Autorenarchiv

Reinventing Czechias, Lituhanias and Slovakias Democratic Image

17. Februar 2022

By GLOBSEC Poli­cy Insti­tu­te, AMO, Free­dom House Lit­hua­nia, and the GMFUS.

Good to know that not only Chi­na is buy­ing influ­ence by cour­ting smal­ler coun­tries wit­hin the EU (*wave bund­le of cash emo­ji*) for poli­ti­cal moti­ves. Just throw in the word demo­cra­cy about 200 times and you should be fine.

Keep Germany down

17. Februar 2022

Sh*t, a for­mer US ambassa­dor is not on message.

Bet­ter not report any of it in the main­stream of wes­tern media. Bet­ter not ask him to com­ment. Bet­ter make up tal­king points (to be used in polit talk­shows), that the issue star­ted in the ear­ly nine­ties. Bet­ter finan­ce think­tanks and ent­i­re insti­tu­tes ful­ly. Bet­ter push for state­ments of non ger­man poli­ti­ci­ans about ger­ma­nys poli­tics, and take over the media cir­cuit to make the inqui­ry “if ger­ma­ny is not in line with US announ­ce­ments” an accu­sa­ti­on and the most pres­sing issue over the past week.

Bet­ter go with wes­tern propaganda.

Mat­lock has taught diplo­ma­cy at Duke Uni­ver­si­ty, Prince­ton Uni­ver­si­ty, Colum­bia Uni­ver­si­ty and Hamil­ton Col­le­ge. In a 1997 inter­view, Mat­lock offers some advice to pro­spec­ti­ve diplo­mats: have an opti­mistic natu­re, get a libe­ral edu­ca­ti­on, do not expect to chan­ge the world, know the coun­try, know your own coun­try, faith­ful­ly repre­sent your government, find the mutu­al inte­rests, and remem­ber that timing is ever­ything.[13]

[…]

Sin­ce lea­ving government ser­vice, Mat­lock has occa­sio­nal­ly joi­ned with other experts to cri­ti­ci­ze U.S. for­eign poli­cy. On June 26, 1997, he signed an Open Let­ter to Pre­si­dent Bill Clin­ton cri­ti­ci­zing plans for NATO expan­si­on.[60] His rea­son for oppo­si­ti­on, as given in tes­ti­mo­ny befo­re the Sena­te For­eign Rela­ti­ons Com­mit­tee, was his belief that NATO expan­si­on would pre­clu­de signi­fi­cant nuclear arms reduc­tion with Rus­sia, and con­se­quent­ly incre­a­se the risk of a nuclear attack by ter­ro­rists.[61]

Mat­lock drew the ire of many Repu­bli­cans during the 2004 pre­si­den­ti­al elec­tion cam­pai­gn when he signed the Offi­cial State­ment of Diplo­mats and Mili­ta­ry Com­man­ders for Chan­ge, which cri­ti­ci­zed the poli­ci­es of Pre­si­dent Geor­ge W. Bush and endor­sed Sena­tor John Ker­ry for pre­si­dent.[62]

On Jan 4, 2007, Mat­lock joi­ned with Geor­ge Shultz, Wil­liam Per­ry, Hen­ry Kis­sin­ger and Sam Nunn to advo­ca­te a goal of a world free of nuclear wea­pons.[63] On 23 Sep­tem­ber 2008 after a two-day con­fe­rence at the Car­ne­gie Endow­ment for Inter­na­tio­nal Peace, he joi­ned several other for­mer ambassa­dors to issue a joint state­ment on how Rus­sia and the United Sta­tes might move for­ward in their rela­ti­ons.[64] He has endor­sed the Glo­bal Zero Initia­ti­ve, a plan to eli­mi­na­te all nuclear wea­pons by 2030.[65] Mat­lock has also signed an open let­ter of May 13, 2011 asking the imple­men­tors of the New START trea­ty bet­ween the U.S. Rus­sia to make public the loca­ti­ons and aggre­ga­te num­bers of nuclear wea­pons, in order to pro­mo­te trans­pa­ren­cy and redu­ce mistrust.[66][67]

On Jan 18, 2011 he co-signed an open let­ter to Pre­si­dent Oba­ma urging a United Nati­ons reso­lu­ti­on con­dem­ning Israe­li sett­le­ments in the occu­p­ied ter­ri­to­ry.[68]

Mat­lock has been open­ly cri­ti­cal of the Ame­ri­can mass media’s coverage of the Ukrai­ne cri­sis. On Jan 26, 2022 he publis­hed an review of Richard Sakwa’s arti­cle “Whis­per it, but Putin has a point in Ukrai­ne” on his per­so­nal blog, sta­ting agree­ment that Rus­sia desi­res a neu­tral Ukrai­ne and pushing back against claims that Rus­sia seeks to annex Ukrai­ne.[69] On Feb 15, 2022, he publis­hed an op-ed in Antiwar.com, ques­tio­ning the vali­di­ty of the media nar­ra­ti­ve around the cur­rent sta­te of Russia–Ukraine rela­ti­ons, sta­ting “May­be I am wrong – tra­gi­cal­ly wrong – but I can­not dis­miss the sus­pi­ci­on that we are wit­nessing an ela­bo­ra­te cha­ra­de, gross­ly magni­fied by pro­mi­nent ele­ments of the Ame­ri­can media, to ser­ve a domestic poli­ti­cal end.”[70]

src: click

Nord Stream 2 will not become operational if Russia attacks Ukraine

15. Februar 2022

Josep Bor­rell says it’s ‘qui­te rea­son­ab­le and qui­te clear’ that con­tro­ver­si­al pipe­line would be stop­ped in event of a Rus­si­an invasion.

[…]

Spea­king on BBC Radio 4’s Today pro­gram about poten­ti­al sanc­tions on Rus­sia, Bor­rell said it was “qui­te rea­son­ab­le and qui­te clear” that Nord Stream 2 “will not” be allo­wed to ope­ra­te in the event of a Rus­si­an strike.

src: click

Without words.

Oh lord, let me be your servant, lord…!

15. Februar 2022

Über­schrift bezieht sich auf den sel­ben Komi­ker, der unten die Rüs­tungs­stra­te­gie der US auch für den Lai­en begreif­bar macht - und soll in etwa aus­drü­cken - die US sind so von ihren lei­der nicht wähl­ba­ren Eli­ten indok­tri­niert und in Sach­zwän­gen gebun­den, dass sie ger­ne für die Mobi­li­sie­rung ihrer Wäh­ler­schich­ten im mitt­le­ren Wes­ten einen dege­ne­rier­ten ultra­kon­ser­va­ti­ven Got­tes­pre­di­ger an die Staats­spit­ze wäh­len, der im Ide­al­fall glaubt Got­tes Werk zu voll­enden. Weil dann hat er genug Demut und schaut auch auf die Leu­te - oder irgend ein Bullsh*t den nie­mand beim zwei­ten Hin­se­hen auch nur annä­hernd glaubt, aber der die emo­tio­na­le Ent­schei­dungs­fin­dung der Wäh­ler highjackt.

