Autorenarchiv

Our transatlantic friends are spitballing

08. Februar 2022

… future sce­n­a­ri­os of Nato deve­lo­p­ment in Euro­pe - report released today. Rough­cut, how to get Euro­pe more res­il­li­ant under war/proxy war conditions.

With it also being para­mount that Nato will grow and chan­ge in the com­ing years. With Euro­pe poten­ti­al­ly being under war.

Fun.

And so sen­si­ti­ve in regards to the situa­ti­on cur­r­ent­ly evolving.

edit:

Now on Ukrai­ne, whe­re the rules based order is under direct ass­ault, we sug­gest a more proac­ti­ve, stra­te­gy dri­ven approach to NATO part­ners­hips, inclu­ding the Ukrai­ne deter­rence initia­ti­ve. That would make it a stra­te­gic prio­ri­ty for the alli­an­ce, to do ever­ything pos­si­ble, short of an arti­cle five gua­ran­tee, to help Ukrai­ne and other part­ners, that are threa­tened by Mos­kow, to defend them­sel­ves and deter aggres­si­on. This Ukrai­ne deter­rence initia­ti­ve could be an exten­si­on of the enhan­ced oppor­tu­nities part­ners pro­gram, at a time when NATO mem­bers­hip of the Ukrai­ne is real­ly not on the agenda.”

Ah, a NATO build-up without a NATO mem­bers­hip. Excellent.

As Juli­an out­lined in his over­view - we argue, that the new stra­te­gic con­cept must com­mit the alli­an­ce to a step chan­ge in the balan­ce of respon­si­bi­li­ty bet­ween the United Sta­tes and the euro­pean mem­bers of the alli­an­ce, to inclu­de Cana­da as well. This is no lon­ger just a mat­ter of over­co­m­ing long stan­ding dis­pu­tes over bur­den sharing in defen­se spen­ding, bet­ween the United Sta­tes and Euro­pe - its now a stra­te­gic neces­si­ty, becau­se the rise of chi­na as a stra­te­gic com­pe­ti­tor crea­tes US need to shift its stra­te­gic focus to the indo­pa­ci­fic regi­on. And under the­se cir­cum­s­tan­ces, Nato can no lon­ger afford it exces­si­ve reli­an­ce on the United sta­tes, eit­her for collec­ti­ve defen­se, or for cri­sis manage­ment and coope­ra­ti­ve secu­ri­ty mis­si­ons bey­ond euro­pes bor­ders. Clear­ly - in an arti­cle five con­tin­gen­cy bet­ween rus­sia in the bal­tic or black sea regi­ons, the United Sta­tes may not always be able to deploy ade­qua­te rein­for­ce­ments to Euro­pe, becau­se of com­pe­ting deman­ds on its for­ces in the indo-pacific. So euro­pean allies will need to be able to pick up most of the slack. Now simi­lar­ly resour­ce cons­traints and shif­ting prio­ri­ties may also lead the US to limit its invol­ve­ment in the midd­le east, afri­ca, and south asia. Or at least to be more selec­ti­ve in when and whe­re it enga­ges. That means, that the United Sta­tes will incre­a­singly look to the euro­pean allies and the euro­pean uni­on to shoul­der more of the bur­den for cri­sis manage­ment and part­ner capa­ci­ty buil­ding in their own neighborhood.”

Same stance - as announ­ced by Peter Zei­han and men­tio­ned in this blog, one year ago.

This is some­what important, as the (trans­at­lan­tic) think­tank cir­cuit is cur­r­ent­ly try­ing to estab­lish that Putin (hims­elf pro­bab­ly) is try­ing to dri­ve a wedge into the US/European coali­ti­on, while in rea­li­ty the stra­te­gic focus of the US has shifted to the indo-pacific and will do more so in the future regard­less of what hap­pens in the­se parts of the world. An expan­sio­nist Chi­na is too much of a stra­te­gic thre­at to the US - while Euro­pe doesnt hold the same value any­mo­re (not mili­ta­ri­ly, not regar­ding ener­gy secu­ri­ty, not in terms of tra­de (US deve­lo­ping Mexi­co and India to be con­su­mer eco­no­mies), not in terms of inno­va­ti­on eit­her (has more to do with the fact that ener­gy secu­ri­ty in the US in the com­ing three deca­des is not rely­ing on anything that Euro­pe pro­du­ces. They’­ve beco­me net exporters.)

Why is the first thing that comes to mind “Fare well a**holes? And thanks for all the hell rai­sing in the past days!”?

Time for another hate post

08. Februar 2022

US vows to stop Nord Stream 2 if Rus­sia inva­des Ukraine

US Pre­si­dent Joe Biden has said the­re is no chan­ce of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipe­line pro­ject going should Rus­sia mount an offen­si­ve. Chan­cellor Olaf Scholz, on his first White House visit in office, was more guarded.

src: click

DW.com mana­ged to mis­re­pre­sent ger­ma­nys posi­ti­on (several repor­ters and ankers on record say­ing that “now the poten­ti­al reac­tion from the west and EU coun­tries has beco­me more clear, and uni­fied” in the past days, while none of that was true.). They’­ve mana­ged to miss, that the­re was a dif­fe­rence in posi­ti­ons for the past week. They’­ve mana­ged to miss, that the US announ­ced a “com­mon posi­ti­on of the US and the EU” on this uni­la­te­ral­ly, ther­eby sud­den­ly con­tra­dic­ting the ger­man governments public posi­ti­on. They’­ve mana­ged to miss, that that was seen as an outra­ge by peop­le fol­lowing poli­ti­cal repor­ting on the issue clo­se­ly. They’­ve mana­ged to miss the BBC rebut­tal, that indi­ca­ted, that this wasnt a pre­me­de­ta­ted move by the US, but only a “mista­ke”, after the US spo­ke to some nort­hern euro­pean coun­tries, then announ­cing a com­mon posi­ti­on that never was one. They mana­ged to miss the aggres­si­ve natu­re in the US announ­cing that state­ment in todays announ­ce­ment, again. (Second time in a row isnt a mista­ke any­mo­re.) They’­ve mana­ged to miss asking for fur­ther cla­ri­fi­ca­ti­on on part of the ger­man government, becau­se the posi­ti­on “its part of a wide ran­ge of meas­su­res” doesnt necessa­ri­ly mean, we sta­te, that we’ll stop it out­right, if the­re is any kind of con­flict in the com­ing days. Not becau­se thats an important dis­tinc­tion in its­elf necessa­ri­ly, but becau­se it lea­ves room for diplo­ma­cy after the fact, without pro­noun­cing it a red line - like the US just did, again. Without caring for the euro­pean posi­ti­on in the least (as far as I under­stand fran­ce isnt in line with the US announ­ce­ment eit­her, but some of the foun­ding NATO mem­bers wit­hin the EU are). With ques­tion­ab­le juris­dic­tion in the mat­ter. They’­ve mana­ged to pro­long this effing sta­te of “who the f*ck makes euro­pean secu­ri­ty and ener­gy poli­cy decisi­ons” for over a f*cking week, not do any repor­ting on it and now pre­sent ano­t­her pres­su­re play from the US in a “man­ner of fact” way.

What the f*ck?

Past deve­lo­p­ments lay­ed out, with pri­ma­ry sources lin­ked, in here:
click

edit: DW now (a few hours later) is doub­ling down, ins­tead of admit­ting their mistake:

The Ger­man chan­cellor came to the White House empty-handed. His hol­low reas­suran­ces about Germany’s com­mit­ment to Ukrai­ne will have done litt­le to con­vin­ce his cri­tics in Washing­ton, says DW’s Michae­la Küfner.

src: click

Cal­ling it a mis­sed oppor­tu­ni­ty, still having no idea that they were wrong in repor­ting this all the way. Still showing no signs of cor­rec­ting them­sel­ves, or admit­ting any of it. If you go with the most haw­kish trans-atlantic think tank stance, its your best opti­on in todays jour­na­lism land­s­cape, by pro­xy, it seems. At least for DW.com

Its time for ano­t­her over­view on how trans­at­lan­tic PR works in this case.

1. US teasing, that in case of an attack the North Stream 2 Pipe­line would never beco­me acti­ve, in an NPR Podcast.
DWs repor­ting: Rather mat­ter of fact.

2. US, one day later, uni­la­te­ral­ly announ­cing, that the­re is a joint euro­pean posi­ti­on on that Nord Stream 2 would never beco­me acti­ve, if any form of inva­si­on would take place. Con­tra­dic­ting the ger­man governments posi­ti­on on the issue, at the time - in a public announ­ce­ment. Thats after Biden had to be cor­rec­ted tal­king about a dif­fe­rence bet­ween a smal­ler and a lar­ge form inva­si­on ear­lier. Becau­se appar­ent­ly that dif­fe­rence didnt exist from the US’ point of view. (Even though Biden publicly announ­ced it did.) Thats two pret­ty lar­ge sca­le scan­dals in a row - that none of the pun­dits in any of the wes­tern media out­lets had anything to say about.

