Wait what?!
24. September 202418.10 Uhr: Pistorius - Bundeswehr schnellstmöglich kriegstüchtig machen
Verteidigungsminister Boris Pistorius (SPD) hat die Notwendigkeit der schnellstmöglichen Ausstattung der Bundeswehr bekräftigt. Bis 2029 müsse man damit rechnen, dass Russland seine militärische Rekonstitution abgeschlossen haben werde und in der Lage sein könnte, einen militärischen Schlag gegen Nato-Gebiet zu führen, sagte Pistorius angesichts des russischen Angriffskriegs gegen die Ukraine.
src: click
Kann man das bitte mal genauer begründen, oder ist schon Vorwahlkampfphase?
Hintergrund: Weder Chatham House, noch Kofman, noch CSIS, noch Gressel, noch… Also niemand hat das bisher auch nur angedeutet.
Selenskyj behauptet Sieg Ende 2025 - gut, hörn wir nicht drauf, der Rest mehr so 3-10 Jahre war of attrition, aber der SPD Kanzlerkandidat in spe…
edit: Ah, schau an - der Pistorius liest Atlantic Council Copy, und BR24 weist das als Eigentleistung aus…
[edit: Korrektur, er liest doch nicht Atlantic Council, der sagt das schon länger (seit Juni)…]
NATO-Russia dynamics: Prospects for reconstitution of Russian military power
Executive summary
The Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, brought war to the North Atlantic Alliance’s doorstep—altering the political-military dynamics between NATO and its neighbor to the east. Since the Russian invasion, NATO has been undergoing a dramatic change that has impacted its plans, command structure, force model, and capabilities requirements. The effectiveness of this change must be gauged against the adversary’s ability to field its forces and resource them in a way that negatively impacts the Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s ability to execute the new regional plans. The delta between how quickly Russia can rebuild its military and how quickly NATO can rearm, especially the European allies, will define the risk level for the Alliance should deterrence fail. A credible assessment of the speed with which Russia can reconstitute and expand its military—especially its land forces component, which has been significantly attritted during the current campaign in Ukraine—is crucial to accurately assessing NATO’s overall force posture and ability to respond should Russia choose to attack a member of the Alliance. Here, the expertise and assessments of the United States’ allies most exposed to the Russian threat along the eastern flank offer valuable insights from the frontline, augmented by their regional expertise and understanding of Russian culture, politics, and military infused with centuries of experience of living next door to Russia.
In support of United States European Command’s Russia Strategic Initiative, the Atlantic Council organized two workshops—in Warsaw, Poland, and in Helsinki, Finland—to gain a better understanding of alternative futures for Russian military reconstitution and its implications for security on the European continent. The workshops were designed to assess (1) how Russia will reconstitute its land forces in response to ongoing developments in Ukraine and NATO force adaptation, (2) the vulnerabilities hindering Russia’s vision for the reconstitution of its military, and (3) the threat of future Russian capabilities to the transatlantic security architecture.
Key takeaways from this line of effort include:
Russia has demonstrated that it can fight and mobilize at the same time.
The pace of Russian military reconstitution has been faster than Western analysts expected, including both refurbished and new equipment and manpower mobilization. Still, the readiness of the Russian armed forces is not likely to be the principal driver of decision-making in Moscow; rather, any decision to attack a NATO member will factor in the “correlation of forces,” with the goal of exploiting the Alliance in a moment of weakness.
Based on production data, the biggest risk of Russia attacking a NATO member will be in 2025–26 when peak production, refurbishment, and training/readiness lines intersect. One analyst projected Russia will produce well over one thousand tanks annually by then.
Moscow will not, however, make decisions based on objective indices of readiness alone. It will decide to move against a NATO state when it deems that the window of opportunity has opened—hence, understanding the political culture that undergirds Russia’s decision-making is as important as having an accurate assessment of its military capabilities.
The West is in a race against time, with the delta between Russian force reconstitution and NATO’s investment in real, exercised military capabilities constituting the level of risk in the European theater in the event of a full-scale war. Closing the gap will require NATO to prioritize rearmament across the board, including its defense industrial base in Europe and the United States.
src: click (Atlantic Council)
edit: Oh Wunder, oh Wunder, Chathamhouse sah das noch im Juli ganz anders… Pick your favourite Anlaysts! I KNOW, I KNOW, I’M BORIS PISTORIUS, I’M PICKING ANALYSTS FROM Warsaw, Poland, and Helsinki, Finland, THOSE WILL TELL ME THE UNFILTERED AND BALANCED TRUTH! (Well in EU terms, you got to listen to the most freaked out members, I guess…)
08 Conclusion
Mathieu Boulègue
Consulting Fellow, Russia and Eurasia ProgrammeJust as the war in Ukraine has highlighted both weaknesses and resilience in the Russian military, the lessons for the West are equally mixed. Signs of Russian vulnerability offer no grounds for Western complacency – but point to the importance of reducing Russia’s war-making capacity by attrition. Above all, continued Western support for Ukraine will remain crucial.