Das war vor 30 Jah­ren. So alt war der Sager des Komi­kers. Heu­te ist das alles noch ein wenig degenerierter…

Was war noch­mal Bidens Ticket ins Oval Office? Jahr­zehn­te­lan­ge pro­ze­du­ra­le Erfah­rung in Poli­tik und Ver­wal­tung, sowie Sach­kom­pe­tenz, oder?

Für NBC reichts.

Oh bit­te und auch inhalt­lich dran­blei­ben. “The­re was no way, we would ever going to unite Afgha­ni­stan, no way that was gon­na hap­pen.” Oh REALLY? Geschichts­stun­de? Kurz­zu­sam­men­fas­sung der Pres­se­mit­tei­lun­gen des Außen­am­tes seit 2001? Größ­ter Feh­ler im Wie­der­auf­bau­pro­zess des Iraks? Aber wenns der Gott­kai­ser voll der Gna­den, dem Idio­ten von NBC in nem per­sön­li­chen Inter­view ver­zählt wie alter­na­tiv­los das war, dann muss das wohl schon immer die Wahr­heit gewe­sen sein. Bloß nicht die Posi­ti­on bei Kriegs­be­ginn nachschlagen.

Das war der Moment in dem die Posi­ti­on geän­dert wurde -

und das hier war die Posi­ti­on zu Kriegs­be­ginn (im zwei­ten Absatz ange­ris­sen).

Für NBC reichts.

Our transatlantic friends are spitballing

08. Februar 2022

… future sce­n­a­ri­os of Nato deve­lo­p­ment in Euro­pe - report released today. Rough­cut, how to get Euro­pe more res­il­li­ant under war/proxy war conditions.

With it also being para­mount that Nato will grow and chan­ge in the com­ing years. With Euro­pe poten­ti­al­ly being under war.

Fun.

And so sen­si­ti­ve in regards to the situa­ti­on cur­r­ent­ly evolving.

edit:

Now on Ukrai­ne, whe­re the rules based order is under direct ass­ault, we sug­gest a more proac­ti­ve, stra­te­gy dri­ven approach to NATO part­ners­hips, inclu­ding the Ukrai­ne deter­rence initia­ti­ve. That would make it a stra­te­gic prio­ri­ty for the alli­an­ce, to do ever­ything pos­si­ble, short of an arti­cle five gua­ran­tee, to help Ukrai­ne and other part­ners, that are threa­tened by Mos­kow, to defend them­sel­ves and deter aggres­si­on. This Ukrai­ne deter­rence initia­ti­ve could be an exten­si­on of the enhan­ced oppor­tu­nities part­ners pro­gram, at a time when NATO mem­bers­hip of the Ukrai­ne is real­ly not on the agenda.”

Ah, a NATO build-up without a NATO mem­bers­hip. Excellent.

As Juli­an out­lined in his over­view - we argue, that the new stra­te­gic con­cept must com­mit the alli­an­ce to a step chan­ge in the balan­ce of respon­si­bi­li­ty bet­ween the United Sta­tes and the euro­pean mem­bers of the alli­an­ce, to inclu­de Cana­da as well. This is no lon­ger just a mat­ter of over­co­m­ing long stan­ding dis­pu­tes over bur­den sharing in defen­se spen­ding, bet­ween the United Sta­tes and Euro­pe - its now a stra­te­gic neces­si­ty, becau­se the rise of chi­na as a stra­te­gic com­pe­ti­tor crea­tes US need to shift its stra­te­gic focus to the indo­pa­ci­fic regi­on. And under the­se cir­cum­s­tan­ces, Nato can no lon­ger afford it exces­si­ve reli­an­ce on the United sta­tes, eit­her for collec­ti­ve defen­se, or for cri­sis manage­ment and coope­ra­ti­ve secu­ri­ty mis­si­ons bey­ond euro­pes bor­ders. Clear­ly - in an arti­cle five con­tin­gen­cy bet­ween rus­sia in the bal­tic or black sea regi­ons, the United Sta­tes may not always be able to deploy ade­qua­te rein­for­ce­ments to Euro­pe, becau­se of com­pe­ting deman­ds on its for­ces in the indo-pacific. So euro­pean allies will need to be able to pick up most of the slack. Now simi­lar­ly resour­ce cons­traints and shif­ting prio­ri­ties may also lead the US to limit its invol­ve­ment in the midd­le east, afri­ca, and south asia. Or at least to be more selec­ti­ve in when and whe­re it enga­ges. That means, that the United Sta­tes will incre­a­singly look to the euro­pean allies and the euro­pean uni­on to shoul­der more of the bur­den for cri­sis manage­ment and part­ner capa­ci­ty buil­ding in their own neighborhood.”

Same stance - as announ­ced by Peter Zei­han and men­tio­ned in this blog, one year ago.

This is some­what important, as the (trans­at­lan­tic) think­tank cir­cuit is cur­r­ent­ly try­ing to estab­lish that Putin (hims­elf pro­bab­ly) is try­ing to dri­ve a wedge into the US/European coali­ti­on, while in rea­li­ty the stra­te­gic focus of the US has shifted to the indo-pacific and will do more so in the future regard­less of what hap­pens in the­se parts of the world. An expan­sio­nist Chi­na is too much of a stra­te­gic thre­at to the US - while Euro­pe doesnt hold the same value any­mo­re (not mili­ta­ri­ly, not regar­ding ener­gy secu­ri­ty, not in terms of tra­de (US deve­lo­ping Mexi­co and India to be con­su­mer eco­no­mies), not in terms of inno­va­ti­on eit­her (has more to do with the fact that ener­gy secu­ri­ty in the US in the com­ing three deca­des is not rely­ing on anything that Euro­pe pro­du­ces. They’­ve beco­me net exporters.)

Why is the first thing that comes to mind “Fare well a**holes? And thanks for all the hell rai­sing in the past days!”?

