Autorenarchiv

The lies, the lies, the lies…

19. Februar 2022

So - first lets put it on record that the posi­ti­on of “we, the allies of the west” now swit­ched from “Rus­sia is going to inva­de”, to “Rus­sia is not so dumb to inva­de, they are going to play this as a con­flict of attri­ti­on” - which is pro­bab­ly cor­rect from my point of view - at this very moment - as well - btw.

But the lies are still so effing outra­gious. So Ian Brem­mer is cur­r­ent­ly buil­ding a new nar­ra­ti­ve, whe­re Putin (always the devil hims­elf) has been allo­wed to walk over red lines in the past, without con­se­quen­ces - most­ly in terms of “cyber­at­tacks” (unat­tri­bu­t­ed cyber­at­tacks most­ly, btw - but who needs pro­of the­se days…) - and now is high on his short term suc­cess, lashing out like a bul­ly at a UN ral­ly (Why does the US come to mind, while for­mu­la­ting that men­tal image?). But now that has chan­ged, and NATO stan­ding in abso­lu­te unity will act as a detrac­tor (so gre­at, always the things you coi­ned as a rea­li­ty two days ear­lier, turn out to have been the most important all along…), and show Putin that he cant con­ti­nue his pro­vo­ca­ti­ons, and divi­de Nato mem­bers, etc, etc.

Slight issue with that. Putin hims­elf was on a pro­mo­ti­on tour for bila­te­ral diplo­ma­tic dis­cus­sions with the US, eight mon­ths ago, sta­ting several times, that they are open to dis­cuss a bila­te­ral posi­ti­on against cyber­at­tacks, but the US has refu­sed to hear them under Oba­ma, under Trump, and always rejec­ted direct talks on the matter.

See: click

Sure, its a poli­ti­cal gam­bit, but Putin “having been encou­ra­ged by how devas­ta­tin­g­ly effec­ti­ve his cyber attacks were, and now belie­ving he can use them again and again becau­se the west was too timid to react” - is the oppo­si­te of what was part of the public diplo­ma­tic sta­ging as the pre­cur­sor of the conflict.

But who needs to fact­check, when they have a jour­na­lism that never shows any pro­fes­sio­nal cour­te­sy? And ins­tead is exch­an­ging smi­les with for­mer public repre­sen­ta­ti­ves on how far wes­tern infor­ma­ti­on war­fa­re is allo­wed to go… (Last blog ent­ry. Read it.)

Sh*t - its almost like some peop­le belie­ve that the public cant fact­check state­ments or poli­ti­cal back­ground affiliations.

Brem­mer has held rese­arch and facul­ty posi­ti­ons[which?]at New York Uni­ver­si­ty, Colum­bia Uni­ver­si­ty, the East­West Insti­tu­te, the World Poli­cy Insti­tu­te, Law­rence Liver­mo­re Natio­nal Labo­ra­to­ry, and the Asia Socie­ty Poli­cy Insti­tu­te, whe­re he has ser­ved as the first Harold J. New­man Dis­tin­guis­hed Fel­low in Geo­po­li­tics sin­ce 2015.[cita­ti­on nee­ded]

In 2013, he was named Glo­bal Rese­arch Pro­fes­sor at New York Uni­ver­si­ty.[11] and in 2019, Colum­bia University’s School of Inter­na­tio­nal and Public Affairs announ­ced that Brem­mer would teach an App­lied Geo­po­li­tics cour­se at the school.[12]

Brem­mer ser­ves on the President’s Coun­cil of the Near East Foun­da­ti­on, the Lea­ders­hip Coun­cil for the Con­cordia Sum­mit, and the board of trus­tees of Intel­li­gence Squa­red. In 2007, he was named as a “Young Glo­bal Lea­der” of the World Eco­no­mic Forum, and in 2010, foun­ded and was appoin­ted Chair of the Forum’s Glo­bal Agen­da Coun­cil for Geo­po­li­ti­cal Risk. In Decem­ber 2015, Brem­mer was knigh­ted by the government of Ita­ly.[13]

Coun­cil mem­ber of the Near East Foun­da­ti­on, Leders­hip coun­cil of the Con­cordia Sum­mit, Board of trus­tees of Intel­li­gence Squa­red (seems like an out­lier, and judge on ame­ri­can idol?) - but doesnt read tran­scripts of public inter­views Putin gave eight mon­ths ago to NBC

Named “Young Glo­bal Lea­der” by the WEF, Chair of the Glo­bal Agen­da Coun­cil for Geo­po­li­ti­cal Risk at the WEF, but doesnt read tran­scripts of inter­views Putin gave eight mon­ths ago.