More than two years into the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia remains able simultaneously to continue to prosecute the war and to effect wartime adaptations to its command structure. With varying degrees of success, the Kremlin has been able to rapidly mobilize reservists, employ private military companies, sustain military-industrial production for basic systems, and heavily militarize the public information space in support of the war.
In terms of command structure, the separation of the Western Military District into Moscow and Leningrad districts in March 2024 is also telling.163 Moscow is now reverting to its ‘comfort zone’, namely Soviet-era command structures in the European theatre. The new Moscow Military District will concern itself exclusively with Ukraine, Belarus and Kaliningrad, which will inevitably be of direct concern to the US and NATO in the Baltic theatre as well as on the eastern flank of the Alliance.
The pace of implementation and the efficiency of continued reforms in the command structure, however, remain to be seen. They will partly depend on the effectiveness or otherwise of the new minister of defence, Andrei Belousov, appointed in May 2024. Similarly, it is unknown if the Russian Armed Forces can be a ‘learning organization’ able to implement genuine changes, whether structural or cultural.164
On top of wartime adaptations in the command structure, the military industry has displayed resilience in its ability to deliver military equipment and hardware in the war against Ukraine. The ongoing reconstitution of military equipment and hardware will inevitably inform the next cycle of the State Armament Programme (GPV) after 2027, as well as future plans regarding modern military technology and military innovation.
The Russian Armed Forces remain a credible threat to NATO and its allies. In Ukraine, the Russian military has shown it can absorb losses and maintain tactical-operational credibility despite strategic failures. Russian forces can count on improved reconnaissance fire and strike complexes equipped with a vast arsenal of long-range precision munitions, as well as larger quantities of improved uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs). Russian long-range strike and stand-off munitions, coupled with multi-layered air defence systems, represent the biggest conventional threat to NATO.
The Aerospace Forces (VKS) and the Russian Federation Navy (RFN) remain critical parts of the nuclear and conventional strategic deterrence force, potentially holding NATO assets at risk of destruction. Finally, asymmetric capabilities – especially the use of cyber and information warfare; electronic warfare for counter-UAV and counter-precision-guided-munitions operations; and space-based assets – are still able to offset NATO and US conventional superiority.
Russia’s prospects for regenerating its military machine remain mixed, both in terms of speed and effectiveness. Yet as the war against Ukraine continues, and regardless of the depth of the reconstitution of Russia’s military power, the current Kremlin leadership will remain a threat to European and transatlantic security as well as a strategic competitor to NATO and its allies.
Analysis of Moscow’s nuclear declaratory policy suggests that if Russia were to suffer sufficiently severe degradation of its conventional military power, such that the leadership deemed the existence of the Russian state to be under threat, this would create conditions under which Russia might consider the use of nuclear weapons.165 However, this possibility remains remote, especially while Russia’s air arms, and its naval forces beyond the Black Sea, remain relatively intact.
Furthermore, Russia will continue to exploit its toolkit of asymmetric capabilities and ambiguous sub-threshold tactics. These tools must no longer be analysed as part of a ‘grey zone’ or ‘hybrid’ range of measures aimed at blurring the line between war and peace. They are fundamentally part of Russia’s continued low-intensity warfare against Western interests.
Continued assessments of Russia’s military reform and of its ongoing reconstitution of equipment are vital to understanding in which sectors Moscow still represents a threat to Western interests. Such assessments will be essential for the US and NATO in terms of retaining both a technological and overall deterrence advantage against the Kremlin.
The single most significant factor that can impair Russia’s ability to reconstitute its overall military power and leverage asymmetric capabilities in coming years will be ongoing Western support for Ukraine.
Finally, the single most significant factor that can impair Russia’s ability to reconstitute its overall military power and leverage asymmetric capabilities in coming years will be ongoing Western support for Ukraine. Western countries must continue to work together to provide Ukraine with arms, ammunition, financial support and refugee assistance, and to show moral solidarity with the Ukrainian war effort.
Denying Russia victory and forcing it to continue in a long attritional struggle will further degrade all elements of its war-making capacity, including its ability to invest in and produce cutting-edge technological enablers. Critically, these efforts will also further undermine the Kremlin’s informational strategy both at home and abroad, diminishing its ability to destabilize Western democratic systems and, ultimately, weakening its long-term hold on power.
src: click (Chathamhouse)
Halbzeit Fazit
23. September 2024This House Would Fight for Democracy, Liberty & the Rule of Law Abroad (OxfordUnion)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mEwmtZtOgGo
I counted:
3x Hitler
2x Genocide
1x shame
and
1x neverending war for our children, if we let Russia win
on the side of the “would fight for democracy” fraction.