Time for another hate post

08. Februar 2022

US vows to stop Nord Stream 2 if Rus­sia inva­des Ukraine

US Pre­si­dent Joe Biden has said the­re is no chan­ce of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipe­line pro­ject going should Rus­sia mount an offen­si­ve. Chan­cellor Olaf Scholz, on his first White House visit in office, was more guarded.

src: click

DW.com mana­ged to mis­re­pre­sent ger­ma­nys posi­ti­on (several repor­ters and ankers on record say­ing that “now the poten­ti­al reac­tion from the west and EU coun­tries has beco­me more clear, and uni­fied” in the past days, while none of that was true.). They’­ve mana­ged to miss, that the­re was a dif­fe­rence in posi­ti­ons for the past week. They’­ve mana­ged to miss, that the US announ­ced a “com­mon posi­ti­on of the US and the EU” on this uni­la­te­ral­ly, ther­eby sud­den­ly con­tra­dic­ting the ger­man governments public posi­ti­on. They’­ve mana­ged to miss, that that was seen as an outra­ge by peop­le fol­lowing poli­ti­cal repor­ting on the issue clo­se­ly. They’­ve mana­ged to miss the BBC rebut­tal, that indi­ca­ted, that this wasnt a pre­me­de­ta­ted move by the US, but only a “mista­ke”, after the US spo­ke to some nort­hern euro­pean coun­tries, then announ­cing a com­mon posi­ti­on that never was one. They mana­ged to miss the aggres­si­ve natu­re in the US announ­cing that state­ment in todays announ­ce­ment, again. (Second time in a row isnt a mista­ke any­mo­re.) They’­ve mana­ged to miss asking for fur­ther cla­ri­fi­ca­ti­on on part of the ger­man government, becau­se the posi­ti­on “its part of a wide ran­ge of meas­su­res” doesnt necessa­ri­ly mean, we sta­te, that we’ll stop it out­right, if the­re is any kind of con­flict in the com­ing days. Not becau­se thats an important dis­tinc­tion in its­elf necessa­ri­ly, but becau­se it lea­ves room for diplo­ma­cy after the fact, without pro­noun­cing it a red line - like the US just did, again. Without caring for the euro­pean posi­ti­on in the least (as far as I under­stand fran­ce isnt in line with the US announ­ce­ment eit­her, but some of the foun­ding NATO mem­bers wit­hin the EU are). With ques­tion­ab­le juris­dic­tion in the mat­ter. They’­ve mana­ged to pro­long this effing sta­te of “who the f*ck makes euro­pean secu­ri­ty and ener­gy poli­cy decisi­ons” for over a f*cking week, not do any repor­ting on it and now pre­sent ano­t­her pres­su­re play from the US in a “man­ner of fact” way.

What the f*ck?

Past deve­lo­p­ments lay­ed out, with pri­ma­ry sources lin­ked, in here:
click

edit: DW now (a few hours later) is doub­ling down, ins­tead of admit­ting their mistake:

The Ger­man chan­cellor came to the White House empty-handed. His hol­low reas­suran­ces about Germany’s com­mit­ment to Ukrai­ne will have done litt­le to con­vin­ce his cri­tics in Washing­ton, says DW’s Michae­la Küfner.

src: click

Cal­ling it a mis­sed oppor­tu­ni­ty, still having no idea that they were wrong in repor­ting this all the way. Still showing no signs of cor­rec­ting them­sel­ves, or admit­ting any of it. If you go with the most haw­kish trans-atlantic think tank stance, its your best opti­on in todays jour­na­lism land­s­cape, by pro­xy, it seems. At least for DW.com

Its time for ano­t­her over­view on how trans­at­lan­tic PR works in this case.

1. US teasing, that in case of an attack the North Stream 2 Pipe­line would never beco­me acti­ve, in an NPR Podcast.
DWs repor­ting: Rather mat­ter of fact.

2. US, one day later, uni­la­te­ral­ly announ­cing, that the­re is a joint euro­pean posi­ti­on on that Nord Stream 2 would never beco­me acti­ve, if any form of inva­si­on would take place. Con­tra­dic­ting the ger­man governments posi­ti­on on the issue, at the time - in a public announ­ce­ment. Thats after Biden had to be cor­rec­ted tal­king about a dif­fe­rence bet­ween a smal­ler and a lar­ge form inva­si­on ear­lier. Becau­se appar­ent­ly that dif­fe­rence didnt exist from the US’ point of view. (Even though Biden publicly announ­ced it did.) Thats two pret­ty lar­ge sca­le scan­dals in a row - that none of the pun­dits in any of the wes­tern media out­lets had anything to say about.

DWs repor­ting: “Final­ly a uni­fied stra­te­gy, and a clear posi­ti­on, we are now see­ing con­se­quen­ces emerge”.

3. A day later Ger­ma­ny still not chan­ging their posi­ti­on (Nord Stream 2 will be part of a ran­ge of actions, if an inva­si­on takes place.)

DWs repor­ting: “Still a uni­fied stra­te­gy and a clear mes­sa­ge, that if the­re is an inva­si­on North Stream 2 will never beco­me active.”

4. BBC pro­du­ces a report in which it announ­ces, that the­re still is seve­re uncer­tain­ty over how euro­pe would pro­ceed in detail in case of an inva­si­on, regar­ding what would hap­pen to Nord­stream 2, and only on that stance - men­tio­ning, that the cau­se was the US tal­king to “one nort­hern euro­pean alley” and then having announ­ced a uni­fied Euro­pean and US position.

DWs repor­ting: None existent.

5. The US repea­ting the pri­or made state­ment - with US jour­na­lists ques­tio­ning the spea­ker, on what basis tho­se remarks were made, and why the US had the presump­ti­on that this would be the uni­fied stance. Jour­na­lists are shut down, and not given an answer.

DWs repor­ting: None existent.

6. By now the ger­man talk­show cir­cuit (Anne Will, …) is fil­led with coa­ched pun­dits, that cant talk free­ly on issu­es in the Ukrai­ne, but have very pro­mi­nent tal­king points, that ger­ma­ny is not pul­ling its weight, brin­ging in the gam­bit of the 5000 hel­mets deli­ve­r­ed to the Ukrai­ne only - which Klitsch­ko was on a press cir­cuit for - but which if loo­ked at clo­se­ly was ful­fil­ling a demand for sup­plies the Ukrai­ne had made pri­or, and then tur­ned around into ridi­cu­le to incre­a­se public pres­su­re on the ger­man government, pri­or to the US visit. Ukrai­ne offi­cials later back­tra­cked, and went the poten­ti­al denia­bi­li­ty rou­te of “the num­ber (5000) had been the issue”, and too small, alt­hough they didnt spe­ci­fy a num­ber befo­re, just that they nee­ded helmets.

DWs repor­ting: Ger­ma­ny is being cri­ti­cis­ed by its allies for not pul­ling its weight.