Also sh*t its Alp­bach all over again! (Man­da­to­ry cur­se, becau­se look, we’­ve found us ano­t­her “Young Glo­bal Lea­der” here. (And all the best peop­le have taught at Colum­bia once more…))

Oh, and on the point of coor­di­na­ting public nar­ra­ti­ves. You get payed for repea­ting what was sta­ted in the brie­fing room of the white house two days ear­lier, of cour­se. Then a jour­na­list asks you what the new nar­ra­ti­ve is. Then you repeat that. As an inde­pen­dent poli­ti­cal sci­en­tist. At the Munich Secu­ri­ty Conference.

Thats job security.

And if Rus­sia attacks the United Sta­tes or our Allies through asym­metric means, like dis­rup­ti­ve cyber­at­tacks against our com­pa­nies or cri­ti­cal infra­st­ruc­tu­re, we are pre­pa­red to respond. 

We’re moving in lock­step with our NATO allies and part­ners to deepen our collec­ti­ve defen­se against thre­ats in cyberspace.

Two paths are still open. For the sake of the his­to­ric respon­si­bi­li­ty Rus­sia and the United Sta­tes share for glo­bal sta­bi­li­ty, for the sake of our com­mon future — to choo­se diplomacy.

src: click

Thats how pro­pa­gan­da works in the west.

edit: Oh second out­right lie in one state­ment “I think ger­ma­ny being cut off from rus­si­an gas moves euro­pe in the direc­tion of rene­wa­bles fas­ter.” Bullsh*t. The pro­mi­se of a social­ly just ener­gy tran­si­ti­on reli­es on fos­si­le fuels beco­m­ing more expen­si­ve, but in terms of the sta­te being able to skim off the dif­fe­rence in taxes, so it can redis­tri­bu­te it in com­pen­sa­ti­on pay­ments for the not so aff­lu­ent, and use the inco­me to sub­si­di­ze indus­tries that are working towards sus­taina­bi­li­ty but that arent eco­no­mi­c­al­ly via­ble yet. While fos­si­le fuels pro­du­ced will get used by non allied part­ners, at lower pri­ces, becau­se rus­sia still needs tra­ding part­ners and to aqui­re for­eign cur­ren­cy. The last part is ack­now­led­ged in the interview.

The ent­i­re pro­spect of a car­bon tax on impor­ted goods into the EU is based on that princip­le as well. Pri­ma­ri­ly so.

But what does a f*cking payed cro­ney care. Or Habeck for that mat­ter, who in public inter­views pret­ty ear­ly on into the esca­la­ti­on of the Ukrai­ne con­flict (pro­bab­ly without having been ful­ly brie­fed) also couldnt con­cep­tua­li­ze the dif­fe­rence. And by dif­fe­rence I mean money lan­ding in US’ cor­po­ra­te hands (fos­si­le fuel com­pa­nies and freight ship­ping, mind you) that should have acce­le­ra­ted Ger­ma­nys green tran­si­ti­on. But whos bit­ing the hand thats fee­ding their polit­cal care­ers, right?

If the jour­na­list in front of them does a *blink blink* with their eyes, and not much else.

Third faux pas - is the mat­ter of fact way, the expert sta­tes how ger­ma­ny was whip­ped into posi­ti­on, while fran­ce wasnt. You have to hear it to belie­ve it. Watch the video.

New question: Do you like information warfare?

19. Februar 2022

After that video, watch this one: click

Now, do you still like infor­ma­ti­on war­fa­re (IW)?

Now the reverting of prior logic begins

19. Februar 2022

Pri­or logic: Rus­sia will sta­ge fal­se flag attacks, to rec­ti­fy an inva­si­on of Ukraine.

Cur­rent logic: Pro rus­si­an sepa­ra­tists in eas­tern Ukrai­ne have see­ded vide­os on social media net­works citing riot like con­di­ti­ons to rec­ti­fy a gene­ral mobi­liz­a­ti­on of their for­ces, that were crea­ted two days befo­re tho­se con­di­ti­ons bro­ke out, as indi­ca­ted by metadata.

So rus­si­an mili­ta­ry is still at the bor­ders, fal­se flag is not used as offi­cial rea­so­ning to enter a war. Rus­sia will sup­port pro rus­si­an sepa­ra­tists in eas­tern Ukrai­ne, and use the credi­ble thre­at of for­ce to advan­ce mili­ta­ry goals to gene­ra­te poli­ti­cal out­co­mes using sepa­ra­tists and, at this time, likely also covert ope­ra­ti­ons, but not their mili­ta­ry in an offi­cial capacity.

