14th paragraph from the top

06. Februar 2022

DW news story:

Ger­ma­ny must cut reli­an­ce on Rus­si­an gas, minis­ter says

Germany’s Eco­no­my Minis­ter Robert Habeck war­ned against Europe’s No.1 eco­no­my beco­m­ing a “pawn” in Russia’s game. Natu­ral gas stock­pi­les across the EU are at their lowest in years as ten­si­ons over Ukrai­ne intensify.

What did Habeck say?
“We must impro­ve our pre­pa­red­ness for next win­ter,” the Green Par­ty poli­ti­ci­an told the news­pa­pers of the Fun­ke Media Group and the French regio­nal dai­ly Ouest-France.

Habeck said the Ukrai­ne cri­sis is for­cing Ger­ma­ny to “crea­te other import oppor­tu­nities and to diver­si­fy its sup­ply, inclu­ding infra­st­ruc­tu­ral issues.”

We have to act here and bet­ter secu­re our­sel­ves. If we don’t, we beco­me a pawn in the game [of Russia].”

[…]

Ger­ma­ny remains reli­ant on Rus­si­an gas for over a third of its needs as it pha­ses out coal and nuclear energies.

14th para­graph from the top:

He went on to cri­ti­ci­ze the gas mar­ket for being com­ple­te­ly dere­gu­la­ted and hin­ted that the government may have to play a grea­ter role.

src: click

Why is this important?
Becau­se this is how RT (via fefe, don’t read them other­wi­se :)) is repor­ting the same story:

Gaz­prom hat den Gas­hahn wie­der aufgedreht.

while some EU offi­cials are accu­sing Gaz­prom of deli­ber­ate­ly with­hol­ding sup­plies. Howe­ver, Gaz­prom says addi­tio­nal sup­plies were not boo­ked befo­re Febru­a­ry 2. 

Na sowas. Stellt sich raus: Wenn man bei denen was kauft, dann lie­fern die das auch. Und zwar frist­ge­mäß und in vol­ler Höhe.
Kön­nen wir viel­leicht jetzt auf­hö­ren so zu tun, als sei das Schuld der Rus­sen, dass unse­re Kon­zer­ne die für unse­re Bür­ger gemein­ten Gas­re­ser­ven zwecks Pro­fit­ma­xi­mie­rung auf dem Spot­markt ver­hö­kert haben?

src: click

RT goes into more detail as well:

Gaz­prom has resu­med gas sup­plies to Euro­pe through Ukrai­ne, boo­king 109 mil­li­on cubic meters of dai­ly pipe­line capa­ci­ty, Bloom­berg repor­ted on Tues­day. Under the five-year con­tract, which expi­res in 2024, the com­pa­ny is expec­ted to deli­ver 40 bil­li­on cubic meters of gas per year to Euro­pe via Ukrai­ne. The news trig­ge­red a long-anticipated decli­ne in gas pri­ces, with March futures drop­ping below $900 per thousand cubic meters.

Janu­a­ry sales of Rus­si­an natu­ral gas out­side the for­mer Soviet Uni­on saw a mas­si­ve drop of 41.3% year-on-year, while the country’s over­all pro­duc­tion has incre­a­sed, Rus­si­an ener­gy major Gaz­prom repor­ted on Tuesday.

Euro­pean inven­to­ry levels have repor­ted­ly sunk to his­to­ric lows over the past several mon­ths, sen­ding ener­gy pri­ces in the regi­on soa­ring, while some EU offi­cials are accu­sing Gaz­prom of deli­ber­ate­ly with­hol­ding sup­plies. Howe­ver, Gaz­prom says addi­tio­nal sup­plies were not boo­ked befo­re Febru­a­ry 2.

The Company’s gas deli­ve­ries are car­ri­ed out as reques­ted by con­su­mers in full com­pli­an­ce with con­trac­tu­al obli­ga­ti­ons,” Gaz­prom said in a press release.

Gaz­prom said ear­lier this mon­th it hadn’t boo­ked any mon­th­ly tran­sit capa­ci­ty via the Yamal-Europe gas pipe­line [the one going through Ukrai­ne] for Febru­a­ry. Howe­ver, the com­pa­ny may still book the rou­te via dai­ly auctions.

The pipe­line, which usual­ly accounts for about 15% of Russia’s annu­al gas exports to Euro­pe and Tur­key, has been working in rever­se mode sin­ce late Decem­ber, put­ting addi­tio­nal pres­su­re on Euro­pean ener­gy prices.

Mean­while, working gas invent­ories in Europe’s under­ground gas sto­rage faci­li­ties were lag­ging behind last year’s level by 27.2% as of Janu­a­ry 30, Gaz­prom said on Tues­day, citing data from Gas Infra­st­ruc­tu­re Europe.

Over 81% of the fuel deli­ve­r­ed during the sum­mer is alrea­dy pum­ped out from the faci­li­ties, accord­ing to the com­pa­ny, while “the total amount of working gas invent­ories in Euro­pean UGS faci­li­ties was as low as 38.1 bil­li­on cubic meters on Janu­a­ry 30, fal­ling by 2.7 bil­li­on cubic meters below the his­to­ri­cal mini­mum for this date.”

