Victoria Nuland taught russians squaredancing when she was 20, and it never stopped

26. September 2024

That sum­mer she tal­ked to a fami­ly at the ame­ri­can embas­sy in Moscow, who hired her as a nan­ny, so she could get a visa exten­si­on, and she real­ly loo­ked after a bunch of child­ren this sum­mer, but also “tra­v­eled all over the place”.

Oh, and she con­firms, that it wasnt But­cha, why the peace nego­tia­ti­ons stopped --

as Wagen­knecht points out here --

But we alrea­dy knew that.

From Davyd Arak­ha­mi­ia, from Nafta­li Ben­net, and from Simon Shus­ter (Times Repor­ter for over 15 years).

Aber aus irgend­ei­nem Grund scheint der Lanz zu glau­ben die not­wen­di­ge Auf­ar­bei­tung der Jour­na­lis­ti­schen Per­for­mance bei der Bericht­erstat­tung über die­sen Krieg lie­se sich mit “schrein wir die Wagen­knecht nie­der” übertünchen…

Now its only fair that Zygar gets Nuland to con­firm this on his you­tube chan­nel - becau­se we all know that Zygar is the spo­kes­ho­le into the rus­si­an expat com­mu­ni­ty, of cour­se all US Nar­ra­ti­ve Sales­men have to talk to him. Timo­thy Sny­der, Fio­na Hill, Anne App­le­baum, Vic­to­ria Nuland -- becau­se if they dont Zygar wri­tes gre­at com­men­ta­ry arti­cles in the ger­man Spie­gel that assess that the Kursk offen­si­ve will speed up peace nego­tia­ti­ons [Die Inva­si­on von Kursk könn­te den Beginn von Ver­hand­lun­gen bedeu­ten] -- you know so Zygar can then be invi­ted to Glob­sec Forum panels, 

- whe­re Zygar can talk about buil­ding this real­ly gre­at, honest and true rus­si­an oppo­si­ti­on, that will run rus­sia in case of a coup…

I hope the­re are some more Nuland “stin­gers” (nota­ble moments) in this video, becau­se I’m only about 5 minu­tes in and alrea­dy had to docu­ment her sto­ry­tel­ling - anec­do­te wise, on how good she taught rus­si­an peop­le squa­re­dan­cing in Odes­sa, and how well she cared about tho­se child­ren as an Au Pair in Mos­kow, while tra­ve­ling all over the coun­try in tho­se six mon­ths… - while she was working for a US con­gress­man - back in the US, who allo­wed her to take this time off… Becau­se it was just too good to let it slide.

And the best part? As she retur­ned back home, she found an invi­ta­ti­on from the US sta­te depart­ment in her post box to work there.

Love it!

edit: Also of cour­se Vic­to­ria Nuland doesnt know the dif­fe­rence bet­ween a debt cut and an IMF credit in the 90s, … - but hey at least half of Ger­ma­ny doesnt eit­her, Son­der­ver­mö­gen sei Dank. Gut, der IMF Kre­dit war in USD nicht in Rubel, aber was macht das schon für einen Unter­schied… Dem Zygar fällt da nichts auf. Er ist ja nur legi­ti­me rus­si­sche Opposition.

edit: Sor­ry, sor­ry - I have to inter­ject again, the coo­kies were sand­wi­ches, and Nuland orga­ni­zed them to be han­ded out to pro­tes­ters becau­se of “too much sla­vik instinct”, becau­se “tho­se pro­tes­ters were 18 and 19 year olds, after a long night of being kett­led in by Ukrai­nes (Janu­ko­wytschs) poli­ce forces”.

Of cour­se Nuland also thought, that lea­king the “fuck the EU” pho­ne­call real­ly show­ed how despe­ra­te Putin was, and that he didnt see any other way out of the situa­ti­on other than “to make me famous”. Nuland thought that was a “move born out of desperation”.

Ah sto­ry­tel­ling, I bet­ter book a work­shop soon to get as good as Nuland!

Productive work day

25. September 2024

Bildschirmfoto 2024 09 25 um 15 34 56Bildschirmfoto 2024 09 25 um 21 37 14

Wait what?!