Prac­ti­cal­ly the same as “Rus­sia will inva­de the Ukrai­ne using cri­sis actors as a pre­text”. Just not in scope, inten­si­ty - and also ulti­mate­ly not prova­ble to a lar­ge extent.

As a result ger­ma­nys posi­ti­on has beco­me to urge rus­sia to use its influ­ence on sepa­ra­tist groups to deesca­la­te the situa­ti­on, not a gene­ral push to trig­ger sanctions.

The poli­ti­cal decisi­on makers under­stand the dif­fe­rence. For as long as it is possible.

The gene­ral public is pushed to cele­bra­te “US intel­li­gence reports were cor­rect”, des­pi­te - them not having been used as a pre­text for war.

Fun how that works.

The nuan­ces of not going to war.

Reinventing Czechias, Lituhanias and Slovakias Democratic Image

17. Februar 2022

By GLOBSEC Poli­cy Insti­tu­te, AMO, Free­dom House Lit­hua­nia, and the GMFUS.

Good to know that not only Chi­na is buy­ing influ­ence by cour­ting smal­ler coun­tries wit­hin the EU (*wave bund­le of cash emo­ji*) for poli­ti­cal moti­ves. Just throw in the word demo­cra­cy about 200 times and you should be fine.

Keep Germany down

17. Februar 2022

Sh*t, a for­mer US ambassa­dor is not on message.

Bet­ter not report any of it in the main­stream of wes­tern media. Bet­ter not ask him to com­ment. Bet­ter make up tal­king points (to be used in polit talk­shows), that the issue star­ted in the ear­ly nine­ties. Bet­ter finan­ce think­tanks and ent­i­re insti­tu­tes ful­ly. Bet­ter push for state­ments of non ger­man poli­ti­ci­ans about ger­ma­nys poli­tics, and take over the media cir­cuit to make the inqui­ry “if ger­ma­ny is not in line with US announ­ce­ments” an accu­sa­ti­on and the most pres­sing issue over the past week.

Bet­ter go with wes­tern propaganda.

Mat­lock has taught diplo­ma­cy at Duke Uni­ver­si­ty, Prince­ton Uni­ver­si­ty, Colum­bia Uni­ver­si­ty and Hamil­ton Col­le­ge. In a 1997 inter­view, Mat­lock offers some advice to pro­spec­ti­ve diplo­mats: have an opti­mistic natu­re, get a libe­ral edu­ca­ti­on, do not expect to chan­ge the world, know the coun­try, know your own coun­try, faith­ful­ly repre­sent your government, find the mutu­al inte­rests, and remem­ber that timing is ever­ything.[13]

[…]

Sin­ce lea­ving government ser­vice, Mat­lock has occa­sio­nal­ly joi­ned with other experts to cri­ti­ci­ze U.S. for­eign poli­cy. On June 26, 1997, he signed an Open Let­ter to Pre­si­dent Bill Clin­ton cri­ti­ci­zing plans for NATO expan­si­on.[60] His rea­son for oppo­si­ti­on, as given in tes­ti­mo­ny befo­re the Sena­te For­eign Rela­ti­ons Com­mit­tee, was his belief that NATO expan­si­on would pre­clu­de signi­fi­cant nuclear arms reduc­tion with Rus­sia, and con­se­quent­ly incre­a­se the risk of a nuclear attack by ter­ro­rists.[61]

Mat­lock drew the ire of many Repu­bli­cans during the 2004 pre­si­den­ti­al elec­tion cam­pai­gn when he signed the Offi­cial State­ment of Diplo­mats and Mili­ta­ry Com­man­ders for Chan­ge, which cri­ti­ci­zed the poli­ci­es of Pre­si­dent Geor­ge W. Bush and endor­sed Sena­tor John Ker­ry for pre­si­dent.[62]

On Jan 4, 2007, Mat­lock joi­ned with Geor­ge Shultz, Wil­liam Per­ry, Hen­ry Kis­sin­ger and Sam Nunn to advo­ca­te a goal of a world free of nuclear wea­pons.[63] On 23 Sep­tem­ber 2008 after a two-day con­fe­rence at the Car­ne­gie Endow­ment for Inter­na­tio­nal Peace, he joi­ned several other for­mer ambassa­dors to issue a joint state­ment on how Rus­sia and the United Sta­tes might move for­ward in their rela­ti­ons.[64] He has endor­sed the Glo­bal Zero Initia­ti­ve, a plan to eli­mi­na­te all nuclear wea­pons by 2030.[65] Mat­lock has also signed an open let­ter of May 13, 2011 asking the imple­men­tors of the New START trea­ty bet­ween the U.S. Rus­sia to make public the loca­ti­ons and aggre­ga­te num­bers of nuclear wea­pons, in order to pro­mo­te trans­pa­ren­cy and redu­ce mistrust.[66][67]