Mea­ning, as gas pri­ces soared, euro­pean pro­vi­ders stop­ped orde­ring, becau­se they were bet­ting on lower pri­ces on spot­mar­kets, becau­se it was indi­ca­ted, that the pri­ce shock had exter­nal cau­ses, part of which would have been rela­ted to acts of natu­re bey­ond human con­trol. So the­re was an expec­tancy of pri­ces fal­ling again, over time. Rus­si­an gas wasnt going through the Ukrai­ne for that peri­od of time, becau­se rus­sia had enough capa­ci­ty over the remai­ning pipe­line net­work to deli­ver the boo­ked amounts without ship­ping them through Ukrai­ne. This now chan­ged, on the same day, or the day after (unclear) euro­pean sup­pliers incre­a­sed orders.

Three more steps to ful­ly under­stand the logic here.

Ener­gy pri­ces for gas incre­a­sed in the US as well, (ope­ning up the Yamal-Europe pipe­line actual­ly incre­a­sed them fur­ther), as - again acts of natu­re bey­ond con­trol are cited to be a cau­se the­re as well. In fact, U.S. Natu­ral Gas Pri­ces Jum­ped by 10% on Wed­nes­day alo­ne, cited cau­se: “Fri­gid weather”.

That was fol­lowing the sin­gle most rapid climb in gas pri­ces ever, in a sin­gle day in the US, a week earlier.

Ope­ning up the Yamal-Europe pipe­line has also incre­a­sed the gas pri­ce - after a mini slump, becau­se again rus­sia saw 41.3% less demand year on year, des­pi­te hit­ting an all time high in gas pro­duc­tion. (What drop­ped accord­ing to RT were the futures, so spe­cu­la­ti­on on long term pri­ce increases.)

At the same time this happens: 

The Glo­bal Gas Cri­sis Has Made Ame­ri­can LNG Hot Again

The glo­bal gas crunch and sky­ro­cke­ting pri­ces in Euro­pe and Asia are lay­ing the foun­da­ti­ons for a revi­val in final invest­ment decisi­ons in new lique­fied natu­ral gas (LNG)

src: click

That was step one.

Step two is now loo­king at Habecks quo­te in context.

Germany’s Eco­no­my Minis­ter Robert Habeck war­ned against Europe’s No.1 eco­no­my beco­m­ing a “pawn” in Russia’s game. Natu­ral gas stock­pi­les across the EU are at their lowest in years as ten­si­ons over Ukrai­ne intensify.

Who stop­ped orde­ring gas?

We must impro­ve our pre­pa­red­ness for next win­ter,” the Green Par­ty poli­ti­ci­an told the news­pa­pers of the Fun­ke Media Group and the French regio­nal dai­ly Ouest-France.

Habeck said the Ukrai­ne cri­sis is for­cing Ger­ma­ny to “crea­te other import oppor­tu­nities and to diver­si­fy its sup­ply, inclu­ding infra­st­ruc­tu­ral issues.”

Diver­si­fy­ing”, is only pos­si­ble if Ame­ri­can LNG mar­kets are set­ting invest­ment decisi­ons right now, and they are set­ting them based on: 

The Glo­bal Gas Cri­sis Has Made Ame­ri­can LNG Hot Again

The glo­bal gas crunch and sky­ro­cke­ting pri­ces in Euro­pe and Asia are lay­ing the foun­da­ti­ons for a revi­val in final invest­ment decisi­ons in new lique­fied natu­ral gas (LNG)

src: click

As well as the 14th para­graph from the top for DW.com:

He [Habeck] went on to cri­ti­ci­ze the gas mar­ket for being com­ple­te­ly dere­gu­la­ted and hin­ted that the government may have to play a grea­ter role.

src: click

Third step is to under­stand the “new role governments should play in co-regulating ener­gy markets”.

The Ger­man Mar­shall Fund of the United Sta­tes released a press state­ment two days ago.