DWs repor­ting: “Final­ly a uni­fied stra­te­gy, and a clear posi­ti­on, we are now see­ing con­se­quen­ces emerge”.

3. A day later Ger­ma­ny still not chan­ging their posi­ti­on (Nord Stream 2 will be part of a ran­ge of actions, if an inva­si­on takes place.)

DWs repor­ting: “Still a uni­fied stra­te­gy and a clear mes­sa­ge, that if the­re is an inva­si­on North Stream 2 will never beco­me active.”

4. BBC pro­du­ces a report in which it announ­ces, that the­re still is seve­re uncer­tain­ty over how euro­pe would pro­ceed in detail in case of an inva­si­on, regar­ding what would hap­pen to Nord­stream 2, and only on that stance - men­tio­ning, that the cau­se was the US tal­king to “one nort­hern euro­pean alley” and then having announ­ced a uni­fied Euro­pean and US position.

DWs repor­ting: None existent.

5. The US repea­ting the pri­or made state­ment - with US jour­na­lists ques­tio­ning the spea­ker, on what basis tho­se remarks were made, and why the US had the presump­ti­on that this would be the uni­fied stance. Jour­na­lists are shut down, and not given an answer.

DWs repor­ting: None existent.

6. By now the ger­man talk­show cir­cuit (Anne Will, …) is fil­led with coa­ched pun­dits, that cant talk free­ly on issu­es in the Ukrai­ne, but have very pro­mi­nent tal­king points, that ger­ma­ny is not pul­ling its weight, brin­ging in the gam­bit of the 5000 hel­mets deli­ve­r­ed to the Ukrai­ne only - which Klitsch­ko was on a press cir­cuit for - but which if loo­ked at clo­se­ly was ful­fil­ling a demand for sup­plies the Ukrai­ne had made pri­or, and then tur­ned around into ridi­cu­le to incre­a­se public pres­su­re on the ger­man government, pri­or to the US visit. Ukrai­ne offi­cials later back­tra­cked, and went the poten­ti­al denia­bi­li­ty rou­te of “the num­ber (5000) had been the issue”, and too small, alt­hough they didnt spe­ci­fy a num­ber befo­re, just that they nee­ded helmets.

DWs repor­ting: Ger­ma­ny is being cri­ti­cis­ed by its allies for not pul­ling its weight.

7. Scholz announ­ces his tal­king points for the mee­ting with Biden pri­or to the flight.

DWs repor­ting: By then having swit­ched onto the “Ger­ma­ny is being cri­ti­zi­ced for being too inac­ti­ve, and not pro­vi­ding wea­pon ship­ments” beat, with think tank experts fea­tured cri­ti­ci­zing ger­ma­ny for “being unclear in their stance towards their allies” - which never was the case, becau­se the gam­bit used to announ­ce that was now a com­bi­na­ti­on of “Ger­ma­ny doesnt want NS2 to be used as a red line in threa­tening rus­sia” and ger­ma­ny not deli­vering wea­pon­ry into con­flict are­as. Both of which were long stan­ding posi­ti­ons, for weeks, at that point.

8. Scholz still using a dif­fe­rent wor­d­ing after the mee­ting under­li­ning that ger­ma­nys posi­ti­on hadnt chan­ged. While Biden tri­es to strong arm the red line posi­ti­on once more, by announ­cing, that the US - and not its part­ners, would pre­vent NS2 from beco­m­ing acti­ve in case of an invasion.

DWs repor­ting: NEWSFLASH! Ger­ma­ny is using dif­fe­rent wording!

9. DW repor­ting that the mee­ting had been a flop, becau­se ger­ma­ny went to the US without making any fur­ther con­ces­si­ons coi­ning it as “At every step of the way, Scholz has avoided addres­sing the issue direct­ly. Ins­tead, he sounds like a bro­ken record chur­ning out the same non-committal state­ments the public has beco­me accus­to­med to after his first 62 days in office.”. Not men­tio­ning the 5000 hel­mets stand in for the cri­ti­cism in the least, becau­se that only was used as a pres­su­re point pri­or to the talks, and now has beco­me ent­i­re­ly - useless it seems. As ger­ma­ny hasnt chan­ged posi­ti­on. So… Not an issue any­mo­re, right? Lets just drop repor­ting, without men­tio­ning, that that was a gam­bit employ­ed by the Ukrai­ne, reac­ting outra­ged at the ful­fill­ment of an actu­al request made. (You can see that exchan­ge here: click)

DW never admit­ting the mista­ke on their part. Never loo­king at it from the euro­pean per­spec­ti­ve, never ack­now­led­ging, that the US tried to pull a fast one here, … Plain­ly repea­ting the nar­ra­ti­ve, that Scholz had fai­led in his mis­si­on of out­lining ger­ma­nys posi­ti­on. (Which by then had beco­me a fail­u­re to mer­ge posi­ti­ons, with the US announ­ce­ment.). Which at the time it was made, was ent­i­re­ly made up. Just as made up, as the “uni­fied US and euro­pean posi­ti­on” on making NS2 a red line, which they repor­ted for two days, without cor­rec­ting it - and still haven’t cor­rec­ted up until now.

Also - as DW is ent­i­re­ly rely­ing in their inter­pre­ta­ti­on on think tanks like the Ger­man Coun­cil on For­eign rela­ti­ons (thats pos­si­ble?), may be it would be inte­res­ting to hear their posi­ti­on on future deve­lo­p­ments in the matter.

Which is a not so rea­son­ab­le - Ever­ything short of a war is “very dif­fi­cult to imagine”.

See:

Lets see on that point, how accu­ra­te they turn out to be in the com­ing weeks. Just know that one thing will remain cer­tain. DW will ask them for their assess­ment in a dai­ly seg­ment in the future as well - and then model their edi­to­ri­al posi­ti­on some­whe­re around the state­ments given.

edit: Just so you know what to think and feel, when tal­king about this sto­ry, the aus­tri­an Die Pres­se also is very hel­pful in instil­ling that in you.
Olaf Schol­zes press appearan­ce was “bizar­re”, becau­se he didnt ful­fill haw­kish trans­at­lan­tic think­tank expec­ta­ti­ons. See: click Its so hel­pful to always get told what to think and feel, without get­ting the back­ground on a story.

The new normalcy

06. Februar 2022


Attract images in the you­tube pre­roll (what you’d see when you mou­se over this video on you­tube) for news clips, with three year olds with card­board wea­pons in their hands sound­ing *piew* *piew* *piew* - which is out­right heroic, becau­se its the clip for “US tro­ops arri­ve in Poland to deter & defend”.

Inter­views with the peop­le on the streets con­tai­ning the fol­lowing sen­ti­ment: “Ukrai­ne has been in a sta­te of war sin­ce 2014, some of my friends have not retur­ned from the front, and I’m con­stant­ly thin­king about it, it tou­ches every fami­ly - we are not just pre­pa­ring for an attack, its hap­pe­ning alrea­dy. We are not pre­pa­ring for anything, this - is sim­ply our life.”

Ah, the healt­hy wes­tern pro­pa­gan­da. Child with card­board auto­ma­tic wea­pon and red wool bea­nie, and psy­cho­lo­gi­cal­ly ins­ta­ble young women con­fla­ting the death of her friends with pur­po­se - even more so, with it being a necessa­ry part of their dai­ly lives, that will pro­long into the future. For the nati­on, for future genera­ti­ons, for the non resol­ved part of the trau­ma that is showing…

Ah… That is good TV. What won­der­ful sen­ti­ments. “For free­dom” is so abs­tract com­pa­red to that, whe­res the human ang­le on that…

The demons­tra­ti­on to stop rus­si­an aggres­si­on then is brought to you as the third ele­ment of this very infor­ma­ti­ve clip. Was­n’t “on mes­sa­ge” enough, I pre­su­me… At least they show­ed clips of peop­le sin­ging the Ukrai­ne anthem with their fist on their heart, thats at least pathos!

Lets go to our cor­re­spon­dent next, ask them some ques­ti­on about how the EU sees this, that no one is asking. But that for some rea­son also is their thumb­nail title.

No need to con­tex­tua­li­ze what we just showed.

edit: Just for com­pa­ri­sons sake, this is the attract roll CBS put tog­e­ther. Same news story.

edit2: I’ll also drop this here (Addi­tio­nal infor­ma­ti­on (on what dri­ves public sentiments)).