24. September 2024

18.10 Uhr: Pis­to­ri­us - Bun­des­wehr schnellst­mög­lich kriegs­tüch­tig machen

Ver­tei­di­gungs­mi­nis­ter Boris Pis­to­ri­us (SPD) hat die Not­wen­dig­keit der schnellst­mög­li­chen Aus­stat­tung der Bun­des­wehr bekräf­tigt. Bis 2029 müs­se man damit rech­nen, dass Russ­land sei­ne mili­tä­ri­sche Rekon­sti­tu­ti­on abge­schlos­sen haben wer­de und in der Lage sein könn­te, einen mili­tä­ri­schen Schlag gegen Nato-Gebiet zu füh­ren, sag­te Pis­to­ri­us ange­sichts des rus­si­schen Angriffs­kriegs gegen die Ukraine. 

src: click

Kann man das bit­te mal genau­er begrün­den, oder ist schon Vorwahlkampfphase?

Hin­ter­grund: Weder Chat­ham House, noch Kof­man, noch CSIS, noch Gres­sel, noch… Also nie­mand hat das bis­her auch nur angedeutet.

Selen­skyj behaup­tet Sieg Ende 2025 - gut, hörn wir nicht drauf, der Rest mehr so 3-10 Jah­re war of attri­ti­on, aber der SPD Kanz­ler­kan­di­dat in spe…

edit: Ah, schau an - der Pis­to­ri­us liest Atlan­tic Coun­cil Copy, und BR24 weist das als Eigent­leis­tung aus…

[edit: Kor­rek­tur, er liest doch nicht Atlan­tic Coun­cil, der sagt das schon län­ger (seit Juni)…]

NATO-Russia dyna­mics: Pro­spects for recon­sti­tu­ti­on of Rus­si­an mili­ta­ry power

Exe­cu­ti­ve summary

The Rus­si­an Federation’s full-scale inva­si­on of Ukrai­ne on Febru­a­ry 24, 2022, brought war to the North Atlan­tic Alliance’s doorstep—altering the political-military dyna­mics bet­ween NATO and its neigh­bor to the east. Sin­ce the Rus­si­an inva­si­on, NATO has been under­go­ing a dra­ma­tic chan­ge that has impac­ted its plans, com­mand struc­tu­re, for­ce model, and capa­bi­li­ties requi­re­ments. The effec­ti­ve­ness of this chan­ge must be gau­ged against the adversary’s abi­li­ty to field its for­ces and resour­ce them in a way that nega­tively impacts the Supre­me Allied Com­man­der Europe’s abi­li­ty to exe­cu­te the new regio­nal plans. The del­ta bet­ween how quick­ly Rus­sia can rebuild its mili­ta­ry and how quick­ly NATO can rearm, espe­cial­ly the Euro­pean allies, will defi­ne the risk level for the Alli­an­ce should deter­rence fail. A credi­ble assess­ment of the speed with which Rus­sia can recon­sti­tu­te and expand its military—especially its land for­ces com­po­nent, which has been signi­fi­cant­ly attrit­ted during the cur­rent cam­pai­gn in Ukraine—is cru­cial to accu­rate­ly asses­sing NATO’s over­all for­ce pos­tu­re and abi­li­ty to respond should Rus­sia choo­se to attack a mem­ber of the Alli­an­ce. Here, the exper­ti­se and assess­ments of the United Sta­tes’ allies most expo­sed to the Rus­si­an thre­at along the eas­tern flank offer valu­able insights from the front­li­ne, aug­men­ted by their regio­nal exper­ti­se and under­stan­ding of Rus­si­an cul­tu­re, poli­tics, and mili­ta­ry infu­sed with cen­tu­ries of expe­ri­ence of living next door to Russia. 