EU-US Ener­gy Coope­ra­ti­on to Address Cli­ma­te Change

In 2022, the big­gest exis­ten­ti­al thre­at to the health, pro­spe­ri­ty, and exis­tence of humans on Earth is cli­ma­te chan­ge. Mas­si­ve efforts are nee­ded to urgent­ly miti­ga­te green­house gas emis­si­ons and, in par­al­lel, sup­port adap­t­ati­on mea­su­res for tho­se alrea­dy affec­ted by its nega­ti­ve impact. On the occa­si­on of the EU-US Ener­gy Coun­cil mee­ting in Febru­a­ry 2022, it is use­ful to recall the dra­ma­tic impact of the Euro­pean Reco­very Program—the Mar­shall Plan—on the recon­struc­tion of Euro­pe; that the finan­cial, tech­ni­cal, and poli­ti­cal sup­port of the United Sta­tes to both for­mer friends and foes in Euro­pe were essen­ti­al in re-establishing demo­cra­cy and growth in a Euro­pe devas­ta­ted by inter­nal stri­fe and war. Seventy-five years sin­ce Secreta­ry of Sta­te Geor­ge Mar­shall announ­ced the plan, and 50 years sin­ce the Ger­man Mar­shall Fund was estab­lis­hed to build grea­ter trans­at­lan­tic and inter­na­tio­nal coope­ra­ti­on, it is a time­ly moment to reflect on how the Euro­pean and Ame­ri­can powers can work tog­e­ther glo­bal­ly to address cli­ma­te chan­ge immedia­te­ly, ade­qua­te­ly, and inno­va­tively to ensu­re glo­bal pro­spe­ri­ty and demo­cra­cy. The coope­ra­ti­on of the trans­at­lan­tic powers to trans­fer regu­la­to­ry best prac­ti­ces and new tech­no­lo­gies in the clean ener­gy tran­si­ti­on can help all glo­bal part­ners attain net-zero emis­si­ons by 2050. In addi­ti­on, tech­ni­cal and finan­cial assi­s­tance to tho­se suf­fe­ring most from the con­se­quen­ces of cli­ma­te chan­ge must be pro­vi­ded to help them to urgent­ly take mea­su­res to adapt and pro­tect themselves.

[…]

Hydro­gen
Fol­lowing on from bet­ter manage­ment of electri­ci­ty grids and grea­ter sup­ply of rene­wa­ble ener­gy, “excess” rene­wa­ble electri­ci­ty can be used to gene­ra­te clean hydro­gen. The United Sta­tes and the EU have alrea­dy begun coope­ra­ting bi- and mul­ti­la­te­ral­ly on dri­ving for­ward a hydro­gen mar­ket and need fur­ther impe­tus from regu­la­to­ry, infra­st­ruc­tu­re, and invest­ment per­spec­ti­ves to ensu­re that this com­po­nent of the ener­gy mix is in place and ope­ra­tio­nal at sca­le. Hydro­gen sto­rage can be used to off­set varia­bi­li­ty in rene­wa­ble electricity. 

With respect to hydro­gen gene­ra­ted from natu­ral gas, bet­ter and more effi­ci­ent car­bon cap­tu­re and sto­rage tech­no­lo­gies at a lower cost should be encou­ra­ged to ensu­re that “blue” hydro­gen can be ram­ped up as a tran­si­ti­on fuel in par­al­lel to the deve­lo­p­ment of “green” hydro­gen. The cost-benefit ana­ly­sis will depend to a lar­ge degree on the mar­ket pri­ces of natu­ral gas; its avai­la­bi­li­ty; car­bon cap­tu­re, use, and sequestra­ti­on (CCUS) cos­ts; and alter­na­ti­ve sources for hydro­gen pro­duc­tion. None­theless, for many coun­tries, hydro­gen will be an important part of the future ener­gy mix and efforts to encou­ra­ge and help with regu­la­to­ry and tech­no­lo­gy impro­ve­ments can dri­ve for­ward this development.

Natu­ral Gas
Natu­ral gas will con­ti­nue to play a key role as a tran­si­ti­on fuel in the clean ener­gy future. Repla­cing coal with natu­ral gas can hal­ve green­house gas emis­si­ons, but access to sup­ply, and at a rea­son­ab­le pri­ce, will be an important fac­tor. Given the cur­rent high cost of natu­ral gas in many parts of the world, grea­ter sup­ply at lower cost will be nee­ded to encou­ra­ge that displacement.

Gas as a sto­rage and back-up fuel for electri­ci­ty sup­ply will also con­ti­nue to be important during the tran­si­ti­on peri­od, and joint efforts to redu­ce metha­ne emis­si­ons (as announ­ced at COP26) will be cru­cial in crea­ting grea­ter public accep­t­ance of natu­ral gas use while ram­ping up the genera­ti­on of rene­wa­ble sources.

Sourcing natu­ral gas and the role of inter­na­tio­nal mar­kets are essen­ti­al to the smooth func­tio­n­ing and app­li­ca­ti­on of natu­ral gas as a tran­si­ti­on fuel; the United Sta­tes and the EU should both con­ti­nue to rein­for­ce regu­la­to­ry pro­vi­si­ons to encou­ra­ge the effi­ci­ent func­tio­n­ing of tho­se markets.

src: click

Now - how is what Habeck is doing not sim­ply lying to peop­le? How is what DW is doing not sim­ply copy­ing lies, without set­ting them in context?

The truth”, should it exist, is some­whe­re is bur­ried in the 14th para­graph in the arti­cle, while the fact, that soa­ring gas pri­ces are enab­ling LNG pro­duc­tion to begin with, is not even men­tio­ned. Ger­man Mar­shal Fund of the United Sta­tes is sta­ting that for the green tran­si­ti­on mode­ra­te gas pri­ces are para­mount, and Habeck is “incre­a­sing ener­gy secu­ri­ty” for ger­ma­ny by making “diver­si­fi­ca­ti­on of sources” mandatory?