On Jan 18, 2011 he co-signed an open let­ter to Pre­si­dent Oba­ma urging a United Nati­ons reso­lu­ti­on con­dem­ning Israe­li sett­le­ments in the occu­p­ied ter­ri­to­ry.[68]

Mat­lock has been open­ly cri­ti­cal of the Ame­ri­can mass media’s coverage of the Ukrai­ne cri­sis. On Jan 26, 2022 he publis­hed an review of Richard Sakwa’s arti­cle “Whis­per it, but Putin has a point in Ukrai­ne” on his per­so­nal blog, sta­ting agree­ment that Rus­sia desi­res a neu­tral Ukrai­ne and pushing back against claims that Rus­sia seeks to annex Ukrai­ne.[69] On Feb 15, 2022, he publis­hed an op-ed in Antiwar.com, ques­tio­ning the vali­di­ty of the media nar­ra­ti­ve around the cur­rent sta­te of Russia–Ukraine rela­ti­ons, sta­ting “May­be I am wrong – tra­gi­cal­ly wrong – but I can­not dis­miss the sus­pi­ci­on that we are wit­nessing an ela­bo­ra­te cha­ra­de, gross­ly magni­fied by pro­mi­nent ele­ments of the Ame­ri­can media, to ser­ve a domestic poli­ti­cal end.”[70]

src: click

Nord Stream 2 will not become operational if Russia attacks Ukraine

15. Februar 2022

Josep Bor­rell says it’s ‘qui­te rea­son­ab­le and qui­te clear’ that con­tro­ver­si­al pipe­line would be stop­ped in event of a Rus­si­an invasion.

[…]

Spea­king on BBC Radio 4’s Today pro­gram about poten­ti­al sanc­tions on Rus­sia, Bor­rell said it was “qui­te rea­son­ab­le and qui­te clear” that Nord Stream 2 “will not” be allo­wed to ope­ra­te in the event of a Rus­si­an strike.

src: click

Without words.

Oh lord, let me be your servant, lord…!

15. Februar 2022

Über­schrift bezieht sich auf den sel­ben Komi­ker, der unten die Rüs­tungs­stra­te­gie der US auch für den Lai­en begreif­bar macht - und soll in etwa aus­drü­cken - die US sind so von ihren lei­der nicht wähl­ba­ren Eli­ten indok­tri­niert und in Sach­zwän­gen gebun­den, dass sie ger­ne für die Mobi­li­sie­rung ihrer Wäh­ler­schich­ten im mitt­le­ren Wes­ten einen dege­ne­rier­ten ultra­kon­ser­va­ti­ven Got­tes­pre­di­ger an die Staats­spit­ze wäh­len, der im Ide­al­fall glaubt Got­tes Werk zu voll­enden. Weil dann hat er genug Demut und schaut auch auf die Leu­te - oder irgend ein Bullsh*t den nie­mand beim zwei­ten Hin­se­hen auch nur annä­hernd glaubt, aber der die emo­tio­na­le Ent­schei­dungs­fin­dung der Wäh­ler highjackt.

Das war vor 30 Jah­ren. So alt war der Sager des Komi­kers. Heu­te ist das alles noch ein wenig degenerierter…

Was war noch­mal Bidens Ticket ins Oval Office? Jahr­zehn­te­lan­ge pro­ze­du­ra­le Erfah­rung in Poli­tik und Ver­wal­tung, sowie Sach­kom­pe­tenz, oder?

Für NBC reichts.

Oh bit­te und auch inhalt­lich dran­blei­ben. “The­re was no way, we would ever going to unite Afgha­ni­stan, no way that was gon­na hap­pen.” Oh REALLY? Geschichts­stun­de? Kurz­zu­sam­men­fas­sung der Pres­se­mit­tei­lun­gen des Außen­am­tes seit 2001? Größ­ter Feh­ler im Wie­der­auf­bau­pro­zess des Iraks? Aber wenns der Gott­kai­ser voll der Gna­den, dem Idio­ten von NBC in nem per­sön­li­chen Inter­view ver­zählt wie alter­na­tiv­los das war, dann muss das wohl schon immer die Wahr­heit gewe­sen sein. Bloß nicht die Posi­ti­on bei Kriegs­be­ginn nachschlagen.

