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‘Femi­nist’ for­eign poli­cy — what does that mean?

Anna­le­na Baer­bock is Germany’s first fema­le for­eign minis­ter. Accord­ing to the new government’s coali­ti­on agree­ment, she wants to pur­sue a “femi­nist for­eign poli­cy.” But opi­ni­ons dif­fer as to what that actual­ly means.

You mean for­eign poli­cy, the thing thats inten­tio­nal­ly deco­u­pled from per­so­nal egos, day to day poli­tics and socie­ties morals, becau­se other­wi­se it didnt turn out great?

How about we soak that in a con­cept that is inten­ded for morals based class war­fa­re, I mean betterment?

The first group seeks a peace­ful, uto­pian ver­si­on of for­eign poli­cy at all cos­ts; while the other is pri­ma­ri­ly con­cer­ned with get­ting more women into posi­ti­ons of power in public diplo­ma­cy, the mili­ta­ry and civil society.

What could go wrong?

“Femi­nism tri­es to smash struc­tures that rely on vio­lence,” she told DW. She cites the fight against ter­ro­rism as one examp­le: 90% of ter­ro­rists ope­ra­ting world­wi­de are men.

Sor­ry I asked… Won’t ask again.

So is this real­ly how you’d have a lea­ding coun­try in the EU ope­ra­te in the fol­lowing years?

The con­cern is that the chan­cel­le­ry will con­ti­nue to take care of the “big play­ers” like the United Sta­tes, Chi­na, Fran­ce, the EU and Rus­sia, while lea­ving smal­ler fish to the For­eign Ministry.

She cri­ti­ci­zed for­mer For­eign Minis­ter Hei­ko Maas for allowing hims­elf to be, as she put it, “demo­ted” in this way. She hopes that Anna­le­na Baer­bock will bring more strength to the For­eign Minis­try, and not just hand ever­ything over to the chancellery.

Masal­la, howe­ver, does not think this will hap­pen, and pre­dicts that the chan­cel­le­ry will con­ti­nue to focus on the “big play­ers.” He belie­ves that the old divi­si­on of labor will con­ti­nue under the new government, and that Anna­le­na Baer­bock will sim­ply have to get used to it.

Ah, it’s all in the details, isn’t it?

“Peace­ful, uto­pian ver­si­on of for­eign poli­cy” is main­ly for the smal­ler coun­tries I presume.

src: click

At this point, you could teach world poli­tics to a todd­ler. Literally.

Back­ground: click

The con­cept of “eco­no­mic hitman-esque” debt-traps (unre­paya­ble infra­st­ruc­tu­re loans, with the len­der coun­tries indus­tri­al sec­tor net­ting the actu­al buil­ding con­tracts), that had been remo­de­led by the chi­ne­se into gif­ting infra­st­ruc­tu­re out­right, and then gran­ting them­sel­ves ope­ra­ting rights, if cer­tain con­di­ti­ons aren’t met accord­ing to a pre­de­fi­ned con­tract, has now mor­phed into *pau­se*

“The Glo­bal Gate­way Strategy”

“[…] smart invest­ments in qua­li­ty infra­st­ruc­tu­re, respec­ting the hig­hest social and envi­ron­men­tal stan­dards, in line with the EU’s demo­cra­tic values”

“[So] Euro­pe can build more resi­li­ent con­nec­tions with the world.”

Envi­ron­men­tal? Resi­li­ent? Yes, becau­se it’s most­ly tar­ge­ting data and health­ca­re infra­st­ruc­tu­re, if the deb­ter coun­try choo­ses, out of their own voli­ti­on, to use the funds in that way. Euro­pe would only be sug­ges­ting as much. At a third of the volu­me Chi­na is inves­ting in belt and road, only a deca­de later. Part­ly using alrea­dy pre­al­lo­ca­ted funds.

DW has their youn­gest Brussels cor­re­spon­dent on the case right now. (See video.)

The stra­te­gy is “of par­ti­cu­lar impor­t­ance in Sou­the­ast Asia,” whe­re the EU has been a strong part­ner for the regi­on, said Igor Dries­mans, the EU ambassa­dor to the Asso­cia­ti­on of Sou­the­ast Asi­an Nati­ons (ASEAN) bloc.

Dries­mans said the Glo­bal Gate­way will build on a stra­te­gy for coope­ra­ti­on with coun­tries in the regi­on, inclu­ding the 2018 EU-Asia con­nec­ti­vi­ty strategy.

The­re is also the poten­ti­al for the EU’s Glo­bal Gate­way to part­ner with the United Sta­tes’ glo­bal invest­ment pro­po­sal, Build Back Bet­ter World.

src: click

To get more infor­ma­ti­on on Build Back Bet­ter World in Gaza/Westbank, for examp­le, plea­se read: click