In sup­port of United Sta­tes Euro­pean Command’s Rus­sia Stra­te­gic Initia­ti­ve, the Atlan­tic Coun­cil orga­ni­zed two workshops—in War­saw, Poland, and in Hel­sin­ki, Finland—to gain a bet­ter under­stan­ding of alter­na­ti­ve futures for Rus­si­an mili­ta­ry recon­sti­tu­ti­on and its impli­ca­ti­ons for secu­ri­ty on the Euro­pean con­ti­nent. The work­shops were desi­gned to assess (1) how Rus­sia will recon­sti­tu­te its land for­ces in respon­se to ongo­ing deve­lo­p­ments in Ukrai­ne and NATO for­ce adap­t­ati­on, (2) the vul­nera­bi­li­ties hin­de­ring Russia’s visi­on for the recon­sti­tu­ti­on of its mili­ta­ry, and (3) the thre­at of future Rus­si­an capa­bi­li­ties to the trans­at­lan­tic secu­ri­ty architecture.

Key takea­ways from this line of effort include:

Rus­sia has demons­tra­ted that it can fight and mobi­li­ze at the same time.
The pace of Rus­si­an mili­ta­ry recon­sti­tu­ti­on has been fas­ter than Wes­tern ana­lysts expec­ted, inclu­ding both refur­bis­hed and new equip­ment and man­power mobi­liz­a­ti­on. Still, the rea­di­ness of the Rus­si­an armed for­ces is not likely to be the princi­pal dri­ver of decision-making in Moscow; rather, any decisi­on to attack a NATO mem­ber will fac­tor in the “cor­re­la­ti­on of for­ces,” with the goal of explo­i­t­ing the Alli­an­ce in a moment of weakness.
Based on pro­duc­tion data, the big­gest risk of Rus­sia attacking a NATO mem­ber will be in 2025–26 when peak pro­duc­tion, refur­bish­ment, and training/readiness lines inter­sect. One ana­lyst pro­jec­ted Rus­sia will pro­du­ce well over one thousand tanks annu­al­ly by then.
Moscow will not, howe­ver, make decisi­ons based on objec­ti­ve indi­ces of rea­di­ness alo­ne. It will deci­de to move against a NATO sta­te when it deems that the win­dow of oppor­tu­ni­ty has opened—hence, under­stan­ding the poli­ti­cal cul­tu­re that under­girds Russia’s decision-making is as important as having an accu­ra­te assess­ment of its mili­ta­ry capabilities.
The West is in a race against time, with the del­ta bet­ween Rus­si­an for­ce recon­sti­tu­ti­on and NATO’s invest­ment in real, exer­cis­ed mili­ta­ry capa­bi­li­ties con­sti­tu­ting the level of risk in the Euro­pean thea­ter in the event of a full-scale war. Clo­sing the gap will requi­re NATO to prio­ri­ti­ze rear­ma­ment across the board, inclu­ding its defen­se indus­tri­al base in Euro­pe and the United States.

src: click (Atlan­tic Council)

edit: Oh Wun­der, oh Wun­der, Chat­ham­house sah das noch im Juli ganz anders… Pick your favou­rite Anlaysts! I KNOW, I KNOW, I’M BORIS PISTORIUS, I’M PICKING ANALYSTS FROM War­saw, Poland, and Hel­sin­ki, Fin­land, THOSE WILL TELL ME THE UNFILTERED AND BALANCED TRUTH! (Well in EU terms, you got to lis­ten to the most frea­ked out mem­bers, I guess…)

08 Conclusion
Mathieu Boulègue
Con­sul­ting Fel­low, Rus­sia and Eura­sia Programme

Just as the war in Ukrai­ne has high­ligh­ted both weak­nes­ses and resi­li­en­ce in the Rus­si­an mili­ta­ry, the les­sons for the West are equal­ly mixed. Signs of Rus­si­an vul­nera­bi­li­ty offer no grounds for Wes­tern com­pla­cen­cy – but point to the impor­t­ance of redu­cing Russia’s war-making capa­ci­ty by attri­ti­on. Abo­ve all, con­ti­nued Wes­tern sup­port for Ukrai­ne will remain crucial.