Das war der Moment in dem die Posi­ti­on geän­dert wurde -

und das hier war die Posi­ti­on zu Kriegs­be­ginn (im zwei­ten Absatz ange­ris­sen).

Für NBC reichts.

Our transatlantic friends are spitballing

08. Februar 2022

… future sce­n­a­ri­os of Nato deve­lo­p­ment in Euro­pe - report released today. Rough­cut, how to get Euro­pe more res­il­li­ant under war/proxy war conditions.

With it also being para­mount that Nato will grow and chan­ge in the com­ing years. With Euro­pe poten­ti­al­ly being under war.

Fun.

And so sen­si­ti­ve in regards to the situa­ti­on cur­r­ent­ly evolving.

edit:

Now on Ukrai­ne, whe­re the rules based order is under direct ass­ault, we sug­gest a more proac­ti­ve, stra­te­gy dri­ven approach to NATO part­ners­hips, inclu­ding the Ukrai­ne deter­rence initia­ti­ve. That would make it a stra­te­gic prio­ri­ty for the alli­an­ce, to do ever­ything pos­si­ble, short of an arti­cle five gua­ran­tee, to help Ukrai­ne and other part­ners, that are threa­tened by Mos­kow, to defend them­sel­ves and deter aggres­si­on. This Ukrai­ne deter­rence initia­ti­ve could be an exten­si­on of the enhan­ced oppor­tu­nities part­ners pro­gram, at a time when NATO mem­bers­hip of the Ukrai­ne is real­ly not on the agenda.”

Ah, a NATO build-up without a NATO mem­bers­hip. Excellent.

As Juli­an out­lined in his over­view - we argue, that the new stra­te­gic con­cept must com­mit the alli­an­ce to a step chan­ge in the balan­ce of respon­si­bi­li­ty bet­ween the United Sta­tes and the euro­pean mem­bers of the alli­an­ce, to inclu­de Cana­da as well. This is no lon­ger just a mat­ter of over­co­m­ing long stan­ding dis­pu­tes over bur­den sharing in defen­se spen­ding, bet­ween the United Sta­tes and Euro­pe - its now a stra­te­gic neces­si­ty, becau­se the rise of chi­na as a stra­te­gic com­pe­ti­tor crea­tes US need to shift its stra­te­gic focus to the indo­pa­ci­fic regi­on. And under the­se cir­cum­s­tan­ces, Nato can no lon­ger afford it exces­si­ve reli­an­ce on the United sta­tes, eit­her for collec­ti­ve defen­se, or for cri­sis manage­ment and coope­ra­ti­ve secu­ri­ty mis­si­ons bey­ond euro­pes bor­ders. Clear­ly - in an arti­cle five con­tin­gen­cy bet­ween rus­sia in the bal­tic or black sea regi­ons, the United Sta­tes may not always be able to deploy ade­qua­te rein­for­ce­ments to Euro­pe, becau­se of com­pe­ting deman­ds on its for­ces in the indo-pacific. So euro­pean allies will need to be able to pick up most of the slack. Now simi­lar­ly resour­ce cons­traints and shif­ting prio­ri­ties may also lead the US to limit its invol­ve­ment in the midd­le east, afri­ca, and south asia. Or at least to be more selec­ti­ve in when and whe­re it enga­ges. That means, that the United Sta­tes will incre­a­singly look to the euro­pean allies and the euro­pean uni­on to shoul­der more of the bur­den for cri­sis manage­ment and part­ner capa­ci­ty buil­ding in their own neighborhood.”

Same stance - as announ­ced by Peter Zei­han and men­tio­ned in this blog, one year ago.

This is some­what important, as the (trans­at­lan­tic) think­tank cir­cuit is cur­r­ent­ly try­ing to estab­lish that Putin (hims­elf pro­bab­ly) is try­ing to dri­ve a wedge into the US/European coali­ti­on, while in rea­li­ty the stra­te­gic focus of the US has shifted to the indo-pacific and will do more so in the future regard­less of what hap­pens in the­se parts of the world. An expan­sio­nist Chi­na is too much of a stra­te­gic thre­at to the US - while Euro­pe doesnt hold the same value any­mo­re (not mili­ta­ri­ly, not regar­ding ener­gy secu­ri­ty, not in terms of tra­de (US deve­lo­ping Mexi­co and India to be con­su­mer eco­no­mies), not in terms of inno­va­ti­on eit­her (has more to do with the fact that ener­gy secu­ri­ty in the US in the com­ing three deca­des is not rely­ing on anything that Euro­pe pro­du­ces. They’­ve beco­me net exporters.)