First absolute hate post in a while…

06. Februar 2022

Arti­cle: Why the EU needs Rus­si­an ener­gy giant Gazprom

Ang­le:

Gaz­prom uses its mar­ket power by influ­en­cing pri­ces through the amount of gas that it sup­plies to Euro­pe,” ener­gy expert Georg Zach­mann from the Brussels-based Brue­gel think tank told DW.”

Rea­so­ning:

The­re is a kind of com­pe­ti­ti­on bet­ween the Euro­pean regu­la­tors who are try­ing to crea­te a mar­ket with uni­fied pri­ces and Gaz­prom which is try­ing to impo­se dif­fe­rent pri­ces in dif­fe­rent coun­tries,” exp­lai­ned Zachmann.

While Gaz­prom insists that it has hono­red all its long-term sup­ply com­mit­ments, Zach­mann said that the com­pa­ny was actual­ly sup­ply­ing less gas to the mar­ket with short-term contracts. 

Zach­mann said that the short-term mar­ket had beco­me incre­a­singly important in recent years becau­se the­re was an attempt to beco­me less depen­dent on Gaz­prom in the long run.

So, that Gaz­prom and with it rus­sia doesnt want to rely on short term con­trac­ting, becau­se it encom­pas­ses an attempt to beco­me less depen­dant on Gaz­prom over­all is… wait for it…

Gaz­prom is ful­fil­ling its con­tracts, that is true, but only at the lowest level of its com­mit­ments,” Euro­pean Com­mis­si­on Pre­si­dent Ursu­la von der Ley­en poin­ted out recent­ly. She said that other sup­pliers had incre­a­sed their deli­ve­ries in view of the rapidly rising demand and record prices. 

Von der Ley­en added that Gaz­prom was beha­ving in a stran­ge way, con­si­de­ring that more gas was not being sup­plied des­pi­te high demand. She also told the Ger­man dai­ly Han­dels­blatt that the fact that the com­pa­ny belon­ged to the Rus­si­an sta­te rai­sed doubts as to its reliability.

STRANGE BEHAVIOR con­si­de­ring that not more gas was sup­plied, given the high demand.

But Gaz­prom is ful­fil­ling its con­tracts, thats true.

But this is all rai­sing doubts, becau­se rely­ing on the Rus­si­an sta­te rai­ses doubts on relia­bi­li­ty overall.

But Gaz­prom is ful­fil­ling contracts.

Yes, but we expec­ted more than just ful­fil­ling contracts.

While threa­tening sanc­tions at the same time.

edit: Short inter­lu­de, to dilu­te the hate in this pos­ting with a litt­le bit of comedy.

And then, when ger­man sup­pliers final­ly put in a big­ger order a few days ago, Gaz­prom reports, that capa­ci­ty on the Ukrai­ne pipe­line was boo­ked wit­hin a day, and deli­very star­ted wit­hin a day or two…

But its stran­ge beha­vi­or, that it was­n’t more, befo­re that happened.

Becau­se Gaz­prom was just ful­fil­ling their contracts.

Becau­se of this excel­lent effing logic, and cer­tain­ly not becau­se of any alte­rior moti­ves, UvdL announ­ced the fol­lowing in the same Inter­view with the “Han­dels­blatt”.

If Gaz­prom were to recei­ve inst­ruc­tions from the Krem­lin to stop sup­ply­ing gas to the EU, the­re could be signi­fi­cant shortages.

Von der Ley­en said that she did not belie­ve it would come to that. Sin­ce the Rus­si­an eco­no­my is so depen­dent on ener­gy exports, it would not make sen­se to jeo­par­di­ze its rela­ti­ons­hip with its big­gest cli­ent and investor.

But she told Han­dels­blatt that the EU and the US were working to incre­a­se sup­plies of lique­fied natu­ral gas from Qatar or the US. Nego­tia­ti­ons are to take place this com­ing Mon­day in Washing­ton DC

So becau­se we dont belie­ve, that Rus­sia would cau­se signi­fi­cant shor­ta­ges of gas sup­plies in Euro­pe out of their own voli­ti­on, basi­cal­ly becau­se of the ent­i­re eco­no­mic design of the ven­ture to begin with, the EU now has to work with the US to incre­a­se sup­plies of LNG from Qatar, or the US.

AM I GOING INSANE, OR IS IT THE WORLD AROUND ME?

edit: Bloom­berg arti­cle has more details:

Tra­ders are watching every move by Europe’s top sup­plier, focu­sing on how much gas is deli­ve­r­ed bey­ond con­trac­ted volu­mes. Auc­tions of pipe­line capa­ci­ty for Decem­ber run next Mon­day, which will cast a light on whe­ther extra ship­ments could mate­ria­li­ze. Addi­tio­nal boo­kings may be likely if Gaz­prom sees pro­gress in the cer­ti­fi­ca­ti­on of the con­ten­tious Nord Stream 2 pipe­line, ana­lysts have said.

News arti­cle was from Novem­ber 10th 2021. That was after Gaz­prom boo­ked pipe­line capa­ci­ty over Ukrai­ne to deli­ver accord­ing to con­tract obligations.

So lets sum­me­ri­ze. Becau­se Euro­pe moved away from long term pro­cu­re­ment deals, end­an­ge­ring ener­gy secu­ri­ty, while Ger­ma­ny set into action plans to exit from coal and nuclear ener­gy simul­ta­ne­ous­ly, and stop­ped North Stream 2, on the poli­ti­cal level, becau­se of U.S. inter­ven­ti­on at the licen­sing sta­ge, Gaz­prom stop­ped to sup­ply spot mar­kets with (by then more expen­si­ve) natu­ral gas - at “expec­ted volu­mes”, expec­ted, becau­se it was the inten­ded goal of the EU to decre­a­se ener­gy depen­den­cy on rus­sia, so they went into day tra­ding it in lar­ger volu­mes, and spot mar­kets ins­tead -- which now has cau­sed UvdL to anoun­ce, that this would have been “stran­ge beha­vi­or” of Gaz­prom - that they didnt just sup­ply the dayt­ra­ding sec­tor with the same amount as befo­re, and ther­eby causing ques­ti­ons over rus­si­an relia­bi­li­ty in the ener­gy pro­cu­re­ment sec­tor - while at the same time sta­ting, that the rus­si­an eco­no­my would fal­ter, if they ever did so (at any extent that would end­an­ger EU ener­gy secu­ri­ty), and that it wasnt very likely -- and becau­se of that, its now in the inte­rest of ener­gy sup­ply sta­bi­li­ty to diver­si­fy pro­cu­re­ment, and go with LNG from the US or Qatar (who knows, cer­tain­ly not UvdL), which needs an exten­si­on of the LNG infra­st­ruc­tu­re wit­hin the EU, which the EU is backing, but which is usual­ly pri­va­te­ly fun­ded (with invest­ment gua­ran­tees given out), and only just beca­me inte­res­ting for inves­tors in the sec­tor, becau­se of rising gas pri­ces. Oh and that on its own (diver­si­fi­ca­ti­on) will rai­se effec­ti­ve pro­cu­re­ment pri­ces. Also slowing down the sus­tainab­le ener­gy tran­si­ti­on - which still is the main pro­ject of the UvdL pre­si­den­cy, apparently.

No - checks out. Why should jour­na­lism report anything else. Or ask any questions.

Oh, and btw. the LNG indus­try has a new lea­ding expor­ting nati­on.

Oh, and the sin­gu­lar cau­se for hig­her US natu­ral gas pri­ces was “the arc­tic cold snap”, of course.

The­res good news in all this as well, of course -
Gold­man: Ukrai­ne Con­flict Could Dou­ble EU Natu­ral Gas Prices

WAIT THE UKRAINE CONFLICT? I THOUGHT IT WAS RUSSIAS UNRELIABILITY ON THE SPOTMARKETS! (Becau­se if it wasnt, it would have been EU thre­ats of sanc­tions, play­ing a major role, surely…)

AM I GOING INSANE, OR IS IT THE WORLD AROUND ME? (Sh*t they are lying to us!™)

14th paragraph from the top

06. Februar 2022

DW news story:

Ger­ma­ny must cut reli­an­ce on Rus­si­an gas, minis­ter says

Germany’s Eco­no­my Minis­ter Robert Habeck war­ned against Europe’s No.1 eco­no­my beco­m­ing a “pawn” in Russia’s game. Natu­ral gas stock­pi­les across the EU are at their lowest in years as ten­si­ons over Ukrai­ne intensify.

What did Habeck say?
“We must impro­ve our pre­pa­red­ness for next win­ter,” the Green Par­ty poli­ti­ci­an told the news­pa­pers of the Fun­ke Media Group and the French regio­nal dai­ly Ouest-France.

Habeck said the Ukrai­ne cri­sis is for­cing Ger­ma­ny to “crea­te other import oppor­tu­nities and to diver­si­fy its sup­ply, inclu­ding infra­st­ruc­tu­ral issues.”

We have to act here and bet­ter secu­re our­sel­ves. If we don’t, we beco­me a pawn in the game [of Russia].”

[…]

Ger­ma­ny remains reli­ant on Rus­si­an gas for over a third of its needs as it pha­ses out coal and nuclear energies.

14th para­graph from the top:

He went on to cri­ti­ci­ze the gas mar­ket for being com­ple­te­ly dere­gu­la­ted and hin­ted that the government may have to play a grea­ter role.

src: click

Why is this important?
Becau­se this is how RT (via fefe, don’t read them other­wi­se :)) is repor­ting the same story:

Gaz­prom hat den Gas­hahn wie­der aufgedreht.

while some EU offi­cials are accu­sing Gaz­prom of deli­ber­ate­ly with­hol­ding sup­plies. Howe­ver, Gaz­prom says addi­tio­nal sup­plies were not boo­ked befo­re Febru­a­ry 2. 

Na sowas. Stellt sich raus: Wenn man bei denen was kauft, dann lie­fern die das auch. Und zwar frist­ge­mäß und in vol­ler Höhe.
Kön­nen wir viel­leicht jetzt auf­hö­ren so zu tun, als sei das Schuld der Rus­sen, dass unse­re Kon­zer­ne die für unse­re Bür­ger gemein­ten Gas­re­ser­ven zwecks Pro­fit­ma­xi­mie­rung auf dem Spot­markt ver­hö­kert haben?

src: click

RT goes into more detail as well:

Gaz­prom has resu­med gas sup­plies to Euro­pe through Ukrai­ne, boo­king 109 mil­li­on cubic meters of dai­ly pipe­line capa­ci­ty, Bloom­berg repor­ted on Tues­day. Under the five-year con­tract, which expi­res in 2024, the com­pa­ny is expec­ted to deli­ver 40 bil­li­on cubic meters of gas per year to Euro­pe via Ukrai­ne. The news trig­ge­red a long-anticipated decli­ne in gas pri­ces, with March futures drop­ping below $900 per thousand cubic meters.

Janu­a­ry sales of Rus­si­an natu­ral gas out­side the for­mer Soviet Uni­on saw a mas­si­ve drop of 41.3% year-on-year, while the country’s over­all pro­duc­tion has incre­a­sed, Rus­si­an ener­gy major Gaz­prom repor­ted on Tuesday.

Euro­pean inven­to­ry levels have repor­ted­ly sunk to his­to­ric lows over the past several mon­ths, sen­ding ener­gy pri­ces in the regi­on soa­ring, while some EU offi­cials are accu­sing Gaz­prom of deli­ber­ate­ly with­hol­ding sup­plies. Howe­ver, Gaz­prom says addi­tio­nal sup­plies were not boo­ked befo­re Febru­a­ry 2.

The Company’s gas deli­ve­ries are car­ri­ed out as reques­ted by con­su­mers in full com­pli­an­ce with con­trac­tu­al obli­ga­ti­ons,” Gaz­prom said in a press release.

Gaz­prom said ear­lier this mon­th it hadn’t boo­ked any mon­th­ly tran­sit capa­ci­ty via the Yamal-Europe gas pipe­line [the one going through Ukrai­ne] for Febru­a­ry. Howe­ver, the com­pa­ny may still book the rou­te via dai­ly auctions.

The pipe­line, which usual­ly accounts for about 15% of Russia’s annu­al gas exports to Euro­pe and Tur­key, has been working in rever­se mode sin­ce late Decem­ber, put­ting addi­tio­nal pres­su­re on Euro­pean ener­gy prices.

Mean­while, working gas invent­ories in Europe’s under­ground gas sto­rage faci­li­ties were lag­ging behind last year’s level by 27.2% as of Janu­a­ry 30, Gaz­prom said on Tues­day, citing data from Gas Infra­st­ruc­tu­re Europe.

Over 81% of the fuel deli­ve­r­ed during the sum­mer is alrea­dy pum­ped out from the faci­li­ties, accord­ing to the com­pa­ny, while “the total amount of working gas invent­ories in Euro­pean UGS faci­li­ties was as low as 38.1 bil­li­on cubic meters on Janu­a­ry 30, fal­ling by 2.7 bil­li­on cubic meters below the his­to­ri­cal mini­mum for this date.”

Mea­ning, as gas pri­ces soared, euro­pean pro­vi­ders stop­ped orde­ring, becau­se they were bet­ting on lower pri­ces on spot­mar­kets, becau­se it was indi­ca­ted, that the pri­ce shock had exter­nal cau­ses, part of which would have been rela­ted to acts of natu­re bey­ond human con­trol. So the­re was an expec­tancy of pri­ces fal­ling again, over time. Rus­si­an gas wasnt going through the Ukrai­ne for that peri­od of time, becau­se rus­sia had enough capa­ci­ty over the remai­ning pipe­line net­work to deli­ver the boo­ked amounts without ship­ping them through Ukrai­ne. This now chan­ged, on the same day, or the day after (unclear) euro­pean sup­pliers incre­a­sed orders.

Three more steps to ful­ly under­stand the logic here.

Ener­gy pri­ces for gas incre­a­sed in the US as well, (ope­ning up the Yamal-Europe pipe­line actual­ly incre­a­sed them fur­ther), as - again acts of natu­re bey­ond con­trol are cited to be a cau­se the­re as well. In fact, U.S. Natu­ral Gas Pri­ces Jum­ped by 10% on Wed­nes­day alo­ne, cited cau­se: “Fri­gid weather”.

That was fol­lowing the sin­gle most rapid climb in gas pri­ces ever, in a sin­gle day in the US, a week earlier.

Ope­ning up the Yamal-Europe pipe­line has also incre­a­sed the gas pri­ce - after a mini slump, becau­se again rus­sia saw 41.3% less demand year on year, des­pi­te hit­ting an all time high in gas pro­duc­tion. (What drop­ped accord­ing to RT were the futures, so spe­cu­la­ti­on on long term pri­ce increases.)

At the same time this happens: 

The Glo­bal Gas Cri­sis Has Made Ame­ri­can LNG Hot Again

The glo­bal gas crunch and sky­ro­cke­ting pri­ces in Euro­pe and Asia are lay­ing the foun­da­ti­ons for a revi­val in final invest­ment decisi­ons in new lique­fied natu­ral gas (LNG)

src: click

That was step one.

Step two is now loo­king at Habecks quo­te in context.

Germany’s Eco­no­my Minis­ter Robert Habeck war­ned against Europe’s No.1 eco­no­my beco­m­ing a “pawn” in Russia’s game. Natu­ral gas stock­pi­les across the EU are at their lowest in years as ten­si­ons over Ukrai­ne intensify.

Who stop­ped orde­ring gas?

We must impro­ve our pre­pa­red­ness for next win­ter,” the Green Par­ty poli­ti­ci­an told the news­pa­pers of the Fun­ke Media Group and the French regio­nal dai­ly Ouest-France.

Habeck said the Ukrai­ne cri­sis is for­cing Ger­ma­ny to “crea­te other import oppor­tu­nities and to diver­si­fy its sup­ply, inclu­ding infra­st­ruc­tu­ral issues.”

Diver­si­fy­ing”, is only pos­si­ble if Ame­ri­can LNG mar­kets are set­ting invest­ment decisi­ons right now, and they are set­ting them based on: 

The Glo­bal Gas Cri­sis Has Made Ame­ri­can LNG Hot Again

The glo­bal gas crunch and sky­ro­cke­ting pri­ces in Euro­pe and Asia are lay­ing the foun­da­ti­ons for a revi­val in final invest­ment decisi­ons in new lique­fied natu­ral gas (LNG)

src: click

As well as the 14th para­graph from the top for DW.com:

He [Habeck] went on to cri­ti­ci­ze the gas mar­ket for being com­ple­te­ly dere­gu­la­ted and hin­ted that the government may have to play a grea­ter role.

src: click

Third step is to under­stand the “new role governments should play in co-regulating ener­gy markets”.

The Ger­man Mar­shall Fund of the United Sta­tes released a press state­ment two days ago.