More than two years into the full-scale inva­si­on of Ukrai­ne, Rus­sia remains able simul­ta­ne­ous­ly to con­ti­nue to pro­se­cu­te the war and to effect war­ti­me adap­t­ati­ons to its com­mand struc­tu­re. With vary­ing degrees of suc­cess, the Krem­lin has been able to rapidly mobi­li­ze reser­vists, employ pri­va­te mili­ta­ry com­pa­nies, sus­tain military-industrial pro­duc­tion for basic sys­tems, and hea­vi­ly mili­ta­ri­ze the public infor­ma­ti­on space in sup­port of the war.

In terms of com­mand struc­tu­re, the sepa­ra­ti­on of the Wes­tern Mili­ta­ry District into Moscow and Lenin­grad districts in March 2024 is also telling.163 Moscow is now rever­ting to its ‘com­fort zone’, name­ly Soviet-era com­mand struc­tures in the Euro­pean theat­re. The new Moscow Mili­ta­ry District will con­cern its­elf exclu­si­ve­ly with Ukrai­ne, Bela­rus and Kali­nin­grad, which will ine­vi­ta­b­ly be of direct con­cern to the US and NATO in the Bal­tic theat­re as well as on the eas­tern flank of the Alliance.

The pace of imple­men­ta­ti­on and the effi­ci­en­cy of con­ti­nued reforms in the com­mand struc­tu­re, howe­ver, remain to be seen. They will part­ly depend on the effec­ti­ve­ness or other­wi­se of the new minis­ter of defence, And­rei Belou­sov, appoin­ted in May 2024. Simi­lar­ly, it is unknown if the Rus­si­an Armed For­ces can be a ‘lear­ning orga­niz­a­ti­on’ able to imple­ment genui­ne chan­ges, whe­ther struc­tu­ral or cultural.164

On top of war­ti­me adap­t­ati­ons in the com­mand struc­tu­re, the mili­ta­ry indus­try has dis­play­ed resi­li­en­ce in its abi­li­ty to deli­ver mili­ta­ry equip­ment and hard­ware in the war against Ukrai­ne. The ongo­ing recon­sti­tu­ti­on of mili­ta­ry equip­ment and hard­ware will ine­vi­ta­b­ly inform the next cycle of the Sta­te Arma­ment Pro­gram­me (GPV) after 2027, as well as future plans regar­ding modern mili­ta­ry tech­no­lo­gy and mili­ta­ry innovation.

The Rus­si­an Armed For­ces remain a credi­ble thre­at to NATO and its allies. In Ukrai­ne, the Rus­si­an mili­ta­ry has shown it can absorb los­ses and main­tain tactical-operational credi­bi­li­ty des­pi­te stra­te­gic fail­u­res. Rus­si­an for­ces can count on impro­ved recon­nais­sance fire and strike com­ple­xes equip­ped with a vast arse­nal of long-range pre­cisi­on muni­ti­ons, as well as lar­ger quan­ti­ties of impro­ved uncrewed aeri­al vehi­cles (UAVs). Rus­si­an long-range strike and stand-off muni­ti­ons, cou­pled with multi-layered air defence sys­tems, repre­sent the big­gest con­ven­tio­nal thre­at to NATO.

The Aero­space For­ces (VKS) and the Rus­si­an Fede­ra­ti­on Navy (RFN) remain cri­ti­cal parts of the nuclear and con­ven­tio­nal stra­te­gic deter­rence for­ce, poten­ti­al­ly hol­ding NATO assets at risk of dest­ruc­tion. Final­ly, asym­metric capa­bi­li­ties – espe­cial­ly the use of cyber and infor­ma­ti­on war­fa­re; elec­tro­nic war­fa­re for counter-UAV and counter-precision-guided-munitions ope­ra­ti­ons; and space-based assets – are still able to off­set NATO and US con­ven­tio­nal superiority.

Russia’s pro­spects for rege­ne­ra­ting its mili­ta­ry machi­ne remain mixed, both in terms of speed and effec­ti­ve­ness. Yet as the war against Ukrai­ne con­ti­nues, and regard­less of the depth of the recon­sti­tu­ti­on of Russia’s mili­ta­ry power, the cur­rent Krem­lin lea­ders­hip will remain a thre­at to Euro­pean and trans­at­lan­tic secu­ri­ty as well as a stra­te­gic com­pe­ti­tor to NATO and its allies.