Why is the first thing that comes to mind “Fare well a**holes? And thanks for all the hell rai­sing in the past days!”?

Time for another hate post

08. Februar 2022

US vows to stop Nord Stream 2 if Rus­sia inva­des Ukraine

US Pre­si­dent Joe Biden has said the­re is no chan­ce of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipe­line pro­ject going should Rus­sia mount an offen­si­ve. Chan­cellor Olaf Scholz, on his first White House visit in office, was more guarded.

src: click

DW.com mana­ged to mis­re­pre­sent ger­ma­nys posi­ti­on (several repor­ters and ankers on record say­ing that “now the poten­ti­al reac­tion from the west and EU coun­tries has beco­me more clear, and uni­fied” in the past days, while none of that was true.). They’­ve mana­ged to miss, that the­re was a dif­fe­rence in posi­ti­ons for the past week. They’­ve mana­ged to miss, that the US announ­ced a “com­mon posi­ti­on of the US and the EU” on this uni­la­te­ral­ly, ther­eby sud­den­ly con­tra­dic­ting the ger­man governments public posi­ti­on. They’­ve mana­ged to miss, that that was seen as an outra­ge by peop­le fol­lowing poli­ti­cal repor­ting on the issue clo­se­ly. They’­ve mana­ged to miss the BBC rebut­tal, that indi­ca­ted, that this wasnt a pre­me­de­ta­ted move by the US, but only a “mista­ke”, after the US spo­ke to some nort­hern euro­pean coun­tries, then announ­cing a com­mon posi­ti­on that never was one. They mana­ged to miss the aggres­si­ve natu­re in the US announ­cing that state­ment in todays announ­ce­ment, again. (Second time in a row isnt a mista­ke any­mo­re.) They’­ve mana­ged to miss asking for fur­ther cla­ri­fi­ca­ti­on on part of the ger­man government, becau­se the posi­ti­on “its part of a wide ran­ge of meas­su­res” doesnt necessa­ri­ly mean, we sta­te, that we’ll stop it out­right, if the­re is any kind of con­flict in the com­ing days. Not becau­se thats an important dis­tinc­tion in its­elf necessa­ri­ly, but becau­se it lea­ves room for diplo­ma­cy after the fact, without pro­noun­cing it a red line - like the US just did, again. Without caring for the euro­pean posi­ti­on in the least (as far as I under­stand fran­ce isnt in line with the US announ­ce­ment eit­her, but some of the foun­ding NATO mem­bers wit­hin the EU are). With ques­tion­ab­le juris­dic­tion in the mat­ter. They’­ve mana­ged to pro­long this effing sta­te of “who the f*ck makes euro­pean secu­ri­ty and ener­gy poli­cy decisi­ons” for over a f*cking week, not do any repor­ting on it and now pre­sent ano­t­her pres­su­re play from the US in a “man­ner of fact” way.

What the f*ck?

Past deve­lo­p­ments lay­ed out, with pri­ma­ry sources lin­ked, in here:
click

edit: DW now (a few hours later) is doub­ling down, ins­tead of admit­ting their mistake:

The Ger­man chan­cellor came to the White House empty-handed. His hol­low reas­suran­ces about Germany’s com­mit­ment to Ukrai­ne will have done litt­le to con­vin­ce his cri­tics in Washing­ton, says DW’s Michae­la Küfner.

src: click

Cal­ling it a mis­sed oppor­tu­ni­ty, still having no idea that they were wrong in repor­ting this all the way. Still showing no signs of cor­rec­ting them­sel­ves, or admit­ting any of it. If you go with the most haw­kish trans-atlantic think tank stance, its your best opti­on in todays jour­na­lism land­s­cape, by pro­xy, it seems. At least for DW.com

Its time for ano­t­her over­view on how trans­at­lan­tic PR works in this case.

1. US teasing, that in case of an attack the North Stream 2 Pipe­line would never beco­me acti­ve, in an NPR Podcast.
DWs repor­ting: Rather mat­ter of fact.

2. US, one day later, uni­la­te­ral­ly announ­cing, that the­re is a joint euro­pean posi­ti­on on that Nord Stream 2 would never beco­me acti­ve, if any form of inva­si­on would take place. Con­tra­dic­ting the ger­man governments posi­ti­on on the issue, at the time - in a public announ­ce­ment. Thats after Biden had to be cor­rec­ted tal­king about a dif­fe­rence bet­ween a smal­ler and a lar­ge form inva­si­on ear­lier. Becau­se appar­ent­ly that dif­fe­rence didnt exist from the US’ point of view. (Even though Biden publicly announ­ced it did.) Thats two pret­ty lar­ge sca­le scan­dals in a row - that none of the pun­dits in any of the wes­tern media out­lets had anything to say about.

DWs repor­ting: “Final­ly a uni­fied stra­te­gy, and a clear posi­ti­on, we are now see­ing con­se­quen­ces emerge”.

3. A day later Ger­ma­ny still not chan­ging their posi­ti­on (Nord Stream 2 will be part of a ran­ge of actions, if an inva­si­on takes place.)

DWs repor­ting: “Still a uni­fied stra­te­gy and a clear mes­sa­ge, that if the­re is an inva­si­on North Stream 2 will never beco­me active.”

4. BBC pro­du­ces a report in which it announ­ces, that the­re still is seve­re uncer­tain­ty over how euro­pe would pro­ceed in detail in case of an inva­si­on, regar­ding what would hap­pen to Nord­stream 2, and only on that stance - men­tio­ning, that the cau­se was the US tal­king to “one nort­hern euro­pean alley” and then having announ­ced a uni­fied Euro­pean and US position.

DWs repor­ting: None existent.

5. The US repea­ting the pri­or made state­ment - with US jour­na­lists ques­tio­ning the spea­ker, on what basis tho­se remarks were made, and why the US had the presump­ti­on that this would be the uni­fied stance. Jour­na­lists are shut down, and not given an answer.

DWs repor­ting: None existent.

6. By now the ger­man talk­show cir­cuit (Anne Will, …) is fil­led with coa­ched pun­dits, that cant talk free­ly on issu­es in the Ukrai­ne, but have very pro­mi­nent tal­king points, that ger­ma­ny is not pul­ling its weight, brin­ging in the gam­bit of the 5000 hel­mets deli­ve­r­ed to the Ukrai­ne only - which Klitsch­ko was on a press cir­cuit for - but which if loo­ked at clo­se­ly was ful­fil­ling a demand for sup­plies the Ukrai­ne had made pri­or, and then tur­ned around into ridi­cu­le to incre­a­se public pres­su­re on the ger­man government, pri­or to the US visit. Ukrai­ne offi­cials later back­tra­cked, and went the poten­ti­al denia­bi­li­ty rou­te of “the num­ber (5000) had been the issue”, and too small, alt­hough they didnt spe­ci­fy a num­ber befo­re, just that they nee­ded helmets.

DWs repor­ting: Ger­ma­ny is being cri­ti­cis­ed by its allies for not pul­ling its weight.

7. Scholz announ­ces his tal­king points for the mee­ting with Biden pri­or to the flight.

DWs repor­ting: By then having swit­ched onto the “Ger­ma­ny is being cri­ti­zi­ced for being too inac­ti­ve, and not pro­vi­ding wea­pon ship­ments” beat, with think tank experts fea­tured cri­ti­ci­zing ger­ma­ny for “being unclear in their stance towards their allies” - which never was the case, becau­se the gam­bit used to announ­ce that was now a com­bi­na­ti­on of “Ger­ma­ny doesnt want NS2 to be used as a red line in threa­tening rus­sia” and ger­ma­ny not deli­vering wea­pon­ry into con­flict are­as. Both of which were long stan­ding posi­ti­ons, for weeks, at that point.

8. Scholz still using a dif­fe­rent wor­d­ing after the mee­ting under­li­ning that ger­ma­nys posi­ti­on hadnt chan­ged. While Biden tri­es to strong arm the red line posi­ti­on once more, by announ­cing, that the US - and not its part­ners, would pre­vent NS2 from beco­m­ing acti­ve in case of an invasion.

DWs repor­ting: NEWSFLASH! Ger­ma­ny is using dif­fe­rent wording!

9. DW repor­ting that the mee­ting had been a flop, becau­se ger­ma­ny went to the US without making any fur­ther con­ces­si­ons coi­ning it as “At every step of the way, Scholz has avoided addres­sing the issue direct­ly. Ins­tead, he sounds like a bro­ken record chur­ning out the same non-committal state­ments the public has beco­me accus­to­med to after his first 62 days in office.”. Not men­tio­ning the 5000 hel­mets stand in for the cri­ti­cism in the least, becau­se that only was used as a pres­su­re point pri­or to the talks, and now has beco­me ent­i­re­ly - useless it seems. As ger­ma­ny hasnt chan­ged posi­ti­on. So… Not an issue any­mo­re, right? Lets just drop repor­ting, without men­tio­ning, that that was a gam­bit employ­ed by the Ukrai­ne, reac­ting outra­ged at the ful­fill­ment of an actu­al request made. (You can see that exchan­ge here: click)

DW never admit­ting the mista­ke on their part. Never loo­king at it from the euro­pean per­spec­ti­ve, never ack­now­led­ging, that the US tried to pull a fast one here, … Plain­ly repea­ting the nar­ra­ti­ve, that Scholz had fai­led in his mis­si­on of out­lining ger­ma­nys posi­ti­on. (Which by then had beco­me a fail­u­re to mer­ge posi­ti­ons, with the US announ­ce­ment.). Which at the time it was made, was ent­i­re­ly made up. Just as made up, as the “uni­fied US and euro­pean posi­ti­on” on making NS2 a red line, which they repor­ted for two days, without cor­rec­ting it - and still haven’t cor­rec­ted up until now.

Also - as DW is ent­i­re­ly rely­ing in their inter­pre­ta­ti­on on think tanks like the Ger­man Coun­cil on For­eign rela­ti­ons (thats pos­si­ble?), may be it would be inte­res­ting to hear their posi­ti­on on future deve­lo­p­ments in the matter.

Which is a not so rea­son­ab­le - Ever­ything short of a war is “very dif­fi­cult to imagine”.

See:

Lets see on that point, how accu­ra­te they turn out to be in the com­ing weeks. Just know that one thing will remain cer­tain. DW will ask them for their assess­ment in a dai­ly seg­ment in the future as well - and then model their edi­to­ri­al posi­ti­on some­whe­re around the state­ments given.

edit: Just so you know what to think and feel, when tal­king about this sto­ry, the aus­tri­an Die Pres­se also is very hel­pful in instil­ling that in you.
Olaf Schol­zes press appearan­ce was “bizar­re”, becau­se he didnt ful­fill haw­kish trans­at­lan­tic think­tank expec­ta­ti­ons. See: click Its so hel­pful to always get told what to think and feel, without get­ting the back­ground on a story.

The new normalcy

06. Februar 2022


Attract images in the you­tube pre­roll (what you’d see when you mou­se over this video on you­tube) for news clips, with three year olds with card­board wea­pons in their hands sound­ing *piew* *piew* *piew* - which is out­right heroic, becau­se its the clip for “US tro­ops arri­ve in Poland to deter & defend”.

Inter­views with the peop­le on the streets con­tai­ning the fol­lowing sen­ti­ment: “Ukrai­ne has been in a sta­te of war sin­ce 2014, some of my friends have not retur­ned from the front, and I’m con­stant­ly thin­king about it, it tou­ches every fami­ly - we are not just pre­pa­ring for an attack, its hap­pe­ning alrea­dy. We are not pre­pa­ring for anything, this - is sim­ply our life.”

Ah, the healt­hy wes­tern pro­pa­gan­da. Child with card­board auto­ma­tic wea­pon and red wool bea­nie, and psy­cho­lo­gi­cal­ly ins­ta­ble young women con­fla­ting the death of her friends with pur­po­se - even more so, with it being a necessa­ry part of their dai­ly lives, that will pro­long into the future. For the nati­on, for future genera­ti­ons, for the non resol­ved part of the trau­ma that is showing…

Ah… That is good TV. What won­der­ful sen­ti­ments. “For free­dom” is so abs­tract com­pa­red to that, whe­res the human ang­le on that…

The demons­tra­ti­on to stop rus­si­an aggres­si­on then is brought to you as the third ele­ment of this very infor­ma­ti­ve clip. Was­n’t “on mes­sa­ge” enough, I pre­su­me… At least they show­ed clips of peop­le sin­ging the Ukrai­ne anthem with their fist on their heart, thats at least pathos!

Lets go to our cor­re­spon­dent next, ask them some ques­ti­on about how the EU sees this, that no one is asking. But that for some rea­son also is their thumb­nail title.

No need to con­tex­tua­li­ze what we just showed.

edit: Just for com­pa­ri­sons sake, this is the attract roll CBS put tog­e­ther. Same news story.

edit2: I’ll also drop this here (Addi­tio­nal infor­ma­ti­on (on what dri­ves public sentiments)).