EU-US Ener­gy Coope­ra­ti­on to Address Cli­ma­te Change

In 2022, the big­gest exis­ten­ti­al thre­at to the health, pro­spe­ri­ty, and exis­tence of humans on Earth is cli­ma­te chan­ge. Mas­si­ve efforts are nee­ded to urgent­ly miti­ga­te green­house gas emis­si­ons and, in par­al­lel, sup­port adap­t­ati­on mea­su­res for tho­se alrea­dy affec­ted by its nega­ti­ve impact. On the occa­si­on of the EU-US Ener­gy Coun­cil mee­ting in Febru­a­ry 2022, it is use­ful to recall the dra­ma­tic impact of the Euro­pean Reco­very Program—the Mar­shall Plan—on the recon­struc­tion of Euro­pe; that the finan­cial, tech­ni­cal, and poli­ti­cal sup­port of the United Sta­tes to both for­mer friends and foes in Euro­pe were essen­ti­al in re-establishing demo­cra­cy and growth in a Euro­pe devas­ta­ted by inter­nal stri­fe and war. Seventy-five years sin­ce Secreta­ry of Sta­te Geor­ge Mar­shall announ­ced the plan, and 50 years sin­ce the Ger­man Mar­shall Fund was estab­lis­hed to build grea­ter trans­at­lan­tic and inter­na­tio­nal coope­ra­ti­on, it is a time­ly moment to reflect on how the Euro­pean and Ame­ri­can powers can work tog­e­ther glo­bal­ly to address cli­ma­te chan­ge immedia­te­ly, ade­qua­te­ly, and inno­va­tively to ensu­re glo­bal pro­spe­ri­ty and demo­cra­cy. The coope­ra­ti­on of the trans­at­lan­tic powers to trans­fer regu­la­to­ry best prac­ti­ces and new tech­no­lo­gies in the clean ener­gy tran­si­ti­on can help all glo­bal part­ners attain net-zero emis­si­ons by 2050. In addi­ti­on, tech­ni­cal and finan­cial assi­s­tance to tho­se suf­fe­ring most from the con­se­quen­ces of cli­ma­te chan­ge must be pro­vi­ded to help them to urgent­ly take mea­su­res to adapt and pro­tect themselves.

[…]

Hydro­gen
Fol­lowing on from bet­ter manage­ment of electri­ci­ty grids and grea­ter sup­ply of rene­wa­ble ener­gy, “excess” rene­wa­ble electri­ci­ty can be used to gene­ra­te clean hydro­gen. The United Sta­tes and the EU have alrea­dy begun coope­ra­ting bi- and mul­ti­la­te­ral­ly on dri­ving for­ward a hydro­gen mar­ket and need fur­ther impe­tus from regu­la­to­ry, infra­st­ruc­tu­re, and invest­ment per­spec­ti­ves to ensu­re that this com­po­nent of the ener­gy mix is in place and ope­ra­tio­nal at sca­le. Hydro­gen sto­rage can be used to off­set varia­bi­li­ty in rene­wa­ble electricity. 

With respect to hydro­gen gene­ra­ted from natu­ral gas, bet­ter and more effi­ci­ent car­bon cap­tu­re and sto­rage tech­no­lo­gies at a lower cost should be encou­ra­ged to ensu­re that “blue” hydro­gen can be ram­ped up as a tran­si­ti­on fuel in par­al­lel to the deve­lo­p­ment of “green” hydro­gen. The cost-benefit ana­ly­sis will depend to a lar­ge degree on the mar­ket pri­ces of natu­ral gas; its avai­la­bi­li­ty; car­bon cap­tu­re, use, and sequestra­ti­on (CCUS) cos­ts; and alter­na­ti­ve sources for hydro­gen pro­duc­tion. None­theless, for many coun­tries, hydro­gen will be an important part of the future ener­gy mix and efforts to encou­ra­ge and help with regu­la­to­ry and tech­no­lo­gy impro­ve­ments can dri­ve for­ward this development.

Natu­ral Gas
Natu­ral gas will con­ti­nue to play a key role as a tran­si­ti­on fuel in the clean ener­gy future. Repla­cing coal with natu­ral gas can hal­ve green­house gas emis­si­ons, but access to sup­ply, and at a rea­son­ab­le pri­ce, will be an important fac­tor. Given the cur­rent high cost of natu­ral gas in many parts of the world, grea­ter sup­ply at lower cost will be nee­ded to encou­ra­ge that displacement.

Gas as a sto­rage and back-up fuel for electri­ci­ty sup­ply will also con­ti­nue to be important during the tran­si­ti­on peri­od, and joint efforts to redu­ce metha­ne emis­si­ons (as announ­ced at COP26) will be cru­cial in crea­ting grea­ter public accep­t­ance of natu­ral gas use while ram­ping up the genera­ti­on of rene­wa­ble sources.

Sourcing natu­ral gas and the role of inter­na­tio­nal mar­kets are essen­ti­al to the smooth func­tio­n­ing and app­li­ca­ti­on of natu­ral gas as a tran­si­ti­on fuel; the United Sta­tes and the EU should both con­ti­nue to rein­for­ce regu­la­to­ry pro­vi­si­ons to encou­ra­ge the effi­ci­ent func­tio­n­ing of tho­se markets.

src: click

Now - how is what Habeck is doing not sim­ply lying to peop­le? How is what DW is doing not sim­ply copy­ing lies, without set­ting them in context?

The truth”, should it exist, is some­whe­re is bur­ried in the 14th para­graph in the arti­cle, while the fact, that soa­ring gas pri­ces are enab­ling LNG pro­duc­tion to begin with, is not even men­tio­ned. Ger­man Mar­shal Fund of the United Sta­tes is sta­ting that for the green tran­si­ti­on mode­ra­te gas pri­ces are para­mount, and Habeck is “incre­a­sing ener­gy secu­ri­ty” for ger­ma­ny by making “diver­si­fi­ca­ti­on of sources” mandatory?

This only makes sen­se, if you accu­se Gaz­prom of inten­tio­nal­ly incre­a­sing gas pri­ces, for poli­ti­cal rea­sons (which no one does open­ly, btw - other­wi­se, fact che­cking would come in), to the point whe­re they’­ve lost 41.3% of exports year on year - and from then on it stops making sen­se, becau­se if you diver­si­fy by buil­ding out LNG ter­mi­nals or try to pro­cu­re lar­ge quan­ti­ties from other sources, you do that with a pri­ce expec­ta­ti­on of todays pri­ce levels of gas. Not lower ones. US is par­ti­ci­pa­ting in this trend to the ful­lest extent (Inte­res­tin­g­ly enough OPEC did­n’t flood the mar­ket with cheap natu­ral gas this time around, to com­pen­sa­te for “mar­ket pri­ces”, with expert opi­ni­on most­ly sta­ting, that this had occu­red in lar­ge parts becau­se “green tran­si­ti­on” as the fore­mo­st goal in their most important con­su­mer mar­kets made them bind tog­e­ther with rus­si­an ener­gy pro­du­cers). Mar­kets so far dont care about poli­ti­cal inter­ven­ti­on in the least, that goes for the US as well (or at least?). At the same time Habeck pro­mo­tes “hig­her ener­gy pri­ces” as a way to acce­le­ra­te the tran­si­ti­on towards green ener­gy” publicly, while the peop­le respon­si­ble for his actu­al poli­ci­es (how could that be mis­sed by now…) out­right sta­te, that lower natu­ral gas pri­ces would be nee­ded in the mid term, to enab­le the ener­gy tran­si­ti­on. And if you think “diver­si­fy­ing natu­ral gas pro­cu­re­ment” means some­thing other than hig­her gas pri­ces - think again.

UK Gas Pro­duc­tion Could Plun­ge 75% By 2030

The UK could beco­me much more vul­nerable to pri­ce shocks and geo­po­li­ti­cal events unless new off­shore fiel­ds are appro­ved and developed—and the UK’s gas pro­duc­tion could plum­met by 75 percent

src: click

Diver­si­fy­ing natu­ral gas pro­cu­re­ment, means hig­her natu­ral gas pri­ces. Is only pos­si­ble with hig­her natu­ral gas pri­ces in place. Is not in the inte­rest of rus­sia (If not for incre­a­sing the pri­ce of natu­ral gas over­all.). And accord­ing to Habeck was cau­sed by mar­ket mecha­nisms. (Para­graph 14 in the DW arti­cle.) Becau­se what was in the inte­rest of rus­sia, was ful­fil­ling their stan­ding obli­ga­ti­ons, and doing so wit­hin one or two days after the order amounts incre­a­sed again. (At a hig­her pri­ce, but look at US gas­mar­kets at the same time at least - when making the state­ment that diver­si­fy­ing pro­cu­re­ment would be the way out of this.)

This time I pro­vi­ded the through­li­ne. I hope ever­yo­ne is hap­py with it as is. I just cant stand the lies anymore.