This only makes sen­se, if you accu­se Gaz­prom of inten­tio­nal­ly incre­a­sing gas pri­ces, for poli­ti­cal rea­sons (which no one does open­ly, btw - other­wi­se, fact che­cking would come in), to the point whe­re they’­ve lost 41.3% of exports year on year - and from then on it stops making sen­se, becau­se if you diver­si­fy by buil­ding out LNG ter­mi­nals or try to pro­cu­re lar­ge quan­ti­ties from other sources, you do that with a pri­ce expec­ta­ti­on of todays pri­ce levels of gas. Not lower ones. US is par­ti­ci­pa­ting in this trend to the ful­lest extent (Inte­res­tin­g­ly enough OPEC did­n’t flood the mar­ket with cheap natu­ral gas this time around, to com­pen­sa­te for “mar­ket pri­ces”, with expert opi­ni­on most­ly sta­ting, that this had occu­red in lar­ge parts becau­se “green tran­si­ti­on” as the fore­mo­st goal in their most important con­su­mer mar­kets made them bind tog­e­ther with rus­si­an ener­gy pro­du­cers). Mar­kets so far dont care about poli­ti­cal inter­ven­ti­on in the least, that goes for the US as well (or at least?). At the same time Habeck pro­mo­tes “hig­her ener­gy pri­ces” as a way to acce­le­ra­te the tran­si­ti­on towards green ener­gy” publicly, while the peop­le respon­si­ble for his actu­al poli­ci­es (how could that be mis­sed by now…) out­right sta­te, that lower natu­ral gas pri­ces would be nee­ded in the mid term, to enab­le the ener­gy tran­si­ti­on. And if you think “diver­si­fy­ing natu­ral gas pro­cu­re­ment” means some­thing other than hig­her gas pri­ces - think again.

UK Gas Pro­duc­tion Could Plun­ge 75% By 2030

The UK could beco­me much more vul­nerable to pri­ce shocks and geo­po­li­ti­cal events unless new off­shore fiel­ds are appro­ved and developed—and the UK’s gas pro­duc­tion could plum­met by 75 percent

src: click

Diver­si­fy­ing natu­ral gas pro­cu­re­ment, means hig­her natu­ral gas pri­ces. Is only pos­si­ble with hig­her natu­ral gas pri­ces in place. Is not in the inte­rest of rus­sia (If not for incre­a­sing the pri­ce of natu­ral gas over­all.). And accord­ing to Habeck was cau­sed by mar­ket mecha­nisms. (Para­graph 14 in the DW arti­cle.) Becau­se what was in the inte­rest of rus­sia, was ful­fil­ling their stan­ding obli­ga­ti­ons, and doing so wit­hin one or two days after the order amounts incre­a­sed again. (At a hig­her pri­ce, but look at US gas­mar­kets at the same time at least - when making the state­ment that diver­si­fy­ing pro­cu­re­ment would be the way out of this.)

This time I pro­vi­ded the through­li­ne. I hope ever­yo­ne is hap­py with it as is. I just cant stand the lies anymore.

What a difference a day makes…

04. Februar 2022


US says Rus­si­an attack no lon­ger ‘immi­nent’

Now who saw that one com­ing? Anyone?

edit: Bonus - if you want the con­tra­dic­ting infor­ma­ti­on released by a US Sta­tes Depart­ment spo­kes­per­son, a few hours earlier:

Must-watch exchan­ge bet­ween @APDi­plo­Wri­ter Matt Lee and @StateDeptSpox:

Repor­ter: “It’s an action that you say they have taken, but you have shown no evi­dence to con­firm that. […] This is like - cri­sis actors? Real­ly? This is like Alex Jones ter­ri­to­ry you’re get­ting into now.”

src: click
Rus­si­as reac­tion: click

The european unity you’ve been waiting for

02. Februar 2022

US incre­a­sed mili­ta­ry sup­port spen­ding and is about to incre­a­se tro­ops sta­tio­ned in Nato mem­ber sta­tes, Gre­at Bri­tain and Poland are now incre­a­sing mili­ta­ry aid and poli­ti­cal sup­port by hol­ding smal­ler sum­mits as well - the Dut­ch Prime Minis­ter will visit Ukrai­ne tomor­row, and for­mer Prime Minis­ter of Swe­den, Carl Bildt, now co-chair of the Euro­pean Coun­cil on For­eign Rela­ti­ons (thats pos­si­ble?) is put­ting out “sca­re tac­tics” tal­king­points as well.

You know you have a genui­ne euro­pean effort going, when the US, Gre­at Bri­tain, Poland, and the Co Chair of the ECFR, are put­ting out the “we stand with Ukrai­ne” rhe­to­ric, and hol­ding spee­ches at sta­te visits in the Ukrai­ne cur­r­ent­ly, oh and dont for­get the Prime Minis­ter of the Nether­lands (It worked! -- on a more serious note: 

The King­dom of the Nether­lands beca­me a foun­ding mem­ber of NATO in 1949 and its unaba­ted com­mit­ment to the inter­na­tio­nal legal order gave it a much lar­ger role in inter­na­tio­nal affairs than its size would nor­mal­ly jus­ti­fy. It also exp­lains why Dut­ch lea­ders let NATO mem­bers­hip, as well as its mem­bers­hip of the Euro­pean Uni­on and the United Nati­ons, shape a lar­ge part of the country’s for­eign poli­cy and why Atlan­ti­cism for­med a cor­ner­stone of its secu­ri­ty poli­cy during the ent­i­re Cold War period.”

src: click)!

The Ukrai­ne mean­while, has the best mas­ter­plan you could think of in this instance - incre­a­se armed for­ces capa­ci­ty by 100.000 units wit­hin three years.

Wait - wit­hin three years? For how long does the coali­ti­on of the wil­ling think this con­flict should be held acti­ve again? Rus­sia basi­cal­ly loo­ses advan­ta­ge in late febru­a­ry… And from then on their nego­tia­ting posi­ti­on gets suc­ces­si­ve­ly worse.

So in three years from now, when the Ukrai­ne final­ly has a stan­ding army of 100.000 units more, and an ener­gy depen­den­cy of about 70% on rus­si­an oil exports… Their eco­no­mic growth will streng­t­hen, so they can final­ly aim at poli­ti­cal or ener­gy inde­pen­dence? Oh no, I for­got, the US will invest hea­vi­ly in green ener­gy infra­st­ruc­tu­re in the Ukrai­ne, and then - they’ll do an infra­st­ruc­tu­re build up with oil and shale­gas ship­ped in from half around the glo­be, becau­se “the pro­spects of buil­ding green infra­st­ruc­tu­re in the Ukrai­ne” are out­right rosy - with them now having built up their army signi­fi­cant­ly, having suf­fe­red oca­tio­nal ener­gy outa­ges and sup­ply shocks (during the transition).

Someo­ne draw me the through­li­ne here again?

Some­thing might be mis­sing from this ana­ly­sis, like - rus­si­an gas on its way to euro­pe goes through which coun­tries (if we pre­su­me Nord Stream 2 stays inactive)?

edit: Oh, Brussels (as the home base of NATO) is ent­i­re­ly impar­ti­al as well, of cour­se - no con­flict of inte­rest whatsoever. (The peace move­ments, inter­view­ed here, his­to­ri­cal­ly are seen as aiding the rus­si­an sphe­re of influ­ence.)

edit2: Short state­ment by the Ukrai­ni­an Pre­si­dent: “We are loo­king for­ward to taking the Krim back [or other ter­ri­to­ries?], and that bila­te­ral tra­de bet­ween the UK and Ukrai­ne incre­a­sed by 60% over the last years is gre­at, and a gre­at suc­cess, and we should talk more about free tra­de [Wait what? So the bila­te­ral tra­de agree­ment beco­mes worth less?]. Dont quo­te me on that who­le com­plex, becau­se I havent sourced mul­ti­ple sources, but thats liter­al­ly what the trans­la­tor said. (Source is The Tele­graph.) Ah - the best of the best as heads of the sta­te again, I see…

Update: El Pais has acces­sed the some of the US and NATO nego­tia­ti­on docu­ments and is publi­shing details. Click and click.

edit: The US is cur­r­ent­ly signa­ling, that Ger­ma­ny is not depen­da­ble. Oh, so sad… did the litt­le trick of “spea­king for the who­le of euro­pe” Vic­to­ria Nuland pul­led off not work… *sniff* So sad. Second source: DW as par­ti­al as ever.

edit2: Whats this? The Ukrai­ne con­fir­ming, that the num­bers of rus­si­an troups near the bor­der are too small for a full sca­le inva­si­on - at this point? click How can that be pos­si­ble? The next step would be them ack­now­led­ging, that Kiev is not likely under risk of being taken by a par­ti­al inva­si­on. The insanity!

German Marshall Fund of the United States and Starr Forum

28. Januar 2022

Panel on Streng­t­he­ning the Secu­ri­ty Resi­li­en­ce of Ukrai­ne: Mili­ta­ry, Ener­gy, Cyber

High­light: Mode­ra­tor asks, if Ukrai­ne would be able to beco­me a net ener­gy exporter wit­hin the next five years to redu­ce eco­no­mic depen­dance - expert fol­lows up with a sli­de that reads:

Pos­si­ble addi­tio­nal thre­ats [to Ukrai­ne] in 2022:

Phy­si­cal attacks
- phy­si­cal dama­ge to infra­st­ruc­tu­re - gas pipe­lines, to for­ce NS2 operation
- electri­ci­ty net­work to pre­vent joi­ning ENTSO-E (Euro­pean asso­cia­ti­on for the coope­ra­ti­on of trans­mis­si­on sys­tem ope­ra­tors (TSOs) for electricity)

Cyber attacks on infrastructure
- gas pipe­lines to for­ce NS2 operation
- electri­ci­ty net­work to pre­vent joi­ning ENTSO-E

Attacks on coal mines/nuclear plants to crea­te evi­ron­men­tal dis­as­ters, risk to people’s health

Infor­ma­tio­nal attacks
- alrea­dy happening

Eco­no­mic attacks
- Blo­cka­ge of coal/gas supply
- Blo­cka­ge of oil pro­ducts supply

Fol­lo­wed up by a plea, to the US minis­try of ener­gy to help Ukrai­ne with imple­men­ting a sus­tainab­le ener­gy infra­st­ruc­tu­re, because 

The US has real­ly, real­ly gre­at ener­gy resi­li­en­ce sys­tems, star­ting with trai­nings, com­mu­ni­ca­ti­on, and buil­ding capa­ci­ty of dif­fe­rent sta­ke­hol­ders. It would be real­ly good, if the US depart­ment of ener­gy and the US government, would help the Ukrai­ne minis­try of ener­gy and other sta­ke­hol­ders, to build this capa­ci­ty here in the Ukrai­ne. I belie­ve this is a real­ly gre­at chan­ce to enhan­ce our coope­ra­ti­on, thank you very much.”

What a nice invi­ta­ti­on - I might actual­ly vaca­ti­on the­re, next summer!

[First pro­blem being Bela­rus is cur­r­ent­ly not sup­ply­ing electri­ci­ty to the Ukrai­ne, with it being up in the air, if they will recon­nect in the near future.] “The second pro­blem is sup­ply of oil pro­ducts to Ukrai­ne, becau­se Rus­sia and Bela­rus sup­ply up to 70% of oil pro­ducts to Ukrai­ne now, and if they stop this sup­ply, well, the­re will be a pos­si­bi­li­ty to replace this fuel, but the time will mat­ter. So Bela­rus can play some nega­ti­ve role, even des­troy­ing lets say ener­gy secu­ri­ty of Ukraine.”

--

Starr Forum (MIT Cen­ter for Inter­na­tio­nal Studies)

Pri­ma­ri­ly sees “saber ratt­ling”. Then fol­lo­wed up by a collec­tion of all the US think­tank lead pro­po­sals dis­sec­ted here in the last days. Eura­si­on eco­no­mic uni­on, Putin beha­vio­ral ana­ly­sis and cha­rac­ter cen­te­red moti­va­ti­on fin­ding for the con­flict, pain­ting the Ukrai­ne as an eco­no­mic power­house, tel­ling peop­le its Putins fear of peop­le power, pin­ning it on ego/status, … Ever­ything except for crea­ting a secu­ri­ty infra­st­ruc­tu­re along­side rus­si­as bor­ders that would sus­tain a com­ing demo­gra­phic nar­ro­wing. First and fourth spea­kers at least touch upon it. Fourth spea­ker then also pro­po­ses some­thing along tho­se lines, detail­ed talks about a new secu­ri­ty infra­st­ruc­tu­re as “the best pos­si­ble solu­ti­on, and the one thats cur­r­ent­ly being pur­sued”. All in all the best panel I’ve scree­n­ed so far, watching it is recommended.

edit: Pas­send dazu der öster­rei­chi­sche Fal­ter: “Nie­mand hat wirk­lich ein Inter­es­se an Kämp­fen in der Ukrai­ne. War­um trom­meln dann trotz­dem alle nach Krieg?”

edit2: Fifth spea­ker in the Starr Forum Panel goes into the thre­at from a mili­ta­ry tro­ops sta­tio­ned at the bor­der ang­le. Cur­r­ent­ly about 56.000 com­bat units and sup­port units to fill up the 100.000 repor­ted by other out­lets befo­re. Thats about 40% of rus­si­as cur­rent com­bat poten­ti­al, now near the bor­der (120-200 miles from the ukrai­ni­an bor­der). About half the num­ber are bri­ga­des, that are regu­lar­ly sta­tio­ned the­re. That inclu­des most of the sup­por­ting ground tro­ops. (Almost no addi­tio­nal sup­port tro­ops were added.) 15-20 SPTGs have moved pri­ma­ri­ly into Bela­rus, equa­ling 50% of the total eas­tern groups com­bat poten­ti­al, that has now moved near the Ukrai­ne. Posi­tio­ning would make it pos­si­ble to occu­py the east or the south of Ukrai­ne, or to encir­cle Kiev, pro­bab­ly not take Kiev “becau­se that’s hard”. A total occup­a­ti­on is unli­kely, but the­re is a pos­si­bi­li­ty to use a limi­ted mili­ta­ry vic­to­ry to attain poli­ti­cal goals. Sus­tai­ned par­ti­al occup­a­ti­on also seems unli­kely accord­ing to the speaker.

edit3: Two new major takea­ways. The panel agrees that rus­sia has lar­ge­ly deco­u­pled its abi­li­ty to take mili­ta­ry action from the public sen­ti­ment of its peop­le, and also agrees, that the con­flict is about lar­ger con­ces­si­ons in the ori­en­ta­ti­on of the secu­ri­ty based order of the wes­tern alli­an­ce. Con­ces­si­ons that would exceed “pre­ven­ting Ukrai­ne from beco­m­ing a mem­ber of Nato”, becau­se that wasnt very likely wit­hin the next years any­how, accord­ing to the panelists.

72 days of Kafka

28. Januar 2022

17.11.2021: Sky News UK talks to the ukrai­ni­an ambassa­dor to the United King­dom, Vadym Prystaiko:

At 7:30 in:

Vadym Prys­ta­iko: “What I’m here to say [is], that [the] ukra­ni­an pipe­line could pro­vi­de [the] euro­pean uni­on, all euro­pean nati­ons with the gas easi­ly. We have enough capa­ci­ty. For the rus­si­ans are doing this -- they [are] just rather wea­po­nizing the gas.”

Sky News: “But you think that this is the play by Rus­sia to get this pipe­line appro­ved, and then perhaps they’d back off?”

Vadym Prys­ta­iko: “Obvious­ly they will use this gas, they wont use [the] ukrai­ni­an pipe­line, which will untie their hands in Ukrai­ne, in the ukrai­ni­ni­an cam­pai­gn, which is yet ano­t­her risk [for] a real mili­ta­ry invasion.”

Sky­news: “Are you worried about the ger­man atti­tu­de to this, I mean the pipe­line, in the main will start sup­ply­ing ger­ma­ny. We hear that out­go­ing chan­cellor Ange­la Mer­kel has con­ti­nuing decent rela­ti­ons with the krem­lin and that in actu­al fact has over­rid­den pre­si­dent Biden in his oppo­si­ti­on to North Stream 2?”

Vadym Prys­ta­iko: “I am worry­ing, becau­se the ger­mans were not under­stan­ding, for all the­se years and years. They tried it [?] befo­re. I remem­ber the pre­de­ces­sor of mother Mer­kel who pro­mi­sed to help us with that, but then beca­me a depu­ty chief of gas­prom hims­elf. So when we are tal­king about ger­mans, we have to under­stand how clo­se­ly they are con­nec­ted eco­no­mi­c­al­ly to rus­si­ans, and how much of their own cal­cu­la­ti­ons of whats going on in their neigh­bor­hood actual­ly depends on rus­si­an gas, or some­thing else from the rus­si­an federation.”

src: click

72 days later:

28.01.2022: NPR talks to the spo­kes­man for the United Sta­tes Depart­ment of Sta­te, Ned Price:

I want to be very clear: if Rus­sia inva­des Ukrai­ne one way or ano­t­her, Nord Stream 2 will not move for­ward,” Pri­ce told Natio­nal Public Radio. “I’m not going to get into the spe­ci­fics. We will work with Ger­ma­ny to ensu­re it does not move forward.”

src: click

Someo­ne paint me the through­li­ne here.

1. Did Rus­sia esca­la­te mili­ta­ry ten­si­ons to get North Stream 2 appro­ved? Ans­wer: [Implied: Yes - Then expli­ci­tly:] Well obvious­ly it redu­ces their invol­ve­ment in day to day poli­tics in the Ukrai­ne, which is ano­t­her risk for invasion.

Mea­ning - rus­sia esca­la­ted ten­si­ons, to get North Stream 2 appro­ved (wait what?!), so it can deco­u­p­le from Ukrai­ne eco­no­mi­c­al­ly, which incre­a­ses the risk of inva­si­on? So this isnt about Rus­sia wan­ting to pre­vent Ukrai­ne from beco­m­ing a Nato part­ner, becau­se Ukrai­ne wants Rus­sia invol­ved in their domestic poli­tics, which would pre­vent them from (most likely - ever) beco­m­ing a Nato mem­ber state?

Reflec­ting on the ECFRs posi­ti­on of “Euro­pe needs to deco­u­p­le from Rus­si­as ener­gy mar­kets long­term”, this means, what?

2. It’s bet­ter for lower mili­ta­ry ten­si­ons in the Ukrai­ne, to have Rus­sia invol­ved actively in their day to day poli­tics for as long as possible?

It’s bet­ter for lower poli­ti­cal ten­si­ons in the Ukrai­ne, to have Rus­sia invol­ved in their day to day poli­tics for as long as possible?

If Rus­sia inva­des in the Ukrai­ne, the US will make sure, that North Stream 2 never is ope­ned, so rus­si­an gas com­ing into the EU has to go through the ukrai­ni­an pipe­line, not redu­cing through­put - but incre­a­sing Ukrai­nes poli­ti­cal depen­den­cy on Rus­sia? Rus­si­as poli­ti­cal depen­den­cy on Ukrai­ne? Redu­cing the EUs poli­ti­cal depen­den­cy on Russia?

