry uh of 2022, but from what we’­ve just tal­ked about so far in this dis­cus­sion - Shi­na, this cabi­net shake up ahead of a big con­fe­rence, whe­re you’­re try­ing to con­vin­ce peop­le that you’­re a good coun­try to invest in. The fact that they’­re not going to get as many par­ti­ci­pants in this peace sum­mit next week as they would have lik­ed -- is Selen­skyj losing the magic the the midas touch?”

Eliza­beth Braw: “Yeah, I think that the­re is the­re kind of dif­fe­rent um ways of see­ing it right, we see this as this is what’s on the sur­face so to say this is the what’s, what’s going on now on the other hand when you fix a big tar­get and you announ­ce it -- that’s that loo­ks very good, but also it’s a tar­get for yourself, it means that even if you fall short of it - it may still be good for you, becau­se it depends who are the peop­le who are actual­ly going to show up, who would­n’t have shown up in the gene­ral assem­bly of the UN -- if the big regio­nal play­ers hea­vy weights like Sau­di Ara­bia are brought on board - etc, etc. I don’t know if the­re was a rea­listic expec­ta­ti­on that Biden is going to actual­ly again come to Euro­pe - In such a short time even given his phy­si­cal con­di­ti­on honestly -- ”

Gul­li­ver Gragg: “He has to be at the G7 right?
Aint it --”

Mode­ra­tor “Yeah, let’s talk about that. Befo­re Bür­gen­stock in Switz­er­land, there’s a G7 Sum­mit in Ita­ly uh he’s he’s alrea­dy boar­ded the Air For­ce One and he’s com­ing back to Europe!”

Eliza­beth Braw: “*inter­rup­t­ing* -- that did­n’t work, that did­n’t work at all, then then then they blew it - but but just to say that for me even if they fall short of the expec­ta­ti­on alrea­dy that we have to see how many peop­le do they mana­ge to g - to gar­ner and whe­ther whe­ther it’s going to be a suc­cess­ful exer­cise -- in gene­ral the exer­cise is a com­mu­ni­ca­ti­on exer­cise. Nobo­dy expects any result from the sum­mit, in sen­se of peace decisi­ons, some -- the decisi­ons about the pro­gress in the war, what’s going to hap­pen to the future, what’s going to hap­pen to secu­ri­ty of euro­pe --- it is inde­ed a pure­ly image-, com­mu­ni­ca­ti­on exer­cise and in that way - may­be would may­be -- it’s a mes­sa­ge in---including from by the US that - bet­ter con­cen­tra­te your efforts, on some­thing that can actual­ly yield results - like for examp­le recon­struc­tion mee­tings, or the uh the recon­struc­tion sum­mit in Ber­lin - or the Washing­ton Sum­mit hope­ful­ly - hope­ful­ly leads also results that’s the big one also, we for­got so…”

Mode­ra­tor “Eliza­beth Braw, did you hear that, there’s a fourth sum­mit - we did­n’t men­ti­on it yet it’s the NATO Sum­mit taking place uh actual­ly it’s due to begin the day after the second round of uh french legis­la­ti­ve elec­tions - we’ll know then if the far right’s in power or not in this coun­try, uh is that the big one?”

Eliza­beth Braw: “Well it is the big one as as far as NATO is con­cer­ned, but it’s not going, it’s not going to to lead any bre­akthroughs when it comes to the Ukrai­ne war and and sin­ce we are also dis­cus­sing peop­le who, who will not be at various Sum­mits -- the Washing­ton Sum­mit will be just a few days after the UK elec­tions, so it’s uh it’s who will par­ti­ci­pa­te from the UK government is is still shrou­ded in mys­te­ry - and we may not know until the day of of the sum­mit [doesnt mat­ter much all par­ties are pro Ukrai­ne] this day - the sum­mit begins who will repre­sent the UK but um the Washing­ton Sum­mit real­ly is about NATO its­elf and yes, the­re will be various uh over­tures to Ukrai­ne -- shows of sup­port, but this is about uh decisi­ons uh about NATO intern­al­ly how to to, how the alli­an­ce should be set up - it’s it’s much less about Ukrai­ne, but I think that the the - what has chan­ged in the­se past two years is that Selen­skyj has beco­me a regu­lar guest at various gathe­rings at which Ukrai­ne would not have been invi­ted to -- which Ukrai­ne would not have been invi­ted two and a half years ago, and he’s he’s invi­ted as essen­ti­al­ly as a star guest and a spe­cial guest uh and not as a full par­ti­ci­pant - but it’s it’s it is striking, becau­se Ukrai­ne is always the that addi­tio­nal guest that is invi­ted and and then when it comes to to Selen­skyj lo-- losing his midas touch, that was always going to hap­pen -- it was going to be uh tren­dy and and uh important, right -- at the begin­ning of the war for ever­y­bo­dy to to sup­port Ukrai­ne and they wan­ted to -- they felt very pas­sio­na­te­ly about it, it was always the case that, that pas­si­on was going to wane after a while and it has waned by the fact that he is con­ti­nuing the­se uh uh the­se con­stant visits to the West - is both a sign of the fact that he’s invi­ted to the west and other coun­tries, is both a sign of the fact that he’s still invi­ted -- still wel­co­me and of the fact that the­se coun­tries feel that is still the­re is, still a via­ble case for sup­por­ting Ukrai­ne - if they did­n’t think that was the­re was anything more they could do he would not be invited.”

Sum­ma­ry: “Whats he doing?” “Well, Idk - it seems like hes still get­ting sup­port, so let him.”