What a difference a day makes…

04. Februar 2022


US says Rus­si­an attack no lon­ger ‘immi­nent’

Now who saw that one com­ing? Anyone?

edit: Bonus - if you want the con­tra­dic­ting infor­ma­ti­on released by a US Sta­tes Depart­ment spo­kes­per­son, a few hours earlier:

Must-watch exchan­ge bet­ween @APDi­plo­Wri­ter Matt Lee and @StateDeptSpox:

Repor­ter: “It’s an action that you say they have taken, but you have shown no evi­dence to con­firm that. […] This is like - cri­sis actors? Real­ly? This is like Alex Jones ter­ri­to­ry you’re get­ting into now.”

src: click
Rus­si­as reac­tion: click

The european unity you’ve been waiting for

02. Februar 2022

US incre­a­sed mili­ta­ry sup­port spen­ding and is about to incre­a­se tro­ops sta­tio­ned in Nato mem­ber sta­tes, Gre­at Bri­tain and Poland are now incre­a­sing mili­ta­ry aid and poli­ti­cal sup­port by hol­ding smal­ler sum­mits as well - the Dut­ch Prime Minis­ter will visit Ukrai­ne tomor­row, and for­mer Prime Minis­ter of Swe­den, Carl Bildt, now co-chair of the Euro­pean Coun­cil on For­eign Rela­ti­ons (thats pos­si­ble?) is put­ting out “sca­re tac­tics” tal­king­points as well.

You know you have a genui­ne euro­pean effort going, when the US, Gre­at Bri­tain, Poland, and the Co Chair of the ECFR, are put­ting out the “we stand with Ukrai­ne” rhe­to­ric, and hol­ding spee­ches at sta­te visits in the Ukrai­ne cur­r­ent­ly, oh and dont for­get the Prime Minis­ter of the Nether­lands (It worked! -- on a more serious note: 

The King­dom of the Nether­lands beca­me a foun­ding mem­ber of NATO in 1949 and its unaba­ted com­mit­ment to the inter­na­tio­nal legal order gave it a much lar­ger role in inter­na­tio­nal affairs than its size would nor­mal­ly jus­ti­fy. It also exp­lains why Dut­ch lea­ders let NATO mem­bers­hip, as well as its mem­bers­hip of the Euro­pean Uni­on and the United Nati­ons, shape a lar­ge part of the country’s for­eign poli­cy and why Atlan­ti­cism for­med a cor­ner­stone of its secu­ri­ty poli­cy during the ent­i­re Cold War period.”

src: click)!

The Ukrai­ne mean­while, has the best mas­ter­plan you could think of in this instance - incre­a­se armed for­ces capa­ci­ty by 100.000 units wit­hin three years.

Wait - wit­hin three years? For how long does the coali­ti­on of the wil­ling think this con­flict should be held acti­ve again? Rus­sia basi­cal­ly loo­ses advan­ta­ge in late febru­a­ry… And from then on their nego­tia­ting posi­ti­on gets suc­ces­si­ve­ly worse.

So in three years from now, when the Ukrai­ne final­ly has a stan­ding army of 100.000 units more, and an ener­gy depen­den­cy of about 70% on rus­si­an oil exports… Their eco­no­mic growth will streng­t­hen, so they can final­ly aim at poli­ti­cal or ener­gy inde­pen­dence? Oh no, I for­got, the US will invest hea­vi­ly in green ener­gy infra­st­ruc­tu­re in the Ukrai­ne, and then - they’ll do an infra­st­ruc­tu­re build up with oil and shale­gas ship­ped in from half around the glo­be, becau­se “the pro­spects of buil­ding green infra­st­ruc­tu­re in the Ukrai­ne” are out­right rosy - with them now having built up their army signi­fi­cant­ly, having suf­fe­red oca­tio­nal ener­gy outa­ges and sup­ply shocks (during the transition).

Someo­ne draw me the through­li­ne here again?

Some­thing might be mis­sing from this ana­ly­sis, like - rus­si­an gas on its way to euro­pe goes through which coun­tries (if we pre­su­me Nord Stream 2 stays inactive)?

edit: Oh, Brussels (as the home base of NATO) is ent­i­re­ly impar­ti­al as well, of cour­se - no con­flict of inte­rest whatsoever. (The peace move­ments, inter­view­ed here, his­to­ri­cal­ly are seen as aiding the rus­si­an sphe­re of influ­ence.)

edit2: Short state­ment by the Ukrai­ni­an Pre­si­dent: “We are loo­king for­ward to taking the Krim back [or other ter­ri­to­ries?], and that bila­te­ral tra­de bet­ween the UK and Ukrai­ne incre­a­sed by 60% over the last years is gre­at, and a gre­at suc­cess, and we should talk more about free tra­de [Wait what? So the bila­te­ral tra­de agree­ment beco­mes worth less?]. Dont quo­te me on that who­le com­plex, becau­se I havent sourced mul­ti­ple sources, but thats liter­al­ly what the trans­la­tor said. (Source is The Tele­graph.) Ah - the best of the best as heads of the sta­te again, I see…

Update: El Pais has acces­sed the some of the US and NATO nego­tia­ti­on docu­ments and is publi­shing details. Click and click.

edit: The US is cur­r­ent­ly signa­ling, that Ger­ma­ny is not depen­da­ble. Oh, so sad… did the litt­le trick of “spea­king for the who­le of euro­pe” Vic­to­ria Nuland pul­led off not work… *sniff* So sad. Second source: DW as par­ti­al as ever.

edit2: Whats this? The Ukrai­ne con­fir­ming, that the num­bers of rus­si­an troups near the bor­der are too small for a full sca­le inva­si­on - at this point? click How can that be pos­si­ble? The next step would be them ack­now­led­ging, that Kiev is not likely under risk of being taken by a par­ti­al inva­si­on. The insanity!

German Marshall Fund of the United States and Starr Forum

28. Januar 2022

Panel on Streng­t­he­ning the Secu­ri­ty Resi­li­en­ce of Ukrai­ne: Mili­ta­ry, Ener­gy, Cyber

High­light: Mode­ra­tor asks, if Ukrai­ne would be able to beco­me a net ener­gy exporter wit­hin the next five years to redu­ce eco­no­mic depen­dance - expert fol­lows up with a sli­de that reads:

Pos­si­ble addi­tio­nal thre­ats [to Ukrai­ne] in 2022:

Phy­si­cal attacks
- phy­si­cal dama­ge to infra­st­ruc­tu­re - gas pipe­lines, to for­ce NS2 operation
- electri­ci­ty net­work to pre­vent joi­ning ENTSO-E (Euro­pean asso­cia­ti­on for the coope­ra­ti­on of trans­mis­si­on sys­tem ope­ra­tors (TSOs) for electricity)

Cyber attacks on infrastructure
- gas pipe­lines to for­ce NS2 operation
- electri­ci­ty net­work to pre­vent joi­ning ENTSO-E

Attacks on coal mines/nuclear plants to crea­te evi­ron­men­tal dis­as­ters, risk to people’s health

Infor­ma­tio­nal attacks
- alrea­dy happening

Eco­no­mic attacks
- Blo­cka­ge of coal/gas supply
- Blo­cka­ge of oil pro­ducts supply

Fol­lo­wed up by a plea, to the US minis­try of ener­gy to help Ukrai­ne with imple­men­ting a sus­tainab­le ener­gy infra­st­ruc­tu­re, because 

The US has real­ly, real­ly gre­at ener­gy resi­li­en­ce sys­tems, star­ting with trai­nings, com­mu­ni­ca­ti­on, and buil­ding capa­ci­ty of dif­fe­rent sta­ke­hol­ders. It would be real­ly good, if the US depart­ment of ener­gy and the US government, would help the Ukrai­ne minis­try of ener­gy and other sta­ke­hol­ders, to build this capa­ci­ty here in the Ukrai­ne. I belie­ve this is a real­ly gre­at chan­ce to enhan­ce our coope­ra­ti­on, thank you very much.”

What a nice invi­ta­ti­on - I might actual­ly vaca­ti­on the­re, next summer!

[First pro­blem being Bela­rus is cur­r­ent­ly not sup­ply­ing electri­ci­ty to the Ukrai­ne, with it being up in the air, if they will recon­nect in the near future.] “The second pro­blem is sup­ply of oil pro­ducts to Ukrai­ne, becau­se Rus­sia and Bela­rus sup­ply up to 70% of oil pro­ducts to Ukrai­ne now, and if they stop this sup­ply, well, the­re will be a pos­si­bi­li­ty to replace this fuel, but the time will mat­ter. So Bela­rus can play some nega­ti­ve role, even des­troy­ing lets say ener­gy secu­ri­ty of Ukraine.”