7. Scholz announ­ces his tal­king points for the mee­ting with Biden pri­or to the flight.

DWs repor­ting: By then having swit­ched onto the “Ger­ma­ny is being cri­ti­zi­ced for being too inac­ti­ve, and not pro­vi­ding wea­pon ship­ments” beat, with think tank experts fea­tured cri­ti­ci­zing ger­ma­ny for “being unclear in their stance towards their allies” - which never was the case, becau­se the gam­bit used to announ­ce that was now a com­bi­na­ti­on of “Ger­ma­ny doesnt want NS2 to be used as a red line in threa­tening rus­sia” and ger­ma­ny not deli­vering wea­pon­ry into con­flict are­as. Both of which were long stan­ding posi­ti­ons, for weeks, at that point.

8. Scholz still using a dif­fe­rent wor­d­ing after the mee­ting under­li­ning that ger­ma­nys posi­ti­on hadnt chan­ged. While Biden tri­es to strong arm the red line posi­ti­on once more, by announ­cing, that the US - and not its part­ners, would pre­vent NS2 from beco­m­ing acti­ve in case of an invasion.

DWs repor­ting: NEWSFLASH! Ger­ma­ny is using dif­fe­rent wording!

9. DW repor­ting that the mee­ting had been a flop, becau­se ger­ma­ny went to the US without making any fur­ther con­ces­si­ons coi­ning it as “At every step of the way, Scholz has avoided addres­sing the issue direct­ly. Ins­tead, he sounds like a bro­ken record chur­ning out the same non-committal state­ments the public has beco­me accus­to­med to after his first 62 days in office.”. Not men­tio­ning the 5000 hel­mets stand in for the cri­ti­cism in the least, becau­se that only was used as a pres­su­re point pri­or to the talks, and now has beco­me ent­i­re­ly - useless it seems. As ger­ma­ny hasnt chan­ged posi­ti­on. So… Not an issue any­mo­re, right? Lets just drop repor­ting, without men­tio­ning, that that was a gam­bit employ­ed by the Ukrai­ne, reac­ting outra­ged at the ful­fill­ment of an actu­al request made. (You can see that exchan­ge here: click)

DW never admit­ting the mista­ke on their part. Never loo­king at it from the euro­pean per­spec­ti­ve, never ack­now­led­ging, that the US tried to pull a fast one here, … Plain­ly repea­ting the nar­ra­ti­ve, that Scholz had fai­led in his mis­si­on of out­lining ger­ma­nys posi­ti­on. (Which by then had beco­me a fail­u­re to mer­ge posi­ti­ons, with the US announ­ce­ment.). Which at the time it was made, was ent­i­re­ly made up. Just as made up, as the “uni­fied US and euro­pean posi­ti­on” on making NS2 a red line, which they repor­ted for two days, without cor­rec­ting it - and still haven’t cor­rec­ted up until now.

Also - as DW is ent­i­re­ly rely­ing in their inter­pre­ta­ti­on on think tanks like the Ger­man Coun­cil on For­eign rela­ti­ons (thats pos­si­ble?), may be it would be inte­res­ting to hear their posi­ti­on on future deve­lo­p­ments in the matter.

Which is a not so rea­son­ab­le - Ever­ything short of a war is “very dif­fi­cult to imagine”.

See:

Lets see on that point, how accu­ra­te they turn out to be in the com­ing weeks. Just know that one thing will remain cer­tain. DW will ask them for their assess­ment in a dai­ly seg­ment in the future as well - and then model their edi­to­ri­al posi­ti­on some­whe­re around the state­ments given.

edit: Just so you know what to think and feel, when tal­king about this sto­ry, the aus­tri­an Die Pres­se also is very hel­pful in instil­ling that in you.
Olaf Schol­zes press appearan­ce was “bizar­re”, becau­se he didnt ful­fill haw­kish trans­at­lan­tic think­tank expec­ta­ti­ons. See: click Its so hel­pful to always get told what to think and feel, without get­ting the back­ground on a story.

The new normalcy

06. Februar 2022


Attract images in the you­tube pre­roll (what you’d see when you mou­se over this video on you­tube) for news clips, with three year olds with card­board wea­pons in their hands sound­ing *piew* *piew* *piew* - which is out­right heroic, becau­se its the clip for “US tro­ops arri­ve in Poland to deter & defend”.

Inter­views with the peop­le on the streets con­tai­ning the fol­lowing sen­ti­ment: “Ukrai­ne has been in a sta­te of war sin­ce 2014, some of my friends have not retur­ned from the front, and I’m con­stant­ly thin­king about it, it tou­ches every fami­ly - we are not just pre­pa­ring for an attack, its hap­pe­ning alrea­dy. We are not pre­pa­ring for anything, this - is sim­ply our life.”

Ah, the healt­hy wes­tern pro­pa­gan­da. Child with card­board auto­ma­tic wea­pon and red wool bea­nie, and psy­cho­lo­gi­cal­ly ins­ta­ble young women con­fla­ting the death of her friends with pur­po­se - even more so, with it being a necessa­ry part of their dai­ly lives, that will pro­long into the future. For the nati­on, for future genera­ti­ons, for the non resol­ved part of the trau­ma that is showing…

Ah… That is good TV. What won­der­ful sen­ti­ments. “For free­dom” is so abs­tract com­pa­red to that, whe­res the human ang­le on that…

The demons­tra­ti­on to stop rus­si­an aggres­si­on then is brought to you as the third ele­ment of this very infor­ma­ti­ve clip. Was­n’t “on mes­sa­ge” enough, I pre­su­me… At least they show­ed clips of peop­le sin­ging the Ukrai­ne anthem with their fist on their heart, thats at least pathos!

Lets go to our cor­re­spon­dent next, ask them some ques­ti­on about how the EU sees this, that no one is asking. But that for some rea­son also is their thumb­nail title.

No need to con­tex­tua­li­ze what we just showed.

edit: Just for com­pa­ri­sons sake, this is the attract roll CBS put tog­e­ther. Same news story.

edit2: I’ll also drop this here (Addi­tio­nal infor­ma­ti­on (on what dri­ves public sentiments)).

First absolute hate post in a while…

06. Februar 2022

Arti­cle: Why the EU needs Rus­si­an ener­gy giant Gazprom

Ang­le:

Gaz­prom uses its mar­ket power by influ­en­cing pri­ces through the amount of gas that it sup­plies to Euro­pe,” ener­gy expert Georg Zach­mann from the Brussels-based Brue­gel think tank told DW.”

Rea­so­ning:

The­re is a kind of com­pe­ti­ti­on bet­ween the Euro­pean regu­la­tors who are try­ing to crea­te a mar­ket with uni­fied pri­ces and Gaz­prom which is try­ing to impo­se dif­fe­rent pri­ces in dif­fe­rent coun­tries,” exp­lai­ned Zachmann.

While Gaz­prom insists that it has hono­red all its long-term sup­ply com­mit­ments, Zach­mann said that the com­pa­ny was actual­ly sup­ply­ing less gas to the mar­ket with short-term contracts. 

Zach­mann said that the short-term mar­ket had beco­me incre­a­singly important in recent years becau­se the­re was an attempt to beco­me less depen­dent on Gaz­prom in the long run.

So, that Gaz­prom and with it rus­sia doesnt want to rely on short term con­trac­ting, becau­se it encom­pas­ses an attempt to beco­me less depen­dant on Gaz­prom over­all is… wait for it…

Gaz­prom is ful­fil­ling its con­tracts, that is true, but only at the lowest level of its com­mit­ments,” Euro­pean Com­mis­si­on Pre­si­dent Ursu­la von der Ley­en poin­ted out recent­ly. She said that other sup­pliers had incre­a­sed their deli­ve­ries in view of the rapidly rising demand and record prices. 

Von der Ley­en added that Gaz­prom was beha­ving in a stran­ge way, con­si­de­ring that more gas was not being sup­plied des­pi­te high demand. She also told the Ger­man dai­ly Han­dels­blatt that the fact that the com­pa­ny belon­ged to the Rus­si­an sta­te rai­sed doubts as to its reliability.

STRANGE BEHAVIOR con­si­de­ring that not more gas was sup­plied, given the high demand.

But Gaz­prom is ful­fil­ling its con­tracts, thats true.

But this is all rai­sing doubts, becau­se rely­ing on the Rus­si­an sta­te rai­ses doubts on relia­bi­li­ty overall.

But Gaz­prom is ful­fil­ling contracts.

Yes, but we expec­ted more than just ful­fil­ling contracts.

While threa­tening sanc­tions at the same time.

edit: Short inter­lu­de, to dilu­te the hate in this pos­ting with a litt­le bit of comedy.

And then, when ger­man sup­pliers final­ly put in a big­ger order a few days ago, Gaz­prom reports, that capa­ci­ty on the Ukrai­ne pipe­line was boo­ked wit­hin a day, and deli­very star­ted wit­hin a day or two…

But its stran­ge beha­vi­or, that it was­n’t more, befo­re that happened.

Becau­se Gaz­prom was just ful­fil­ling their contracts.

Becau­se of this excel­lent effing logic, and cer­tain­ly not becau­se of any alte­rior moti­ves, UvdL announ­ced the fol­lowing in the same Inter­view with the “Han­dels­blatt”.

If Gaz­prom were to recei­ve inst­ruc­tions from the Krem­lin to stop sup­ply­ing gas to the EU, the­re could be signi­fi­cant shortages.

Von der Ley­en said that she did not belie­ve it would come to that. Sin­ce the Rus­si­an eco­no­my is so depen­dent on ener­gy exports, it would not make sen­se to jeo­par­di­ze its rela­ti­ons­hip with its big­gest cli­ent and investor.

But she told Han­dels­blatt that the EU and the US were working to incre­a­se sup­plies of lique­fied natu­ral gas from Qatar or the US. Nego­tia­ti­ons are to take place this com­ing Mon­day in Washing­ton DC

So becau­se we dont belie­ve, that Rus­sia would cau­se signi­fi­cant shor­ta­ges of gas sup­plies in Euro­pe out of their own voli­ti­on, basi­cal­ly becau­se of the ent­i­re eco­no­mic design of the ven­ture to begin with, the EU now has to work with the US to incre­a­se sup­plies of LNG from Qatar, or the US.

AM I GOING INSANE, OR IS IT THE WORLD AROUND ME?

edit: Bloom­berg arti­cle has more details:

Tra­ders are watching every move by Europe’s top sup­plier, focu­sing on how much gas is deli­ve­r­ed bey­ond con­trac­ted volu­mes. Auc­tions of pipe­line capa­ci­ty for Decem­ber run next Mon­day, which will cast a light on whe­ther extra ship­ments could mate­ria­li­ze. Addi­tio­nal boo­kings may be likely if Gaz­prom sees pro­gress in the cer­ti­fi­ca­ti­on of the con­ten­tious Nord Stream 2 pipe­line, ana­lysts have said.

News arti­cle was from Novem­ber 10th 2021. That was after Gaz­prom boo­ked pipe­line capa­ci­ty over Ukrai­ne to deli­ver accord­ing to con­tract obligations.

So lets sum­me­ri­ze. Becau­se Euro­pe moved away from long term pro­cu­re­ment deals, end­an­ge­ring ener­gy secu­ri­ty, while Ger­ma­ny set into action plans to exit from coal and nuclear ener­gy simul­ta­ne­ous­ly, and stop­ped North Stream 2, on the poli­ti­cal level, becau­se of U.S. inter­ven­ti­on at the licen­sing sta­ge, Gaz­prom stop­ped to sup­ply spot mar­kets with (by then more expen­si­ve) natu­ral gas - at “expec­ted volu­mes”, expec­ted, becau­se it was the inten­ded goal of the EU to decre­a­se ener­gy depen­den­cy on rus­sia, so they went into day tra­ding it in lar­ger volu­mes, and spot mar­kets ins­tead -- which now has cau­sed UvdL to anoun­ce, that this would have been “stran­ge beha­vi­or” of Gaz­prom - that they didnt just sup­ply the dayt­ra­ding sec­tor with the same amount as befo­re, and ther­eby causing ques­ti­ons over rus­si­an relia­bi­li­ty in the ener­gy pro­cu­re­ment sec­tor - while at the same time sta­ting, that the rus­si­an eco­no­my would fal­ter, if they ever did so (at any extent that would end­an­ger EU ener­gy secu­ri­ty), and that it wasnt very likely -- and becau­se of that, its now in the inte­rest of ener­gy sup­ply sta­bi­li­ty to diver­si­fy pro­cu­re­ment, and go with LNG from the US or Qatar (who knows, cer­tain­ly not UvdL), which needs an exten­si­on of the LNG infra­st­ruc­tu­re wit­hin the EU, which the EU is backing, but which is usual­ly pri­va­te­ly fun­ded (with invest­ment gua­ran­tees given out), and only just beca­me inte­res­ting for inves­tors in the sec­tor, becau­se of rising gas pri­ces. Oh and that on its own (diver­si­fi­ca­ti­on) will rai­se effec­ti­ve pro­cu­re­ment pri­ces. Also slowing down the sus­tainab­le ener­gy tran­si­ti­on - which still is the main pro­ject of the UvdL pre­si­den­cy, apparently.

No - checks out. Why should jour­na­lism report anything else. Or ask any questions.

Oh, and btw. the LNG indus­try has a new lea­ding expor­ting nati­on.

Oh, and the sin­gu­lar cau­se for hig­her US natu­ral gas pri­ces was “the arc­tic cold snap”, of course.

The­res good news in all this as well, of course -
Gold­man: Ukrai­ne Con­flict Could Dou­ble EU Natu­ral Gas Prices

WAIT THE UKRAINE CONFLICT? I THOUGHT IT WAS RUSSIAS UNRELIABILITY ON THE SPOTMARKETS! (Becau­se if it wasnt, it would have been EU thre­ats of sanc­tions, play­ing a major role, surely…)

AM I GOING INSANE, OR IS IT THE WORLD AROUND ME? (Sh*t they are lying to us!™)

14th paragraph from the top

06. Februar 2022

DW news story:

Ger­ma­ny must cut reli­an­ce on Rus­si­an gas, minis­ter says

Germany’s Eco­no­my Minis­ter Robert Habeck war­ned against Europe’s No.1 eco­no­my beco­m­ing a “pawn” in Russia’s game. Natu­ral gas stock­pi­les across the EU are at their lowest in years as ten­si­ons over Ukrai­ne intensify.

What did Habeck say?
“We must impro­ve our pre­pa­red­ness for next win­ter,” the Green Par­ty poli­ti­ci­an told the news­pa­pers of the Fun­ke Media Group and the French regio­nal dai­ly Ouest-France.

Habeck said the Ukrai­ne cri­sis is for­cing Ger­ma­ny to “crea­te other import oppor­tu­nities and to diver­si­fy its sup­ply, inclu­ding infra­st­ruc­tu­ral issues.”

We have to act here and bet­ter secu­re our­sel­ves. If we don’t, we beco­me a pawn in the game [of Russia].”

[…]

Ger­ma­ny remains reli­ant on Rus­si­an gas for over a third of its needs as it pha­ses out coal and nuclear energies.

14th para­graph from the top:

He went on to cri­ti­ci­ze the gas mar­ket for being com­ple­te­ly dere­gu­la­ted and hin­ted that the government may have to play a grea­ter role.

src: click

Why is this important?
Becau­se this is how RT (via fefe, don’t read them other­wi­se :)) is repor­ting the same story:

Gaz­prom hat den Gas­hahn wie­der aufgedreht.

while some EU offi­cials are accu­sing Gaz­prom of deli­ber­ate­ly with­hol­ding sup­plies. Howe­ver, Gaz­prom says addi­tio­nal sup­plies were not boo­ked befo­re Febru­a­ry 2. 

Na sowas. Stellt sich raus: Wenn man bei denen was kauft, dann lie­fern die das auch. Und zwar frist­ge­mäß und in vol­ler Höhe.
Kön­nen wir viel­leicht jetzt auf­hö­ren so zu tun, als sei das Schuld der Rus­sen, dass unse­re Kon­zer­ne die für unse­re Bür­ger gemein­ten Gas­re­ser­ven zwecks Pro­fit­ma­xi­mie­rung auf dem Spot­markt ver­hö­kert haben?

src: click

RT goes into more detail as well:

Gaz­prom has resu­med gas sup­plies to Euro­pe through Ukrai­ne, boo­king 109 mil­li­on cubic meters of dai­ly pipe­line capa­ci­ty, Bloom­berg repor­ted on Tues­day. Under the five-year con­tract, which expi­res in 2024, the com­pa­ny is expec­ted to deli­ver 40 bil­li­on cubic meters of gas per year to Euro­pe via Ukrai­ne. The news trig­ge­red a long-anticipated decli­ne in gas pri­ces, with March futures drop­ping below $900 per thousand cubic meters.

Janu­a­ry sales of Rus­si­an natu­ral gas out­side the for­mer Soviet Uni­on saw a mas­si­ve drop of 41.3% year-on-year, while the country’s over­all pro­duc­tion has incre­a­sed, Rus­si­an ener­gy major Gaz­prom repor­ted on Tuesday.

Euro­pean inven­to­ry levels have repor­ted­ly sunk to his­to­ric lows over the past several mon­ths, sen­ding ener­gy pri­ces in the regi­on soa­ring, while some EU offi­cials are accu­sing Gaz­prom of deli­ber­ate­ly with­hol­ding sup­plies. Howe­ver, Gaz­prom says addi­tio­nal sup­plies were not boo­ked befo­re Febru­a­ry 2.

The Company’s gas deli­ve­ries are car­ri­ed out as reques­ted by con­su­mers in full com­pli­an­ce with con­trac­tu­al obli­ga­ti­ons,” Gaz­prom said in a press release.

Gaz­prom said ear­lier this mon­th it hadn’t boo­ked any mon­th­ly tran­sit capa­ci­ty via the Yamal-Europe gas pipe­line [the one going through Ukrai­ne] for Febru­a­ry. Howe­ver, the com­pa­ny may still book the rou­te via dai­ly auctions.

The pipe­line, which usual­ly accounts for about 15% of Russia’s annu­al gas exports to Euro­pe and Tur­key, has been working in rever­se mode sin­ce late Decem­ber, put­ting addi­tio­nal pres­su­re on Euro­pean ener­gy prices.

Mean­while, working gas invent­ories in Europe’s under­ground gas sto­rage faci­li­ties were lag­ging behind last year’s level by 27.2% as of Janu­a­ry 30, Gaz­prom said on Tues­day, citing data from Gas Infra­st­ruc­tu­re Europe.

Over 81% of the fuel deli­ve­r­ed during the sum­mer is alrea­dy pum­ped out from the faci­li­ties, accord­ing to the com­pa­ny, while “the total amount of working gas invent­ories in Euro­pean UGS faci­li­ties was as low as 38.1 bil­li­on cubic meters on Janu­a­ry 30, fal­ling by 2.7 bil­li­on cubic meters below the his­to­ri­cal mini­mum for this date.”

Mea­ning, as gas pri­ces soared, euro­pean pro­vi­ders stop­ped orde­ring, becau­se they were bet­ting on lower pri­ces on spot­mar­kets, becau­se it was indi­ca­ted, that the pri­ce shock had exter­nal cau­ses, part of which would have been rela­ted to acts of natu­re bey­ond human con­trol. So the­re was an expec­tancy of pri­ces fal­ling again, over time. Rus­si­an gas wasnt going through the Ukrai­ne for that peri­od of time, becau­se rus­sia had enough capa­ci­ty over the remai­ning pipe­line net­work to deli­ver the boo­ked amounts without ship­ping them through Ukrai­ne. This now chan­ged, on the same day, or the day after (unclear) euro­pean sup­pliers incre­a­sed orders.

Three more steps to ful­ly under­stand the logic here.

Ener­gy pri­ces for gas incre­a­sed in the US as well, (ope­ning up the Yamal-Europe pipe­line actual­ly incre­a­sed them fur­ther), as - again acts of natu­re bey­ond con­trol are cited to be a cau­se the­re as well. In fact, U.S. Natu­ral Gas Pri­ces Jum­ped by 10% on Wed­nes­day alo­ne, cited cau­se: “Fri­gid weather”.

That was fol­lowing the sin­gle most rapid climb in gas pri­ces ever, in a sin­gle day in the US, a week earlier.

Ope­ning up the Yamal-Europe pipe­line has also incre­a­sed the gas pri­ce - after a mini slump, becau­se again rus­sia saw 41.3% less demand year on year, des­pi­te hit­ting an all time high in gas pro­duc­tion. (What drop­ped accord­ing to RT were the futures, so spe­cu­la­ti­on on long term pri­ce increases.)

At the same time this happens: 

The Glo­bal Gas Cri­sis Has Made Ame­ri­can LNG Hot Again

The glo­bal gas crunch and sky­ro­cke­ting pri­ces in Euro­pe and Asia are lay­ing the foun­da­ti­ons for a revi­val in final invest­ment decisi­ons in new lique­fied natu­ral gas (LNG)

src: click

That was step one.

Step two is now loo­king at Habecks quo­te in context.

Germany’s Eco­no­my Minis­ter Robert Habeck war­ned against Europe’s No.1 eco­no­my beco­m­ing a “pawn” in Russia’s game. Natu­ral gas stock­pi­les across the EU are at their lowest in years as ten­si­ons over Ukrai­ne intensify.

Who stop­ped orde­ring gas?

We must impro­ve our pre­pa­red­ness for next win­ter,” the Green Par­ty poli­ti­ci­an told the news­pa­pers of the Fun­ke Media Group and the French regio­nal dai­ly Ouest-France.

Habeck said the Ukrai­ne cri­sis is for­cing Ger­ma­ny to “crea­te other import oppor­tu­nities and to diver­si­fy its sup­ply, inclu­ding infra­st­ruc­tu­ral issues.”

Diver­si­fy­ing”, is only pos­si­ble if Ame­ri­can LNG mar­kets are set­ting invest­ment decisi­ons right now, and they are set­ting them based on: 

The Glo­bal Gas Cri­sis Has Made Ame­ri­can LNG Hot Again

The glo­bal gas crunch and sky­ro­cke­ting pri­ces in Euro­pe and Asia are lay­ing the foun­da­ti­ons for a revi­val in final invest­ment decisi­ons in new lique­fied natu­ral gas (LNG)

src: click

As well as the 14th para­graph from the top for DW.com:

He [Habeck] went on to cri­ti­ci­ze the gas mar­ket for being com­ple­te­ly dere­gu­la­ted and hin­ted that the government may have to play a grea­ter role.

src: click

Third step is to under­stand the “new role governments should play in co-regulating ener­gy markets”.

The Ger­man Mar­shall Fund of the United Sta­tes released a press state­ment two days ago.

EU-US Ener­gy Coope­ra­ti­on to Address Cli­ma­te Change

In 2022, the big­gest exis­ten­ti­al thre­at to the health, pro­spe­ri­ty, and exis­tence of humans on Earth is cli­ma­te chan­ge. Mas­si­ve efforts are nee­ded to urgent­ly miti­ga­te green­house gas emis­si­ons and, in par­al­lel, sup­port adap­t­ati­on mea­su­res for tho­se alrea­dy affec­ted by its nega­ti­ve impact. On the occa­si­on of the EU-US Ener­gy Coun­cil mee­ting in Febru­a­ry 2022, it is use­ful to recall the dra­ma­tic impact of the Euro­pean Reco­very Program—the Mar­shall Plan—on the recon­struc­tion of Euro­pe; that the finan­cial, tech­ni­cal, and poli­ti­cal sup­port of the United Sta­tes to both for­mer friends and foes in Euro­pe were essen­ti­al in re-establishing demo­cra­cy and growth in a Euro­pe devas­ta­ted by inter­nal stri­fe and war. Seventy-five years sin­ce Secreta­ry of Sta­te Geor­ge Mar­shall announ­ced the plan, and 50 years sin­ce the Ger­man Mar­shall Fund was estab­lis­hed to build grea­ter trans­at­lan­tic and inter­na­tio­nal coope­ra­ti­on, it is a time­ly moment to reflect on how the Euro­pean and Ame­ri­can powers can work tog­e­ther glo­bal­ly to address cli­ma­te chan­ge immedia­te­ly, ade­qua­te­ly, and inno­va­tively to ensu­re glo­bal pro­spe­ri­ty and demo­cra­cy. The coope­ra­ti­on of the trans­at­lan­tic powers to trans­fer regu­la­to­ry best prac­ti­ces and new tech­no­lo­gies in the clean ener­gy tran­si­ti­on can help all glo­bal part­ners attain net-zero emis­si­ons by 2050. In addi­ti­on, tech­ni­cal and finan­cial assi­s­tance to tho­se suf­fe­ring most from the con­se­quen­ces of cli­ma­te chan­ge must be pro­vi­ded to help them to urgent­ly take mea­su­res to adapt and pro­tect themselves.

[…]

Hydro­gen
Fol­lowing on from bet­ter manage­ment of electri­ci­ty grids and grea­ter sup­ply of rene­wa­ble ener­gy, “excess” rene­wa­ble electri­ci­ty can be used to gene­ra­te clean hydro­gen. The United Sta­tes and the EU have alrea­dy begun coope­ra­ting bi- and mul­ti­la­te­ral­ly on dri­ving for­ward a hydro­gen mar­ket and need fur­ther impe­tus from regu­la­to­ry, infra­st­ruc­tu­re, and invest­ment per­spec­ti­ves to ensu­re that this com­po­nent of the ener­gy mix is in place and ope­ra­tio­nal at sca­le. Hydro­gen sto­rage can be used to off­set varia­bi­li­ty in rene­wa­ble electricity. 

With respect to hydro­gen gene­ra­ted from natu­ral gas, bet­ter and more effi­ci­ent car­bon cap­tu­re and sto­rage tech­no­lo­gies at a lower cost should be encou­ra­ged to ensu­re that “blue” hydro­gen can be ram­ped up as a tran­si­ti­on fuel in par­al­lel to the deve­lo­p­ment of “green” hydro­gen. The cost-benefit ana­ly­sis will depend to a lar­ge degree on the mar­ket pri­ces of natu­ral gas; its avai­la­bi­li­ty; car­bon cap­tu­re, use, and sequestra­ti­on (CCUS) cos­ts; and alter­na­ti­ve sources for hydro­gen pro­duc­tion. None­theless, for many coun­tries, hydro­gen will be an important part of the future ener­gy mix and efforts to encou­ra­ge and help with regu­la­to­ry and tech­no­lo­gy impro­ve­ments can dri­ve for­ward this development.

Natu­ral Gas
Natu­ral gas will con­ti­nue to play a key role as a tran­si­ti­on fuel in the clean ener­gy future. Repla­cing coal with natu­ral gas can hal­ve green­house gas emis­si­ons, but access to sup­ply, and at a rea­son­ab­le pri­ce, will be an important fac­tor. Given the cur­rent high cost of natu­ral gas in many parts of the world, grea­ter sup­ply at lower cost will be nee­ded to encou­ra­ge that displacement.

Gas as a sto­rage and back-up fuel for electri­ci­ty sup­ply will also con­ti­nue to be important during the tran­si­ti­on peri­od, and joint efforts to redu­ce metha­ne emis­si­ons (as announ­ced at COP26) will be cru­cial in crea­ting grea­ter public accep­t­ance of natu­ral gas use while ram­ping up the genera­ti­on of rene­wa­ble sources.

Sourcing natu­ral gas and the role of inter­na­tio­nal mar­kets are essen­ti­al to the smooth func­tio­n­ing and app­li­ca­ti­on of natu­ral gas as a tran­si­ti­on fuel; the United Sta­tes and the EU should both con­ti­nue to rein­for­ce regu­la­to­ry pro­vi­si­ons to encou­ra­ge the effi­ci­ent func­tio­n­ing of tho­se markets.

src: click

Now - how is what Habeck is doing not sim­ply lying to peop­le? How is what DW is doing not sim­ply copy­ing lies, without set­ting them in context?

The truth”, should it exist, is some­whe­re is bur­ried in the 14th para­graph in the arti­cle, while the fact, that soa­ring gas pri­ces are enab­ling LNG pro­duc­tion to begin with, is not even men­tio­ned. Ger­man Mar­shal Fund of the United Sta­tes is sta­ting that for the green tran­si­ti­on mode­ra­te gas pri­ces are para­mount, and Habeck is “incre­a­sing ener­gy secu­ri­ty” for ger­ma­ny by making “diver­si­fi­ca­ti­on of sources” mandatory?

This only makes sen­se, if you accu­se Gaz­prom of inten­tio­nal­ly incre­a­sing gas pri­ces, for poli­ti­cal rea­sons (which no one does open­ly, btw - other­wi­se, fact che­cking would come in), to the point whe­re they’­ve lost 41.3% of exports year on year - and from then on it stops making sen­se, becau­se if you diver­si­fy by buil­ding out LNG ter­mi­nals or try to pro­cu­re lar­ge quan­ti­ties from other sources, you do that with a pri­ce expec­ta­ti­on of todays pri­ce levels of gas. Not lower ones. US is par­ti­ci­pa­ting in this trend to the ful­lest extent (Inte­res­tin­g­ly enough OPEC did­n’t flood the mar­ket with cheap natu­ral gas this time around, to com­pen­sa­te for “mar­ket pri­ces”, with expert opi­ni­on most­ly sta­ting, that this had occu­red in lar­ge parts becau­se “green tran­si­ti­on” as the fore­mo­st goal in their most important con­su­mer mar­kets made them bind tog­e­ther with rus­si­an ener­gy pro­du­cers). Mar­kets so far dont care about poli­ti­cal inter­ven­ti­on in the least, that goes for the US as well (or at least?). At the same time Habeck pro­mo­tes “hig­her ener­gy pri­ces” as a way to acce­le­ra­te the tran­si­ti­on towards green ener­gy” publicly, while the peop­le respon­si­ble for his actu­al poli­ci­es (how could that be mis­sed by now…) out­right sta­te, that lower natu­ral gas pri­ces would be nee­ded in the mid term, to enab­le the ener­gy tran­si­ti­on. And if you think “diver­si­fy­ing natu­ral gas pro­cu­re­ment” means some­thing other than hig­her gas pri­ces - think again.

UK Gas Pro­duc­tion Could Plun­ge 75% By 2030

The UK could beco­me much more vul­nerable to pri­ce shocks and geo­po­li­ti­cal events unless new off­shore fiel­ds are appro­ved and developed—and the UK’s gas pro­duc­tion could plum­met by 75 percent

src: click

Diver­si­fy­ing natu­ral gas pro­cu­re­ment, means hig­her natu­ral gas pri­ces. Is only pos­si­ble with hig­her natu­ral gas pri­ces in place. Is not in the inte­rest of rus­sia (If not for incre­a­sing the pri­ce of natu­ral gas over­all.). And accord­ing to Habeck was cau­sed by mar­ket mecha­nisms. (Para­graph 14 in the DW arti­cle.) Becau­se what was in the inte­rest of rus­sia, was ful­fil­ling their stan­ding obli­ga­ti­ons, and doing so wit­hin one or two days after the order amounts incre­a­sed again. (At a hig­her pri­ce, but look at US gas­mar­kets at the same time at least - when making the state­ment that diver­si­fy­ing pro­cu­re­ment would be the way out of this.)

This time I pro­vi­ded the through­li­ne. I hope ever­yo­ne is hap­py with it as is. I just cant stand the lies anymore.

What a difference a day makes…

04. Februar 2022


US says Rus­si­an attack no lon­ger ‘immi­nent’

Now who saw that one com­ing? Anyone?

edit: Bonus - if you want the con­tra­dic­ting infor­ma­ti­on released by a US Sta­tes Depart­ment spo­kes­per­son, a few hours earlier:

Must-watch exchan­ge bet­ween @APDi­plo­Wri­ter Matt Lee and @StateDeptSpox:

Repor­ter: “It’s an action that you say they have taken, but you have shown no evi­dence to con­firm that. […] This is like - cri­sis actors? Real­ly? This is like Alex Jones ter­ri­to­ry you’re get­ting into now.”

src: click
Rus­si­as reac­tion: click