The unsettling part being, that the majority of people in europe think like me, when it comes to fighting for their country - never mind democracy.
But as we all know, the emotional argument wins -- damit kann der Krieg dann ja endlich weitergehen.
Bonus: The US intervention in Kuwait, according to the proponents for the motion was also to safeguard international rule of law.
Its interesting to see how far back some concepts go.
Rechnen lernen mit dem ukrainischen Kriegsbedarf
23. September 2024oder Neuigkeiten auf dem Gebiet der konventionellen und weniger konventionellen Kriegsführung
Reisner schätzt aktuell den Defensivbedarf der Ukraine bei Kampfpanzern und Kampfschützenpanzern auf 300 -- und den Bedarf für eine Offensive die das aktuelle Kriegsziel der Ukraine erfüllen könnte auf “weitere 3000”.
Das Verhältnis Kampfpanzer zu Kampfschützenpanzer ist dabei 1:2 (selbes Videointerview).
Laut statistica.com hat Europa im Jahr 2024 gesamt 4540 Kampfpanzer, von denen die Ukraine in der Defensive demnächst 100 braucht um weiterzukämpfen, und 1000 um nochmal in die Offensive gehen zu können -- um auf dem konventionellen Weg ihre Ziele (Rückeroberung aller ukrainischen Gebiete mit dem Stand vor 2014) zu erreichen.
Das wäre also nochmal ein Viertel aller in Europa verfügbaren Panzer.
Laut wikipedia liegt die Aufstockungsquote in Deutschland bei 39 in vier Jahren, dh 10 Panzern pro Jahr - bei 300 Bestand. Dh. die Ukraine bräuchte von Deutschland so viel, wie Deutschland in 8 Jahren durch Produktion lukrieren kann.
Laut Oryx hat die Ukraine bisher etwa 1000 Panzer und Schützenpanzer verloren. Aktuell hat die Ukraine ebenfalls laut Oryx etwa 2000 Panzer und Kampfschützenpanzer im Einsatz.
Zusammengefasst, für das Potential eines konventionellen Sieges (alles Gebiet zum Stand von vor 2014 zurück) bräuchte die Ukraine 2.5 mal MEHR Panzer als sie derzeit hat -- und das wären ein gutes Viertel aller in Europa derzeit noch verfügbaren Panzer. (Ohne Angabe zur tatsächlichen Einsatzbereitschaft der staatlich angegebenen Zahlen, wir kennen das Problem aus Deutschland. Zumal 1365 von den 4540 in Griechenland stationiert sind.)
(Alles unter dem Vorbehalt, dass die US keine Abrahams mit Turbinenantrieb schicken. (Aktuell warens 31.))
Jetzt zur weniger Konventionellen Kriegsführung:
Laut Zeihan hat die Ukraine möglicherweise die russische Rail Logistik einsehen können und beide Seiten wissens.
Bedeutet - die Ukraine hat ein besseres Verständnis von Russischen Munitionsdepots (Zahl - Ort, Menge) -- und könnte jetzt die Russische Logistik durch Angriffe auf die russische Energieinfrastruktur empfindlich entschleunigen (russische Züge sind zum Großteil elektrifiziert und fahren mit Strom).
edit: Kiev Post Editor in Chief indicates, that Ukraines “winning” is in large part a regime change play, so getting the current regime to topple in russia:
What is NATO Propaganda
22. September 2024SPÖ-Wehrsprecher sieht Druck auf Neutralität durch “transatlantische Elite-Zirkel”
src: click Der Standard dazu: click
Wie kann er nur!
Siehe:
Siehe dazu auch:
First off - it is amazing to see Fiona Hill show that much restraint. For once. The selective framings are few and far in between if you just look at the statements of Hill and Constanze Stelzenmüller. They are still there, but this time they are very muted.
Of course Hill is still needed to tell the story that this is one persons war - and Putin was so isolated, and mostly worried about his legacy, and that this was a plan that he had for years and planned out meticulously, which of course is disputed by both the initial Naftali Bennett Interview (the isolation part) - as well as Stephen Kotkin, and David Arakhamiia (the head of Selenskyjs party) by now -- but Fiona this time around has downgraded her “isolation” argument to “isolated with the same people” (so didnt talk to the west, during the Corona lockdowns?), which was when Putins decision - according to Fiona - was made to attack Ukraine, because Putin thought mostly about his lifes legacy in those days. Which Fiona of course knows, because she knows how Putin thinks. Because of those four stone statues she saw in his office in 2015 - when she last participated in a Valdai Discussion Club meeting. Thats a very tame version of her story (that still contains double Vladimir btw - which is amazing), but none of her other logic jumps - she previously made, when presenting her “what Putin thinks” story in the past.
Of course Fiona Hill is now also contradicted by Stephen Kotkin (the person who invented the initial western war narrative at the Hoover Institution, which then every european news outlet copied, see Kotkin at the Hoover Institution on the 4th of March 2022):
Because Kotkin by now states, that the most popular public narrative in the west has now changed from “crazy Putin” to a “this was the goal of the broader russian leadership” one, because the russian people seem ok with it, and because the “crazy Putin narrative” kind of fizzled out over time, making Fionas input, narrative wise, less and less important.
Stephen Kotkin: “So it’s really Putin personal, capricious, whimsical, his personality, his KGB past, all the things that you write about. That explanation was popular until recently when people started to see that it wasn’t only Putin in the war in Ukraine, that Russian elites seemed to fall in line. Not everyone, but many of them.
The Russian people didn’t seem on on mass to oppose the war. Yes, many did and suffered for it, and many are in exile or in prison as a result. But it’s hard to say that this is one person alone. It’s also hard to say that any of the alternatives would’ve been different once they’re in power.
Cause Putin wasn’t today’s Putin when he first came to power. It’s also hard to understand how if they had been different, they would’ve survived. Just because you come to power doesn’t mean you survive in power. You can come to power by accident. But surviving in power for decade after decade is not an accident.
And so this, the second explanation, it’s Putin or predominantly Putin, I don’t think holds water.”
Of course Fiona Hill is also famous for her appearance at the CFR here:
Where she encourages the audience the people in the CFR and journalists to come up with better storytelling, to tell to people in a simple way what has happened, trying to regain them in mass, after having lost them -- referencing the two thirds of the world that might believe in chinas view on the events f.e.
Here the moneyquote:
Fiona Hill: “You know, you’ve lost—forgotten—and this is exactly what he said. You’ve kind of lost humanity. What’s happened to the Americans who go out there and tell a story, you know, that makes it very clear about why people are doing things? And, you know, that’s something that members of the Council on Foreign Relations do. It’s why we’re having this event.
It’s also what people do in journalism, like Serge and, you know, all of his opinion and commentary pieces. But it’s kind of, you know, something that we’re all going to have to do on a regular basis. And, you know, I think some of you might have read just recently in the New York Times the movie of Bulgakov, Master and Margarita, that’s being shown, you know, right now in in Russia and having an impact. We’ve got to start being creative about things like this, about telling stories.
The story of Alexei Navalny dying—you know, somebody of that kind of unspeakable bravery to, you know, do the things that he did, and to sacrifice himself in the way that he did—telling that story and moving it forward.
Because you can’t just leave Vladimir Putin to tell the story. And I think that this documentary is a challenge to all of us about how do we get out there and work on the narrative.”
Thank you Fiona!
Next we look at Constanze Stelzenmüller, who of course, as always, finds it so hard to deal with that fact, that in germany there still isnt this notion, that there is a real war going on right now between the west and china, and that we really ought to take a hint and side with the americans on this -- “because of democracies vs. authocracies”, right?
Right. So - here is why thats so hard for the germans to understand. Because the german economic infrastructure is interwoven with China in a different way, than the one in the US is. So while the US benefits from 100% tarrifs on chinese goods, the german economy actually suffers even from the lower impact tarrifs the EU has by now put on chinese electric vehicles (see, Politico: Germany launches 11th-hour bid to avert trade war with China) but Constanze just cant fathom why thats still the dominant view in germany.
Trying to debunk the two male counterparts on this panel is an excercise in futility, because they flog emotional “US, the shining city on a hill” narratives where about every second sentence is wrong - in a fundamental way -- so I will not even try that to -- for once, keep this posting from exploding into 10 pages of dealing with idiotic gobbledigug.
And there is a final slight, soft framing thats established in the Brookings Institution panel discussion here, that still touches on -- well russia had no real reasons to start this war.
While on the fundamental level thats correct, this seeks to simply outfence all the international policy maneuvers the US and the Ukraine put in place beforehand to essentially free Crimea, which might have been an essential impetus for Russia to start this war -- as Herfried Münkler states here:
And which Angela Merkel also openly alluded to when talking about the nature of Minsk 2.
So take your NATO narrative, and essentially stuff it -- even though this is the tamest and closest version to what will be in our history books ten years from now.
(Putin manipulated russian history as a high priority goal since 2015 - I’m still an equal opportunity take your shit and stuff it kind of guy. (Hopefully.))