--

Starr Forum (MIT Cen­ter for Inter­na­tio­nal Studies)

Pri­ma­ri­ly sees “saber ratt­ling”. Then fol­lo­wed up by a collec­tion of all the US think­tank lead pro­po­sals dis­sec­ted here in the last days. Eura­si­on eco­no­mic uni­on, Putin beha­vio­ral ana­ly­sis and cha­rac­ter cen­te­red moti­va­ti­on fin­ding for the con­flict, pain­ting the Ukrai­ne as an eco­no­mic power­house, tel­ling peop­le its Putins fear of peop­le power, pin­ning it on ego/status, … Ever­ything except for crea­ting a secu­ri­ty infra­st­ruc­tu­re along­side rus­si­as bor­ders that would sus­tain a com­ing demo­gra­phic nar­ro­wing. First and fourth spea­kers at least touch upon it. Fourth spea­ker then also pro­po­ses some­thing along tho­se lines, detail­ed talks about a new secu­ri­ty infra­st­ruc­tu­re as “the best pos­si­ble solu­ti­on, and the one thats cur­r­ent­ly being pur­sued”. All in all the best panel I’ve scree­n­ed so far, watching it is recommended.

edit: Pas­send dazu der öster­rei­chi­sche Fal­ter: “Nie­mand hat wirk­lich ein Inter­es­se an Kämp­fen in der Ukrai­ne. War­um trom­meln dann trotz­dem alle nach Krieg?”

edit2: Fifth spea­ker in the Starr Forum Panel goes into the thre­at from a mili­ta­ry tro­ops sta­tio­ned at the bor­der ang­le. Cur­r­ent­ly about 56.000 com­bat units and sup­port units to fill up the 100.000 repor­ted by other out­lets befo­re. Thats about 40% of rus­si­as cur­rent com­bat poten­ti­al, now near the bor­der (120-200 miles from the ukrai­ni­an bor­der). About half the num­ber are bri­ga­des, that are regu­lar­ly sta­tio­ned the­re. That inclu­des most of the sup­por­ting ground tro­ops. (Almost no addi­tio­nal sup­port tro­ops were added.) 15-20 SPTGs have moved pri­ma­ri­ly into Bela­rus, equa­ling 50% of the total eas­tern groups com­bat poten­ti­al, that has now moved near the Ukrai­ne. Posi­tio­ning would make it pos­si­ble to occu­py the east or the south of Ukrai­ne, or to encir­cle Kiev, pro­bab­ly not take Kiev “becau­se that’s hard”. A total occup­a­ti­on is unli­kely, but the­re is a pos­si­bi­li­ty to use a limi­ted mili­ta­ry vic­to­ry to attain poli­ti­cal goals. Sus­tai­ned par­ti­al occup­a­ti­on also seems unli­kely accord­ing to the speaker.

edit3: Two new major takea­ways. The panel agrees that rus­sia has lar­ge­ly deco­u­pled its abi­li­ty to take mili­ta­ry action from the public sen­ti­ment of its peop­le, and also agrees, that the con­flict is about lar­ger con­ces­si­ons in the ori­en­ta­ti­on of the secu­ri­ty based order of the wes­tern alli­an­ce. Con­ces­si­ons that would exceed “pre­ven­ting Ukrai­ne from beco­m­ing a mem­ber of Nato”, becau­se that wasnt very likely wit­hin the next years any­how, accord­ing to the panelists.

72 days of Kafka

28. Januar 2022

17.11.2021: Sky News UK talks to the ukrai­ni­an ambassa­dor to the United King­dom, Vadym Prystaiko:

At 7:30 in:

Vadym Prys­ta­iko: “What I’m here to say [is], that [the] ukra­ni­an pipe­line could pro­vi­de [the] euro­pean uni­on, all euro­pean nati­ons with the gas easi­ly. We have enough capa­ci­ty. For the rus­si­ans are doing this -- they [are] just rather wea­po­nizing the gas.”

Sky News: “But you think that this is the play by Rus­sia to get this pipe­line appro­ved, and then perhaps they’d back off?”

Vadym Prys­ta­iko: “Obvious­ly they will use this gas, they wont use [the] ukrai­ni­an pipe­line, which will untie their hands in Ukrai­ne, in the ukrai­ni­ni­an cam­pai­gn, which is yet ano­t­her risk [for] a real mili­ta­ry invasion.”

Sky­news: “Are you worried about the ger­man atti­tu­de to this, I mean the pipe­line, in the main will start sup­ply­ing ger­ma­ny. We hear that out­go­ing chan­cellor Ange­la Mer­kel has con­ti­nuing decent rela­ti­ons with the krem­lin and that in actu­al fact has over­rid­den pre­si­dent Biden in his oppo­si­ti­on to North Stream 2?”

Vadym Prys­ta­iko: “I am worry­ing, becau­se the ger­mans were not under­stan­ding, for all the­se years and years. They tried it [?] befo­re. I remem­ber the pre­de­ces­sor of mother Mer­kel who pro­mi­sed to help us with that, but then beca­me a depu­ty chief of gas­prom hims­elf. So when we are tal­king about ger­mans, we have to under­stand how clo­se­ly they are con­nec­ted eco­no­mi­c­al­ly to rus­si­ans, and how much of their own cal­cu­la­ti­ons of whats going on in their neigh­bor­hood actual­ly depends on rus­si­an gas, or some­thing else from the rus­si­an federation.”

src: click

72 days later:

28.01.2022: NPR talks to the spo­kes­man for the United Sta­tes Depart­ment of Sta­te, Ned Price:

I want to be very clear: if Rus­sia inva­des Ukrai­ne one way or ano­t­her, Nord Stream 2 will not move for­ward,” Pri­ce told Natio­nal Public Radio. “I’m not going to get into the spe­ci­fics. We will work with Ger­ma­ny to ensu­re it does not move forward.”

src: click

Someo­ne paint me the through­li­ne here.

1. Did Rus­sia esca­la­te mili­ta­ry ten­si­ons to get North Stream 2 appro­ved? Ans­wer: [Implied: Yes - Then expli­ci­tly:] Well obvious­ly it redu­ces their invol­ve­ment in day to day poli­tics in the Ukrai­ne, which is ano­t­her risk for invasion.

Mea­ning - rus­sia esca­la­ted ten­si­ons, to get North Stream 2 appro­ved (wait what?!), so it can deco­u­p­le from Ukrai­ne eco­no­mi­c­al­ly, which incre­a­ses the risk of inva­si­on? So this isnt about Rus­sia wan­ting to pre­vent Ukrai­ne from beco­m­ing a Nato part­ner, becau­se Ukrai­ne wants Rus­sia invol­ved in their domestic poli­tics, which would pre­vent them from (most likely - ever) beco­m­ing a Nato mem­ber state?

Reflec­ting on the ECFRs posi­ti­on of “Euro­pe needs to deco­u­p­le from Rus­si­as ener­gy mar­kets long­term”, this means, what?

2. It’s bet­ter for lower mili­ta­ry ten­si­ons in the Ukrai­ne, to have Rus­sia invol­ved actively in their day to day poli­tics for as long as possible?

It’s bet­ter for lower poli­ti­cal ten­si­ons in the Ukrai­ne, to have Rus­sia invol­ved in their day to day poli­tics for as long as possible?

If Rus­sia inva­des in the Ukrai­ne, the US will make sure, that North Stream 2 never is ope­ned, so rus­si­an gas com­ing into the EU has to go through the ukrai­ni­an pipe­line, not redu­cing through­put - but incre­a­sing Ukrai­nes poli­ti­cal depen­den­cy on Rus­sia? Rus­si­as poli­ti­cal depen­den­cy on Ukrai­ne? Redu­cing the EUs poli­ti­cal depen­den­cy on Russia?

I thought Rus­sia esca­la­ted the con­flict to get Nord Stream 2 appro­ved? *sar­casm*

3. In actu­al fact, Ger­ma­ny has over­rid­den Bidens con­cerns (Wait, and Ted Cruz sent the memo?) on North Stream 2 to ensu­re, that it beco­mes active.

In actu­al fact, the United Sta­tes Depart­ment of Sta­te has over­rid­den Ger­ma­nys con­cerns on North Stream 2 to ensu­re, that it never beco­mes active.

Nach­trag: Tat­säch­lich. Das alles muss wohl so sein, denn die öster­rei­chi­sche Qua­li­täts­zei­tung der Stan­dard fin­det schon wie­der auf wun­der­sa­me Wei­se Kom­men­ta­to­ren (vom Insti­tu­te for Euro-Atlantic Coope­ra­ti­on) die dafür eine ganz ein­fa­che Erklä­rung haben:

Ent­ge­gen sei­nen Reden ficht Putin nicht die Nato-Erweiterung an, son­dern das Recht der Ukrai­ne, selbst­be­stimmt Ent­schei­dun­gen zu tref­fen und Bünd­nis­se zu schmie­den, die dem Land zu einem Auf­schwung verhelfen.

src: click

Alles klar jetzt?

Nach­trag 2: Es wird noch bes­ser - Nach­dem die US auf NPR ges­tern “ange­kün­digt” hat eine Red Line “North Stream 2 kommt nicht, wenn eine Inva­si­on der Ukrai­ne statt­fin­det” mit den euro­päi­schen Part­nern “zu ver­han­deln”, und zwar so - dass man sich sicher sein kann - dass das in der Form kommt und gilt, egal was die Euro­pä­er sagen - hat jetzt eine ehe­ma­li­ge Spre­che­rin des US Außen­mi­nis­te­ri­ums ange­kün­digt, dass dies eine gemein­sa­me Posi­ti­on der US und der EU sei.
(DW: US and Ger­ma­ny step up pipe­line warnings to Rus­sia”)

Euro­news hat das aktu­ell mit “Washing­ton droht Mos­kau mit dem Ende der Gas-Pipeline” im Ticker. Es gibt bis jetzt noch kein State­ment eines Regie­rungs­ver­ant­wort­li­chen in Deutsch­land, oder auf EU Ebe­ne dazu. DW über­nimmt es, ohne Quel­len im Euro­päi­schen oder Deut­schen Raum zu nen­nen, und schal­tet anstatt des­sen zu einem Kor­re­spon­den­ten in Kiev, und die tat­säch­li­che Ände­rung der Posi­ti­on ent­spricht der Grö­ßen­ord­nung von “vor eini­gen Tagen spricht Biden noch von Unter­schie­den zwi­schen einer klei­nen und einer grö­ße­ren Inva­si­on”, und “Deutsch­lands Posi­ti­on bis dato war, dass es sich bei Nord Stream 2 um ein Wirt­schafts­pro­jekt hand­le, und es nicht von poli­ti­schen Sank­tio­nen betrof­fen sein würde”.

Was hat die­se Posi­ti­on geän­dert? Mora­li­sche Argu­men­te? Dürf­te die die Euro­päi­sche Bevöl­ke­rung auch mal hören, oder…

Nein? Ok - dann halt nicht. Eine ehe­ma­li­ge Spre­che­rin des US Außen­mi­nis­te­ri­ums reicht ja völ­lig… (DW dazu: “A clea­rer pic­tu­re is emer­ging.” Deus Ex machi­na. Nie­mand wars. Plötz­lich wars da. Es gebiert sich sozu­sa­gen aus dem Schau­me der Bran­dung selbst.) Nach­fra­gen wie sie denn dazu kommt das anzu­neh­men von US Repor­ter­kol­le­gen wur­den abge­schmet­tert. Sie­he Link.

Nach­trag 3: BBC to the res­cue:

Ques­ti­ons remain over how the US could stop it (‘it’ being NS2 in Under Secreta­ry of Sta­te for Poli­ti­cal Affairs, Vic­to­ria Nulands state­ment that “If Rus­sia inva­des in Ukrai­ne, one way or ano­t­her, Nord Stream 2 will not move for­ward”, and that being a joint posi­ti­on of the US and the EU) but its the kind of bul­lish talk one nort­hern euro­pean Nato ally thinks is their best bet at stop­ping an attack.”

What a nice SNAFUUS tal­ked to one nort­hern euro­pean nati­on (won­der which one), then went in front of the press and announ­ced, that this would be “the joint euro­pean posi­ti­on”, when it was­n’t. One nati­on, the EU - what does it mat­ter, right?

Nach­trag 4: Die offi­zi­el­le Posi­ti­on Deutsch­lands ver­bleibt aktu­ell beim State­ment von Baer­bock von vor zwei Tagen, dass die Zukunft von Nord Stream 2 ein Teil einer brei­ten Rei­he an Sank­tio­nen auf Rus­si­sche Aggres­sio­nen sein könn­te. Sie­he: click

Qualitätszeitung für Klima und Gesundheit

27. Januar 2022

Stan­dard mal wie­der… Arti­kel bezahlt mit EU-Fördermitteln, aber in der redak­tio­nel­len Ver­ant­wor­tung des Stan­dard (Kate­go­rie: “Ich nehm das Geld schon, sags auch dem Redak­teur von wem er bezahlt wird, aber der schreibt dann unbefangen.”).

Euro­ba­ro­me­ter: Jun­ge Euro­pä­er sehen Kli­ma­wan­del als wich­tigs­te Herausforderung

[…]

In der Grup­pe der 15- bis 24-Jährigen glau­ben sat­te 91 Pro­zent, die Ein­däm­mung des Kli­ma­wan­dels kön­ne zur Ver­bes­se­rung ihrer Gesund­heit eben­so bei­tra­gen wie zu ihrem Wohlergehen.

src: click

Dazu klimafakten.de (bezug­neh­mend auf Her­man Lotze-Campen und das Potsdam-Institut für Kli­ma­fol­gen­for­schung (PIK) (*hust*)):

Kli­ma­wan­del und Gesund­heit - bringt die Ver­bin­dung zusätz­li­che Aufmerksamkeit?

Die übli­chen Öko-Kampagnen zum Kli­ma­schutz errei­chen vie­le Men­schen nicht oder nur wenig. Eine Alter­na­ti­ve wäre, ande­re Aspek­te des Kli­ma­wan­dels stär­ker zu the­ma­ti­sie­ren, etwa sei­ne Fol­gen für die mensch­li­che Gesund­heit. Diver­se Stu­di­en deu­ten dar­auf hin, dass dies funk­tio­nie­ren könnte

src: click

Nicht, dass es rele­vant, oder ein wesent­li­cher Aspekt wäre - nein, bit­te exakt lesen - Stu­di­en dazu, dass es funk­tio­nie­ren könn­te. (Ande­re Argu­men­ta­ti­ons­ebe­ne (die persuasive).)

klimafakten.de, das muss man wis­sen, wird von der sel­ben Per­son betrie­ben, die auch Clean Ener­gy News Wire betreibt (sie­he: click), und die dann in Alp­bach von als “Mode­ra­to­ren” bezahl­ten Standard-Redakteuren, öffent­lich in nem Dialog-Event dazu befragt wird, wel­che PR denn die Bes­te wäre um sei­ne Fami­lie (die des Jour­na­lis­ten und aller Zuhö­rer) von der Rele­vanz des Kli­ma­the­mas zu über­zeu­gen, aber mehr so auf der inter­per­so­nel­len Ebe­ne, wor­auf dann ein fünf Punk­te Plan folgt, und der Jour­na­list sich dann artig für die PR (den Akti­ons­plan) bedankt. Auf einen Kom­men­tar im Chat, dan­ke für soviel PR, von einem Ver­tre­ter des Jour­na­lis­mus - zuckt dann noch mal kurz was im Gesicht des Stan­dard­jour­na­lis­ten (könn­te schlech­tes Gewis­sen gewe­sen sein, aber viel­leicht auch Abscheu) - und das wars dann.

Sor­ry für den Exkurs, schnell wie­der zurück zum The­ma. Na wie sol­lens die 15- bis 24-Jährigen denn wis­sen, dass das pri­mär Framing ist (in Mit­tel­eu­ro­pa, für sie ihre Kin­der und ihre Enkel), wenns ihnen selbst die Qua­li­täts­me­di­en nicht sagen?

Im Arti­kel zur Euro­ba­ro­me­ter Umfra­ge ist das dann natür­lich kein Wort wert, denn da gehts erneut dar­um Effek­te die PR gene­riert hat, so umzu­deu­ten, alls sei­en Sie gesell­schaft­lich all­ge­mein aner­kannt und ‘wenns die Jugend­li­chen mei­nen - die Zukunft Euro­pas’. Das ist manu­fac­tu­ring con­sent nach Chom­sky (Pro­pa­gan­da Model).

Wer noch mehr Mate­ri­al braucht:

Im Fly­er klimabündnis.at ist Gesund­heit ein non sequi­tur und Füllwort.

So sieht das Messaging beim PIK aus. (dh. das ist die Logik­fol­ge um das Framing argu­men­tie­ren zu kön­nen - dar­in ein­fach mal nach Mit­tel­eu­ro­pa suchen) Gelis­tet in der Rubrik ‘For­schung > Kli­ma­re­si­li­enz > Arbeits­grup­pen’. Die Wir­kungs­stu­di­en die sie fah­ren, gibts dann etwas weni­ger pro­mi­nent - auf klimafakten.de.