Ana­ly­sis of Moscow’s nuclear decla­ra­to­ry poli­cy sug­gests that if Rus­sia were to suf­fer suf­fi­ci­ent­ly seve­re degra­dati­on of its con­ven­tio­nal mili­ta­ry power, such that the lea­ders­hip deemed the exis­tence of the Rus­si­an sta­te to be under thre­at, this would crea­te con­di­ti­ons under which Rus­sia might con­si­der the use of nuclear weapons.165 Howe­ver, this pos­si­bi­li­ty remains remo­te, espe­cial­ly while Russia’s air arms, and its naval for­ces bey­ond the Black Sea, remain rela­tively intact.

Fur­ther­mo­re, Rus­sia will con­ti­nue to explo­it its tool­kit of asym­metric capa­bi­li­ties and ambi­guous sub-threshold tac­tics. The­se tools must no lon­ger be ana­ly­sed as part of a ‘grey zone’ or ‘hybrid’ ran­ge of mea­su­res aimed at blur­ring the line bet­ween war and peace. They are fun­da­ment­al­ly part of Russia’s con­ti­nued low-intensity war­fa­re against Wes­tern interests.

Con­ti­nued assess­ments of Russia’s mili­ta­ry reform and of its ongo­ing recon­sti­tu­ti­on of equip­ment are vital to under­stan­ding in which sec­tors Moscow still repres­ents a thre­at to Wes­tern inte­rests. Such assess­ments will be essen­ti­al for the US and NATO in terms of retai­ning both a tech­no­lo­gi­cal and over­all deter­rence advan­ta­ge against the Kremlin.

The sin­gle most signi­fi­cant fac­tor that can impair Russia’s abi­li­ty to recon­sti­tu­te its over­all mili­ta­ry power and leverage asym­metric capa­bi­li­ties in com­ing years will be ongo­ing Wes­tern sup­port for Ukraine.

Final­ly, the sin­gle most signi­fi­cant fac­tor that can impair Russia’s abi­li­ty to recon­sti­tu­te its over­all mili­ta­ry power and leverage asym­metric capa­bi­li­ties in com­ing years will be ongo­ing Wes­tern sup­port for Ukrai­ne. Wes­tern coun­tries must con­ti­nue to work tog­e­ther to pro­vi­de Ukrai­ne with arms, ammu­ni­ti­on, finan­cial sup­port and refu­gee assi­s­tance, and to show moral soli­da­ri­ty with the Ukrai­ni­an war effort.

Deny­ing Rus­sia vic­to­ry and for­cing it to con­ti­nue in a long attri­tio­nal strugg­le will fur­ther degra­de all ele­ments of its war-making capa­ci­ty, inclu­ding its abi­li­ty to invest in and pro­du­ce cutting-edge tech­no­lo­gi­cal enab­lers. Cri­ti­cal­ly, the­se efforts will also fur­ther under­mi­ne the Kremlin’s infor­ma­tio­nal stra­te­gy both at home and abroad, dimi­nis­hing its abi­li­ty to desta­bi­li­ze Wes­tern demo­cra­tic sys­tems and, ulti­mate­ly, wea­ke­n­ing its long-term hold on power.

src: click (Chat­ham­house)

Halbzeit Fazit

23. September 2024

This House Would Fight for Demo­cra­cy, Liber­ty & the Rule of Law Abroad (Oxford­Uni­on)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mEwmtZtOgGo

I coun­ted:

3x Hit­ler
2x Genocide
1x shame
and
1x neve­r­en­ding war for our child­ren, if we let Rus­sia win

on the side of the “would fight for demo­cra­cy” fraction.

The unsett­ling part being, that the majo­ri­ty of peop­le in euro­pe think like me, when it comes to figh­t­ing for their coun­try - never mind democracy.

But as we all know, the emo­tio­nal argu­ment wins -- damit kann der Krieg dann ja end­lich weitergehen.

Bonus: The US inter­ven­ti­on in Kuwait, accord­ing to the pro­pon­ents for the moti­on was also to safe­guard inter­na­tio­nal rule of law.