I thought Rus­sia esca­la­ted the con­flict to get Nord Stream 2 appro­ved? *sar­casm*

3. In actu­al fact, Ger­ma­ny has over­rid­den Bidens con­cerns (Wait, and Ted Cruz sent the memo?) on North Stream 2 to ensu­re, that it beco­mes active.

In actu­al fact, the United Sta­tes Depart­ment of Sta­te has over­rid­den Ger­ma­nys con­cerns on North Stream 2 to ensu­re, that it never beco­mes active.

Nach­trag: Tat­säch­lich. Das alles muss wohl so sein, denn die öster­rei­chi­sche Qua­li­täts­zei­tung der Stan­dard fin­det schon wie­der auf wun­der­sa­me Wei­se Kom­men­ta­to­ren (vom Insti­tu­te for Euro-Atlantic Coope­ra­ti­on) die dafür eine ganz ein­fa­che Erklä­rung haben:

Ent­ge­gen sei­nen Reden ficht Putin nicht die Nato-Erweiterung an, son­dern das Recht der Ukrai­ne, selbst­be­stimmt Ent­schei­dun­gen zu tref­fen und Bünd­nis­se zu schmie­den, die dem Land zu einem Auf­schwung verhelfen.

src: click

Alles klar jetzt?

Nach­trag 2: Es wird noch bes­ser - Nach­dem die US auf NPR ges­tern “ange­kün­digt” hat eine Red Line “North Stream 2 kommt nicht, wenn eine Inva­si­on der Ukrai­ne statt­fin­det” mit den euro­päi­schen Part­nern “zu ver­han­deln”, und zwar so - dass man sich sicher sein kann - dass das in der Form kommt und gilt, egal was die Euro­pä­er sagen - hat jetzt eine ehe­ma­li­ge Spre­che­rin des US Außen­mi­nis­te­ri­ums ange­kün­digt, dass dies eine gemein­sa­me Posi­ti­on der US und der EU sei.
(DW: US and Ger­ma­ny step up pipe­line warnings to Rus­sia”)

Euro­news hat das aktu­ell mit “Washing­ton droht Mos­kau mit dem Ende der Gas-Pipeline” im Ticker. Es gibt bis jetzt noch kein State­ment eines Regie­rungs­ver­ant­wort­li­chen in Deutsch­land, oder auf EU Ebe­ne dazu. DW über­nimmt es, ohne Quel­len im Euro­päi­schen oder Deut­schen Raum zu nen­nen, und schal­tet anstatt des­sen zu einem Kor­re­spon­den­ten in Kiev, und die tat­säch­li­che Ände­rung der Posi­ti­on ent­spricht der Grö­ßen­ord­nung von “vor eini­gen Tagen spricht Biden noch von Unter­schie­den zwi­schen einer klei­nen und einer grö­ße­ren Inva­si­on”, und “Deutsch­lands Posi­ti­on bis dato war, dass es sich bei Nord Stream 2 um ein Wirt­schafts­pro­jekt hand­le, und es nicht von poli­ti­schen Sank­tio­nen betrof­fen sein würde”.

Was hat die­se Posi­ti­on geän­dert? Mora­li­sche Argu­men­te? Dürf­te die die Euro­päi­sche Bevöl­ke­rung auch mal hören, oder…

Nein? Ok - dann halt nicht. Eine ehe­ma­li­ge Spre­che­rin des US Außen­mi­nis­te­ri­ums reicht ja völ­lig… (DW dazu: “A clea­rer pic­tu­re is emer­ging.” Deus Ex machi­na. Nie­mand wars. Plötz­lich wars da. Es gebiert sich sozu­sa­gen aus dem Schau­me der Bran­dung selbst.) Nach­fra­gen wie sie denn dazu kommt das anzu­neh­men von US Repor­ter­kol­le­gen wur­den abge­schmet­tert. Sie­he Link.

Nach­trag 3: BBC to the res­cue:

Ques­ti­ons remain over how the US could stop it (‘it’ being NS2 in Under Secreta­ry of Sta­te for Poli­ti­cal Affairs, Vic­to­ria Nulands state­ment that “If Rus­sia inva­des in Ukrai­ne, one way or ano­t­her, Nord Stream 2 will not move for­ward”, and that being a joint posi­ti­on of the US and the EU) but its the kind of bul­lish talk one nort­hern euro­pean Nato ally thinks is their best bet at stop­ping an attack.”

What a nice SNAFUUS tal­ked to one nort­hern euro­pean nati­on (won­der which one), then went in front of the press and announ­ced, that this would be “the joint euro­pean posi­ti­on”, when it was­n’t. One nati­on, the EU - what does it mat­ter, right?

Nach­trag 4: Die offi­zi­el­le Posi­ti­on Deutsch­lands ver­bleibt aktu­ell beim State­ment von Baer­bock von vor zwei Tagen, dass die Zukunft von Nord Stream 2 ein Teil einer brei­ten Rei­he an Sank­tio­nen auf Rus­si­sche Aggres­sio­nen sein könn­te. Sie­he: click