Its inte­res­ting to see how far back some con­cepts go.

Rechnen lernen mit dem ukrainischen Kriegsbedarf

23. September 2024

oder Neu­ig­kei­ten auf dem Gebiet der kon­ven­tio­nel­len und weni­ger kon­ven­tio­nel­len Kriegsführung

Reis­ner schätzt aktu­ell den Defen­siv­be­darf der Ukrai­ne bei Kampf­pan­zern und Kampf­schüt­zen­pan­zern auf 300 -- und den Bedarf für eine Offen­si­ve die das aktu­el­le Kriegs­ziel der Ukrai­ne erfül­len könn­te auf “wei­te­re 3000”.

Das Ver­hält­nis Kampf­pan­zer zu Kampf­schüt­zen­pan­zer ist dabei 1:2 (sel­bes Videointerview).

Laut statistica.com hat Euro­pa im Jahr 2024 gesamt 4540 Kampf­pan­zer, von denen die Ukrai­ne in der Defen­si­ve dem­nächst 100 braucht um wei­ter­zu­kämp­fen, und 1000 um noch­mal in die Offen­si­ve gehen zu kön­nen -- um auf dem kon­ven­tio­nel­len Weg ihre Zie­le (Rück­erobe­rung aller ukrai­ni­schen Gebie­te mit dem Stand vor 2014) zu erreichen.

Das wäre also noch­mal ein Vier­tel aller in Euro­pa ver­füg­ba­ren Panzer.

Laut wiki­pe­dia liegt die Auf­sto­ckungs­quo­te in Deutsch­land bei 39 in vier Jah­ren, dh 10 Pan­zern pro Jahr - bei 300 Bestand. Dh. die Ukrai­ne bräuch­te von Deutsch­land so viel, wie Deutsch­land in 8 Jah­ren durch Pro­duk­ti­on lukrie­ren kann.

Laut Oryx hat die Ukrai­ne bis­her etwa 1000 Pan­zer und Schüt­zen­pan­zer ver­lo­ren. Aktu­ell hat die Ukrai­ne eben­falls laut Oryx etwa 2000 Pan­zer und Kampf­schüt­zen­pan­zer im Einsatz.

Zusam­men­ge­fasst, für das Poten­ti­al eines kon­ven­tio­nel­len Sie­ges (alles Gebiet zum Stand von vor 2014 zurück) bräuch­te die Ukrai­ne 2.5 mal MEHR Pan­zer als sie der­zeit hat -- und das wären ein gutes Vier­tel aller in Euro­pa der­zeit noch ver­füg­ba­ren Pan­zer. (Ohne Anga­be zur tat­säch­li­chen Ein­satz­be­reit­schaft der staat­lich ange­ge­be­nen Zah­len, wir ken­nen das Pro­blem aus Deutsch­land. Zumal 1365 von den 4540 in Grie­chen­land sta­tio­niert sind.)

(Alles unter dem Vor­be­halt, dass die US kei­ne Abra­hams mit Tur­bi­nen­an­trieb schi­cken. (Aktu­ell warens 31.))

Jetzt zur weni­ger Kon­ven­tio­nel­len Kriegsführung:
Laut Zei­han hat die Ukrai­ne mög­li­cher­wei­se die rus­si­sche Rail Logis­tik ein­se­hen kön­nen und bei­de Sei­ten wissens.

Bedeu­tet - die Ukrai­ne hat ein bes­se­res Ver­ständ­nis von Rus­si­schen Muni­ti­ons­de­pots (Zahl - Ort, Men­ge) -- und könn­te jetzt die Rus­si­sche Logis­tik durch Angrif­fe auf die rus­si­sche Ener­gie­in­fra­struk­tur emp­find­lich ent­schleu­ni­gen (rus­si­sche Züge sind zum Groß­teil elek­tri­fi­ziert und fah­ren mit Strom).

edit: Kiev Post Edi­tor in Chief indi­ca­tes, that Ukrai­nes “win­ning” is in lar­ge part a regime chan­ge play, so get­ting the cur­rent regime to topp­le in russia: